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ABSTRACT 
Although nationalism is often posited as a cause of interstate conflict, few scholars have 
addressed why such a connection might exist.  Using the constructivist approach in IR theory to 
rethink the usual perspectives on nationalism, the author argues that nationalism is as much a 
product of international politics as it is a product of domestic political forces.  In essence, 
nationalism is constituted by the social structure of the international system.  As such, the 
conflict propensity of nationalism is largely dependent on the nature of the social relationships 
that develop between states and the distribution of ideas that provide these relationships with 
meaning.  Specifically, this dissertation argues that nationalism can be seen as both a macro- and 
micro-structural phenomenon, each having different implications for understanding nationalist 
conflict.  At a macro-structural level, nationalism is an expression of a particular type of state (a 
nation-state) with explicitly ‘national’ interests which sets the parameters on behavior by 
informing the state what it wants, and what is worth fighting for.  At a micro-structural level, 
nationalism is the result of a conflict between the role that the state seeks to enact and the 
counter-role that an Other seeks to impose on it, and thus is a reaction to perceived threats to its 
identity that can lead to a downward spiral in relations and (potentially) to interstate conflict. 
This theoretical framework is then used to examine Chinese foreign policy, particularly 
the Taiwan issue and Sino-US relations, in order to address the common claim that the growth of 
 iv
nationalism makes China more prone to interstate conflict.  This analysis yields three 
conclusions.  First, Chinese nationalism was a product of China’s interaction with the West and 
represents a transformation in identity from cultural-state to a nation-state.  Second, this 
transformation forced China to redefine its relationship to territory and to interpret its territorial 
losses as a legacy of national humiliation, setting parameters on its behavior.  Third, China’s 
‘new nationalism’ is a reaction to a perceived identity threat from the United States that has led 
to a marked deterioration in Sino-US relations since Tiananmen Square. 
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION:  THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALIST CONFLICT 
 
 Nationalism, which has been called “the most powerful political force of the twentieth century,”1 
has long been a popular subject of scholarly inquiry.  However, the end of the Cold War brought a 
renewed interest in the subject due to the breakup of multinational states like the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia, and the outbreak of ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, central Africa, Indonesia, and elsewhere.2  
While scholars have examined the potential for such conflicts to become internationalized,3 much of the 
new attention on nationalism has been focused on the problem of ethnic conflict within states.4  The 
question of how nationalism affects the foreign policy behavior of states, and particularly how this could 
produce interstate conflict, has received relatively little attention.  This is despite the fact that nationalism 
has often been posited as a source of such conflict.  The historian, Carlton Hayes, compiled a long list of 
wars that he asserted were rooted in nationalism.5  James Kellas has remarked that “the critical 
importance of nationalism in international relations is recognised in the received wisdom that 
                                                 
1 William Pfaff, The Wrath of Nations:  Civilization and the Furies of Nationalism  (New York:  Simon & Schuster, 
1993), 13. 
2 Jack Snyder, “Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State,” Survival  35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 5; Barry R. 
Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” International Security  18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 80; Donald 
L. Horowitz, “Ethnic and Nationalist Conflict,” in World Security:  Challenges for a New Century, 2d ed., ed. 
Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas  (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 175; James Mayall, “Nationalism in 
the Study of International Relations,” in Contemporary International Relations:  A Guide to Theory, ed. A. J. R. 
Groom and Margot Light  (London:  Pinter Publishers, 1994), 188-89; and Lui Hebron and John F. Stack, Jr., “The 
Internationalization of Ethnicity:  The Crisis of Legitimacy and Authority in World Politics,” in The Ethnic 
Entanglement:  Conflict and Intervention in World Politics, ed. John F. Stack, Jr. and Lui Hebron  (Westport:  
Praeger Publishers, 1999). 
3 For instance, see The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict:  Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, ed. David A. Lake 
and Donald Rothchild  (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1998). 
4 For instance, see Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics  (Boulder:  Westview 
Press, 1994); Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown et al.  (Cambridge:  The MIT Press, 1997); 
Wars in the Midst of Peace:  The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict, ed. David Carment and Patrick James  
(Pittsburgh:  University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997); Rajat Ganguly and Raymond C. Taras, Understanding Ethnic 
Conflict:  The International Dimension  (New York:  Longman, 1998); and Peace in the Midst of Wars:  Preventing 
and Managing International Ethnic Conflicts, ed. David Carment and Patrick James  (Columbia:  University of 
South Carolina Press, 1998). 
5 Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism  (New York:  The Macmillan Company, 1926), 135-37. 
1 
 ‘nationalism’ caused both World Wars in the twentieth century.”6  Similarly, John Mearsheimer has 
asserted that “hyper-nationalism helped cause the two world wars, and the decline of nationalism in 
Europe since 1945 has contributed to the peacefulness of the postwar world.”7
 Unfortunately, such assertions about the relationship between nationalism and interstate conflict 
remain largely unexamined, as “few scholars have tried directly to connect the two phenomena.”8  As 
Stephen Van Evera points out, “most authors take the war-causing character of nationalism for granted, 
assuming it without proof or explanation,”9 leaving the presumed linkage between them woefully under-
theorized.  This is symptomatic of a broader problem in the study of international relations – namely, Ilya 
Prizel’s observation that the “literature on the role of national identity in the formation of foreign policy 
remains in an embryonic state.”10  According to James Mayall, “the virtual absence of an authoritative 
account of [nationalism’s] international impact”11 results in two related problems: 
On the one hand, without such an account, nationalism itself will continue to resist 
ultimate explanation, since it will not be clear how far it springs from, or is constrained 
by, a particular kind of international environment.  On the other hand, in the analysis of 
international politics, nationalism is likely to be regarded as a convenient black box into 
which whatever cannot be explained in any other way…can be filed away without further 
consideration.12
 
This study will argue that these problems are not only related, but in fact represent two sides of the same 
coin.  Nationalism is, in part, a product of the international system – namely, it is part of the social 
structure of shared knowledge that shapes the system and gives it meaning.  This has important 
consequences for the way in which states define themselves and their interests, and thus for their 
behavior.  In order to understand the relationship between nationalism and interstate conflict, it is 
therefore essential to develop a greater theoretical understanding of how nationalism is constituted by the 
                                                 
6 James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity  (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 146. 
7 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future:  Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International Security  15, 
no. 1 (Summer 1990): 7.  It should be noted that despite this observation, Mearsheimer maintains that the 
distribution of military capabilities among actors was a more immediate cause (p. 12). 
8 Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” 80. 
9 Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, ed. Michael E. 
Brown, et al.  (Cambridge:  The MIT Press, 1997), 26. 
10 Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy:  Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine  
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1998), 7. 
11 James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5. 
12 Ibid., 5. 
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 international system, the implications this has for the identities and interests of states, and how these 
identities and interests are translated into foreign policy behavior. 
Defining the Problem:  Nationalism & Its Impact on State Behavior 
The idea that nationalism may be a factor in international conflict would seem to have at least 
some face validity.  Nationalism is often equated with xenophobia and an almost irrational glorification of 
the nation-state.  It would therefore not take a great leap of faith to presume that such conditions might 
lead to more aggressive foreign policy behavior on the part of a nationalistic state.  The expansionist 
policies of Nazi Germany and imperialist Japan in the 1930s and 1940s are generally regarded as 
quintessential examples of the aggressive tendencies of highly nationalistic states.  The enthusiastic public 
support expressed by European publics for the launching of WWI is another oft-cited, if less extreme, 
example of the presumed connection between nationalism and international conflict.  However, as 
Stephen Reicher and Nick Hopkins point out, “there is a danger in reducing nationalism to its most 
intense manifestations.”13  Namely, it risks ignoring the fact that nationalism may often be expressed in 
rather mundane ways that never reach the level of violent conflict, and thus slip below the radar screen.  
As Ernest Gellner has suggested, “nationalism is like gravity, an important and pervasive force, but not, at 
most times, strong enough to be violently disruptive.”14  Similarly, Michael Billig has argued that the 
association of nationalism with extremism incorrectly leaves it on the periphery of political experience.15  
Thus, two essential questions arise – how does nationalism affect the behavior of states?  Does it really 
make states more prone to engage in conflict?  It is important that we do not take the answer to such 
questions for granted, but instead develop a theoretically informed approach to addressing them. 
Yet despite the importance of such questions to both scholars of nationalism and international 
politics, they have not been adequately addressed.  The two relevant literatures – nationalism and 
                                                 
13 Stephen Reicher and Nick Hopkins, Self and Nation:  Categorization, Contestation and Mobilization  (London:  
SAGE Publications, 2001), 2. 
14 Ernest Gellner, Encounters With Nationalism  (Oxford:  Blackwell Publishers, 1994), xi. 
15 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism  (London:  SAGE Publications, 1995), 5; see also Craig Calhoun, Nationalism  
(Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 2. 
3 
 international politics – remain separated by a conceptual chasm that few have attempted (or desired) to 
bridge.  On the one hand, “sociologists and political scientists who study nationalism rarely venture into 
foreign affairs as a major issue.”16  Instead, the literature on nationalism has tended to focus on seemingly 
endless debates over its nature and origins.  The fact that these debates have largely failed to yield 
agreement or even establish widely accepted definitions for the central concepts of ‘nation’ and 
‘nationalism’ has simply added to the problem by making the terms more difficult to operationalize.17  On 
the other hand, scholars of international politics have generally shown little interest in nationalism, a fact 
that some now see as both shocking and embarrassing.18  Instead, the field has been primarily concerned 
with rationalist and systemic explanations of state behavior, neither of which owes itself well to studying 
nationalism, a phenomenon that is difficult to understand in rationalist terms and rarely conceived of in 
systemic terms.  With a few notable exceptions,19 realists in particular have largely avoided addressing 
issues of nationalism or ethnicity.20  This “‘neglect-of-nationalism’ problem”21 is particularly serious if 
one accepts F. H. Hinsley’s contention that nationalism and international conflict should not be seen as 
separate fields, but as “inseparable, if different, facets of a single phenomenon – of the division of men 
into political groups.”22  The result has been that the question of nationalism’s impact on the foreign 
policy behavior of states has essentially fallen through the conceptual cracks. 
 Bridging the gap between nationalism and international relations (IR) requires addressing the 
tendency toward theoretical reductionism that exists in much of the literature on nationalism.  This 
                                                 
16 Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, 7. 
17 Martha L. Cottam and Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism and Politics:  The Political Behavior of Nation States  
(Boulder:  Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 5. 
18 Hebron & Stack, “The Internationalization of Ethnicity,” 3; Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, “Revisiting 
the ‘National’:  Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism?,” in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. 
Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil  (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 105. 
19 See Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future”; Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power”; and Barry R. 
Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival  35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 27-47. 
20 John F. Stack, Jr., “The Ethnic Challenge to International Relations Theory,” in Wars in the Midst of Peace:  The 
International Politics of Ethnic Conflict, ed. David Carment and Patrick James  (Pittsburgh:  University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 19; Hebron & Stack, “The Internationalization of Ethnicity,” 4. 
21 Yosef Lapid, “Theorizing the ‘National’ in International Relations Theory:  Reflections on Nationalism and 
Neorealism,” in International Organization:  A Reader, ed. Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward D. Mansfield  (New 
York:  HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994), 20. 
22 F. H. Hinsley, Nationalism and the International System  (Dobbs Ferry:  Oceana Publications, Inc., 1973), 15. 
4 
 problem has been two-fold.  On the one hand, many scholars (though certainly not all) have reduced 
nationalism either to some inherent quality of human nature or to a product of domestic political 
competition.  This reductionism is particularly evident in discussions of ethnic or nationalist conflicts23 
that seek to explain such conflicts as the result of ‘ancient hatreds’ or the purposeful manipulation of 
political elites.  While such explanations may contain kernels of truth, they risk vastly oversimplifying the 
relationship between nationalism and state political behavior.  On the other hand, while scholars have 
increasingly come to see the nation as socially constructed, this has yet to be adequately applied to 
questions of political behavior.24  Perhaps more importantly, such approaches have focused almost 
exclusively on the domestic side of the process – i.e., the production and reproduction of the nation (as 
social structure) by the practice of domestic agents.  The possible role that system-level structures and 
processes might play in the social construction of nationalism has been largely ignored.25  Not only does 
this risk overlooking important factors for understanding the impact of nationalism on state behavior, but 
it also effectively removes the issue of nationalism from serious consideration by many IR scholars. 
This dissertation will seek to develop a deeper theoretical understanding of how nationalism 
influences the foreign policy behavior of states by bridging the gap between IR theory and theories of 
nationalism.  Specifically, it will employ the constructivist approach in IR theory to examine how 
nationalism is constituted by the international system, and the consequences this has for state behavior.  
Constructivism provides an excellent foundation for this study because it has sought to challenge the 
focus of traditional IR theory on rationalism and material structure that would otherwise make 
nationalism a difficult subject to study.  Instead, constructivism focuses on how the social structure of the 
international system shapes state identities and interests.  This will help to avoid the tendency toward 
reductionism, both explanatory and ontological, that exists in much of the, admittedly limited, literature 
                                                 
23 In order to differentiate between conflicts that are primarily domestic and those that are between states, I will use 
the term ‘ethnic conflict’ to refer to the former and the term ‘nationalist conflict’ to refer to the latter. 
24 For a critique of constructivist approaches to ethnic conflict, see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence 
and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” International Organization  54 (Autumn 2000): 845-77. 
25 An important exception to this is Rodney Bruce Hall, National Collective Identity:  Social Constructs and 
International Systems  (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1999). 
5 
 on nationalism and interstate conflict.  Put simply, the argument will be made that nationalism cannot be 
properly understood as simply a characteristic of states, but must be seen in part as a product of state 
interaction within the international system.  Therefore, the conflict propensity of nationalism is largely 
dependent on the nature of the social relationships that develop between states and the distribution of 
ideas and knowledge that provide these relationships with meaning. 
The central argument that will be made is that nationalism’s influence on state behavior is two-
fold.  On the one hand, it helps to define the ‘national’ interests that the state will pursue, including those 
interests that it will be willing to use force to defend.  This sets the basic parameters of the state’s 
behavior, though it may not necessarily determine how it will behave in any specific case.  On the other 
hand, nationalism is a reaction to perceived threats, not necessarily to the state’s material security (though 
this may also be important), but to its ideational security.  In other words, outward expressions of 
nationalism arise as states seek to defend their identities – their conceptions of self and the roles such 
conceptions imply – against challenges from others, making nationalism essentially reactive.  From this 
perspective, nationalism is less a direct cause of conflict than an effect of it.  While it may help to fuel 
worsening relations between two states, its causal relationship with interstate conflict is largely indirect.  
As such, the impact of nationalism on state behavior is far more complex, and far more variable, then is 
often assumed. 
Defining the Case:  Nationalism & Chinese Foreign Policy 
 In order to determine the validity of the theoretical argument being made, as well as identify 
potential issues for future research, this project will examine the impact of nationalism on Chinese foreign 
policy, particularly as it relates to the Taiwan issue and Sino-US relations.  China provides an excellent 
case study for investigating the impact of nationalism on state behavior for a number of reasons.  First, it 
has long been asserted by China scholars that nationalism plays a key role in Chinese foreign policy.  
Harold Hinton once remarked that “nowhere has anti-Western nationalism burned more fiercely in the 
6 
 twentieth century than among…the Chinese.”26  As a result, Chinese foreign policy has, since the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, been based on “a strong determination on 
the part of [the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)] leadership to eliminate foreign influence within China, 
to modernize their country, and to eliminate Western…influence from eastern Asia.”27  Ishwer Ojha 
argued that, even during the ideological excesses of the Cultural Revolution, nationalism was an 
important force behind Chinese foreign policy: 
Just as Peking condemns Moscow for subordinating revolutionary movements to 
cooperation with Washington, so China may be guilty of yielding to a burning drive to 
thwart the Soviet Union at every step at the expense of Communist solidarity.  Peking’s 
shrill concern for territorial integrity vis-à-vis both the Soviet Union and the United 
States is indeed a feature of nationalism.28
 
In the 1980s, Allen Whiting argued that China’s shift to an ‘independent foreign policy’ was rooted in a 
new ‘assertive nationalism’ that sought “to introduce an emotional and hostile tone to relationships which 
are posited as historically and fundamentally antagonistic.”29  The 1990s brought a renewed interest in 
Chinese nationalism – what many have referred to as the ‘new’ Chinese nationalism – among scholars 
eager to understand China’s role in the post-Cold War world. 
 Yet the conflict propensity of Chinese nationalism remains an open question.  For advocates of 
the ‘China Threat’ thesis “that an increasingly powerful China is likely to destabilize regional security in 
the near future,”30 nationalism provides the prime motivating force for China to pursue a more aggressive 
foreign policy in order to regain lost territory and status.  For instance, Thomas Metzger and Ramon 
Myers have argued that “today [the world order] is challenged by a revitalized China uncomfortable with 
both the leading position of the United States in world affairs and the Western model of modernity as a 
combination of capitalism and democracy.”31  Similarly, Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro have asserted 
                                                 
26 Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics  (London:  Macmillan, 1966), 5. 
27 Ibid., 6-7. 
28 Ishwer C. Ojha, Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition:  The Diplomacy of Cultural Despair, 2d ed.  
(Boston:  Beacon Press, 1971), 143. 
29 Allen S. Whiting, “Assertive Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Asian Survey  23 (August 1983): 915. 
30 Denny Roy, “The ‘China Threat’ Issue:  Major Arguments,” Asian Survey  36 (August 1996): 758. 
31 Thomas A. Metzger and Ramon H. Myers, “Chinese Nationalism and American Policy,” Orbis  42 (Winter 1998): 
21. 
7 
 that “China’s ambitions are fired by a nationalism of historic aggrievement and thwarted grandeur, a 
nationalism that is strange and therefore little understood in the more satisfied and complacent West.”32  
They argue that this nationalism will not only lead to a more aggressive China in general, but to an 
eventual conflict with the United States in particular. 
On the surface such assertions may seem valid.  Nationalist sentiments were on full display after 
the accidental bombing on May 7, 1999, of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, by the United 
States during the conflict in Kosovo.  In highly emotional demonstrations that at times became violent, 
thousands of Chinese students converged on the US embassy in Beijing and US consulates around the 
country.  Part of the US consulate in Chengdu, Sichuan, was destroyed by fire.  Despite numerous 
apologies and attempts to explain how the accident occurred, as well as promises of compensation, most 
Chinese continue to believe that the bombing was part of a deliberate plot by the United States.  While 
such a charge may seem preposterous to most Americans, it fits into a perceived pattern of US actions – 
including the linkage of human rights with trade, continued support for Taiwan, opposition to China’s bid 
for the 2000 Olympics, and the loss of a Chinese fighter pilot after an in-air collision with a US 
reconnaissance plane near the Chinese island of Hainan in Spring 2001 – that throughout the 1990s led 
many Chinese to believe that the US was pursuing an active strategy to ‘hold China down.’  As a result, 
Sino-US relations have often been strained, and some in the Chinese defense establishment have 
themselves talked openly about the potential for military conflict between China and the United States. 
However, the idea that Chinese nationalism will inevitably drive China to pursue more aggressive 
policies toward its neighbors or the United States should not be accepted uncritically.  Indeed, others have 
argued that nationalism does not make China more prone to engage in conflict.  For instance, Michel 
Oksenberg has used the term ‘confident nationalism’ to describe the Chinese belief “that through 
increased involvement in world affairs China can attain wealth and power while preserving its national 
essence.”33  Far from leading to more aggressiveness, Oksenberg argued that “its overriding purpose is to 
                                                 
32 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China  (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 4. 
33 Michel Oksenberg, “China’s Confident Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs  65 (1987): 501. 
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 forge a tranquil security environment in support of ambitious domestic economic development….They 
[the Chinese leadership] combine a search for military security with a desire to expand economic ties with 
all potential trading partners.  They seek to preserve Chinese sovereignty and autonomy while accepting 
the constraints of increased commercial and security links with the outside world.”34  Similarly, Yongnian 
Zheng argues that “the rise of the new nationalism…does not mean that China will become aggressive 
towards the existing world system….It seems to many Chinese political leaders that only by integrating 
China into the world system can it become a strong state and world power.  What the leadership wants is 
not to overthrow the existing system, but the recognition of Chinese power and its rightful place in the 
world system by other major world powers.”35  Thus, whether or not nationalism will make China a 
greater threat to regional security is a puzzle that a theory of nationalist conflict could help to solve. 
The Taiwan issue and Sino-US relations represent particularly good places to begin tackling this 
puzzle.  The Taiwan issue is critically important to both Chinese national identity and Chinese foreign 
policy.  Moreover, it has produced interstate confrontation and conflict in the past, and retains the 
potential to do so again in the future.  China has consistently stated its willingness to go to war over 
Taiwan in order to prevent it from making its current separation from the mainland permanent.  This has 
put it in conflict with US interests, a traditional supporter of Taiwan (though not of Taiwanese 
independence).  As such, the Taiwan issue has serious implications for Sino-US relations, and provides a 
potential flashpoint for conflict between the world’s last superpower and a regional giant on the rise.  
Indeed, both states have already faced off against each other over Taiwan on more than one occasion.  
The most recent example of this was the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis in which Chinese attempts to 
influence elections in Taiwan through military intimidation resulted in a confrontation with the United 
States.  The Taiwan issue is thus an excellent case for investigating the impact of nationalism on Chinese 
behavior. 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 501. 
35 Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China:  Modernization, Identity, and International 
Relations  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999), 19. 
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 A second reason that China provides a good case study is that the existing literature on Chinese 
nationalism has generally been more cognizant of the role of international politics in shaping its 
development – empirically, if not theoretically.  It has become common to see the development of 
Chinese nationalism as the direct result of China’s attempts during the 19th and early-20th centuries to 
respond to pressures from foreign powers, a process one could argue which continues today.  As such, the 
China case provides the evidence necessary for better understanding the role of the international system in 
constituting nationalism, and thereby, can aid in the important task of theory-building.  In essence, if 
nationalism cannot be shown to have a demonstrable effect in the China case, it is less likely to be an 
important factor in other cases and may be discarded as a useful explanation of interstate conflict.  If, on 
the other hand, one can demonstrate that nationalism does have a significant impact on Chinese foreign 
policy, and provide an explanation for how and why it does so, then it may provide important insights that 
are generalizable to other cases.  Thus, the aim of the empirical portion of this dissertation will be to 
examine evidence to see whether it supports the theoretical argument being made, and to help discover 
additional theoretical questions that need to be addressed to further our understanding of how nationalism 
affects state behavior. 
Finally, while the primary goal of this dissertation is to develop a better understanding of the 
effect of nationalism on state behavior, using China as a test case may help to address an important 
secondary issue as well – the gap that too often exists between IR theory and studies of Chinese foreign 
policy.  Although studies of the subject have increased substantially over the years,36 “with a few notable 
exceptions, Western scholarship on Chinese foreign policy is open to the…charge [of a poverty of 
theoretical oversight].  Rich in descriptive analysis, it has produced a low level of comparability and 
generalization, despite its periodic calls for bridging the chasm between Chinese foreign policy and 
international relations.”37  As Whiting points out, “research on Chinese foreign policy preponderantly 
                                                 
36 Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy:  The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 8. 
37 Samuel S. Kim, “China’s International Organizational Behaviour,” in Chinese Foreign Policy:  Theory and 
Practice, eds. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh  (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1995), 401. 
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 uses Sinology rather than general theory.”38  Although this has often been justified on the grounds “that 
China’s unique 3,000-year history of essential isolation locates it outside the purview of any general 
theory that might be applicable to other states,” James Rosenau correctly argues that “for all its 
uniqueness, China has long been an actor in the international system and has thus been subject to the 
same dynamics and controls that are inherent in the system and that condition all states.”39  As such, while 
studies of Chinese foreign policy often demonstrate a nuanced understanding of China’s specific 
circumstances, they generally “lack…imaginative and theoretical approaches that could lead to 
comprehensive and conceptual ways to interpret Chinese foreign policy.”40  A more blunt criticism has 
been offered by William Kirby, who has suggested that “while the study of China’s foreign relations has 
generally been theory-poor, it has not lacked poor theories.”41  As Samuel Kim argues 
There is a need for more integrated and synthetic theoretical approaches to the study of 
Chinese foreign policy behaviors in various issue areas, toward major international 
actors, and across time.  There is also a need for more imaginative interdisciplinary 
approaches that will cross-fertilize and invigorate the field with advances made in 
international relations and other related social science disciplines.  There is, in short, a 
strong case for moving the field toward new issue areas and theoretical approaches that 
will relate disparate variables in a more comprehensive picture of the dynamics of 
Chinese international conduct.42
 
It is hoped that an examination of Chinese nationalism and foreign policy, through the lens of IR theory, 
will help to do just that.  At the same time, a more consciously theoretical approach to Chinese foreign 
policy may help to flesh out theories of international relations that have too often been Eurocentric.43
                                                 
38 Allen S. Whiting, “Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy:  IR Theory vs. the Fortune Cookie,” in Chinese Foreign 
Policy:  Theory and Practice, eds. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh  (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1995), 
506. 
39 James N. Rosenau, “China in a Bifurcated World:  Competing Theoretical Perspectives,” in Chinese Foreign 
Policy:  Theory and Practice, eds. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh  (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1995), 
524. 
40 Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy, 8-9. 
41 William C. Kirby, “The Internationalization of China:  Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad in the Republican 
Era,” The China Quarterly  150 (June 1997): 435. 
42 Samuel S. Kim, “China and the World in Theory and Practice,” in China and the World:  Chinese Foreign 
Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, 3d ed., ed. Samuel S. Kim  (Boulder:  Westview Press, 1994), 11. 
43 David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong:  The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security  27, 
no. 4 (Spring 2003): 57-85. 
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 Outlining the Argument:  The Systemic Origins of Nationalism in the Taiwan Issue & Sino-
US Relations 
This dissertation is divided into two parts.  Part I will present the main theoretical arguments.  
Since IR theory is to be the cornerstone of this dissertation, Chapter 2 will provide a brief overview of 
the major debates in IR theory, and the place that constructivism has in those debates.  While it might be 
argued that such a discussion is premature without first addressing the literature on nationalism and 
nationalist conflict in order to determine whether such an approach is warranted in the first place, it is 
necessary to address constructivism first for reasons of organizational logic – namely, the need to discuss 
existing (non-IR) constructivist approaches in the chapter on nationalism.44  The basic tenets of 
constructivism will be discussed, as well as its applicability to the study of foreign policy.  In addition, the 
importance of combining constructivism with more traditional realist approaches will be addressed.  
Namely, it will be argued that a ‘realist-constructivist’ approach is more useful for understanding 
nationalist conflicts. 
 Chapter 3 will present an overview of the literature on nationalism and nationalist conflict 
through the lens of the levels-of-analysis problem in IR theory.  The levels-of-analysis perspective 
provides a useful way to organize the myriad theories of nationalism, and shed light on what may be 
missing.  It will be argued that most theories of nationalism, including (non-IR) constructivist approaches, 
are grounded primarily in either the individual or state levels of analysis (first image and second image 
explanations, respectively), with the level of the international system (third image) largely neglected.  As 
a result, theories of nationalist conflict often fail to adequately address the effect of the international 
system on state behavior.  Although first and second image explanations of nationalism are not incorrect 
per se, they may miss key explanatory factors.  Therefore, it will be argued, it is necessary to develop an 
alternative third image explanation of nationalism and nationalist conflict capable of identifying factors 
missed by other theories – namely, the social structure of the international system. 
                                                 
44 It should be noted that while these approaches are constructivist in the broader sociological sense of the term, they 
do not explicitly make reference to the international system and should therefore be treated as compatible with, but 
distinct from, the IR approach to be developed here. 
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 Such a third image explanation will be developed in Chapter 4 by applying (IR) constructivism 
to the problem of nationalism and conflict.  It will be argued that the constructivist focus on structures of 
shared knowledge made real through social practice is not only consistent with much of the contemporary 
literature on nationalism, but also that it provides added explanatory value by shifting the focus from 
largely domestic social forces to international ones.  Specifically, nationalism may be seen as being 
constituted by both the macro- and micro-structures of international politics.  As such, nationalism may 
be understood in two ways – as the political expression of a particular type of state (macro) and as a role 
enacted by a state in relation to others (micro) – each of which has important implications for how it 
influences state behavior.  On the one hand, a nation-state may be seen to possess interests distinct from 
those of other types of states (e.g., national self-determination, protection of co-nationals), setting broad 
parameters on its behavior.  On the other hand, the specific manifestations of ‘national’ interest will 
depend on the specific role(s) adopted by the state in its interactions with others, and in particular on 
whether that role comes into conflict with the counter-role that an Other seeks to impose on it.  Thus, the 
impact of nationalism on state behavior is not set in stone, but instead depends on the social structures in 
which it is embedded and the social practices that reproduce them. 
In order to explore what this means, the proposed theoretical framework will be applied in Part 
II to the case of China, and specifically to the related issues of Taiwan and Sino-US relations.  Toward 
this end, it is necessary to answer three main questions with respect to the China case.  First, can Chinese 
nationalism be conceptualized as being constituted by the international system?  The answer to this 
question will determine the essential validity of the theoretical framework being developed; if Chinese 
nationalism is derived solely from domestic sources, then constructivism (at least in the IR sense) is likely 
to be of little use.  Chapter 5 will argue that Chinese nationalism can indeed be conceptualized in this 
way by demonstrating that its development was a direct response to international pressures brought about 
by Western imperialism.  These pressures resulted in the breakdown of the traditional regional subsystem 
centered around China and based on Confucian norms, and its absorption into an increasingly global 
system centered around Western Europe and based on norms of state sovereignty.  In essence, Chinese 
13 
 nationalism may be seen as the result of a learning process through which China was integrated into the 
international system, the outcome of which was a transformation in Chinese identity.  Further, it will be 
argued that the evolution of Chinese nationalism in the 20th century has been directly related to its 
relations with other states.  Of course, these are not dramatically new arguments; China scholars have 
long been aware of the impact foreign powers have had on China’s political development.  However, this 
discussion is necessary to provide readers with a basic historical context for understanding current 
Chinese nationalism, and, perhaps most importantly, to provide evidence for the initial proposition that 
the international system plays an integral role in the development of nationalism, thereby demonstrating 
the necessity for scholars of nationalism to address its role more directly. 
Second, if Chinese nationalism can indeed be conceptualized this way, what interests and 
associated behavioral parameters are associated with its type identity, as constituted by the macro-
structure of the international system?  In other words, what are China’s ‘national’ interests (as opposed to 
other kinds of interests) and what patterns of behavior might they produce?  This question will be 
addressed in Chapter 6 by examining the issue of Taiwan.  It will be argued that Taiwan’s importance to 
China can only be understood in terms of the identity China was forced to adopt through its interactions 
with Western powers – namely, that of a sovereign nation-state.  This transformation in China’s identity 
brought about a redefinition of its relationship to territory and its own people that resulted in Taiwan 
changing from being ‘beyond the pale of Chinese civilization’ to being an integral part of the Chinese 
nation-state that must be reclaimed in order for China to be whole again.  In essence, China’s interest in 
Taiwan is socially constructed.  However, while this sets basic parameters on Chinese foreign policy, it 
will also be shown that such parameters are relatively broad and allow for a wide range of specific 
actions. 
The third question to be addressed is, within these basic parameters, how do China’s interactions 
with other states constitute it with specific role identities, and what does this mean for the specific ways in 
which ‘national’ interests manifest themselves in Chinese behavior?  This question will be addressed in 
Chapter 7 by examining Sino-US relations, both generally and as they relate to the Taiwan issue.  It will 
14 
 be argued that while China’s identity as a nation-state provides it with a core set of interests, how these 
interests are expressed is largely dependent on the specific role(s) enacted in their defense.  Thus, modern 
Chinese nationalism may be seen as a role enacted as a defense against perceived threats to its self-image.  
Given the fact that the ‘new’ Chinese nationalism of the 1990s has often been associated with a 
significant degree of anti-Americanism, it makes sense to consider the issue of nationalism as role with 
respect to Sino-US relations.  While Taiwan plays a major part in this relationship, other issues in Sino-
US relations will also be examined.   
Chapters 6 and 7 will provide an opportunity to address some important questions regarding the 
effect of nationalism on state behavior, and particularly the presumed linkage between nationalism and 
interstate conflict.  For instance, is the belligerence in foreign policy supposedly associated with 
nationalism inherent to the nation-state (i.e., is it tied to the state’s type identity), or is it an emergent 
property that results from the interaction of states under specific circumstances (i.e., is it tied to the state’s 
role)?  In essence, what level of social structure is responsible for the conflict propensity of nationalism, 
and how conditional is it?  Do the two levels of social structure produce different, potentially conflicting, 
interests that complicate the relationship between nationalism and state behavior?  If so, how is this 
contradiction resolved?  Each of these questions is important to developing a greater understanding of 
nationalism and foreign policy. 
It should be noted that the emphasis given to structural elements of nationalism is not meant to 
discount the role of decision-makers.  Although constructivism (in IR) is generally regarded as a systemic 
theory concerned with how structures of shared knowledge shape state identities and interests, it differs 
from other such theories in IR in that agent and structure are regarded as mutually constituted; the 
properties of each are determined by the actions of the other, but are not reducible to them.  The 
continued existence of each is therefore dependent on social practice.  As Alexander Wendt points out, 
“structures and agents are both effects of what people do.”45  As a result, it has been argued that 
constructivism not only provides a new structural approach to international politics, but also allows for 
                                                 
45 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999), 313. 
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 the possibility of bringing the agent (i.e., the actions of decision-makers) back in.  While this dissertation 
will focus on developing a structural theory, in part because this is the dimension of nationalism that has 
been most ignored, the role of Chinese decision-makers will be addressed throughout. 
Finally, Chapter 8 will draw conclusions about the utility of a constructivist model for 
understanding the impact of nationalism on Chinese foreign policy.  Perhaps more importantly, it will 
address the generalizability of the China case to the problem of nationalism and foreign policy, and 
attempt to identify questions for further research.  However, it is important to offer a few caveats about 
the prospects for developing a general understanding of nationalist conflict from an analysis of the China 
case.  First, it should be noted that Prizel has made the argument that “because the sources of national 
identity are unique for each nation, and indeed are subject to constant re-creation, each study of 
nationalism and its impact on a given nation’s foreign policy must be treated separately.  Few 
generalizations are applicable to the international system as a whole.”46  While it may indeed be true that 
the impact that nationalism has on a state’s foreign policy will be highly dependent on the specific 
circumstances surrounding its identity formation, requiring a detailed analysis of each case, it is the 
author’s contention that a proper theoretical framework will yield some important, generalizable 
statements regarding the relationship between nationalism and conflict.  However, one needs to keep in 
mind that such generalizations may be limited. 
Second, even if some generalizations can be made, they may not prove useful in all cases.  As 
stated above, the author’s use of a system-level approach to the problem of nationalist conflict is not 
meant to discount the important role played by domestic politics.  The point is merely that the domestic 
aspect of nationalism is only part of the story and should be considered within the international context in 
which it takes place.  However, it may be that in some cases, perhaps even in most cases, the domestic 
politics explanation may prove sufficient, thereby making the proposed theoretical perspective 
unnecessary. 
                                                 
46 Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, 8. 
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 Finally, it should be made clear that the conclusions in this dissertation about the impact of 
nationalism on state behavior, and particularly about the impact of nationalism on Chinese foreign policy, 
are meant to add to, not replace, more traditional factors (e.g., balance of power).  For instance, to say that 
nationalism does not necessarily make China a greater threat to regional security is not the same as saying 
that China is not a regional threat at all.  One might still argue that the growth of Chinese capabilities 
alone presents a significant challenge to regional stability.  In addition, it may at times be difficult to 
determine conclusively whether Chinese behavior is the result of nationalism or other factors – e.g., 
power competition; it would almost certainly be influenced by both.  That said, it is hoped that the 
argument presented here will provide a more nuanced understanding of nationalism and state behavior. 
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PART I:  THEORY DEVELOPMENT
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Chapter 2. A VIEW FROM THE MIDDLE GROUND:  IR THEORY & THE TURN 
TOWARD CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
 As stated in the introduction, this dissertation seeks to bridge the gap between the fields of IR 
theory and nationalism in order to gain a better understanding of how the latter influences state behavior, 
particularly with respect to its impact on the conflict propensity of states.  The first step in accomplishing 
this task is to begin building from the IR theory side of the gap by outlining the basic theoretical approach 
to be taken.  For some readers, this may seem premature, since the author has yet to examine the existing 
literature on nationalism and conflict to demonstrate why this approach is necessary.  However, for 
reasons of organizational logic – namely, the need to address other ‘constructivist’ approaches to 
nationalism in the next chapter – it is useful to start with this discussion of IR theory.  I therefore request 
the reader’s patience in addressing the central issue of nationalism. 
 In order to make the discussion that follows accessible to readers outside the discipline of 
international politics, this chapter will first provide some background on the main contemporary debates 
in IR theory.  It will then examine what has been called “the constructivist turn in international relations 
theory,”1 and the implications it has for our understanding of state behavior.  The author supports the 
view (admittedly a controversial one) that constructivism represents a relatively agnostic, middle ground 
approach to IR theory, one that allows the researcher to develop a fuller, richer, and more dynamic picture 
of international politics.  More specifically, this study will seek to employ a relatively new variation of 
constructivism – realist constructivism – that recognizes the necessity of better integrating realist 
concerns with material power and constructivist concerns with identity.  Furthermore, it will be argued 
that constructivism provides a way to reintegrate the study of international politics, as a whole, and the 
                                                 
1 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics  50 (January 
1998): 324-48. 
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 study of foreign policy.  As such, constructivism provides an excellent framework for understanding the 
impact of nationalism on a state’s foreign policy. 
Realism, Liberalism, & the Rationalist Paradigm:  Contemporary Debates in IR Theory 
 Contemporary IR theory has been divided by numerous debates – some major, some minor.  
While a detailed examination of their entire evolution is beyond the scope of this study,2 it is necessary to 
present a broad outline of the competing views in order to provide the necessary context for the 
theoretical arguments to be made later.  Almost since its beginning as an independent discipline shortly 
after World War I, the study of international relations has been largely dominated by the debate between 
realism and liberalism (a.k.a., idealism), sometimes referred to as the first debate.3  Both schools of 
thought have long intellectual ancestries that can be traced back to Thucydides and Machiavelli, and to 
what E. H. Carr termed the ‘utopian’ political thought of the Renaissance,4 respectively.  While neither 
represents a uniform set of theoretical propositions, each possesses similarities that make it readily 
identifiable as a distinct approach to understanding international politics.  Realism views international 
politics as competition among states for power in which conflict is an inevitable part of life.  Liberalism 
views such competition as the misguided product of ignorance and corrupt political institutions; as such, 
conflict can be reduced and potentially eliminated. 
Their conflicting attitudes toward the propensity for international conflict have led most scholars 
of international relations to view them as representing diametrically opposed perspectives.  While this is 
in many ways true, both also share certain similarities that are important for understanding the progress of 
                                                 
2 For a basic overview of many of the debates in IR theory, see Steve Smith, “The Self-Images of a Discipline:  A 
Genealogy of International Relations Theory,” in International Relations Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth and Steve 
Smith  (University Park:  The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); and Yosef Lapid, “Sculpting the 
Academic Identity:  Disciplinary Reflections at the Dawn of a New Millenium,” in Visions of International 
Relations:  Assessing an Academic Field, ed. Donald J. Puchala  (Columbia:  University of South Carolina Press, 
2002). 
3 See Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate:  On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era,” 
International Studies Quarterly  33 (September 1989): 235-54; and Ole Wæver, “The Rise and Fall of the Inter-
Paradigm Debate,” in International Theory:  Positivism and Beyond, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia 
Zalewski  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
4 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939:  An Introduction to the Study of International Relations  
(New York:  Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964), 22. 
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 this debate, and the search by some for alternatives.  In their classical forms, realism and liberalism 
developed from fundamentally different philosophical views about human nature; realists focused on the 
inherent flaws of mankind, while liberals saw the possibility for overcoming them.  Yet with the 
behavioralist revolution of the 1950s and 1960s came a desire for a more scientific approach to 
international politics.  The second debate, between tradition/history and science,5 resulted in a shift in 
focus from competing, but ultimately unprovable, assumptions about human nature to more testable 
propositions regarding the factors influencing state behavior.  However, scholars differed significantly 
over what factors were most important.  Specifically, they could not agree which level of analysis was 
most appropriate. 
 The levels-of-analysis problem in international relations is essentially a question of where to look 
for explanations of state behavior.  As J. David Singer put it, 
whether in the physical or social sciences, the observer may choose to focus upon the 
parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system.  He may, for example, 
choose between the flowers or the garden, the rocks or the quarry, the trees or the forest, 
the houses or the neighborhood, the cars or the traffic jam, the delinquents or the gang, 
the legislators or the legislative, and so on.6
 
Levels of analysis have also been referred to as levels of aggregation, since “each concentrates our 
attention on purportedly causal or contributing factors grouped at a different level of social 
organization.”7  In the case of international politics, scholars have identified anywhere between two and 
six different levels.  Perhaps most commonly, scholars use the three levels adopted by Kenneth Waltz in 
his study on the causes of war – the individual (e.g., human nature), the state, and the international 
system.8  Since Waltz’s three ‘images,’ to use his terminology, are fairly simple and are generally 
included in most discussions of levels of analysis, they will be adopted in this study. 
                                                 
5 For a discussion of this debate, see Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches to 
International Politics  (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1970). 
6 J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” in American Foreign Policy:  
Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry  (New York:  Harper Collins Publishers, 1989), 67. 
7 Charles S. Gochman, “Understanding World Politics.” (unpublished manuscript), I-5. 
8 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War:  A Theoretical Analysis  (New York:  Columbia University Press, 
1959). 
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 The question of which level of analysis is most useful for explaining international politics has 
long been a contentious one.  Among advocates of a more analytical approach to understanding state 
behavior there was general agreement that the scientific study of international relations required some 
variables to be left out.  However, “they were diametrically opposed…in what need not be studied.”9  As 
a result, the discipline of international relations split between those that studied foreign policy analysis 
(FPA) and those that studied international politics (IP) in general.  “The central focus of foreign policy 
analysis is on the intentions, statements, and actions of an actor – often, but not always, a state – directed 
toward the external world and the response of other actors to these intentions, statements, and actions.”10  
As such, FPA has generally focused on first and second image explanations of state behavior.  
International politics, on the other hand, was more concerned with identifying and explaining broad, 
system-level patterns of state behavior than the actions of individual states.  At first, foreign policy 
analysis tended to predominate, at least partially due to the fact that “IP had failed to provide a scientific 
account of the system.”11  However, as more powerful system-level theories were developed, FPA began 
to receive less attention.  We will return to this issue at the end of the chapter. 
Waltz did a great deal to advance the cause of systemic theory.  In Man, the State and War, he 
argued that the international system was the proper level of analysis for understanding the causes of war.  
Twenty years later, he developed his ideas further in Theory of International Politics, in which he argued 
against reductionist approaches to international politics.  “A reductionist theory is a theory about the 
behavior of parts….international outcomes are simply the sum of the results produced by separate states, 
and the behavior of each of them is explained through its internal characteristics.”12  According to Waltz, 
such an approach is inherently flawed because it fails to take into account the international system in 
which the state exists.  “From attributes one cannot predict outcomes if outcomes depend on the situations 
                                                 
9 Vendulka Kubálková, “Foreign Policy, International Politics, and Constructivism,” in Foreign Policy in a 
Constructed World, ed. Vendulka Kubálková  (Armonk:  M. E. Sharpe, 2001), 17. 
10 Deborah J. Gerner, “The Evolution of the Study of Foreign Policy,” in Foreign Policy Analysis:  Continuity and 
Change in Its Second Generation, eds. Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey, and Patrick J. Haney  (Englewood Cliffs:  
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1995), 18. 
11 Kubálková, “Foreign Policy, International Politics, and Constructivism,” 18. 
12 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics  (New York:  McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979), 60. 
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 of the actors as well as their attributes.”13  Therefore, Waltz concludes, “one cannot infer the condition of 
international politics from the internal composition of states, nor can one arrive at an understanding of 
international politics by summing the foreign policies and the external behaviors of states.”14  Such 
theories are incapable of providing a general explanation of international politics. 
 Instead of focusing on lower levels of analysis, Waltz based his theory on the structure of the 
international system, which he defined as “the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of the system.”15  
According to him, this arrangement is determined by three components of the system:  ordering 
principles, differentiation of units, and distribution of capabilities.  The first refers to the degree of 
authority that exists in the system (i.e., anarchy vs. hierarchy).  Waltz maintained, as most international 
relations scholars do, that the international system is characterized by anarchy – the absence of a central 
authority.  As a result, states exist in a self-help system in which each is responsible for its own security.  
This forces them to duplicate the successful methods of other states, and therefore perform the same basic 
tasks.  Thus, for Waltz, there is no meaningful differentiation of units in an anarchic system.  Since he 
sees anarchy as a virtual constant in international affairs – what has been called the deep structure of the 
international system16 – the distribution of capabilities (i.e., power) is left to explain the system’s 
dynamics.  This distribution changes as states seek to balance the power of other states by increasing their 
own capabilities or engaging in strategic alliances. 
 As with the classical realists before him, Waltz is primarily concerned with the role of power in 
international politics, and argues that it involves competition between powerful states that often leads to 
conflict and war.  Yet his emphasis on the structure of the international system as the main explanation 
for this led him to be dubbed a ‘neorealist.’  While Waltz was certainly not the first scholar to address the 
role of anarchy in international politics, his reformulation of realist ideas around the concept of system 
structure helped to establish neorealism – sometimes referred to as structural realism – as the modern 
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 descendent of traditional realist thought.  Other variants of neorealism share with Waltz this focus on 
structural explanations of international politics.  As such, the advent of neorealism represents a major 
shift in the level of analysis predominant in much of the literature on international relations. 
 Liberals responded to the challenge of neorealism by themselves approaching the subject of 
international politics more scientifically.  As with realism, liberalism “moved away from being a general 
interpretation of the nature of international relations or an idea of overall developments, and concentrated 
instead on asking a few precise questions.”17  Specifically, it focused on the role of international 
institutions in mitigating the effects of anarchy on state behavior, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
international cooperation.  In so doing, it accepted many of the basic assumptions of neorealism, namely 
that states are the primary actors in international politics and are constrained in their behavior by the 
structure of the international system, characterized by anarchy.18  However, instead of anarchy 
automatically resulting in a conflictual, self-help system, it was argued that international institutions could 
provide the order necessary to allow states to pursue their self-interest cooperatively and prevent cheating.  
By accepting most of the fundamental assumptions of neorealism, liberal theorists were able to argue 
“that institutions are possible and relevant even on these restricted [neorealist] premises.”19
 The result of this reorientation was a body of theory generally referred to as ‘neoliberalism’ or 
‘neoliberal institutionalism.’  Like their traditional predecessors, neoliberals are more optimistic about the 
prospects of international cooperation.  Yet their optimism is based on a deeper theoretical understanding 
of the international system, not assumptions about human nature.  As such, liberals too have generally 
shifted their level of analysis to the international system.  This shift is somewhat less clear-cut than in the 
case of neorealism; important areas of liberal theory remain committed to state-level analysis (e.g., 
democratic peace theory).  However, it would be accurate to describe the main realist-liberal divide of the 
first debate as moving from the individual level to the system level of analysis, with both concerned about 
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 how system structure constrains state behavior.  In essence, as a result of the second debate over tradition 
and science, what once might have been considered two diametrically opposed perspectives of 
international politics have now largely converged.  As Robert Keohane has pointed out, “it is crucial to 
remember that [neoliberalism] borrows as much from realism as from liberalism:  it cannot be 
encapsulated as simply a ‘liberal’ theory opposed at all points to realism.”20
 Of course, this is not to say that such a convergence was generally recognized; the ‘inter-
paradigm’ debate between neorealism and neoliberalism shaped much of the discussion of IR theory in 
the 1980s.  Yet despite continued disagreements over questions of conflict and cooperation between 
states, both had come to an agreement on fundamental questions of theory.  The result of this convergence 
is what Ole Wæver has referred to as the ‘neo-neo synthesis.’  “No longer were realism and liberalism 
‘incommensurable’ – on the contrary they shared a ‘rationalist’ research programme, a conception of 
science, a shared willingness to operate on the premise of anarchy…and investigate the evolution of co-
operation and whether institutions mattered.”21  Similarly, Peter Katzenstein has pointed out that 
both neorealism and neoliberalism…express a widely accepted, though problematic, 
social science paradigm suggesting a three-step analysis.  First, there is the specification 
of a set of constraints.  Then comes the stipulation of a set of actors who are assumed to 
have certain kinds of interests.  Finally, the behavior of the actors is observed, and that 
behavior is related to the constraining conditions in which these actors, with their 
assumed interests, find themselves.  This perspective highlights the instrumental 
rationality of actors and focuses on decisions and choice.22
 
Thus, despite their differences in behavioral predictions, neorealism and neoliberalism represent a 
common rationalist paradigm of international relations. 
As pointed out by Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, this is essentially a microeconomic approach to 
international politics, with neorealists and neoliberals differing only in the degree of orthodoxy in their 
individual applications of the model.  Neorealism represents the more orthodox of the two, where “social 
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 behavior and outcomes are a product of the rational choices of individuals who maximize their 
satisfaction (utility) by efficiently matching available means to their desired ends.”23  Neoliberalism, on 
the other hand, “accepts the rational egoism of orthodox [neorealist] theory but accords institutionalized 
rules a special role in resolving problems of aggregation and coordination.”24  Despite this variation, 
however, “both…assume that self-interested actors maximize their utility, subject to constraints.  In such 
models, actors’ preferences and causal beliefs are given, and attention focuses on the variation in the 
constraints faced by actors.”25  In essence then, this rationalist paradigm posits a set of state actors who 
pursue their own self-interest (exogenously given) within the structural limits set by the international 
system.  It is this paradigm that has dominated much of the scholarship in IR theory. 
Yet such an approach to explaining international politics is not without its problems.  First, it is 
divided over the fundamental issue of what interests to assign to states.  Neorealists argue that since 
survival is a state’s top priority, it must be concerned primarily with relative gains, lest a competitor 
obtain an advantage that threatens its security; in contrast, neoliberals assume that states are more 
interested in absolute gains.  Of course, it should be recognized that both sides hedge their statements to 
some extent.  Keohane states that “institutionalism recognizes the possibility that states’ interests in 
relative gains will make cooperation difficult.  Such a recognition does not involve institutional theory in 
a contradiction, since the theory is explicitly conditional.”26  Similarly, Joseph Grieco states that “realists 
have argued that cooperation is possible under anarchy, but that it is harder to achieve, more difficult to 
maintain, and more dependent on state power than is appreciated by the institutionalist tradition.”27  
However, the fact that neither has developed an adequate theory of state interests makes it difficult for 
them to resolve their differences.  This represents a fundamental problem.  As Keohane has admitted, 
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 “without a theory of interests, which requires analysis of domestic politics, no theory of international 
relations can be fully adequate.  Systemic theory is worthwhile, but it can only take us part of the way; 
and we should be careful to avoid retreating behind it.”28
This brings us to a second problem – the fact that the focus on the structure of the international 
system leaves little room for explanations of foreign policy-making.  In fact, in delineating his systemic 
theory, Waltz explicitly argues that one should not “mistake a theory of international politics for a theory 
of foreign policy.”29  For him, they involve different levels of analysis; “a theory at one level of generality 
cannot answer questions about matters at a different level of generality.”30  Thus, neorealism (and, 
presumably, neoliberalism) is ill-suited to explaining the behavior of a specific state at a specific time.  
Such a position has drawn some criticism; Colin Elman has argued that “there is nothing intrinsic to the 
nature of the concepts and variables employed by neorealist theories that prevent them from making 
foreign-policy predictions.”31  Whether or not system-level theory has anything to offer in understanding 
a state’s foreign policy will be discussed in more detail later.  However, it seems clear that such theories 
would be more useful if they provided insights into the specific behavior of states.  Indeed, some have 
argued that “the distinction between foreign policy analysis and IR studied as a system is artificial, [and] 
that it can and should be eliminated.”32
More fundamentally, however, by focusing on the constraints that the international system 
imposes on state actors, the rationalist paradigm fails to address the possibility that the system may do 
more than simply punish states for irrational behavior; it may also help to define the character of the state 
itself – its identity and interests.  This would have important implications for our understanding of 
international politics.  A growing body of literature, which Keohane has labeled as sociological or 
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 “reflective,”33 has indeed begun to challenge the rationalist foundations of the neo-neo synthesis, and has 
become a pole in a new, third debate – between positivism and post-positivism.34  Reflectivism actually 
represents a very broad set of ideas and theoretical orientations, which “are united more by an opposition 
to [the rationalist] view of international politics than by any agreement over what should replace it.”35  It 
is generally considered to include three main approaches:  post-modernism, critical theory, and 
constructivism.36  Of these, constructivism has gained the widest level of acceptance in mainstream IR 
theory.  In the following sections, I will discuss the basic tenets of constructivism and how it provides a 
useful alternative approach to understanding both international relations generally and foreign policy-
making. 
Ideas, Identity, & the Reflectivist Alternative:  The Constructivist Critique in IR Theory 
 Although its philosophical roots are older, the term ‘constructivism’ was first introduced into the 
literature on IR theory by Nicholas Onuf.37  Since then it has grown into what is arguably the predominant 
critique of the rationalist paradigm, and along with realism and liberalism has been portrayed as one of 
the three pillars of IR theory.38  Constructivism is not itself a theory of international relations “but an 
approach to social inquiry,”39 one that is rooted in “the assumption that the human world is not simply 
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 given and/or natural but that on the contrary, the human world is one of artifice; that it is ‘constructed’ 
through the action of the actors themselves.”40  As J. Samuel Barkin succinctly puts it, “constructivists see 
the facts of international politics as not reflective of an objective, material reality but an intersubjective, or 
social reality.”41  Since it does not make specific theoretical claims, it has been argued that constructivism 
“is largely neutral vis-à-vis dominant paradigms in IR”42 and “analytically neutral between conflict and 
cooperation,”43 an issue to which we will return later. 
 Of course, since constructivism represents a general approach to understanding international 
politics, it should not be surprising that constructivists themselves often disagree over fundamental 
questions of theory.  In fact, it has been argued that there are indeed multiple constructivisms that vary 
depending on the degree to which the world is seen as constructed.44  The author will adopt the somewhat 
more limited “thin constructivism”45 put forward by scholars such as Alexander Wendt and Jeffrey 
Checkel, which “fully endorse[s] the scientific project of falsifying theories against evidence.”46  
Although such an approach has come under criticism from more ‘radical’ constructivists for not going far 
enough,47 the author believes that this represents a more effective way of exploring the way in which 
international politics in general, and Chinese foreign policy more specifically, is constructed.  In addition, 
it will be demonstrated in later chapters that such an approach allows for the possibility of linking 
constructivist concerns for identity and social norms with more traditional realist concerns about power.48
                                                 
40 Kratochwil, “Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study,” 16-7. 
41 J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” International Studies Review  5 (September 2003): 326. 
42 Jørgensen, “Four Levels and a Discipline,” 50. 
43 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security  20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 76. 
44 See Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivisms in International Relations:  Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil,” in Constructing 
International Relations:  The Next Generation, ed. Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jørgensen  (Armonk:  M. E. 
Sharpe, 2001). 
45 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2. 
46 Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” 75. 
47 For instance, see Steve Smith, “Wendt’s World,” Review of International Studies  26 (January 2000): 151-63. 
48 For a discussion of the possible linkages between constructivism and realism, see Barkin, “Realist 
Constructivism”; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, “Constructivist Realism or Realist-
Constructivism?,” International Studies Review  6 (June 2004): 337-41; Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realist-
Constructivism and Morality,” International Studies Review  6 (June 2004): 341-43; Janice Bially Mattern, “Power 
in Realist-Constructivist Research,” International Studies Review  6 (June 2004): 343-46; Richard Ned Lebow, 
“Constructive Realism,” International Studies Review  6 (June 2004): 346-48; and J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist 
Constructivism and Realist-Constructivisms,” International Studies Review  6 (June 2004): 349-51. 
29 
 The constructivist critique of neorealism and neoliberalism rests on the argument that the 
microeconomic approach to international politics taken by both, in which states are seen as acting 
rationally in pursuit of exogenously determined interests within a given set of structural (i.e., material) 
constraints, is inadequate due to the fact that it ignores the social dimension of the international system 
and the impact that this may have on states’ identities and, consequently, how they define their interests.  
Instead, constructivists have sought to do two things.  First, they have developed a broader conception of 
system structure by adding an ideational element (i.e., ideas), arguing “that the fundamental structures of 
international politics are social rather than strictly material.”49  Second, they have reconceptualized the 
relationship between agent and structure, arguing “that these structures shape actors’ identities and 
interests, rather than just their behavior.”50  Each of these points will be dealt with in turn. 
Rethinking System Structure:  The Social Dimension of International Politics 
 One of the main constructivist critiques of rationalist theory, particularly neorealism, is its 
conception of system structure – namely, that it puts too much emphasis on the material aspects of the 
system.  This becomes apparent when one examines how structures are seen to constrain state behavior.  
The constraints that the system places on state behavior in Waltz’s theory do not depend on the 
intentional actions of states; indeed, as already mentioned, Waltz has little interest in explaining the 
behavior of individual states.  Instead, they depend on a selection effect whereby those that fail to act 
correctly are eventually eliminated from the system.  In other words, states are subject to a process of 
natural selection similar to that of biological entities.  In natural selection, “traits are selected through the 
fates of the organisms who carry them, not through the selection of traits as such….[It] does not require 
cognition, rationality, or intentionality, and to that extent it is a material process that operates behind the 
backs of actors.”51  Thus, the international system operates by placing material constraints on how states 
may act and still survive.  Actors may choose to behave any way they wish, but ‘incorrect’ choices will 
                                                 
49 Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” 71. 
50 Ibid., 71-2. 
51 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 321. 
30 
 carry negative consequences that could lead, at least in extreme cases, to the elimination of the state from 
the system at the hands of more successful actors. 
 In contrast to this emphasis on material constraints, constructivists are essentially concerned with 
the role of ideas in international politics.  This is not all that different from the “tradition of cognitivist 
research on the role of belief systems and perceptions in foreign policy decision-making.”52  Yet scholars 
in the cognitive tradition, like Robert Jervis, are grounded primarily in ‘first image’ analyses of “decision-
makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others.”53  Constructivism, on the other hand, has 
sought to develop a third image analysis of how these beliefs and images are socially constructed through 
the interaction of states.  In essence, it addresses Jianwei Wang’s criticism of perceptual-psychological 
approaches to international relations that “insufficient attention has been paid to the dynamic process of 
formation and change of perceptions.  National images usually are taken as a given and the question of 
how these images are formed in the first place is seldom asked.”54  In other words, instead of focusing on 
the images held by decision-makers, constructivism focuses on the social interactions that produce them.  
Thus, while the cognitive and constructivist approaches are similar in that they are both concerned with 
ideas, constructivists make their arguments in explicitly structural terms.  As Wendt points out, “social 
constructivism is not just about idealism [the role of ideas], it is also about structuralism or holism.  
Structures have effects not reducible to agents.”55  In this sense, constructivism is not that different from 
neorealism or neoliberalism – all three are system-level approaches that focus on the effects that system 
structure has on states.  In the case of constructivism, however, the definition of structure is broadened to 
include more than just material capabilities. 
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 Constructivists argue that the social structure of the international system is at least as important as 
its material structure.  This social structure “consists of the stock of interlocking beliefs, ideas, 
understandings, perceptions, identities, or what [Wendt] would simply call ‘knowledge’ held by members 
of the system.”56  Shared knowledge – what one might call the distribution of ideas in the system – 
provides the social context in which actors interact by giving meaning to the material structure of the 
system.  Constructivists argue that “material capabilities as such explain nothing; their effects presuppose 
structures of shared knowledge.”57  For example, Wendt maintains that differences in the way the US 
responds to the nuclear capabilities of Britain and North Korea can only be understood in terms of shared 
understandings of amity and enmity, not by referencing the capabilities themselves.58  Even the logic of 
anarchy, so prevalent in neorealist writings, is heavily dependent on the social structure of the 
international system.  As Wendt points out, “an anarchy of friends differs from one of enemies.”59  Thus, 
without a clear understanding of the structure of shared knowledge within the system, it is impossible to 
predict how states will react to a given set of material constraints. 
Of course, this assumes that knowledge is shared at all.  As Wendt correctly points out, “it is an 
empirical question whether actors share any ideas, and sometimes they do not.”60  In cases where 
knowledge is not shared, materialist theories of IR might prove more useful.  Yet Wendt contends that  
today,…states know a lot about each other, and important parts of this knowledge are 
shared…States and scholars alike treat these shared beliefs as the background, taken-for-
granted assumptions that any competent player or student of contemporary world politics 
must understand:  what a ‘state’ is, what ‘sovereignty’ implies, what ‘international law’ 
requires, what ‘regimes’ are, how a ‘balance of power’ works, how to engage in 
‘diplomacy,’ what constitutes ‘war,’ what an ‘ultimatum’ is, and so on.61
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 In addition, it will be argued that the absence of shared knowledge can itself be an important factor in 
understanding state behavior, particularly in cases where preconceived notions of states come into 
conflict.  Therefore, it is important to examine the ways in which knowledge may be shared. 
Before this issue is addressed, however, it is necessary to more fully outline the nature of system 
structure.  Specifically, it is necessary to address the issue of what role interactions might play in system-
level theory.  According to Waltz, a system is composed of interacting units and structure.  For him, the 
key to system-level theorizing is “to contrive a definition of structure free of the attributes and the 
interactions of units.”62  Although it is the interaction of states that produces the system, he sees these 
interactions as unit-level phenomena, and thus excludes them from his analysis.  However, Waltz 
provides little reasoning for this conclusion.  As Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little point out, 
“Waltz…slips into a tendency to deal with the unit level by exclusion, treating it as a catch-all for 
everything that falls outside his definition of structure.”63  While state properties might clearly be seen as 
existing at the unit level, both Buzan et al. and Wendt argue that state interactions are far different from 
state properties.  For the former, it is the tendency of these interactions to produce recognizable patterns 
that allows them to mimic the effects of system structure.  Similarly, Wendt argues that “interaction may 
have emergent effects that are not predicted by properties alone.”64  As a result, both argue that state 
interactions should be considered as a separate, intervening level between the units that interact and the 
structure produced by that interaction. 
However, the specific way in which they do this is quite different, and has an important bearing 
on our understanding of shared knowledge.  Buzan et al. argue that, while patterns of state interaction 
may be fairly consistent, “Waltz is logically correct to count [them] as unit level explanations and to 
reserve the term structure for the positional relation of the units.”65  On the one hand, they fault Waltz “for 
constructing an unbalanced system theory by developing a highly elaborate definition of structure, while 
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 leaving the unit level as an undifferentiated mass about which it has been all too easy for confusion to 
multiply.”66  On the other, they attempt to solve this problem while still retaining Waltz’s overall scheme.  
As a result, they divide Waltz’s unit-level of analysis into two tiers, process formations and attribute 
analysis, thereby continuing his tradition of leaving interactions out of any theory of structure.67
Wendt argues that this does not go far enough.  Instead, he believes that “theories of inter-state 
interaction share with Waltz’s view of structural theory a concern with the logic of the international 
system.”68  As a result, he divides Waltz’s structure into macro and micro forms.  Macro-structures 
“depict the world from the standpoint of the system.”69  Such structures operate “at the level of the 
population of states, not the level of individual or interacting states.”70  Waltz’s theory of structure 
provides a good example.  Since it operates predominantly through a process of natural selection,71 it 
describes the overall evolution of the system, not the behavior of specific actors.  States may or may not 
respond properly to structural constraints, but they will be punished by the system if they fail to do so. 
 Micro-structures, on the other hand, “depict the world from agents’ point of view.”72  This is the 
level of state interaction that Waltz ignores.  In contrast to macro-structure, micro-structure is concerned 
with the intentional decisions of actors.  However, according to Wendt, this does not make such 
explanations reductionist.  He uses the Prisoner’s Dilemma model from game theory as an example of 
how the intentional decisions of actors may be shaped by the rules of the game – i.e., the structure of the 
system.  “The actors’ attributes alone cannot explain the result [defection]; what matters is how they 
interact, the outcome of which is emergent from rather than reducible to the unit-level.”73  This opens the 
possibility of examining the foreign policies of states from a system perspective, since “interaction-level 
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 theories explain not just an individual’s choices but the overall outcomes of interaction, which have an 
inherently systemic dimension.”74
 Wendt uses his concepts of micro- and macro-structures to distinguish between different degrees 
of shared knowledge – common and collective.  “Common knowledge concerns actors’ beliefs about each 
other’s rationality, strategies, preferences, and beliefs, as well as about states of the external world.”75  
These beliefs are shared, not just in the sense that each has the same beliefs, but that each knows that the 
other possesses them as well.  “Common knowledge requires ‘interlocking’ beliefs, not just everyone 
having the same beliefs.”76  As a result, common knowledge has both subjective and intersubjective 
qualities.  “Common knowledge is subjective in the sense that the beliefs that make it up are in actors’ 
heads, and figure in intentional explanations.  Yet because those beliefs must be accurate beliefs about 
others’ beliefs, it is also an intersubjective phenomenon which confronts actors as an objective social fact 
that cannot be individually wished away.”77  Thus, common knowledge is micro-structural; it involves the 
individual decisions of actors constrained by their knowledge of how the other is likely to react. 
 Collective knowledge, on the other hand, is macro-structural.  It represents the knowledge of a 
group, not necessarily of any individuals in that group.  Common knowledge can be reduced to the beliefs 
of individuals; collective knowledge cannot.  Of course, a group cannot actually believe something; 
groups are not conscious actors.  However, “we can ascribe beliefs to a group…as long as members 
accept the legitimacy of the group’s decisions and the obligation to act in accordance with its results.”78  
These beliefs may not even be possessed by any of its members.  Wendt cites the following example: 
In the interest of consensus,…a divided political party might adopt as part of its platform 
– as its group belief – a compromise that none of its members holds personally, and 
which in turn helps explain certain macro-level patterns in their behavior.79
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 Because it does not rely on the beliefs of specific individuals, collective knowledge may persist for 
generations and may be extremely resistant to change.  As a result, collective knowledge “generate[s] 
macro-level patterns in individual behavior over time.  At the level of the international system, examples 
of collective knowledge include capitalism, the Westphalian system, apartheid, the Afrika Korps, the free 
trade regime, and,…states.”80
 While natural selection provides the primary mechanism whereby structure affects states for 
Waltz, Wendt maintains that cultural selection may be at least as important in generating various forms of 
shared knowledge.  This differs from natural selection in that, “rather than working behind the backs of 
actors through reproductive failure, cultural selection works directly through their capacities for 
cognition, rationality, and intentionality.”81  Cultural selection may take the form of imitation or social 
learning.  However, before we can address the mechanism of cultural selection, it is first necessary to 
address the question of what is being selected – i.e., what is it that states are imitating and/or learning?  
This requires an examination of the impact of social structure on states more generally, specifically its 
role in constituting state identity.  The role that learning plays in this constitution process can then be 
addressed. 
Constitution vs. Causality:  The Impact of Social Structure on State Identities and Interests 
 While the preceding discussion of the social nature of system structure is an important component 
of the constructivist critique of mainstream IR theory, an equally important component is how the 
relationship between agent and structure is conceptualized.  In contrast to the focus of neorealists and 
neoliberals on how structure constrains state behavior, constructivists focus on how structure shapes state 
identity and interests.  The difference is whether system structure is seen as having causal or constitutive 
effects.  “The one describes change in the state of Y as a result of a change in the state of an independently 
existing X.  The other describes how the properties of an X make a Y what it is….The former is a 
relationship of ‘interaction’ or ‘co-determination,’ the latter of ‘conceptual dependence’ or ‘mutual 
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 constitution.’”82  For constructivists, it is the latter that is most important for understanding the agent-
structure relationship; the system does not simply cause states to act in a particular way, it constitutes 
them with certain identities and interests.  In other words, states are what they are, and want what they 
want, because the social system in which they operate defines them that way.  Thus, the structure of the 
international system can be said to have a ‘deeper’ impact on states than simply constraining the choices 
of rational actors pursuing their maximum benefits; it gives their choices meaning. 
 The specific processes by which identity and interests are constituted will be discussed in the next 
section.  It is first necessary, however, to address the issue of state identity.  Despite the importance of 
identity in constructivist theory, the term is rarely defined in a clear and consistent manner.  In order for 
identity to be a useful concept for understanding state behavior, it is necessary to define it as clearly as 
possible.  In its most basic terms, “an identity is whatever makes a thing what it is.”83  More specifically, 
identity can be defined as “the state of being similar to some actors and different from others in a 
particular circumstance.  Identity involves the creation of boundaries that separate self and other.”84  
Although the term has its roots in psychology, it involves material and sociological components as well, 
each of which must be addressed in turn. 
 At its most basic, the material component of identity relates to the physical separation that defines 
entities as distinct.  For instance, the identities of Joe and Sam are rooted in their existence as two distinct 
biological units.  Beyond such a base physical separation, individuals also possess some specific set of 
physical characteristics (e.g., gender, height, skin color).  Such characteristics carry no meaning in and of 
themselves, but may acquire meaning and thus provide a platform on which one’s identity is constructed.  
While the salience of any given characteristic may vary over time or by situation, they may also provide 
some degree of consistency since they will generally be resistant to change.85
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  From a psychological perspective, “identity is a mental construct that both describes and 
prescribes how the actor should think, feel, evaluate, and, ultimately, behave in group-relevant 
situations.”86  As such, it plays an important role in helping actors to make decisions.  This can be 
summed up as follows: 
 Cognitively, identities help individuals cope with complex, demanding situations.  
Identities are self-schemas, mental representations that allow individuals to overcome the 
inherent deficits in short-term memory or other information-processing capacity by 
organizing an otherwise overwhelming amount of incoming stimuli into categories based 
on prior experience.  Self-schemas are tools for managing and organizing information 
about oneself and the self’s relationship to the environment.  An identity, then, is the 
mechanism that provides individuals with a sense of self and the means for 
comprehending the relationship of the self to the external environment.  Identity is an 
inherent part of cognition, and it makes life more predictable and less inchoate, 
inexplicable, and random by giving actors more of a sense of how their behavior will 
affect others’ behavior toward them.87
 
In essence, identity helps to simplify the complexities of the real world by providing actors with a sense 
of who they are and how they relate to the world around them. 
 Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this study, identity has a strong sociological 
component.  On one level, this means that an identity can be shared by members of a group.  Through 
social interaction actors come to see themselves as being part of the same group – i.e., they ascribe 
meaning and importance to some set of shared characteristics.  On a deeper level, however, this involves 
more than the recognition of similarity.  Creating boundaries that separate oneself (or one’s group) from 
others also requires the recognition of difference.  “Meaning is made out of difference.  Definitions begin 
in negation in the designation of what a thing is not.  The process of separating a name, a word, an 
identity, from those surrounding it begins in differentiation.”88  This would indicate that “to say that a 
group of people has a particular identity is to suggest both that they share certain qualities and also that 
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 these qualities somehow set them apart from others.”89  Therefore, it is perhaps better to look at identity, 
“not in psychological terms, but as a relationship between self and others.”90
 For the moment, I will leave aside the question of whether it is appropriate to employ a term 
borrowed from psychology to explain the behavior of collective entities such as states.  Instead, let us 
assume that states may possess identity and address the question of what form this may take.  If identity is 
taken to mean the separation between Self and Other, then it is possible to conceive of this separation on a 
number of different levels.  Specifically, I will argue that one can identify a macro- and a micro-level of 
separation, each of which is related to a different dimension of social structure.  The reason for this 
distinction is to take into account the possibility that actors may have identities with a relatively narrow 
scope that exist within, and are conditioned by, an identity with a much broader scope.  The importance of 
this distinction between micro- and macro-identity will be made clear shortly.  However, it is first 
necessary to define the base on which these identities are built. 
Corporate Identity – The Essential State 
In order to develop gradations of separation between Self and Other, one must first establish that 
such a separation exists.  In other words, it is necessary to identify and define some essential form of 
actor, in the most basic terms possible, that can be used as a starting point for analysis.  This is what 
Wendt refers to as corporate identity, which “refers to the intrinsic qualities that constitute actor 
individuality.”91  Corporate identity defines the actor as an entity distinct from other actors.  “It always 
has a material base, the body in the case of people, many bodies and territory for states.”92  Corporate 
identity thus carries with it no social meaning; it is simply based on the recognition that an actor exists.  It 
is this essentialist, corporate identity that then acts as “a site platform for other identities.”93  Without such 
a corporate identity, no actor exists to relate with others. 
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  For Wendt, the state represents just such a corporate actor for international politics – “an 
organizational actor embedded in an institutional-legal order that constitutes it with sovereignty and a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence over a society in a territory.”94  This is what he 
calls the ‘essential’ state, a minimalist conception that “does not imply any particular political system, any 
particular mode of production, recognition by other states, nationalism, or undivided sovereignty….All of 
these involve contingent forms of state, not the essential state.”95  From this perspective, the term ‘state’ 
can be used to describe virtually any kind of political unit, regardless of whether it is a city-state, nation-
state, or universal empire.  Each has some property that we intuitively recognize as belonging to a similar 
form of political organization; they are all members of the same class of political actors.  Since such 
actors can be found in any historical period, Wendt argues that “the state is not an inherently modern 
phenomenon, and thus, once we have identified its motivational dispositions…it should be possible to 
develop transhistorical generalizations about its behavior.”96
 While I would agree with Wendt that one may be able to identify some kind of essential political 
unit to which we may apply the term ‘state’ in any historical period, I strongly disagree with the definition 
he provides.  As will be discussed shortly, incorporating ideas such as sovereignty into any conception of 
the essential state incorrectly ascribes specific attributes to it that are not warranted, and risks short-
circuiting the constructivist approach to understanding state identity.  It seems likely that this was 
unintentional.  Wendt clearly recognizes that there are “dangers in making transhistorical claims, such as 
projecting contingent features of the modern state backward.”97  Yet given that sovereignty itself is 
generally considered to be historically contingent, it appears that Wendt nonetheless falls into this trap.  In 
order to avoid this problem, I prefer to define the essential state in the terms used by John Ruggie, who 
asserts that “we can define the most generic attribute of any system of rule as comprising legitimate 
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 dominion over a spatial extension.”98  This better represents the core of what Wendt identifies as the 
corporate identity of the essential state without ascribing any particular political form to it, leaving open 
the possibility that different meanings of ‘spatial extension’ and ‘legitimate dominion’ may lead to 
radically different forms of state. 
Type Identity – Historical Forms of State 
 Beyond corporate identity, Wendt identifies three different kinds of social identity – type, role, 
and collective – each of which involves a different level of separation between Self and Other, and is at 
least partially determined by social structure.  For the purposes of this study, I will simply deal with the 
first two.99  Type identity “refers to a social category or ‘label applied to persons who share…some 
characteristic or characteristics, in appearance, behavioral traits, attitudes, values, skills (e.g., language), 
knowledge, opinions, experience, historical commonalities (like region or place of birth), and so on.’”100  
As such, an actor may have multiple type identities whose importance will vary depending on the specific 
category being highlighted at the time.  This is where the importance of social construction comes in.  
While Wendt argues that “the characteristics that underlie type identities are at base intrinsic of actors”, 
he also sees them as having “an inherently cultural dimension.”101  Thus, type identities have both 
material and socially constructed qualities. 
 In the case of the state, one could consider type identity as representing different historically 
contingent forms of the essential state that arise from changes in the meaning of legitimate dominion over 
spatial extension.  Ruggie argues that in pre-modern times a great deal of variation existed in the spatial 
division of political authority.  In some cases, rule was based exclusively on kinship rather than territory.  
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 While “territory was occupied in kin-based systems,…it did not define them.”102  In other cases, political 
space was organized around non-fixed territories.  Citing Owen Lattimore’s work on nomads in Central 
Asia, Ruggie points out that “they did not wander haphazardly:  ‘They laid claim to definite pastures and 
to the control of routes of migration between these pastures.’”103  Finally, political authority was at times 
spatially divided based on fixed territories, but without this authority being mutually exclusive.  The 
example Ruggie uses here is the feudal system of medieval Europe “in which ‘different juridical instances 
were geographically interwoven and stratified, and plural allegiances, asymmetrical suzerainties and 
anomalous enclaves abounded.’”104  Such alterations in “the organization of political space”105 produced 
different types of states.  Each possessed certain material qualities (e.g., people, territory) that defined it 
as a corporate actor, but gave different meanings to them that defined what kind of actor it was. 
 This becomes even clearer when one considers the reorganization of political space that occurred 
at the start of the modern era – the development of the modern state.  In this case, territorial authority is 
fixed and mutually exclusive.  The specific location of a given boundary between any two states might be 
a subject of dispute, but the nature of that boundary is generally accepted.  They can be thought of “as 
vanishing thin lines on a map, so that the state’s spatial extension is precisely delimited.  A state is 
complete up to its boundary, and then disappears equally completely as we cross it.”106  The position of 
the author is that this represents a change in the type identity of the essential state.  In other words, the 
modern state is a specific form or type of state, one based on the idea of sovereignty in which the state is 
the sole legitimate authority over its people and territory.  However, given that Wendt has most recently 
argued that sovereignty is not socially constructed, but is instead a property of the essential state, this 
issue warrants greater attention before moving on. 
 According to Wendt, sovereignty involves two different sets of relationships – one internal, one 
external.  “Internal sovereignty means that the state is the supreme locus of political authority in 
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 society.”107  It is this organizational quality, he maintains, that helps to define the state as a corporate 
actor.  External sovereignty, on the other hand, refers to “the absence of any external authority higher than 
the state.”108  Wendt now argues that, since sovereignty is an issue of legitimate authority and not actual 
autonomy, both its internal and external aspects are essential properties of the state, and therefore should 
not be thought of as socially constructed.  Conceptualized in this way, sovereignty does not require 
outside recognition, leading Wendt to argue that “sovereignty does not presuppose a society of states.  
Sovereignty is intrinsic to the state, not contingent.  Empirical statehood can exist without juridical 
statehood.”109
 However, Wendt’s argument here is not only flawed, but contradicts the predominant 
constructivist view of sovereignty, including some of his own earlier statements.  His fundamental point 
that both internal and external sovereignty are intrinsic to the essential state is incorrect.  As has already 
been discussed, one can find numerous historical examples of overlapping political authorities in which 
the essential state is neither the ‘supreme locus of political authority in society’ nor legally independent of 
all external authorities.  These are qualities of the modern state.  Moreover, even if it were the case that all 
forms of state, modern or otherwise, possess some fundamental sense of sovereignty in terms of 
legitimate authority, this would make the term too general to be of much use.  While the lack of 
recognition of any outside authority is an important aspect of sovereignty, an equally important aspect is 
the recognition that other states have the same authority over themselves. 
 It is in this juridical sense that the term sovereignty is normally used.  Sovereignty defines the 
rights and obligations that states have with respect to one another, and therefore limits (at least in theory) 
the ways in which states may interact.  They cannot legally violate the sovereignty of another state.  State 
sovereignty can therefore be seen “as a basic rule of coexistence”110 between states, a social concept that 
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 helps to constitute a system in which each actor has the legal right of final authority over its own people 
and territory.  As a result, Wendt has argued in the past that, “in contrast to the…definition of 
international system structures as consisting of externally related, preexisting, state agents, a 
[constructivist] approach to the state system would see states in relational terms…In other words, states 
are not even conceivable as states apart from their position in a global structure of individuated and 
penetrated political authorities.”111  The modern state only exists as such because a system of states exists 
to constitute it that way.  Without this set of social relationships (i.e., sovereignty), the state would take on 
a different form. 
Role Identity – Prescribing State Behavior 
The final level of separation between Self and Other to be dealt with here involves role identities.  
A role can be thought of as “identity mobilized in a specific situation.”112  According to Philippe Le 
Prestre, “the articulation of a national role betrays preferences, operationalizes an image of the world, 
triggers expectations, and influences the definition of the situation and of the available options.  It 
imposes obligations and affects the definition of risks.”113  In essence, roles provide guidance for state 
behavior in specific situations.  While type identities remain partially dependent on material factors, “role 
identities take the dependency on culture and thus Others one step further.  Whereas the characteristics 
that give rise to type identities are pre-social, role identities are not based on intrinsic properties and as 
such exist only in relation to Others.”114  For example, Wendt points out that “there is no preexisting 
property in virtue of which a student becomes a student or a master a master; one can have these identities 
only by occupying a position in a social structure and following behavioral norms toward Others 
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 possessing relevant counter-identities.  One cannot enact role identities by oneself.”115  For instance, 
“Smith can stipulate her identity as ‘the President’ any time she likes, but unless others share this idea she 
cannot be the President, and her ideas about herself will be meaningless.”116
The concept of role identity is not entirely new to IR theory.  K. J. Holsti made an early attempt 
to use roles to analyze foreign policy decision-making.  He provided a basic theoretical framework for 
understanding how roles function in international politics, arguing that a state’s role performance (i.e., 
state behavior) is largely dependent on the interaction between role conceptions and role prescriptions.  
The former refers to “the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, 
rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a 
continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems.  It is their ‘image’ of the 
appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.”117  The latter 
refers to outside influences that might influence a state’s role, including “the structure of the international 
system; system-wide values; general legal principles…; and the rules, traditions, and expectations of 
states as expressed in the charters of international and regional organizations, ‘world opinion,’ 
multilateral and bilateral treaties; and less formal or implicit commitments and ‘understandings.’”118  In 
essence, roles have both domestic and international sources. 
Unfortunately, according to Wendt, “despite the fact that the concept of role seems to imply one 
of social structure, there has been little contact between this literature and structural IR.”119  States may be 
seen as taking on roles, but the influence that the international system may have in constituting these roles 
is largely ignored.  Holsti states the main reason for this quite explicitly: 
In international politics,…the fact of sovereignty implies that foreign policy 
decisions and actions…derive primarily from policymakers’ role conceptions, domestic 
needs and demands, and critical events or trends in the external environment.  Generally, 
the expectations of other governments, legal norms expressed through custom, general 
                                                 
115 Ibid., 227. 
116 Ibid., 335. 
117 K. J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly  14 
(September 1970): 245-46. 
118 Ibid., 246. 
119 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 227. 
45 
 usage, or treaties, and available sanctions to enforce these, are ill-defined, flexible, or 
weak compared to those that exist in an integrated society and particularly within formal 
organizations.120
 
Holsti argues that this is particularly the case in conflict situations.  As a result, while he is quick to point 
out that this does not mean that role prescriptions have no influence on state behavior, he asserts that the 
impact of role prescriptions are best seen as “potential and intermittent.”121  Thus, state roles are 
essentially considered, by Holsti and others, as unit-level phenomena. 
Wendt argues against this tendency, and provides three reasons for considering foreign policy 
roles as having important structural sources.  First, he argues that there “is a tendency in the literature to 
take certain international institutions and their associated role identities for granted.”122  In other words, 
they are treated as unproblematically ‘real,’ not as products of social construction.  For instance, 
‘sovereign equality’ is often taken for granted as part of the state’s corporate existence.123  However, as 
Wendt points out, “the fact that the sovereignty of the modern state is recognized by other states means 
that it is now also a role identity with substantial rights and behavioral norms.”124  I argued previously 
that the sovereign state could be considered as a type of state.  However, there is a sense in which 
sovereignty may also be a role.  When the norm of sovereignty is considered legitimate, according to 
Wendt, “implicit in this legitimacy are identities as law-abiding citizens.”125  Thus, when states abide by 
the norm of sovereignty, one may consider this the enactment of a particular role – that of law-abiding 
state. 
The second reason for believing that role identity is structural addresses how roles may influence 
the effects of anarchy.  According to Wendt, there “is a presumption that the concept of role implies 
normative integration and cooperation, which are hard to come by in the ‘state of war’ of international 
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 politics.”126  However, as was already pointed out, anarchy is what states make of it – an anarchy of 
friends is very different from an anarchy of enemies.  ‘Friend’ and ‘enemy’ are roles that states take with 
respect to one another, and this may be an inherently structural phenomenon. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the purpose here, roles are heavily dependent on “the 
degree of interdependence or ‘intimacy’ between Self and Other.”127  When intimacy is low, then the 
roles taken by states may be highly susceptible to domestic political influences or other unit-level 
attributes of the state.  However, “when intimacy is high,…role identities might not be just a matter of 
choice that can easily be discarded, but positions forced on actors by the representations of significant 
Others.  In this situation even if a state wants to abandon a role it may be unable to do so because the 
Other resists out of a desire to maintain its identity.”128  Thus, role identity is more heavily dependent on 
the structure of interactions between states.  As will be discussed later in the dissertation, it is the 
structurally dependent nature of roles that offers the best opportunity for understanding the relationship 
between nationalism and conflict. 
A Word About Interests 
The mechanism by which these identities are constituted by the structure of the international 
system will be discussed in the following section.  First, however, it is necessary to briefly address the 
issue of interests.  Part of the constructivist critique of the neorealist/neoliberal reliance on rational choice 
is that such an approach largely ignores the question of interest formation.  According to Martha 
Finnemore, “aspirations to develop a generalizable theory of international politics modeled on theories in 
the natural sciences and economics have led most international relations scholars in the United States 
since the 1960s to assume rather than problematize state interests.  Interests across the state system had to 
be treated as both stable and roughly identical if system-level theory of this kind was to proceed.”129  Yet 
as she correctly points out, “interests are not just ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered; they are constructed 
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 through social interaction.”130  It is this process that constructivists attempt to better understand.  In 
essence, the constructivist critique of IR theory attempts to address Keohane’s comment, mentioned 
earlier, that a theory of interests is necessary for a more complete understanding of international politics; 
it seeks to explore how interests are shaped by state identity, which is in turn shaped by the social 
structure of the international system.   
The role of interests is an important part of the theoretical story, since “identities themselves do 
not explain action.”131  Knowing who a state is does not automatically tell you what it wants.  Yet identity 
and interest are intimately related.  “Without interests identities have no motivational force, without 
identities interests have no direction.”132  This is not to say that all interests are socially constructed.  
Some interests (e.g., survival) may be relatively free of social content.  Others (e.g., ‘keeping the world 
safe for democracy’), however, are likely to have a very strong social component.  Moreover, even non-
social interests may take on different meanings depending on the social context.  While interests derived 
from an actor’s corporate identity may not be socially constructed, “the content of even these pre-social 
interests is affected by states’ type, role…identities, which to varying degrees are constructed by the 
international system.”133  What it means for a state to survive, and in particular what is necessary for 
survival, may vary depending on the beliefs of the state.  Thus, while “the state is not a tabula rasa on 
which any interest can be written,”134 the impact that different identities may have on interests must be 
taken into consideration.  This issue will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 4.  For now, let us move 
on to the processes by which identities and interests are constituted by the international system. 
Social Practice & Learning:  The Process of Social Construction 
We have so far addressed the nature and content of system structure and the fact that this 
structure constitutes states with certain identities and interests.  It is now necessary to address the specific 
processes by which these identities and interests, and even structure itself, are constituted.  Indeed, 
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 process plays a fundamental role in constructivist theory.  For constructivists, agents and structures are 
never constants, even if they remain unchanged.  They are always subject to the possibility that new ideas 
or beliefs might alter their character, and even when this possibility is not realized the lack of change is 
the product not of constancy, but of a process of reinforcement and reproduction.  As Wendt points out, 
“structures and agents are both effects of what people do.  Social structures do not exist apart from their 
instantiation in practices….[E]ven individuals are just bodies, not ‘agents,’ except in virtue of social 
practices.”135  In order to understand what this means and what its implications are for explaining 
international politics, it is necessary to examine in more detail the relationship between agent and 
structure. 
Structure 
(International System) 
Agent A Agent B 
(State) (State) 
According to Wendt, the nature of the agent-structure relationship may best be understood 
through the concept of supervenience.  “Supervenience is a nonreductive relationship of dependency, in 
which the properties at one level are fixed or constituted by those at another, but are not reducible to 
them.”136  In other words, a relationship of supervenience is one in which the whole is more than the sum 
of its parts.  Applied to international politics this means that while the international system is constituted 
by states through their interactions, 
it is not reducible to them.  Such a 
relationship of one-way 
supervenience between agent 
(state) and structure (international 
system) is illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
This is essentially the same 
argument that Waltz makes when he states that “one cannot…arrive at an understanding of international 
politics by summing the foreign policies and the external behaviors of states.”137  Such policies may 
Figure 2.1 – One-Way Supervenience (Waltz) 
                                                 
135 Ibid., 313. 
136 Wendt, “Identity and Structural Change,” 49. 
137 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 64. 
49 
 produce an international system, but its properties cannot be reduced to them.  Although he does not use 
the term himself, Waltz’s theory involves a supervenient relationship between agent and structure. 
Structure 
(International System) 
Agent A Agent B 
(State) (State) 
Wendt takes the concept of supervenience one step further, arguing that the same process also 
operates in reverse – the properties of individual states, specifically their identities and interests, are 
constituted by the system, but 
are not reducible to it.  In 
essence, supervenience is a 
two-way street, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.2.  The system is 
created by the interaction of 
states, as in neorealism, while 
at the same time the system ‘creates’ states (i.e., constitutes them with certain identities and interests).  In 
its ‘hard’ version, this idea of ‘bilateral supervenience,’ more commonly referred to as mutual constitution 
in the constructivist literature, is seen as basically symmetrical.  It is this ‘hard’ version that Wendt 
originally laid out when he argued that agents and structures should be seen “as mutually constitutive yet 
ontologically distinct entities.  Each is in some sense an effect of the other; they are ‘co-determined.’”138
Figure 2.2 – Two-Way Supervenience (Wendt) 
 However, such an argument contains a serious ‘chicken-and-egg’ dilemma, since agents must in 
some sense exist in order to interact to form a system while at the same time a system must exist in order 
to define the agents that make it up.  In later pieces, Wendt has attempted to solve this dilemma by 
introducing a ‘soft’ version of mutual constitution.  In this version, he argues that mutual constitution is 
asymmetric, stating “the properties of states – including state identities – are, to a significant but lesser 
extent, dependent on the properties of the states system.”139  This allows for the possibility that corporate 
actors may exist and interact before a social structure develops to shape their identities and interests.  
Such an argument is in line with his interest in defending “a ‘rump’ materialism which opposes the more 
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 radical constructivist view that brute material forces have no independent effects on international 
politics.”140  We will return to this issue shortly. 
In order to understand how such a social structure may develop from the interaction of corporate 
actors, and how this structure transforms corporate actors into social actors, it is necessary to return to the 
issue of cultural selection.  As mentioned previously, cultural selection involves imitation and social 
learning.  In contrast to the natural selection focused on by Waltz, both of these selection mechanisms are 
concerned with the intentional decisions of actors.  Imitation occurs “when actors adopt the self-
understandings of those whom they perceive as ‘successful,’ and as such imitation tends to make 
populations more homogeneous.”141  This is similar to Waltz’s argument that anarchy leads states to 
become like units, except that in this case the decision is a conscious one.  As a result, imitation may have 
a much faster impact on the system, since one will not have to wait for unsuccessful states to die off. 
Another way in which social structure may affect states is through social learning.  This may take 
one of two forms – simple and complex.  In the case of simple learning, identity and interests are treated 
as constant.  Learning occurs as “the acquisition of new information about the environment enables actors 
to realize their interests more effectively.”142  This represents an essentially rationalist model of state 
learning.  However, while states may no doubt engage in simple learning, a far more interesting issue for 
Wendt (and for the author) is complex learning, which he argues has the potential to not only change the 
way states pursue their interests, but also what those interests are and the identities from which they are 
derived.  Therefore, it is necessary to examine this issue in more detail. 
According to Wendt, complex learning occurs through a process of mirroring, in which 
“identities and their corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are 
treated by significant Others.”143  In order to illustrate this concept, Wendt outlines a hypothetical first 
encounter between two corporate actors, Ego and Alter.  While they do not yet share any knowledge, 
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 “they bring two kinds of baggage, material in the form of bodies and associated needs, and 
representational in the form of some a priori ideas about who they are.”144  In their first encounter, Ego 
takes on a particular role, which “involves choosing from among the available representations of Self who 
one will be, and thus what interests one intends to pursue, in an interaction.”145  At the same time, Ego 
casts Alter “in a corresponding counter-role that makes Ego’s identity meaningful.  One cannot be a 
trader without someone to trade with, a proselytizer without a convert, or a conqueror without a 
conquest.”146  By doing so, Ego is effectively trying to define the situation as involving a particular kind 
of interaction.  Of course, the same is true for Alter; it will take a particular role and attempt to cast Ego in 
a corresponding counter-role, thereby attempting to define the situation in its own terms.  This introduces 
the possibility of a ‘role conflict.’  In the psychological literature, this refers to a situation in which 
“someone is subjected to two or more contradictory expectations whose stipulations the person cannot 
simultaneously meet in behavior.”147  In this case, however, it is used to refer to an incompatibility of the 
role that one seeks to enact and the counter-role that another actor seeks to impose.  The implications of 
such a conflict will be addressed in Chapter 4. 
During their interaction, each side acts towards the other on the basis of its own definition of the 
encounter.  In the case of Ego, the action it takes “constitutes a signal to Alter about the role that Ego 
wants to take in the interaction and the corresponding role into which it wants to cast Alter.  Ego is trying 
to ‘teach’ its definition of the situation to Alter.”148  Alter’s response will depend on its interpretation of 
Ego’s actions within the context of its own definition of the situation.  As such, signaling is likely to 
prove extremely difficult if no knowledge is shared between them that can provide the basis for common 
understanding of the situation.  The same will be true for actions taken by Alter; they represent signals to 
Ego that may or may not be understood.  In the absence of shared knowledge, interactions between actors 
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 will be plagued by miscommunication.  However, if either actor adjusts its ideas about the encounter due 
to the actions of the other, learning has occurred.  Thus, if Alter responds to Ego’s signals by adjusting its 
own role, then Ego has successfully ‘taught’ Alter its definition of the interaction. 
It is in this way that private knowledge may become shared.  Any learning that occurred in 
previous interactions will provide a foundation of knowledge in future interactions and thus make it easier 
for Ego and Alter to agree on the nature of their relationship.  This is not meant to imply cooperative 
behavior on the part of either actor; they may each agree that the situation is one of conflict, a possibility 
that will be dealt with extensively in this study.  Regardless of whether they agree that the relationship is 
cooperative or conflictual, this gives the role of ideas in international politics a structural quality “because 
when states start interacting with each other their privately held beliefs immediately become a 
‘distribution’ of knowledge that may have emergent effects.”149  As previously discussed, this distribution 
may take the form of either common or collective knowledge, depending on the depth to which 
knowledge is shared.  Learning may lead to a better understanding of each other’s preferences, interests, 
and beliefs – i.e., common knowledge.  Since this is simply an interaction-level (i.e., micro-structural) 
phenomenon, it may be relatively sensitive to changes in the interaction of Ego and Alter.  However, 
learning may also lead to collective knowledge structures whose effects are far deeper, and therefore less 
subject to change. 
In either case, whether a given social structure is sustained or altered will depend on future 
interactions.  Social structures depend on social practices for their production and reproduction.  As such, 
a few words should be said about their susceptibility to change.  On the one hand, one must remain open 
to the possibility that such practices will change over time, leading to different social structures and new 
identities.  If Ego or Alter changes its ideas about the encounter and attempts to cast themselves and the 
Other differently, the resultant interaction could lead to a change in social structure.  Without that 
possibility, social structure would be unimportant.  As Wendt points out, “if process invariably 
reproduces agents and structures in the same form then it becomes relatively uninteresting:  an essential 
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 part of the causal story yes, but one that can be safely bracketed for most purposes.”150  However, this 
does not mean that social structures are susceptible to every whim in the ‘heads’ of states.  On the 
contrary, Wendt argues “that these [social] facts might not be malleable in some historical circumstances.  
Indeed, if anything, structural change should be quite difficult.  As a self-fulfilling prophecy culture has 
natural homeostatic tendencies, and the more deeply it is internalized by actors the stronger those 
tendencies will be.”151  Thus, once knowledge becomes shared, it may be difficult to overcome. 
It is important to note that this discussion of learning does not entirely contradict rationalist 
explanations of state behavior.  However, the constructivist approach does have two main differences.  
First, while rationalists assume “that learning and perspective-taking do not change who actors are or 
what they want,…[t]he interactionist assumption is that learning and perspective-taking may also change 
identities and interests.”152  In other words, complex learning is key.  “Over time, as Alter and Ego 
mutually adjust to the representations of Self and Other conveyed in each other’s actions, their ideas 
about who they are and what they want will come to reflect the appraisals of the Other, at first perhaps for 
instrumental reasons, but increasingly internalized.”153  Moreover, even if identities and interests remain 
relatively stable over time, constructivists would argue that “they are being continually reinforced in 
interaction.”154
Second, the representation that Ego projects on Alter actively constitutes Alter with a given 
identity, and vice versa.  In essence, “through her representational practices Ego is saying to Alter, ‘you 
are an X (trader; convert; conquest), I expect you to act like an X, and I will act toward you as if you were 
an X.’  To that extent who Alter is, in this interaction, depends on who Ego thinks Alter is.”155  Moreover, 
since Ego must also attempt to see herself through Alter’s eyes in order to anticipate Alter’s reaction, “she 
is constituting or positioning herself in a particular way.  To that extent who Ego is, in this interaction, is 
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 not independent of who Ego thinks Alter thinks Ego is.”156  The same can be said of Alter with respect to 
Ego; who Ego is depends on who Alter thinks Ego is, and Alter’s own identity is dependent on who Alter 
thinks Ego thinks Alter is.  “What this means is that in initially forming shared ideas about Self and Other 
through a learning process, and then in subsequently reinforcing those ideas causally through repeated 
interaction, Ego and Alter are at each stage jointly defining who each of them is.”157
We have so far determined how knowledge can become shared through the interaction of actors, 
and how this shared knowledge may constitute the identities of the actors involved.  However, as has 
already been discussed, one can identify two different levels of social structure (micro and macro) and 
two important kinds of social identity (role and type).  It is now necessary to determine the relationship 
between these different structures and identities.  Specifically, it is the author’s contention that macro-
structure constitutes type identity, and that micro-structure constitutes role identity.  By understanding 
these dual relationships, it will be possible to develop a more complete understanding of how nationalism 
influences state behavior.   
The posited relationship between macro- and micro-structures on the one hand, and type and role 
identities on the other, is based on the way in which both levels of structure relate to one another.  Macro-
structures are characterized by ‘multiple realizability’ – meaning that “there are many combinations of 
lower-level properties or interactions that will realize the same macro-state.”158  Macro-structures are not 
reducible to micro-structures; they provide the structural parameters within which micro-structures 
operate.  Thus, “structures of collective knowledge and the patterns of behavior to which they give rise do 
not by definition change simply because their elements have changed.”159  Changes may occur in the 
interactions of states, but this will not necessarily alter the deeper social structure of the international 
system. 
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 The same may be argued for type and role identities.  Roles are a function of the relationship 
between Self and Other, and as such may be subject to change as the interactions between them changes.  
Moreover, the role that a state takes on may vary depending on the Other with which it is interacting.  
Such identities are far more narrow and specific than the type of state involved in the interaction.  Since it 
is based on the deeper macro-structure of the system, a state’s type identity is likely to remain relatively 
stable over time, while its various roles fluctuate with its interactions.  As a result, changes in macro-
structure (i.e., type identity) are likely to produce fundamental changes in international politics.  For 
instance, Hendrik Spruyt argues “that unit change imposes a particular structure on international relations.  
The structure of the system is also determined by the particular type of unit that dominates the system in a 
given historical period.  Such structure is not derivative of the interactions between units, nor is it an 
aggregation of unit-level attributes.”160  The implications of this argument will be made clear in Chapter 
4, where the constructivist concepts discussed above will be applied to the issue of nationalism and its 
impact on state behavior. 
Realist Constructivism:  Reconsidering the Importance of Power 
Before moving on to discuss constructivism and foreign policy, it is necessary to consider one 
more element of the learning process – material power.  Given the general constructivist view of 
international politics as being “ideas all the way down,”161 this may seem to be at best an unnecessary 
detour on the route toward a constructivist theory of nationalist conflict, or at worst a wholesale sellout of 
constructivism itself.  However, despite his emphasis on social structure, Wendt does not fully discount 
the importance of material power.  As he puts it, “the claim is not that ideas are more important than 
power and interest, or that they are autonomous from power and interest….The claim is rather that power 
and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up.”162  In contrast to his earlier 
position, he now maintains (not uncontroversially) that “it cannot be ideas all the way down because 
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 scientific realism shows that ideas are based on and are regulated by an independently existing physical 
reality.”163  One could make the claim that gravity is simply a socially constructed concept that constrains 
our ability to leave the Earth’s surface only because we continue to ‘practice’ it.  However, acting upon 
such a claim by jumping from the roof of a tall building would certainly have an effect independent of 
whether or not society agreed with it.  In the end, physical reality does play a role. 
For Wendt, this rump materialism is “less important and interesting than the contexts of meaning 
that human beings construct around them.”164  As he notes, “the material fact that Germany has more 
military power than Denmark imposes physical limits on Danish foreign policy toward Germany, but 
those limits will be irrelevant to their interaction if neither could contemplate war with the other.”165  In 
essence, material conditions, such as power, simply set the parameters for what is possible; ideas 
determine how states will act within those parameters.  Yet a number of scholars have begun to recognize 
the necessity of integrating constructivist concerns with identity and realist concerns with power.  For 
instance, Henry Nau argues that realism and constructivism are both incomplete. 
Realist theories, which argue that power positioning overrides cultural self-identification, 
do not deal effectively with revisionist states…whose self-image rejects the status quo 
and seeks to maximize, not balance, power.  On the other hand, constructivist theories, 
which argue that national self-images drive foreign policy irrespective of external power 
positions, do not deal adequately with performance or outcomes.  Some self-images work 
better in the ‘real world’ than others….Self-images motivate power, but they are also 
subject to it.  To evaluate outcomes, relative power remains a necessary exogenous 
factor, not a wholly endogenous product of interpretation, as some constructivist 
approaches maintain.166
 
He therefore makes the case for “combining the realist and constructivist variables of power and 
identity.”167  Similarly, J. Samuel Barkin argues that claims made by both sides that realism and 
constructivism are inherently incompatible are incorrect, and suggests the possibility of ‘realist 
constructivism’ (in contrast to ‘idealist constructivism’) that “would look at the way in which power 
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 structures affect patterns of normative change in international relations and, conversely, the way in which 
a particular set of norms affect power structures.”168
This study will adopt the realist constructivist approach, not just because it is primarily interested 
in the issue of nationalist conflict, but also because the social structures associated with nationalism, 
particularly in the case of China, cannot be divorced from considerations of material power.  In particular, 
power can have an important impact on the outcome of social learning.  Wendt points out that in the 
process of social learning “power relations play a crucial role in determining the direction in which this 
evolution unfolds.  In order for an interaction to succeed, in the sense that actors bring their beliefs 
enough into line that they can play the same game, each side tries to get the other to see things its way.  
They do so by rewarding behaviors that support their definition of the situation, and punishing those that 
do not….[W]here there is an imbalance of relevant material capability social acts will tend to evolve in 
the direction favored by the more powerful.”169  In essence, if the states concerned have relatively equal 
power, one might expect them to converge on a new set of ideas and understandings – a synthesis of their 
previous positions.  On the other hand, if the states concerned have unequal power, the less powerful state 
may be forced to adopt the ideas and understandings of the other – assimilation of one state by another.  
Citing Karl Deutsch, Wendt suggests that “power can be seen as ‘the ability to afford not to learn.’”170  
We will return to this issue in Chapter 4. 
Bringing the Agent Back In:  Constructivism & Foreign Policy Analysis 
 The central goal of this study is to use constructivist theory to examine the systemic impact of 
nationalism on foreign policy behavior.  Therefore, before moving on to discuss theories of nationalism 
and nationalist conflict – a necessary prelude to developing such an approach – it is first important to 
revisit the disciplinary divide between IP and FPA discussed earlier.  Specifically, it is necessary to 
address the question of whether a systemic approach, such as constructivism, can be used to explain 
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 and/or predict foreign policy behavior.  As previously mentioned, the desire in the 1950s to develop a 
more scientific approach to international relations produced a split in the field between those that focused 
on the level of the international system (IP) and those that focused on the level of the state (FPA).  Singer 
compared the advantages and disadvantages of the system and state levels of analysis in terms of their 
descriptive, explanatory, and predictive capabilities as follows: 
In terms of description we find that the systemic level produces a more 
comprehensive and total picture of international relations than does the national or 
subsystemic level.  On the other hand, the atomized and less coherent image produced by 
the lower level of analysis is somewhat balanced by its richer detail, greater depth, and 
more intensive portrayal.  As to explanation, there seems little doubt that the subsystemic 
or actor orientation is considerably more fruitful, permitting as it does a more thorough 
investigation of the processes by which foreign policies are made….And in terms of 
prediction, both orientations seem to offer a similar degree of promise.  Here the issue is 
a function of what we seek to predict.171
 
Of course, as already mentioned, Waltz argued that systemic theories were far better at explaining 
international politics than reductionist (i.e., subsystemic) theories.  Yet it is important to recognize the 
basis for his reasoning, and the limits he put on the explanatory abilities of his theory. 
 Waltz does not attempt to develop an all-encompassing theory of international relations.  Instead, 
he is simply interested in explaining “some big, important, and enduring patterns.”172  It is for this reason 
that he argues against explanations based on the ever-changing characteristics of individual states.  “Low-
level explanations are repeatedly defeated, for the similarity and repetition of international outcomes 
persist despite wide variations in the attributes and in the interactions of the agents that supposedly cause 
them.”173  This should not be construed as suggesting that subsystemic factors have no impact on the 
actions of individual states.  Indeed, Waltz recognizes that “nations change in form and in purpose; 
technological advances are made; weaponry is radically transformed; alliances are forged and disrupted.  
These are changes within systems, and such changes help to explain variations in international-political 
outcomes.”174  He is simply uninterested in explaining such variations.  In essence, while unit-level 
                                                 
171 Singer, “The Levels-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” 76. 
172 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 70. 
173 Ibid., 67. 
174 Ibid., 67. 
59 
 factors may influence the behavior of individual states, Waltz prefers to focus on the system-level factors 
that influence the behavior of all states. 
 As such, Waltz provides justification for the split between the study of international politics, as a 
whole, and the study of foreign policy.  For him, a theory of international politics and a theory of foreign 
policy are intended to do two very different things.  “Systems theories [theories of international politics] 
explain why different units behave similarly and, despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall 
within expected ranges.  Conversely, theories at the unit level [theories of foreign policy] tell us why 
different units behave differently despite their similar placement in a system.”175  As a result, he argues 
that the value of a system-level theory for understanding the foreign policy behavior of states is rather 
limited.  “A theory of international politics bears on the foreign policies of nations while claiming to 
explain only certain aspects of them.  It can tell us what international conditions national policies have to 
cope with.  To think that a theory of international politics can in itself say how the coping is likely to be 
done is the opposite of the reductionist error.”176
 If Waltz is correct, then one might consider it a mistake to attempt to apply a system-level theory 
to the study of nationalism’s impact on foreign policy.  However, not everyone agrees with his position.  
In his debate with Waltz over the application of neorealism to foreign policy,177 Elman argues that Waltz 
incorrectly assumes that “there is a necessary correspondence between the independent and dependent 
variables’ levels of analysis.”178  In essence, a theory of international politics can be distinguished from a 
theory of foreign policy, not only by the difference in the level of analysis of their dependent variables, 
but also by the level of analysis of their independent variables.  For a theory of international politics, this 
means that the system-level dependent variable (e.g., aggregate state behavior) is to be explained by 
system-level independent variables (e.g., anarchy).  For a theory of foreign policy, the unit-level 
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 dependent variable (e.g., individual state behavior) is to be explained by unit-level independent variables 
(e.g., domestic politics).  However, Elman argues that “categorizing theories of international politics and 
foreign policy by their independent variables is nonsensical.”179  It is entirely possible to develop theories 
of international politics that include unit-level independent variables (e.g., democratic peace theory) or 
theories of foreign policy that include system-level independent variables (e.g., neorealist discussions of 
military doctrine).180
If this is true for neorealism, then it is even truer for constructivism.  In general, constructivists 
take a dim view of the division between international politics and foreign policy.  As Kubálková points 
out, “most constructivists believe that the FPA/IP split need not have occurred and that constructivism 
provides the tools for putting the two fields back together.”181  This is due to the way constructivists 
conceptualize the agent-structure relationship.  Since they are mutually constituted, “agent and structure 
should never be torn apart nor should one be given priority over the other.”182  Despite this theoretical 
perspective, however, many constructivists have tended to focus on structures at the expense of agents, 
leading Checkel to claim that “agency has fallen through the ontological cracks.”183  He offers three 
reasons for this:  the reliance by many constructivists on sociological institutionalism, the focus on the 
role of norms in shaping state behavior, and the influence of Wendt, who has specifically advocated 
constructivism as a system-level approach.184  “The result,” according to Checkel, “is that constructivism, 
while good at the macrofoundations of behavior and identity (norms, social context), is very weak on the 
microlevel.  It fails to explore systematically how norms connect with agents.”185
Others who support a ‘thicker’ version of social construction attribute the problem to the attempt 
by scholars such as Wendt to treat constructivism as a bridge between positivist and reflectivist 
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 approaches to social science.186  Steve Smith argues that because of the prominence of Wendt’s ‘thin’ 
approach, “the radical possibilities promised by social construction are in danger of being hijacked by a 
mainstream that can assign to it an unthreatening role of being an adjunct explanation for those things that 
the positivist mainstream finds difficult to explain.”187  Smith goes so far as to claim that constructivism, 
at least in its modernist form, is much closer to the rationalist approaches it seeks to criticize than to the 
reflectivist approaches with which it claims to share a common ontological perspective.188  In particular, 
Smith is critical of Wendt’s continued utilization of a state-centric model of international politics.189  Both 
of these issues – Wendt’s almost exclusive focus on system structure and his consequent acceptance of 
the state as the primary unit of analysis – need to be addressed in more detail.   
Like Elman, Wendt distinguishes “two senses in which a theory might be considered ‘systemic’:  
when it makes the international system the dependent variable, and when it makes the international 
system the independent variable.”190  With respect to the former, Wendt argues that there is indeed a 
difference between theories of international politics and theories of foreign policy.  “It is important that 
IR do both kinds of theorizing, but their dependent variables, aggregate behavior versus unit behavior, are 
on different levels of analysis and so their explanations are not comparable.  Their relationship is 
complementary rather than competitive.”191  Despite his criticism of neorealists and neoliberals for 
discounting the way in which the international system constitutes states with particular identities and 
interests, “explaining state identities and interests is not [his] main goal.”192  Like Waltz, he remains 
concerned with understanding the international system.  Yet, like Elman, he leaves open the possibility 
that one could examine foreign policy systemically by treating the international system as an independent 
variable.  Such a theory would be systemic in the sense that “it emphasizes the causal powers of the 
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 structure of the international system in explaining state behavior….The behavior in question might be unit 
or aggregate; the systemic-reductionist distinction is usually only invoked among theories of international 
politics, but it could also be applied to theories of foreign policy.”193  As such, while constructivism may 
be a system-level approach to understanding international relations, nothing prevents it from being used 
to explain how the international system influences the foreign policy behavior of individual states.  It is 
simply necessary to consider the fact that the identities and interests that shape state behavior are not 
solely the product of constitution at the international level; a role remains for agents, even if Wendt 
himself prefers to focus his attention on structure. 
This brings us back to Smith’s criticism that Wendt is overly focused on the state as the primary 
unit of analysis.  The central question is this – when we discuss the agent-structure relationship, who or 
what is the agent?  In other words, can states be treated as corporate actors that possess identities and 
interests, or can these qualities only be ascribed to human beings?  According to Wendt, the answer to 
these questions depends on how one perceives the ontological status of the state, whether one is a 
nominalist or a scientific realist.  For nominalists, “corporate agency is just a useful fiction or metaphor to 
describe what is ‘really’ the actions of individuals.”194  For scientific realists, on the other hand, corporate 
agency “refers to a real, emergent phenomenon which cannot be reduced to individuals.”195  Wendt sees 
both as being problematic.  On the one hand, the state is unobservable; “individuals may say they belong 
to the same organization, and engage in collective action to prove it, but we never actually see the 
state.”196  On the other hand, while we may recognize that states do not in reality ‘make’ decisions, “we 
routinely explain their behavior as the ‘behavior’ of corporate agents, and these explanations work in the 
sense that they enable us to make reliable predictions about individuals.”197  Yet while he recognizes these 
problems, Wendt argues that the scientific realist approach to the problem is far more useful. 
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 For Wendt, the state does not have to be observable in order to be treated as a ‘real’ corporate 
actor.  “Like quarks, capitalism, and preferences, we know that states are real because their structure 
generates a pattern of observable effects, as anyone who denies their reality will quickly find out.”198  
Perhaps more importantly, these patterns of behavior are not reducible to the actions of the individuals 
that comprise the state.  As Wendt points out, “we normally think of states as persisting through time 
despite generational turnover, in part because their properties seem quite stable:  boundaries, symbols, 
national interests, foreign policies, and so on.  Such continuities help give temporal continuity to the 
succession of governments, enabling us to call every national government in Washington, DC for 200 
years a ‘US’ government.”199  This is not to say that states themselves never change; it is obvious that 
boundaries, interests, and policies do change to some extent over time.  The point is merely that such 
changes generally occur within a set of parameters that allows one to still identify a state as being the 
same actor, or that when such changes are drastic enough (e.g., the collapse of the Soviet Union) the 
identity of the state changes as well.  In addition, since the identities and interests of individuals will be 
constituted by the state, “we cannot make sense of the actions of governments apart from the structures of 
states that constitute them as meaningful.”200
As a result, Wendt argues that the state-centric approach to international politics common to most 
theories is perfectly acceptable.  Indeed, he argues that since “states are still the primary medium through 
which the effects of other actors on the regulation of violence are channeled into the world system…it 
makes no more sense to criticize a theory of international politics as ‘state-centric’ than it does to criticize 
a theory of forests for being ‘tree-centric.’”201  However, since Wendt is primarily concerned with 
developing theories of international politics, it is necessary to address what the state as corporate actor 
means for understanding foreign policy.  Is it appropriate to treat the state as a unitary corporate actor, 
constituted within a given social structure at the international level, for purposes of foreign policy 
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 analysis?  The answer is almost certainly ‘no.’  Wendt recognizes “that corporate agents are less unitary 
than individual ones….[B]iology gives their bodies more coherence, and constrains their action to a 
greater extent, than is the case for the discursively constituted state.”202  Thus, while it may be appropriate 
to treat states as corporate actors for purposes of theorizing about international politics as a whole, 
analyzing the foreign policies of individual states may require more attention to the ‘noise’ of domestic 
politics. 
Structure 
(International System) 
Structural Agent A Structural Agent B 
(State) (State) 
Agent A Agent B 
(Domestic Actor) (Domestic Actor) 
How then can one apply constructivism to foreign policy analysis?  The answer lies in the fact 
that the state represents a nexus between two different agent-structure relationships.  On the one hand, it 
is an agent constituted by the structure of the international system.  On the other hand, it is a structure that 
constitutes its own agents (i.e., domestic political actors) with identity and interests.  It is, for lack of a 
better term, a structural agent.  Thus, instead of a two-level agent-structure relationship, we can conceive 
of a three-level relationship between agent (domestic political actors), structural agent (state), and 
structure (international system), represented in Figure 2.3.  In essence, this is simply a reformulation of 
the levels-of-analysis issue, but with the recognition that there is a more dynamic, constitutive 
relationship between the levels, such that they cannot be fully separated.  The social structure of the 
Figure 2.3 – Three-Level Supervenience 
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 international system constitutes states with particular identities and interests, which in turn act to 
reproduce the system through their interactions; while the state constitutes domestic actors with particular 
identities and interests, which in turn act to reproduce the state through their interactions.203
Therefore, in order to develop a more complete picture of a state’s foreign policy, within a 
constructivist framework, it would be necessary to examine both sets of mutually constitutive 
relationships.  On the one hand, how are the state’s identity and interests constituted by the system, and 
what impact does this have on its behavior?  Also, how do states learn new identities and interests in the 
first place?  On the other hand, how are the state’s identity and interests constituted by the actions of 
competing domestic political actors?  Thus, while the system may constitute a state actor with certain 
identities and interests, they are likely to remain at least partially contested at the domestic level, leaving 
open the possibility that the state’s foreign policy behavior will depend on precisely how the identities 
and interests imposed on it by the system are interpreted.  While this project is primarily concerned with 
the first set of questions involving the role of social structure in constituting a state’s identity and 
interests, it will begin to address the second set of questions regarding the role of domestic actors (e.g., 
political elites) in implementing them as well.  Before we continue to develop a constructivist approach to 
understanding the impact of nationalism on state behavior, it is first necessary to examine the issue of 
nationalism.  This will be addressed in the next chapter. 
 
                                                 
203 The question of whether domestic actors are or can be constituted directly by the international system, and/or 
directly act or can act to reproduce the system, without the state as an intervening level, will be left for future debate. 
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Chapter 3. CONTENDING IMAGES OF NATIONALIST CONFLICT:  A LEVELS-
OF-ANALYSIS APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING NATIONALISM & ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 
 
 The next step in bridging the gap between IR theory and nationalism is to address the issue of 
nationalism itself, as well as existing theories of nationalist conflict.  This task is made difficult by what 
Clifford Geertz has referred to as “the stultifying aura of conceptual ambiguity that surrounds the terms 
‘nation,’ ‘nationality,’ and ‘nationalism’.”1  As the 19th century British constitutional scholar, Walter 
Bagehot, once wrote, “we know what [a nation] is when you do not ask us, but we cannot very quickly 
explain or define it.”2  Extensive study on the subject has done very little to change this; the nation 
remains as “tantalisingly ambiguous”3 as ever.  Indeed, Walker Connor has argued that decades of 
research have not only failed to solve this problem, but have actually made it worse as “the linguistic 
jungle that encapsules the concept of nationalism has only grown more dense.”4  As such, Eric 
Hobsbawm has concluded that “the chief characteristic of [the nation] is that…no satisfactory criterion 
can be discovered for deciding which of the many human collectivities should be labeled in this way.”5
 Given this state of affairs, it should perhaps not be surprising that, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
question of what nationalism is has tended to overshadow the question of what its political effects are.  
Yet while the author’s main purpose is to address the latter issue of effect, the former question of what 
nationalism is cannot be left unanswered, since how we conceive of nationalism will inevitably have 
serious consequences for how we explain its effects on state behavior.  This chapter will therefore seek to 
                                                 
1 Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution:  Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,” in Old 
Societies and New States:  The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Geertz  (New York:  The Free 
Press, 1963), 107. 
2 Cited in E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780:  Programme, Myth, Reality, 2d ed.  (Cambridge:  
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 map out the conceptual terrain by first examining the problem of conceptual ambiguity, and then outlining 
the various theoretical perspectives of nationalism and the implications they have for our understanding of 
state behavior.  The analytical framework to be used, based on levels of analysis, will provide a simple, 
yet accurate means for explaining existing theories of nationalism and nationalist conflict, and identifying 
important theoretical omissions, in such a way as to hopefully make the tangled web of competing 
arguments more approachable for IR scholars.  This will help set the stage for showing how a 
constructivist (IR) approach to nationalism can fill in many of the gaps in our understanding of its impact 
on state behavior. 
What is a Nation?:  The Problem of Conceptual Ambiguity 
 If our interest is to develop a better understanding of how nationalism influences state behavior, 
then the ambiguity that surrounds the concept represents a serious challenge.  After all, using nationalism 
as a variable in explaining international conflict requires a certain level of conceptual clarity.  It is 
therefore not surprising that without it the discussion of nationalism and foreign policy has rarely moved 
beyond untested assertions.  The reasons for this conceptual ambiguity are varied.  For one thing, 
nationalism is a subject that is of interest to scholars in various disciplines, including historians, political 
scientists, sociologists, and psychologists,6 that do not necessarily communicate easily with each other, 
making it difficult to agree on a set of standard definitions.  This is further complicated by “the preferred 
remedy [of] adopt[ing] a theoretical eclecticism that, in its attempt to do justice to the multifaceted nature 
of the problems involved, tends to confuse political, psychological, cultural, and demographic factors.”7  
In addition, some scholars use the terms inconsistently, contributing to a general lack of terminological 
precision.8   
However, while they may contribute to the problem, the real source of the ambiguity surrounding 
the concepts of nation and nationalism is not the scholars seeking to make sense of them, but the nature of 
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 the concepts themselves.  As many have pointed out, the nation lies in a conceptual limbo between 
objective reality and subjective perceptions of reality that makes easy definition all but impossible.9  On 
the one hand, it is a social group whose membership is determined by the existence of some set of shared 
characteristics, such as ethnicity (itself an ambiguous term), language, religion, or other aspects of 
culture, that distinguishes it from other groups.  On the other hand, such ‘objective’ criteria are 
meaningless unless those sharing them recognize them as important.  Thus, the nation can be seen as 
either an essentially permanent social group that “exists in nature, outside time [as] one of the ‘givens’ of 
human existence” or as a contingent one dependent on “attitude, perceptions and sentiments that are 
necessarily fleeting and mutable, varying with the particular situation of the subject.”10
Unfortunately, neither perspective is particularly satisfying by itself.  As Hobsbawm has pointed 
out, “objective definitions have failed, for the obvious reason that, since only some members of the large 
class of entities which fit such definitions can at any time be described as ‘nations’, exceptions can always 
be found.”11  Some entities may possess elements of shared culture, but intuitively do not seem to be 
nations, and vice versa.  This is particularly true when one considers which criteria are necessary for 
nationhood.  Is the presence of only one or two criteria sufficient to define a nation (e.g., language or 
religion), or are all needed?  Might not the defining criteria differ from nation to nation?  In addition, the 
fact that such criteria “are themselves fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous”12 must call into question their very 
objectivity.  For instance, how does one define French culture in an objective way that can then be used to 
define the French nation? 
At the same time, however, defining a nation based purely on subjective grounds is equally 
unsatisfying.  As with objective definitions, “if we define nations as groups which will themselves to 
persist as communities, the definition-net that we have cast into the sea will bring forth far too rich a 
                                                 
9 For discussions of this, see Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism  (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1983); 
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 catch.”13  It would apply not just to nations, but also “to many other clubs, conspiracies, gangs, teams, 
parties, not to mention the many numerous communities and associations of the pre-industrial age which 
were not recruited and defined according to the national principle and which defy it.”14  In addition, such 
an attempt may quickly become tautological.  “To define a nation by the existence of ‘national 
consciousness’ or some analogous sense of solidarity between its members, merely amounts to saying that 
a nation is what behaves like a nation.”15  Finally, “it can lead the incautious into extremes of 
volunteerism which suggests that all that is needed to be or to create or recreate a nation is the will to be 
one.”16
Scholars have responded to the problem of whether the nation is objective or subjective in various 
ways.  Some provide definitions only after extensive discussions aimed at justifying them.  According to 
Eugene Kamenka, “definitions, if they are useful at all, come at the end of an inquiry and not at the 
beginning.  In the study of history and society they provide no substitute for grasping a phenomenon in all 
the complexity of its historical and social development.”17  Similarly, Hobsbawm makes the case that 
“agnosticism is the best initial posture of a student in this field” and therefore “assumes no a priori 
definition of what constitutes a nation.”18  Ernest Gellner begins his book with a “discussion of two very 
makeshift, temporary definitions”19 on which he does not elaborate until later. 
Others are little concerned with problems of definition at all, and indeed see attempts to nail 
down what a nation is as essentially counterproductive to the enterprise of understanding such a complex 
phenomenon.  According to John Hall, “no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible.  As the 
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 historical record is diverse so too must be our concepts.”20  He argues that, like economic development, 
nationalism has essentially “been imitative, seeking to copy something whose dimensions were broadly 
known.”21  As such, it is largely idiosyncratic, having “been affected by particular historical combinations 
of analytic factors, whose conjunction may not recur.”22  A similar point was made by A. W. Orridge, 
who argued that “it is pointless to expect more than a limited relationship between all the various kinds of 
nationalism or to hope that some clear-cut classification will encompass all the diverse situations in which 
the concept of nationality and the relationship between nationality and state have been important.”23  
David McCrone agrees, asking “on reflection, why should there be [agreement on definitions]?  Like 
many/most concepts in social sciences, conceptual definitions and differences are theoretically rooted.”24  
Thus we should expect definitions of nationalism to vary with the theoretical perspective being used. 
While there may be some truth to the idea that no single definition can fully encompass the 
complex realities that have given rise to nations around the world, such a position is at the very least 
problematic for (and perhaps fatal to) any prospects of advancing discussions from what a nation is to 
what it means for international politics.  Therefore, the author will take Gellner’s approach and provide 
basic definitions of the terms to be used, along with further elaboration to more fully delineate their 
meanings.  The definitions to be used are relatively common ones.  However, two caveats must be noted.  
First, these definitions are not meant to provide closure to the debates surrounding them; it is doubtful 
that this is possible.  Second, and perhaps most importantly, it must be recognized that no definition of 
these terms, no matter how clear-cut, can fully reconcile their inherent duality as concepts that possess 
both objective and subjective elements; this tension between the objective and the subjective is ever 
present in the literature on nationalism, as will become readily apparent in the coming pages. 
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 With these caveats in mind, this study will employ the following basic definitions.  A nation will 
be defined as a social group whose members identify with each other on the basis of some set of ethnic, 
linguistic, religious, or other cultural similarities, and view this collectivity as the highest object of 
political loyalty.  The feelings of solidarity that link the members of a nation with each other and allow 
them to identify themselves as belonging to a common group will be termed national identity.  
Nationalism is the ideology that gives political expression to this identity by holding that the nation is the 
highest object of political loyalty, and therefore must be defended.  These definitions are of necessity 
somewhat general.  The reason for this is, as Smith contends, “that nationalism is most fruitfully 
conceptualised as a single category containing subvarieties, genus and species, a diversity within a unity.  
That is, all nationalisms show certain basic features which mark the elements of the category, but various 
additional features are present in some cases, and other features in other cases, leading to a convenient 
grouping of cases in subtypes.”25  As a result, Smith and others have attempted to develop various 
typologies to help deal with the diversity of the subject matter.26   
However, this study is less concerned with different varieties of nationalism than with different 
theories of nationalism, and the implications these theories have for our understanding of how 
nationalism influences state behavior.  Therefore, the author will attempt to classify these theories in such 
a way as to explore what nationalism is in greater depth, and that makes the task of addressing existing 
views on nationalist conflict relatively straightforward.  One approach would be to consider their 
perspective on the objective/subjective nature of the nation.  At one end of the spectrum would be theories 
that treat the nation as an objective fact; at the other end would be theories that treat the nation as entirely 
subjective.  For instance, Adeed Dawisha and David Brown have both identified three basic approaches to 
nationalism – primordialist, constructivist, and instrumentalist.27  The first treats the nation as an 
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 essentially real, objective entity rooted in human nature, while the second treats them as fundamentally 
subjective, socially constructed ones.  The instrumentalist approach lies between the other two, treating 
the nation as a “‘purposeful construction,’”28 the product of manipulation by political actors in pursuit of 
other interests. 
 The classification employed in this study is similar, but is more adapted to the task of 
investigating the effects of nationalism on foreign policy behavior.  Specifically, the author will 
categorize theories of nationalism based on levels of analysis (see Chapter 2).  In other words, is 
nationalism best attributed to human nature, to the characteristics of states, or to the dynamics of the 
international system?  This method fits well with the objective/subjective typology; primordialism and 
instrumentalism essentially represent first and second image approaches to nationalism, respectively, 
while constructivism essentially addresses the relationship between them.  As such, it is an effective 
means for examining nationalism in more detail, providing unfamiliar readers with some background to 
the literature on the subject.  In addition, a classification based on levels of analysis has an added 
advantage:  since it is derived from the study of international relations, such an approach to nationalism 
can more clearly illustrate existing perspectives on nationalist conflict, as well as any major gaps that may 
exist therein. 
Human Nature & the Origins of Nations:  First Image Theories of Nationalism & Conflict 
 The first level of analysis to examine is the individual level, or what Kenneth Waltz has termed 
the first image.  In his discussion of the causes of war, Waltz defines first image theories as those that 
identify “the locus of the important causes of war…in the nature and behavior of man.”29  In the study of 
nationalism, one can similarly define first image theories as those based on the belief that it is rooted in 
human nature, a perspective commonly referred to as primordialism.  Originally coined by Edward 
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 Shils,30 this has been adopted as “an ‘umbrella’ term used to describe scholars who hold that nationality is 
a ‘natural’ part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell, and that nations have existed since 
time immemorial.”31  Primordialism thus lies at the objective end of the definitional spectrum – it 
represents the view that nations are real communities with deep historical roots, and whose existence can 
be determined through the identification of some set of more or less objective criteria, such as ethnicity, 
language, religion, or other aspects of shared culture.  Moreover, these ties are believed to “possess a 
prior, overriding, and determining influence on people’s lives, one that is largely immune to ‘rational’ 
interest and political calculation.”32
In its most extreme form, the primordialist perspective sees the nation as not only the product of a 
natural division of human beings into distinct communities, but one that is divinely inspired.  For early 
nationalist writers, such as Johann Herder, Johann Fichte, and Giuseppe Mazzini, “God had created the 
nations as part of His divine plan.”33  Such arguments have long since been discarded from serious social 
scientific inquiry.  However, less extreme versions of primordialism have continued to inform scholarly 
discussions of nationalism.  While generally agreeing that the nation is somehow fundamental to human 
nature, they differ regarding the specific source of the primordial attachments that comprise it.  Such 
differences are not always made explicitly.34  Nonetheless a number of distinct primordialist approaches 
may be identified.  Smith and Umut Özkirimli both identify organicist (which Özkirimli labels 
‘naturalist’), sociobiological, and cultural approaches,35 while Virginia Tilley identifies biological, 
psychological, and cultural approaches.36  The variations of primordialism employed in this study – 
ethnic, psychological, and cultural – are adapted from these typologies.  The term ‘ethnic primordialism’ 
will be used to refer to those approaches, such as organicism and sociobiology, that are based on notions 
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 of common ancestry.  Psychological primordialism refers to approaches that see the nation as grounded in 
the human tendency to form group attachments.  Both of these will be discussed below.  For reasons that 
will be made clear later, cultural primordialism will be addressed toward the end of the chapter. 
Ethnic Primordialism:  The Nation as Kin Group 
Perhaps the most basic way of understanding primordial attachments to the nation is to view it as 
a community based on common ancestry.37  The anthropologist, Charles Keyes, has argued  
what is ‘primordial’ in human relations is not any particular set of cultural attributes, 
whatever attributes might be chosen.  What is given are the facts of birth – sex, biological 
features, time of birth, place of birth, and descent.  Each of these facts of birth have long 
provided humans with the basis for making distinctions among their fellow humans since 
those believed to share common features fixed by birth are held to be of the same 
‘kind.’38
 
For Keyes, the most important of these is shared descent, which he argues “is basic…to the concept of 
ethnic group.”39  The ethnic model of the nation as “a community of birth and native culture”40 has often 
been associated with the development of nationalism, particularly in the non-Western world.  Indeed, 
Walker holds that nationalism “in its pristine sense” can only be understood as ethnonationalism,41 
arguing that the proliferation of alternative conceptions (e.g., religious nationalism) unnecessarily 
worsens the definitional problems that already exist in the literature. 
Whether or not the common ancestry on which the nation is based is real in the genealogical 
sense is open to question.  Some scholars have dismissed considerations of ancestry as an important factor 
for defining nations because “most national groups could be shown to be the variegated offspring of a 
number of peoples.”42  But as Connor responds, “it is not what is, but what people believe is that has 
behavioral consequences.”43  Thus, Keyes has argued that “while…ethnicity is a form of kinship 
reckoning, it is one in which connections with forebears or with those with whom one believes one shares 
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 descent are not traced along precisely genealogical lines.”44  Geertz has referred to this as ‘quasi-kinship’ 
“because kin units formed around known biological relationship[s]…are too small for even the most 
tradition-bound to regard them as having more than limited significance, and the referent is, consequently, 
to a notion of untraceable yet sociologically real kinship.”45  As Smith puts it, “it is myths of common 
ancestry, not any fact of ancestry…, that are crucial.”46
On the other hand, many sociobiologists have taken the position that nations do indeed represent 
a kind of extended family, providing a biological basis for nationalism.  Sociobiology is, in essence, “the 
systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior.”47  As such, sociobiological explanations of 
nationalism are perhaps the most heavily grounded in the view that nations represent naturally occurring 
social communities.  Although initially concerned with social behavior in animals, the main concepts of 
sociobiology have been applied to humans as well.48  The central question that it poses is as follows:  
“why are animals social, that is, why do they cooperate?”49  Sociobiologists answer this question by 
arguing that sociality has an evolutionary basis (i.e., it provides members with a survival advantage).  At 
first blush this may seem counterintuitive, since individuals with a propensity for altruism might be 
expected to decrease their chances of passing on their genes to offspring.  However, sociobiologists 
address this problem by extending the ways in which an individual may pass on its genes, arguing that 
“an animal can duplicate its genes directly through its own reproduction, or indirectly through the 
reproduction of relatives with which it shares specific proportions of genes.”50  This latter process is 
referred to as ‘inclusive fitness.’ 
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 The addition of inclusive fitness criteria has important implications for human behavior.  Since 
individuals have a genetic interest in the propagation of not only themselves, but also their relatives, they 
“can be expected to behave cooperatively, and thereby enhance each other’s fitness to the extent that they 
are genetically related.”51  Thus, they have an evolutionary incentive to favor their own kin.  According to 
Pierre van den Berghe, this process of kin selection may be extended beyond immediate kin groups to 
provide the foundation for ethnicity and race.  He argues that 
ethnic groups, for nearly all of human history, were what geneticists call breeding 
populations, in-breeding superfamilies, in fact, which not only were much more closely 
related to each other than to even their closest neighbors, but which, almost without 
exception, explicitly recognized that fact, and maintained clear territorial and social 
boundaries with other such ethnic groups.52
 
While recognizing that some level of interbreeding always occurred between groups (and indeed would 
be necessary to maintain genetic viability), van den Berghe argues that “kinship was real often enough to 
become the basis of these powerful sentiments we call nationalism, tribalism, racism, and 
ethnocentrism.”53  In other words, even when groups interacted and interbred, individuals would continue 
to identify with their kin group.  Sociobiology therefore provides some evidence for believing that nations 
are based on common ancestry, and for the primordialist view that nations are real communities rooted in 
human nature. 
 This approach to nationalism has distinct advantages and disadvantages.  Although not explicitly 
supporting the sociobiological perspective, Connor has argued that viewing the nation as a form of 
kinship “qualitatively distinguishes national consciousness from nonkinship identities (such as those 
based on religion or class) with which it has too often been grouped.”54  This may help to avoid much of 
the conceptual ambiguity that surrounds nationalism by providing a more narrowly focused set of criteria 
for defining a nation.  In addition, he argues that “an intuitive sense of kindredness or extended family 
would explain why nations are endowed with a very special psychological dimension – an emotional 
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 dimension – not enjoyed by essentially functional or juridical groupings, such as socioeconomic classes 
or states.”55  In essence, seeing nations as a kin group may make it easier to understand why they can 
invoke such strong emotional attachments. 
 However, while the ethnic view of primordialism may provide a good starting point, each of these 
purported advantages entails a distinct problem.  First of all, kinship does not go far enough in narrowing 
the class of entities that could be considered nations.  While sociobiology may provide an evolutionary 
basis for understanding how and why human beings form social groups, it does not indicate the specific 
form that such groups will take.  Defining the nation based on myths of common ancestry, while not 
inaccurate, fails to fully differentiate it from other forms of social organization (e.g., tribes, clans, etc.) 
that may be based on those same myths – i.e., all nations may be based on myths of common ancestry, but 
not all such entities are necessarily nations.  Thus, myths of common ancestry represent a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition for the development of nations.56
 The same is true if one considers the mechanism by which members of a nation recognize each 
other as belonging to an extended kin group.  Such recognition is necessary if the group is to perpetuate 
its existence.  However, sociobiologists like van den Berghe make no attempt to argue “that we have a 
gene for ethnocentrism, or for recognizing kin.”57  Instead, they recognize that the precise method by 
which we select kin has more to do with culture than biology.  As Michael Hechter points out, “whenever 
individuals or groups from different social formations come into each other’s presence, they become 
aware of a host of differences that separate them, differences including language, demeanor, dress, music, 
cuisine, style of life, physiognomy, and values.”58  Such cultural attributes, Keyes and van den Berghe 
agree, serve as important outward markers of common descent.  Yet for them, “culture is merely a 
proximate explanation of why people behave ethnocentrically and nepotistically.”59  Cultural markers 
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 merely represent surrogates for the real selection criterion of kinship.  This helps explain why some 
nations may be based on language and others on religion; markers may differ, but the basic mechanism 
remains the same.  As Keyes puts it, “what is common to all ethnic groups is not any particular set of 
cultural attributes but the idea of shared descent.”60
 Yet if cultural markers play such an important role in defining the nation, one may question the 
utility of pursuing sociobiological explanations.  Even if culture is only a proximate explanation, it may in 
the end be a far more important one, since it allows for variations.  As Keyes recognizes, “while ethnicity 
may rest on a universal predilection of humans to select positively in favor of their own kinsmen, it also is 
variable because of the diverse cultural meanings that people in different historical circumstances have 
drawn upon in interpreting and in action upon this predilection.”61  Similarly, Robin Dunbar has argued 
“that sociobiology only provides a framework within which explanations of particular behavioural 
phenomena can be made.”62  In the end, “the expression of the underlying ethnocentric traits will be 
heavily dependent on the socio-economic context.”63  As such, biology remains a necessary but not 
sufficient condition.  We will return to the issue of culture later. 
 The necessity for recognizing the emotional sentiments that are attached to nationalism introduces 
a second major problem for the sociobiological approach, namely that the psychological element it 
introduces may in fact overshadow kinship relations in importance.  Regardless of any kernel of truth that 
may be behind it, the fact that the myth of common ancestry is more important to the foundation of the 
nation than any genealogical reality demonstrates the key role of perception in defining the nation.  As 
Smith points out,  
primordial attachments rest on perception, cognition, and belief.  It is individual members 
who assume that these cultural features are givens, who attribute overwhelming 
importance to these ties, who feel an overpowering sense of coerciveness, and so on.  
They possess a power beyond rational calculation and interest – because people attribute 
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 that power and meaning to them, not because of the nature of the primordial ties in 
itself.64
 
Connor makes the same point when he states that “tangible characteristics such as religion and language 
are significant to the nation only to the degree to which they contribute to this notion or sense of the 
group’s self-identity and uniqueness.”65  In fact, he argues, “a nation can lose or alter any or all of its 
outward characteristics without losing its sense of vital uniqueness which makes it a nation.”66  Thus, 
while nations may indeed be based on perceived kinship relations, it is these perceptions, not the kinship 
itself, that is important for understanding nationalism.  In that case, nationalism becomes a matter of 
psychology, not biology. 
Psychological Primordialism:  The Nation as In-Group 
 The importance of perception and emotional feelings of group loyalty in defining the nation has 
led some scholars to address its psychological underpinnings.  In fact, despite his focus on the importance 
of kinship, Connor argues that “the essence of the nation is a psychological bond that joins a people and 
differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most vital 
way.”67  According to him, this point is too often overlooked due to the fact that the “tangible elements” 
of the nation are often more easily identified and studied, and because they are so often linked to 
nationalist struggles by nationalists themselves.68  As such, the psychological approach to nationalism has 
often been ignored. 69  Yet as Snyder points out, “psychological analysis is not only possible but necessary 
in dealing with the meaning of nationalism.”70   
 Psychological explanations of nationalism are based on the recognition that human beings seem 
to display a natural tendency to develop group attachments.  As Hayes once put it, “man is a social 
animal, not so much in that he is indiscriminately social with all men as in that he is peculiarly social with 
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 particular groups of men.  He seems always to have been drawn naturally to some special group and to 
have displayed a marked loyalty to it.”71  These group attachments help the individual to satisfy 
“economic, sociocultural, and political needs, giving individuals a sense of security, a feeling of 
belonging, and prestige.”72  Although for some of these needs (e.g., physical security) the role of the 
group may be purely instrumental, requiring little in the way of psychological explanation, others are 
more deeply rooted in the human psyche. 
Yet some would argue that even security has a psychological dimension.  “Need for safety 
encompasses bodily safety, absence of physical threat, and psychological security, which rests or – more 
exactly – is derived from the ‘predictable world’ encompassing the understanding of what will happen 
around us and how people will behave toward us.”73  This need for predictability is based on a human 
being’s limited cognitive capacity.  As Martha and Richard Cottam remind us, “cognitive psychologists 
have argued that people must impose organization on the social environment in order to manage its 
complexities.”74  One way in which this is done is by categorizing.  “At its simplest level, categorization 
involves the placing of a particular object, or entity, within a general category.”75  This allows the 
individual to simplify his or her environment in order to make decision-making easier.  Without such 
simplification, the decision-making process would be too complex and time consuming.76
The process of categorization has important implications for our understanding of nationalism.  
As Dusan Kecmanovic points out, “one of the key properties of social categories is that they 
simultaneously include and exclude:  they at once indicate what one is and what one is not.”77  Thus, by 
categorizing individuals on the basis of relevant similarities and differences (e.g., cultural markers), in-
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 groups and out-groups are established.  Experiments have demonstrated “that the mere classification of 
people into groups evokes biases in favor of one’s own group.  Just by being told that one belongs to a 
particular group as opposed to another – even if one has never seen or met any other members of that 
group – is enough to make the individual prefer the group over others.”78  This holds true even when 
categorization involves ‘minimal groups’ that are “purely perceptual or cognitive,”79 and when neither 
competition nor conflict is present.80  These experiments have also shown that in-group bias results in a 
preference for relative over absolute gains.81
A number of theories have been developed to explain these results.  Social identity theory focuses 
on the way in which group membership enhances an individual’s self-esteem.  “It assumes that people are 
motivated to evaluate themselves positively and that in so far as they define themselves in terms of some 
group membership they will be motivated to evaluate that group positively.”82  In fact, how they define 
themselves relative to the group may be far more important to enhancing their self-esteem than how they 
define themselves in terms of their personal identity – “the idiosyncratic characteristics which distinguish 
us from other individuals.”83  Kecmanovic explains this as follows: 
To improve the latter, [individuals] must improve their own performances, bringing them 
into a more desirable state.  There is, however, another, more comfortable and easier way 
to achieve the same goal.  Individuals can overvalue the qualities, virtues, skills, and so 
on of their own group members, and through such a ‘mental trick’ enhance their positive 
self-image.84
 
As a result, “nationalism links individuals’ self-esteem to the esteem in which the nation is held.  Loyalty 
and identification with the nation become tied to one’s own sense of self.”85
In contrast to social identity theory’s focus on the role of group membership in enhancing self-
esteem, self-categorization theory “places greater emphasis on the nature of the categorization process 
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 that occurs when people identify with groups.”86  In essence, this is a reemphasis “on the cognitive 
aspects of social identification.”87  Categorization involves the identification of a prototype “that 
corresponds to what the group has in common and to what differentiates it from another group.”88  This 
prototype serves as an ideal reference point for the members of the group.  As a result, “self-categories 
provide the values, norms and understandings that guide what members do and don’t do.”89
 Whatever the specific explanation, the natural tendency for human beings to form and identify 
with groups provides evidence for a psychological basis for nationalism.  However, such psychological 
explanations possess problems similar to those of sociobiology.  First, they remain too general.  While 
psychology may help to explain why human beings form groups, it says little about what kind of groups 
will be formed or why the nation should be a more salient group than others.  Self-categorization theory, 
in particular, recognizes that individuals may belong to several groups whose importance to the 
individual’s identity will vary depending on circumstances.  One may identify oneself as a member of 
several groups – citizens of the United States, residents of the state of Maryland, fans of the Pittsburgh 
Steelers – but such group identification does not automatically denote a nation.  Thus, as with 
sociobiology, human psychology may be a necessary condition for nationalism, but it is not sufficient to 
explain why the nation (as opposed to one’s favorite football team) is so often the ultimate object of 
loyalty. 
 Harold Isaacs attempted to explain this by arguing that the nation represents a ‘basic group 
identity,’ one that is more fundamental than other groups (e.g., class, educational, occupational) because it 
“consists of the readymade set of endowments and identifications that every individual shares with others 
from the moment of birth by the chance of the family into which he is born at that given time in that given 
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 place.”90  In that respect it bares similarities with the sociobiological approach; loyalty to the nation is a 
matter of kinship.  However, instead of basing his argument on biology, Isaacs focused on socialization.  
From birth, an individual is socialized to see itself as a member of a particular group.  He puts it as 
follows: 
The baby acquires a name, an individual name, a family name, a group name, a first 
symbol for the new child in the language through which he will discover his world.  He is 
already a product of the history and origins, of which by being born to this family in this 
place at this time, he becomes heir.  He automatically acquires the religion of his family 
and his group and he becomes at once an acknowledged holder of the nationality or other 
condition of national, regional, or tribal affiliation his people hold.91
 
Thus, national identity holds a special place for most individuals because they have been socialized to it 
from birth. 
 However, this introduces a second problem, namely that it begins to call into question the 
primordialism of national feelings.  As Kecmanovic points out, “national feeling is not given by birth (by 
nature) but is rather sociopsychologically conditioned; that is, it develops in the course of the individual’s 
existence.” 92  If that is the case, then it is a serious mistake to assume that nationalism is an inherent part 
of human nature.  Those who study the psychological roots of nationalism are themselves quick to 
recognize the limits of such an approach.  While providing an important necessary condition, a full 
understanding of nationalism requires one to go beyond psychology.  Reicher and Hopkins summarize 
this point as follows: 
Social identity theory will be profoundly misunderstood and misrepresented if one 
forgets the key proviso:  differentiation occurs on valued dimensions of comparison.  
What is valued depends upon the specific category that one is dealing with.  It is a 
function of cultural and not psychological factors….Therefore, in order to understand 
how groups behave towards each other one cannot be content with looking at 
psychological processes in the abstract.  Rather, one must look at how general processes 
manifest themselves within the specific context of concern.93
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 This is particularly important given the fact that the particular manifestations of group identity may 
change over time.  As Isaacs points out, “basic group identity is not as fixed and crusted as it can come to 
seem when one discusses it in shorthand ways.  On the contrary, it is remarkably dynamic, in an almost 
constant state of becoming.”94  Thus, the nation is not a static unit of social organization that can be taken 
for granted.  While the natural tendency to form groups may be rooted in psychology, or biology, the 
specific nature of group membership and loyalty depends on the circumstances in which it develops.  We 
will return to this point later. 
The First Image of Nationalist Conflict:  Primordialism & Its Implications for State Behavior 
 The primordialist perspective described above has important implications for our understanding 
of how nationalism influences state behavior, particularly the propensity for interstate conflict.  From the 
standpoint of ethnic primordialism, ethnic or nationalist conflicts are often attributed to ‘ancient hatreds.’  
However, the question is why the division of humans into different kin groups would necessarily produce 
conflict between them.  After all, the favoring of one’s own kin does not necessarily require hostility 
towards others.  As Vernon Reynolds points out, “relations between more distant groups would be 
characterized by indifference or perhaps even lack of goodwill, but they could still be neutral.”95  
Reynolds addresses this problem by introducing the element of resource competition.  According to him, 
the potential for hostility arises when “resource availability [becomes] a crucial determinant of the 
survival prospects of individuals and groups.”96  Throughout history, human beings have been forced to 
compete for scarce resources, often aggressively, in order to ensure the survival of their own kin group.  
As a result, ethnic attachments have acquired a sense of individual and group survival. 
 This is the basic argument made by R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, who take a distinctly 
evolutionary approach to understanding warfare.  They argue that humans and their propensity for 
warfare have evolved together over time in response to changes in their environment.  Over millions of 
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 years humans “have evolved the capacity to respond aggressively to threats…[which] become operative 
when prompted by appropriate stimuli and environment.”97  Specifically, the demands of competition for 
scarce resources would have forced early humans to form close-knit kin groups for purposes of mutual 
defense and survival, and would have sometimes required these groups to engage in conflict to do so.  Of 
course, Shaw and Wong are quick to point out that this does not imply that humans are “genetically 
determined or inherently driven to fight.”98  However, they do maintain that such evolutionary 
foundations represent the ultimate cause – i.e., “the underlying reason for an activity existing in an 
animal’s repertoire of behavior”99 – of warfare. 
 Although such approaches to understanding warfare are not uncommon,100 Shaw and Wong 
specifically apply it to the problem of nationalist conflict.  They argue that early groups of humans would 
have needed to band together in ever-larger groups in order to ensure their security and survival.  
According to them, “it is by this process that out-group enmity and ethnocentrism have been reinforced 
and carried over from nucleus ethnic group to band, to tribe, to chiefdom, to nation-state.”101  This helps 
to provide the necessary link between the sociobiological responses of individuals and small groups (i.e., 
concerns of inclusive fitness), and the behaviors of nations.  In essence, “the inclusive fitness logic of 
nationalism bonds individual concerns for family and kin with those of the nation.  Inclusive fitness and 
kin selection dictate the family unit as the center of love and solidarity throughout evolution.  Now,…the 
nation is similarly conceived.”102  Thus, while in-group biases arising from concerns for inclusive fitness 
might be more commonly applied to small groups, “nationalism has effectively mobilized these same 
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 biases to operate at the level of the nation.”103  Since such biases are seen as a potential cause of conflict 
between groups, Shaw and Wong conclude that “nationalism has emerged as a powerful vestige of 
humanity’s propensity for war.”104
 From the standpoint of psychological primordialism, the potential for nationalist conflict arises 
primarily from in-group/out-group biases, regardless of whether such biases are grounded in any form of 
shared kinship.  As mentioned earlier, association with an in-group provides an important source of 
individual identity and self-esteem.  Ronald Glossup argues that “people want their own nation-state to 
have a high status; they feel good when their country has the highest gross national product or…the 
largest number of nuclear warheads.  People feel bad when their country falls behind others in these and 
other categories.”105  As a result, Cottam and Cottam argue that strong identification with an in-group will 
make such a group “more vigilant regarding and sensitive to insults, frustrations, and aggressive action by 
out-groups.”106  Similarly, Kecmanovic argues that “the frustration of so-called primary or vital instincts” 
can raise man’s innate aggressive potential.107  Among these vital instincts he includes the desire “to 
retain one’s frame of reference because it, directly and/or indirectly, supplies one’s sense of identity.”108  
Thus, perceived slights from an out-group may be interpreted as a threat to one’s identity, potentially 
resulting in a violent reaction. 
The State & the Development of Nations:  Second Image Theories of Nationalism & 
Conflict 
 In contrast to the first image focus on human nature, second image explanations of interstate 
conflict are based on the belief that “the internal organization of states is the key to understanding war and 
peace.”109  Similarly, second image theories of nationalism see the nation, not as an inherent part of 
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 human existence, but as contingent on specific social and political conditions.  In broad terms, this relates 
to the fact that most scholars maintain that nationalism is the product of a specific stage of history – i.e., it 
is a uniquely modern phenomenon.  Specifically, nations and nationalism are generally seen as the result 
of various changes associated with the rise of the modern state.  In narrower terms, some scholars support 
the idea that they are the product of, and are continually subject to, the conscious manipulation of 
domestic political elites.  Whether the changes that produced the nation are seen as the result of natural 
social processes or purposeful political action, second image theories of nationalism derive their 
explanations from the internal characteristics of states.  Each of these sets of arguments will be addressed 
in turn. 
Nationalism & Modernity:  The Nation as Product of Historical Change 
The fact that nations are a uniquely modern phenomenon may not be readily apparent.  After all, 
it is certainly possible to identify social groups throughout history that have defined themselves as distinct 
entities on the basis of some cultural affinity or sense of kinship.  Yet most scholars today do not 
recognize such groups as representing full-fledged nations.110  As Orridge observed, “ancient Greeks and 
Germans were aware that they were different from other peoples, but their political units were cities and 
tribes, often in bitter conflict with one another, and only external threat produced even temporary 
unity.”111  Instead, Hobsbawm refers to such entities as proto-nations,112 while Smith uses the term ethnic 
cores or ethnies.113  While they might provide the necessary foundations on which future nations could be 
built, they generally remained far too heterogeneous to qualify as nations themselves.  This is not to say 
that modern nations are so homogeneous that they have eliminated all competing group identities; such is 
obviously not the case.  Indeed, when such identities become too strong, they may override or even 
replace broader national identities and lead to the breakdown of the nation in question.  However, when 
one contrasts the group identity of the modern nation with that associated with pre-modern societies, it 
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 becomes clear that the development of nations represents a significant change in the scale of group 
loyalties. 
Both Gellner and Smith argue that pre-modern societies were highly fragmented into various 
horizontal (or lateral, in Smith’s terminology) and vertical cleavages.  For Gellner, both types of 
cleavages existed in all pre-modern, agrarian societies, while Smith sees each as representing a distinct 
type of ethnie.  Whether they are seen as common to all societies or specific to only some, horizontal 
cleavages represent differences in occupational specializations, such as aristocrats, warriors, clerics, and 
administrators, within the upper classes.  They were lateral in the sense that they were “at once socially 
confined to the upper strata while being geographically spread out to form often close links with the upper 
echelons of neighbouring lateral ethnies.”114  While each of these groups shared a privileged position 
within society, they retained distinct group identities.  Gellner points out that “both for the ruling stratum 
as a whole, and for the various sub-strata within it, there is a great stress on cultural differentiation rather 
than on homogeneity.”115  At the same time, Smith makes the point that any sense of ethnic solidarity 
among a given society’s upper classes “was bound up with its esprit de corps as a high status stratum and 
ruling class.”116  Ethnic identity was thus largely subsumed by class identity. 
For the lower classes, vertical fragmentation within a potential ethnic group occurred largely due 
to the fact that “small peasant communities generally live inward-turned lives, tied to the locality by 
economic need if not by political prescription.  Even if the population of a given area starts from the same 
linguistic base…a kind of culture drift soon engenders dialectical and other differences.”117  Because such 
differentiation among the lower classes was an effective tool for keeping them under control, the ruling 
elites made no attempt to reduce vertical fragmentation.  Smith makes a similar point, arguing that even 
ancient societies with a strong sense of ethnic identity generally “failed to inculcate a public culture in the 
middle and lower classes and made little attempt to unify the population either through a single 
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 occupation system throughout the territory or by prescribing common rights and duties for all members of 
the kingdom.”118  Under such conditions, the modern nation could not exist. 
What made the transformation of ethnies into nations possible, according to Gellner and Smith,119 
was the set of fundamental economic, cultural, and institutional changes in social organization that began 
to occur in the modern period.  Economically, the Industrial Revolution helped to break down traditional 
social barriers in the name of greater efficiency.  The innovation needed to fuel economic growth required 
a new dynamism in which the division of labor could constantly change – i.e., it required social mobility.  
Traditional social roles thus became too rigid.  As Gellner puts it, “a society which is destined to a 
permanent game of musical chairs cannot erect deep barriers of rank, of caste or estate, between the 
various sets of chairs which it possesses.  That would hamper the mobility, and…lead to intolerable 
tensions.”120  The advent of industrial society thus produced the first incentives to break down the barriers 
between traditional group identities, making the development of a broader national identity possible. 
This forced important cultural changes as well.  Namely, industrialization required the 
development of a standardized educational system.  In order for individuals to be able to take advantage 
of the new opportunities provided by increased social mobility, their education had to be broad enough to 
give them the potential to shift between various types of jobs.  Gellner argues that this could not be 
achieved in a highly fractured, localized society.   
The level of literacy and technical competence, in a standardized medium, a common 
conceptual currency, which is required of members of this society if they are to be 
properly employable and enjoy full and effective moral citizenship, is so high that it 
simply cannot be provided by the kin or local units, such as they are.  It can only be 
provided by something resembling a modern ‘national’ educational system, a pyramid at 
whose base are primary schools, staffed by teachers trained at secondary schools, staffed 
by university-trained teachers, led by the products of advanced graduate schools.121
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 Similarly, Karl Deutsch emphasized the importance of communication as a prerequisite for the nation, 
arguing that “membership in a people…consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over 
a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders.”122  A system of national 
education would help to facilitate this ability.  Likewise, Benedict Anderson attributes the rise of 
nationalism in Europe to the growth of print media in vernacular languages.123  Thus, the growth and 
standardization of institutions of secular education, at least partially due to the necessities of 
industrialization, helped to produce a more homogenous society by providing its members with a 
common set of skills and the means by which they could better communicate with each other (e.g., a 
national language). 
 Both of these developments were made possible by a third set of institutional changes – the 
development of the modern state.  The modern, bureaucratic state sought to centralize its administrative 
control over society to a far greater extent than ever before – “its agents increasingly reaching down to the 
humblest inhabitant of the least of its villages,”124 in Hobsbawm’s words.  “The extension of citizenship 
rights and the build-up of an infrastructure that linked distant parts of the realm and vastly increased the 
density of communication networks within the state borders drew more and more areas and classes into 
the national political arena and created the images of national community, of ‘England’, ‘France’, ‘Spain’, 
that evoke such powerful feelings of commitment and belongings to this day.”125  Thus, the development 
of the modern state helped to produce a more homogeneous society by making its members more 
interconnected and socializing them “as ‘nationals’ and ‘citizens’.”126  Without this process, nations could 
not develop.  As Smith points out, “the state was the necessary condition and matrix for the gestation of 
the national loyalties so evident today.”127
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  To this trio of revolutionary changes one may add the changing nature of warfare as well.  A 
number of scholars have attributed the development of nationalism, and of the state itself, to the 
transformation in warfare that began to occur around the 16th century.128  Michael Mann has argued that 
“under the pressure of the Military Revolution…, reinforced by persistent eighteenth-century wars, [the 
state’s] military activities began to significantly affect social life….From being fairly insignificant, states 
now loomed over the lives of their subjects, taxing and conscripting them, attempting to mobilize their 
enthusiasm for its goals.”129  This last point is particularly important for the development of nationalism.  
As Hobsbawm points out, with the rise of modern warfare, “state interests now depended on the 
participation of the ordinary citizen to an extent not previously envisaged.  Whether the armies were 
composed of conscripts or volunteers, the willingness of men to serve was now an essential variable in 
government calculations.”130  This willingness was greatly enhanced by the innovation of nationalism. 
 It is for the reasons described above that the nation is so often associated with the modern state, 
so much so that the terms have come to be used interchangeably in everyday speech and political 
discourse, and sometimes even by political scientists themselves.131  In those instances when state and 
nation do not coincide, as is often the case, nationalism often manifests itself as a call for one’s own state 
(e.g., nationalist movements among Palestinians, Kurds, Tamils, Basques, etc.).  In fact, John Breuilly 
explicitly uses the term “to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying 
such action with nationalist arguments.”132  It is this intimate connection with the modern state, which 
itself represents a relatively recent innovation (see Chapter 2), that has led to the recognition among most 
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 scholars of nationalism that nations are an inherently modern phenomenon rooted not in human nature, 
but in the political and economic development of states. 
 It should therefore not be surprising that, with few exceptions, most scholars agree that the 
development of nations began in Western Europe, the birthplace of the modern state.133  According to 
William Pfaff, the nation was “a political consequence of the literary-intellectual movement called 
Romanticism, a Central European reaction to the universalizing, and therefore disorienting, ideas of the 
eighteenth-century French Enlightenment.”134  Smith argues that “the formation of nations in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been profoundly influenced by the examples of England, France 
and Spain, and to a lesser extent Holland and Sweden,”135 which provided the blueprint for others to 
follow.  For Greenfeld, England provided the prototype of all other nations.136  Regardless of the specific 
country of origin, “the ‘nation’ proved an invention on which it was impossible to secure a patent.  It 
became available for pirating by widely different, and sometimes unexpected, hands.”137  As the modern 
state spread throughout Europe, and eventually throughout the world through colonization, so too did the 
nation as a new form of collective identity.  From this point of view, nationalism developed out of a 
natural process of political adaptation arising out of changing circumstances.  While human nature, both 
biologically and psychologically, provided the necessary predisposition for forming distinct group 
identities, changing political circumstances produced their substantive form as nations. 
The Politics of Nationalism:  The Nation as Interest Group 
 While some scholars focus on the historical processes that gave rise to nations, others focus on 
the active role that political actors take in responding to and shaping those processes.  This is essentially 
the instrumentalist or situationalist approach to nationalism, which sees it as a rational response by self-
interested groups to the processes of modernization discussed above.  In essence, national identity is 
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 important “because [it] appear[s] to offer particular utility to individual and group interests in the context 
of contemporary situational opportunities and threats.”138  The idea that the passions generally associated 
with nationalism are in fact rational would seem counterintuitive.  However, Russell Hardin points out 
that competition between ethnic groups may yield benefits to the winner that provide individuals with a 
material incentive to strongly associate themselves with the group.139  In addition, Brown cites the 
possibility that the cultural markers on which nationalism is based are readily identifiable and therefore 
may allow group members to be more easily mobilized for political action.  Also, “ethnic and national 
claims…have an important advantage over other attachments which cannot so easily portray themselves 
as natural, in that they can more easily clothe the interests being defended in the language of natural 
rights, and thereby provide particularly effective ways to strengthen a bargaining position.”140  
Nationalism is thus the product not just of the historical changes associated with the rise of the state, but 
of domestic political processes within the state. 
 Of course, one could argue that if nationalism is rational because it provides certain benefits to 
group members, then it might also encounter a serious free-rider problem.  If these benefits accrue to 
group members solely because they possess the proper ‘objective’ characteristics needed for membership, 
then individuals might have little incentive to become personally involved (i.e., to become strongly 
attached to the group); they might obtain the benefits of membership without active participation.  Hardin 
addresses this problem by treating it as a coordination game in which “all that is needed to achieve 
successful mobilization is relevant communication to coordinate on doing what we would all want to do if 
only we were sure others were also doing it.”141  In the context of nationalism, this means that while 
individuals may have an interest in identifying with a particular national group, doing so requires 
coordination in order to determine the specific basis (e.g., language, religion) on which to establish it.  In 
some cases, such coordination may be more or less random.  However, Hardin also points out that 
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 “whether we coordinate might turn in part on whether there is someone urging us to recognize our 
identity and coordinate on it.”142
This introduces the critical role played by elites in shaping and mobilizing national identity in 
pursuit of their interests.  According to Paul Brass, the cultural markers that allow groups to distinguish 
themselves from others, and which are viewed by primordialists as essentially natural, are actually 
products of a process of politicization on the part of elites.  This process “involves the selection of 
particular dialects or religious practices or styles of dress or historical symbols from a variety of available 
alternatives.”143  These cultural markers become politicized such that they “acquire increasingly 
subjective and symbolic significance, are translated into consciousness of, and a desire for, group 
solidarity, and become the basis for successful political demands.”144  As such, the cultural markers 
themselves do not possess any inherent meaning.  In fact, Gellner points out that “nationalism uses the 
pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very 
selectively, and it most often transforms them radically.”145  While relatively objective differences 
between groups may exist, in many cases the cultural ‘traditions’ that are used to mark the uniqueness of 
the nation are almost entirely invented.146
This is true even of the most ‘objective’ symbols of differentiation, such as language and religion.  
In the case of language for instance, Hobsbawm argues that it is far less of an objective determinant of 
group membership then generally regarded.  For him, “the question is whether such linguistic barriers are 
believed to separate entities which can be regarded as political nationalities or nations, and not merely 
groups which happen to have trouble in understanding each other’s words.”147  In other words, differences 
in language might not carry with them any political significance.  Furthermore, Hobsbawm points out that 
in highly fragmented societies, a language might actually involve various local and regional dialects that 
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 would have often made communication between potential co-nationals extremely difficult.  As a result, 
Hobsbawm concluded that  
national languages are…almost always semi-artificial constructs and occasionally, like 
modern Hebrew, virtually invented.  They are the opposite of what nationalist mythology 
supposes them to be, namely the primordial foundations of national culture and the 
matrices of the national mind.  They are usually attempts to devise a standardized idiom 
out of a multiplicity of actually spoken idioms, which are thereafter downgraded to 
dialects, the main problem in their construction being usually, which dialect to choose as 
the base of the standardized and homogenized language.148
 
Thus, far from being an objective marker of nationality, a national language is generally the product of 
political choices made by elites in their drive to create a common group identity. 
Perhaps most importantly, the selection of appropriate symbols is not a value-free process.  On 
the contrary, it is an inherently political act, as “the choice of the leading symbol of differentiation 
depends upon the interests of the elite group that takes up the ethnic cause.”149  Since situational changes 
may affect group interests, the emphasis given to specific symbols may change over time, undermining 
the view that such symbols represent objective social facts.  Perhaps more importantly, they may be 
contested by competing groups of elites with conflicting interests.  In this case, “the cultural forms, 
values, and practices of ethnic groups become political resources for elites in competition for political 
power and economic advantage.”150  Nationalism becomes a tool for attacking opponents and/or 
mobilizing public support for state policies. 
 In addition to defining the boundaries of the nation through the identification of appropriate 
symbols, elites must mobilize the members of the nation to pursue the nation’s interests (at least as they 
are defined by the elites).  According to Breuilly, mobilization “make[s] it possible for politicians to 
establish contact with large numbers of people or…create the expectation and capacity on the part of large 
numbers of people to insist on some sort of political representation.”151  It is this integration of the public 
that Smith sees as crucial in the evolution of vertical ethnies into nations.  He argues that “the main task 
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 of an ethnic intelligentsia [was] to mobilize a formerly passive community into forming a nation around 
the new vernacular historical culture that it has rediscovered.”152  As Breuilly points out, “even if 
nationalist movements do not have active popular support they claim to speak for the whole nation.  In 
this sense nationalist politics is always mass politics.”153
However, while the development of a nation may depend on the efforts of its elites to mobilize 
and speak for its population, this introduces another important factor in nationalism as a political 
phenomenon – the role of the public as an independent force.  Ernst Haas argues that “nation and 
nationalism imply a situation in which popular awareness of, and some degree of popular participation in, 
politics prevail.”154  Similarly, Hobsbawm maintains that “whatever else a nation was, the element of 
citizenship and mass participation or choice was never absent from it.”155  As such, nationalism has often 
been intimately linked with democracy.  According to Craig Calhoun, “nationalism grew partly out of 
popular challenges to the authority and legitimacy of those at the top of modern states.  A crucial thread in 
the development of nationalism was the idea – and eventually the taken-for-granted, gut-level conviction 
– that political power could only be legitimate when it reflected the will, or at least served the interests, of 
the people subject to it.”156  As Greenfeld succinctly put it, “originally, nationalism developed as 
democracy.”157
From the instrumentalist perspective, nationalism is thus highly variable and dependent on the 
particular circumstances of a given situation.  This implies that nationalism might be a temporary 
phenomenon; indeed, numerous scholars have suggested just that.  As John Comaroff and Paul Stern have 
pointed out, “it has become commonplace to note that the most surprising thing about nationalism…is the 
fact that it is still with us at all.”158  At the very least, even if nationalism is unlikely to fade away entirely, 
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 its variability would indicate that the specific form it takes and the intensity with which it is expressed is 
not constant.  As such, one should be able to determine the conditions necessary to invoke strong 
nationalist reactions, and what their behavioral consequences might be. 
The Second Image of Nationalist Conflict:  Political Nationalism & Its Implications for State 
Behavior 
The broader question of what the nation’s modernity means for nationalist conflict will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.  This leaves nationalism’s overtly political nature to be addressed 
here.  The view that nationalism is a product of domestic political processes is quite common, and yields a 
very different picture of the causes of nationalist conflict than the primordialist views discussed earlier.  
From this perspective, the prospects for nationalist conflict are dependent on the domestic political 
conditions of the state in question.  For instance, Stephan Van Evera identifies four characteristics of 
nationalist movements that affect their likelihood of causing war, each of which relates to the issue of 
nation/state congruence.  First, nationalist movements that have not yet attained statehood are more likely 
to engage in conflict, since “their accommodation requires greater and more disruptive change.”159  Once 
statehood is attained, conflict propensity will depend on the movement’s attitude toward any diaspora that 
may exist (i.e., what is the likelihood that significant irredentist or reintegrationist pressures will persist?).  
In addition, even if no diaspora exists, the likelihood of nationalist conflict will increase if the movement 
does not respect the same rights of self-determination for others (e.g., Nazi Germany).  Finally, conflict 
propensity will be influenced by the degree of respect accorded to national minorities (i.e., is there a 
potential for new separatist claims to arise in the future?).  To these Van Evera adds a number of other 
domestic factors, including demographics, the internal balance of power between groups, past and current 
conduct of national groups, regime legitimacy, and economic and political stability.160
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 Thus, one second image explanation of nationalist conflict is that it arises from disputes regarding 
who has political authority over particular peoples and territories.161  Yet this raises the important 
question of what would happen if these disputes could be settled.  Would nationalism no longer be a 
source of international conflict?  For some scholars the answer is definitely ‘no’.  Hayes asserted “that 
nationalism does not exhaust its functions and resources when it unites a dismembered nationality and 
erects a national state;…almost invariably nationalism is heightened rather than lessened by the 
attainment of national sovereignty and that a national state, so soon as it is solidly established, proceeds to 
evolve a ‘national policy,’ which is as bellicose as it is nationalist.”162  The reason for this continued 
militarism, according to Hayes, is that “every national state has a class of professional militarists, who 
constantly play upon the nationalist emotions of their fellow citizens, particularly upon national fear and 
dread of the foreigner, and who perennially emphasise the competitive nature of national militarism.”163  
This provides another, and particularly common, second image explanation of nationalist conflict – that it 
is the product of elite manipulation. 
According to Erica Downs and Phillip Saunders, such arguments generally take one of three 
forms.  The first is that elites use nationalism “to divert attention from the state’s inability to meet societal 
demands for security, economic development, and effective political institutions.”164  A second is that 
interest groups with expansionist or militarist aims use nationalism to gain political support for their own 
parochial interests.  Finally, “political elites can incite nationalism to gain an advantage in domestic 
political competition.”165  The common element in each of these arguments is the view that nationalism is 
not a genuine expression of loyalty to the nation, but instead is somehow artificially manufactured by 
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 political elites in pursuit of their own, presumably non-nationalist, interests.166  In other words, 
nationalism becomes a justification for the pursuit of policies that were decided on for other reasons.  
Similarly, in their review of a number of books on ethnic conflict, James Fearon and David Laitin point 
out that “if there is a dominant or most common narrative in the texts under review, it is that large-scale 
ethnic violence is provoked by elites seeking to gain, maintain, or increase their hold on political 
power.”167
 If this were indeed the case, there might be little point to exploring the connection between 
nationalism and international conflict.  After all, such an analysis would yield few insights if nationalism 
simply serves to obscure some other factor(s) affecting the conflict propensity of states.  The ability of 
elites to use nationalism to mobilize public support might be a worthy topic of study, but in explaining 
conflict one could be content to focus on the ‘real’ interests of decision-makers.  Yet the very question of 
why publics could be so easily duped by their leaders should give us pause before accepting this 
explanation at face value.  If nationalism can be used to manipulate publics to follow particular policies, 
then some ‘real’ nationalist sentiments must exist in at least some portion of the population for such 
nationalist appeals to work.  After all, how can one exhort people to action on behalf of the nation if that 
term carries no meaning for them?  Consequently, if elites are indeed tapping into something ‘real’ when 
they invoke nationalism, it would seem logical to conclude that such sentiments may be ‘real’ for them as 
well.  This is not to say that nationalism is never used as a political tool.  Indeed, the issue of political 
manipulation may be important in many, perhaps most, cases.  However, to reduce nationalist conflict to 
domestic politics risks ignoring the fact that, while nationalism may be a relatively modern invention, it 
may still have a powerful impact on human behavior. 
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 Moving Beyond ‘What is a Nation?’:  The Constructivist Approach to Nationalism 
 The debate between primordialism and instrumentalism is a long-standing one in the literature on 
nationalism.  Couching it in the context of levels of analysis provides a useful way of presenting the 
debate in terms familiar to scholars of international relations.  However, it also has the added benefit of 
allowing the author to shed new light on the theoretical problems inherent in these perspectives, problems 
that lead back to the value of using IR theory in general, and constructivism in particular, to better 
understand nationalism and nationalist conflict.  In fact, the contours of the primordialist-instrumentalist 
debate bear important resemblances to the debates in IR theory discussed in the previous chapter, leaving 
open the possibility that a similar solution may be employed – namely, a constructivist approach to 
nationalism that can bring together its objective and subjective elements.  Toward that end, it is necessary 
to examine the advantages and disadvantages of both perspectives, particularly the central theoretical 
problem of reductionism that plagues both, and what potential solution can be developed. 
Agent-Structure Redux:  The Problem of Reductionism in Nationalist Theory 
 Let us start with primordialism.  There is a certain temptation in viewing nations as some form of 
permanent or semi-permanent social arrangement based upon a set of objective characteristics whose 
roots lie somewhere in the depths of human antiquity, if for no other reason than that it fits our 
preconceptions about the organization of human communities.  Most people have come to accept the 
primordial nation as a given.  Indeed, one has only to look at the tendency to view ethnic conflicts as the 
result of ‘ancient hatreds’ to recognize the persistence of primordialist attitudes, at least in much of the 
public and popular media.  More importantly, primordialism helps to account for the persistence of 
particular national identities over time.168  While it would certainly be a stretch to argue that all nations 
have ancient historical roots, one can identify regularities in patterns of identification whose persistence 
might call into question the instrumentalist view that such identities are subject to changing calculations 
of interest. 
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 However, critics of the primordialist perspective would argue that such temptations should be 
resisted, since it possesses a number of problems that make its usefulness for understanding nationalism 
questionable.  One criticism, according to John Stack, is that “the very term [primordialism] suggests a 
romanticization of individual and collective behavior not appropriate for social science.”169  This is at 
least in part due to its association with the writings of nationalists themselves, who often use similar 
language to defend the unalterable character of their nation.  Although both the sociobiological and 
psychological variants discussed earlier represent attempts to bring greater scientific scrutiny to the 
subject, it may be difficult to escape a sense of national destiny when one considers the nation as the 
inevitable product of human nature.  Similarly, primordialism comes “dangerously close to crude 
statements of cultural determinism.”170  Not only does this make it difficult to consider possible 
alternative outcomes, but it may also result in stereotypes “in which continents, countries, or ethnic 
groups have been ranked from civilized or superior to uncivilized or barbaric.”171  The term primordialism 
often carries with it a negative connotation.  As such, Cottam and Cottam argue that “treating nationalism 
as something primordial, barbaric, or evil is both value-laden and contrary to the advancement of social 
science.”172
Such problems are more or less specific to the issue of nationalism.  Yet the primordialist 
perspective is further weakened by a broader theoretical problem similar to one discussed in the last 
chapter – namely, reductionism.  As noted in Chapter 2, Waltz argued against reductionist attempts to 
explain international politics (i.e., focusing on the attributes of states), since they fail to take into account 
the external constraints on state behavior.  He illustrates this with the following example: 
To try to [predict outcomes from attributes] amounts to overlooking the difference 
between these two statements:  ‘He is a troublemaker.’  ‘He makes trouble.’  The second 
statement does not follow from the first one if the attributes of actors do not uniquely 
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 determine outcomes.  Just as peacemakers may fail to make peace, so troublemakers may 
fail to make trouble.173
 
The same may be said for primordialist explanations of nationalism.  The statement ‘He behaves as a 
Chinese’ does not necessarily follow from the statement ‘He is a Chinese.’  The latter refers to the fact 
that he possesses the attributes (language, religion, ancestral ties, etc.) of a Chinese; the former refers to 
the fact that his behavior is consistent with someone who identifies with the Chinese nation.  Explaining 
his behavior solely on the basis of his membership within a particular nation is reductionist, since it 
ignores the possibility that circumstances may affect the expression of identity (e.g., an American-born 
Chinese).  It is therefore insufficient to explain the phenomenon of nationalism. 
 In essence, to base our understanding of nationalism on human nature is to ignore the external 
conditions that inevitably influence how that nature is expressed.  As James Kellas has stated, “human 
nature provides the ‘necessary’ condition for ethnocentric behaviour, but politics converts this into the 
‘sufficient conditions’ for nationalism as we understand it today.”174  This point was summarized quite 
succinctly by Waltz in his early criticism of first image theories of war.   
Wars would not exist were human nature not what it is, but neither would Sunday schools 
and brothels, philanthropic organizations and criminal gangs.  Since everything is related 
to human nature, to explain anything one must consider more than human nature.  The 
events to be explained are so many and so varied that human nature cannot possibly be 
the single determinant.175
 
As with first image theories of war, “the primordial approach [to nationalism] explains everything and 
nothing.”176  Thus, while primordialism may provide important insights into the nature of nationalism, it 
is necessary to go beyond it by examining the political conditions that allow nationalism to manifest 
itself. 
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 Like the systemic approach to international politics advocated by Waltz and others, the 
instrumentalist approach to nationalism seeks to explore the structural conditions that produce it.177  It is 
important to note that in this context, structure refers to the domestic structure – e.g., domestic political 
institutions, internal balances of power, etc. – that constrains the behavior of domestic political actors 
(e.g., elites and publics).  For some scholars of nationalism, the second image view that nations and 
nationalism are the products of a process of modernization associated with the rise of the modern state 
and, in particular, that they are the products of a rational political process of national formation and 
mobilization, is an appealing one.  Such “structural analyses of behavior” provide far more “rigor, 
explanatory power, and predictive value” than primordialist explanations.178  In particular, they may help 
to account for fluctuations in the existence and/or intensity of national identities over time and under 
different conditions.179
However, while instrumentalism may be more analytical, its tendency to view nationalism as 
essentially rational introduces other issues.  As Brown points out, it may be problematic “to provide a 
rational-choice explanation for political affiliations which are not perceived as rational choices by those 
involved, which are emotionally powerful, and which clearly sometimes impel people to acts of irrational 
prejudice and hatred.”180  Indeed, instrumentalism’s explanation for ethnic or nationalist conflict would 
seem particularly problematic.  As Hayes once noted, “the ordinary normal man will not lay down his life 
for his own economic gain, and surely not for the financial profit of some anonymous fellow citizen who 
has foreign investments; the supreme sacrifice is paid only for an ideal.”181  Yet instrumentalism generally 
defines interests in largely material terms.  While disputes over the distribution of material benefits may 
be a contributing factor, at least in some cases, Donald Horowitz points out that “disputes over seemingly 
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 symbolic issues, such as recognition of one or another language as the official language or one design or 
another in a national flag, are, if anything, more severe.”182  Thus, instrumentalism “stretch[es] credulity 
by supposing that visions of slightly better jobs motivated the indescribably cruel conflicts, replete with 
ritual maimings and slaughter of the innocent, between Tamils and Sinhalese, Sikhs and Hindus, 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Serbs and Croats.”183  By largely eschewing less tangible factors, such as 
ideology and prestige, in spurring ethnic/nationalist conflict,184 it “fails to explain why ethnic conflicts are 
so often intense and unpredictable, why the ‘masses’ should so readily respond to the call of ethnic origin 
and culture, and why so many people may be ready to lay down their lives for their tribal nations.”185   
Thus, one could argue that while it may correctly seek to identify the structural conditions that 
make nationalism possible, instrumentalism is flawed by its over-reliance on an essentially material view 
of that structure (i.e., the political and economic conditions of society) and how it affects the behavior of 
rational, self-interested domestic actors.  As such, it is hard-pressed to account for the less tangible issues 
of emotion, symbolism, and ideology – or, in a word, ideas.  Such criticism should ring a bell with the 
reader, since this is precisely the constructivist critique of neorealism discussed in the last chapter.  In his 
early discussion of the agent-structure problem in IR theory, Alexander Wendt pointed out that, while 
Waltz and other neorealists reject explanatory reductionism (i.e., explaining state behavior by way of 
state properties), they fall victim to ontological reductionism.  According to Wendt, “an opposition to 
agent-level explanations is analytically independent of how system structure, once recognized as causally 
significant, should be theorized.”186  Although Waltz correctly recognized the importance of system 
structure in any understanding of international politics, he incorrectly defined that structure in a 
reductionist way – as reducible to the distribution of state capabilities.  Thus, the state is made 
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 ‘ontologically primitive’ – its existence and properties are assumed without any theory of the state to 
inform those assumptions.  As a result, it cannot account for the ways in which the state’s identity and 
interests are themselves constituted by the system, nor can it deal with the role that ideas play in that 
process. 
Much the same can be said about instrumentalism.  A structural approach to nationalism could 
certainly prove beneficial by elaborating on the circumstances that produce it.  Yet it matters how that 
structure is defined.  To define it, as instrumentalists generally do, solely in terms of a set of material 
constraints requires one to make assumptions about the interests of domestic actors that may be 
unwarranted.  Just as neorealism has no theory of the state, instrumentalism has no theory of the 
nationalist.  It seeks to explain nationalism as a rational response by self-interested domestic actors to 
structural changes in society without attempting to explain why these actors have the interests they do or 
how they came to be nationalists in the first place.  In other words, it ignores the fact that the identities 
and interests of domestic actors may be constituted by the structure of the social system in which they are 
embedded – i.e., by a set of collectively held ideas. 
This is essentially what Greenfeld argues.  In terms reminiscent of Waltz, she regards nationalism 
as “an ‘emergent phenomenon,’ that is, a phenomenon whose nature…is determined not by the character 
of its elements, but by a certain organizing principle which makes these elements into a unity and imparts 
to them a special significance.”187  However, for her the organizing principle behind the phenomenon of 
nationalism is not material, but the idea of the nation; “the only foundation of nationalism as such, the 
only condition, that is, without which no nationalism is possible, is an idea; nationalism is a particular 
perspective or a style of thought.”188  Specifically, the idea of the nation is the concept that ‘the people’ 
are “the bearer of sovereignty, the basis of political solidarity, and the supreme object of loyalty.”189  
What constituted ‘a people’ (e.g., language, religion, ethnicity) might be determined, often quite 
arbitrarily, by those elites that believed a nation existed or should exist, and sought to give that nation 
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 political expression.  However, without this set of ideas (i.e., without nationalism), there could be no 
nations, since the cultural similarities on which they are based would have no meaning.  As Gellner puts 
it, “it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round.”190  Thus, while 
primordialism may be guilty of the same reductionist errors that Waltz attributes to unit-level theories of 
international politics, instrumentalism shares with him his own error of ontological reductionism.  As in 
IR theory, this leads one to consider a constructivist approach to nationalism. 
Reconciling the Primordial-Instrumental Debate:  The Nation as Social Construct 
 The application of constructivism to the problem of nationalism is certainly not new.  Although 
the term is used inconsistently (or sometimes not at all), many scholars of nationalism have made 
essentially constructivist arguments.  In fact, constructivist concepts can be found even in the work of a 
‘primordialist’ like Geertz.  He supported the idea that the primordial attachments on which the nation is 
based, what he referred to as “the assumed ‘givens’…of social existence,”191 are primarily cultural, a 
position that is often referred to as cultural primordialism.  Along with kinship, these attachments include 
“the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular 
language, and following particular social practices.”192  Thus, national identity depends on more than just 
kinship; it “derives from a cultural interpretation of descent.”193  However, he states elsewhere that 
“believing…that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture 
to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an 
interpretive one in search of meaning.”194  Cultural attributes like language and religion are not primordial 
in the sense of something derived from human nature, but are only treated as if they were by those that 
possess them (and all too often by the scholars who study them).  This brings the primordialism of his 
position into question. 
                                                 
190 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 55. 
191 Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution,” 109. 
192 Ibid., 109. 
193 Keyes, Ethnic Change, 5. 
194 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures:  Selected Essays  (New York:  Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 
1973), 5. 
107 
 As Tilley correctly points out, Geertz’s perspective is more constructivist than it is primordialist, 
since he “specifies the social (not ‘natural’) character of such ‘givens’.”195  Ethnic attachments appear 
primordial because they are based on “certain assumptions or knowledge systems…[that] form a kind of 
cognitive substratum not only for affect but for most conscious thought.”196  In other words, they are 
based on ideas, making them in some sense artificial, but ideas that are so taken for granted that they 
become the virtually unquestioned foundations on which other beliefs are built.  Thus, she argues that 
Geertz’s “use of the term ‘primordialism’ [is] more in its sense of ‘first in a series’…, in order to highlight 
the ways in which foundation concepts provide the basis for other ideas, values, customs or ideologies 
held by the individual.”197  To associate this with the idea that nations are grounded in human nature (the 
usual meaning of primordial) is to misinterpret Geertz’s argument. 
Taken this way, Tilley suggests that it is a mistake to discount the importance of ‘primordial’ 
attachments.198  Ethnic differences may not be primordial in the sense that they are objectively real and 
firmly grounded in human nature, but they may be associated with “actual institutional incompatibility” – 
e.g., a clash of value systems – that could provide a deeper source of group conflict than conscious 
manipulation by political elites.199  In essence, real differences between ethnic groups do exist that may 
have important political consequences, and therefore cannot be ignored.  However, for Tilley, the 
differences that matter are not the ‘objective’ characteristics usually identified by primordialists, but the 
more fundamental differences in ideas and values that give them meaning.200  She thus supports a less 
stringent form of primordialism. 
At the same time, however, Tilley does not entirely discount instrumentalism.  Since they are not 
truly natural, ethnic attachments are subject to change.  New ideas and beliefs may arise as individuals 
adapt to changing circumstances.  Although such ideas may be actively promoted by elites with perceived 
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 interests in them, this does not necessarily prevent them from becoming accepted to the extent that their 
artificial origins no longer matter.  As Tilley points out, “ethnic rhetoric can generate new ideas, values 
and customs which ‘primordialize’ – enter the realm of collectively held unexamined assumptions – in the 
long run.”201  Thus, as a number of scholars have argued, the debate between primordialism and 
instrumentalism is both artificial and unnecessary.202  Each simply represents a different side of the same 
coin – different aspects of a process whereby accepted group identities are continuously reproduced, or 
altered to form a new set of accepted identities, by the actions of the group’s members. 
Thus, as Tilley points out, “any constructivist approach [to nationalism] would…argue for 
understanding ethnic identity as an idea or discourse rather than as an empirically observable social 
‘unit.’”203  The same is true for Rogers Brubaker, who warns against relying on a “realist ontology of 
nations” that sees them “as real entities, as communities, as substantial collectivities.”204  Instead, 
Brubaker argues that nations exist as “categories of practice.”205  In essence, this means that, while the 
nation may be a political fiction based on the ideas of some set of political elites, it is one that “becomes 
momentarily yet powerfully realized in practice.”206  In other words, the nation may not be ‘real’ in the 
primordialist sense, but so long as the idea of the nation continues to influence a society’s perceptions and 
behavior (i.e., its members continue to act as if it were real) the nation may be treated as such.  However, 
once a society ceases to act on the basis of their nationhood (i.e., the idea of a nation no longer carries any 
meaning for its members), the nation ceases to exist.  Therefore, like any other social structure, the 
existence or nonexistence of a nation is only realized through social practice.   
 From this perspective, Brubaker concludes that the emphasis on the nature of nationalism (i.e., 
what is nationalism?) has been ill-founded.  He argues that “we should not ask ‘what is a nation’ but 
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 rather:  how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states?”207  
Similarly, Tilley argues that “ethnic identities should be analyzed not by examining the purported ethnic 
‘unit’ as a stable social entity, but by examining the conditions in which the idea of the ethnic identity 
developed, how the identity has changed character through history, and the social purposes it serves.”208  
Thus, if the nation is not a ‘real’ community, but can only be understood as an outcome of social practice 
based on a set of shared ideas, then it is necessary to focus attention on the dynamics of practice that 
produce it and not treat the nation as a static quality. 
Scholars of nationalism have begun to recognize the need for such a constructivist approach.  
However, this still leaves open the question of how such an approach should be applied to the problem of 
nationalist conflict.  As Fearon and Laitin point out, “no literature articulating theoretical or empirical 
connections between the social construction of ethnicity and violence yet exists….Instead,…we find 
constructivist ‘moves’ mixed sporadically with modes of analysis that do not seem particularly 
constructivist.”209  It is therefore necessary to break new theoretical ground by developing a more 
explicitly constructivist framework for understanding how the social construction of nationalism affects 
state behavior.  This will be done in the next chapter.  However, before moving on to develop a 
constructivist theory of nationalism and conflict, it is first necessary to address a key issue that is often 
missing from discussions of nationalism. 
What’s Missing?:  The Necessity of a Third Image 
 The constructivist approach to nationalism discussed above helps to alleviate the problem of 
reductionism, but only from the standpoint of domestic politics.  If one is concerned with the impact of 
nationalism on the foreign policy behavior of states, as the author is, then this would still be reductionist, 
since nationalism as presented so far is primarily the product of internal processes of social construction.  
However, such processes tell only part of the story.  As Brubaker alludes to when he asks how the nation 
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 is institutionalized within and among states,210 the shared ideas and social practices that define the nation 
are as much a product of international politics as domestic politics, perhaps more so.  Thus, what is 
largely missing from existing theories of nationalism, whether constructivist or not, is a third image that 
takes into account the role of the international system. 
 There are a number of reasons why nationalism should be seen as at least partly the product of 
international-level processes.  First, as already discussed, the nation is fundamentally linked with the 
state.  Since the state may be seen as constituted by the international system (see Chapter 2), it would 
make sense to consider the nation as similarly constituted.  For instance, Prizel makes the point that, 
“while a polity must meet a set of preconditions to form a nation [i.e., it must possess some ethnic or 
cultural characteristics on which a nation may be based], it is interaction with the outside world, namely 
the acceptance or rejection of ‘the other,’ that allows polities to develop a sense of national 
uniqueness.”211  This interaction may take the form of “a short and cataclysmic event,”212 such as a war, 
or may involve continuous interaction over many generations.  Yet whatever its specific form the idea of 
the nation only arises out of the interaction between political actors.  Thus, while the development of 
nationalism may involve some domestic political processes (e.g., cultural homogenization), it is the 
process of international interaction that makes such a development possible.  In essence, it is the existence 
of a system of sovereign states that opens the door to the possibility of nations. 
Second, in most cases the origins of the national idea are not entirely domestic.  As previously 
mentioned, the idea of the nation originated in certain parts of Western Europe and then spread elsewhere 
as other states sought to copy it.  In many cases, this process of adaptation was a direct reaction to 
external threats.  Just as states might seek to copy a new technology from more successful competitors, 
they might also seek to copy ideas and institutional patterns such as nationalism.  As such, it is not 
enough to simply consider the domestic-level processes of cultural and political change that go along with 
the development of nationalism; it is essential to examine its international origins as well. 
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 Of course, a third image approach to nationalism would not necessarily have to be constructivist 
in nature.  Kellas suggests that “international relations and the structure of international society have an 
impact on nationalism, and they often determine its success or failure and the form which it takes.”213  
What he implies here is that international conditions may affect the ability of nationalist movements to 
pursue their goals.  Mark Suzman makes this point more explicitly, stating that “on one level international 
events, relations with other states or movements, and broader geopolitical shifts can all have direct 
repercussions on both the shape of nationalist strategies and their success or failure.  On another, 
achieving independent statehood, the ultimate political objective of nationalism, necessarily implies 
securing international recognition as well as domestic sovereignty.”214  In both cases, international politics 
is recognized as having an important effect on nationalism. 
The same could be said for the effect of the international system on nationalist conflict.  While 
“neorealism has historically played a key role in [the] disengagement of IR theory from the ‘national’ and 
in reproducing realism as an exclusively statecentric discourse,”215 some realists have made attempts to 
address the question of nationalism and conflict from the perspective of the international system.  Such 
analyses have largely focused on the role that anarchy plays in creating the conditions for nationalist 
conflict.216  For instance, John Mearsheimer has argued that the “hyper-nationalism [of the pre-1945 era] 
was caused in large part by security competition among the European states, which compelled European 
elites to mobilize publics to support national defense efforts.”217  After the Cold War, many scholars 
worried that the same security competition that supposedly led to the nationalism-fuelled wars of the 19th 
and 20th centuries could once again become a source of nationalist conflict.  As Van Evera notes, one 
reason for pessimism cited by some scholars was “that Europe’s virulent ethnic hatreds and latent border 
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 conflicts [would] re-emerge, like plagues from Pandora’s box, if the superpowers lift[ed] the lid by 
withdrawing.”218  Without the bipolarity that kept nationalist tensions in check, states and ethnic groups in 
Europe (and presumably other regions) would once again be subject to a security dilemma that could lead 
to war. 
In the opinion of the author, such analyses represent a step in the right direction.  As Yosef Lapid 
and Friedrich Kratochwil suggest, “this readiness to reconsider formerly dismissive attitudes toward 
national phenomena contributes to an end of the strange silence in IR theory and, at the same time, opens 
up new opportunities for a revitalized realist research program.”219  However, a strictly realist approach to 
nationalism remains problematic.  Lapid and Kratochwil argue that it “reduces [nationalism] to a ‘second 
order’ variable, an epiphenomenon of the interstate system and its anarchical structure…merely a 
reflection of more ‘basic’ forces – such as the security dilemma and power balancing among the 
preexisting ‘like units’.”220  As such, it employs an overly simplistic understanding of nationalism that 
(not surprisingly) fails to take into account the fundamental issues of identity that are at the heart of the 
concept.  To correct this problem, it is necessary to develop a constructivist approach to nationalism and 
conflict that addresses the system-level dimension of the national idea. 
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Chapter 4. COMPLETING THE THEORETICAL BRIDGE:  TOWARD A 
CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF NATIONALIST CONFLICT 
 
 The last chapter drew two important conclusions regarding the nature of nationalism.  First, the 
nation is not a ‘real’ community, but an ‘imagined’ one (to borrow Benedict Anderson’s term) – the 
product of an idea of nationhood (i.e., nationalism) shared among its members and made real through 
social practice.  Second, the shared ideas and social practices that define the nation are as much a product 
of international politics as domestic politics.  Because existing approaches to understanding nationalist 
conflict do not fully take these issues into account, they are, at best, incomplete.  It is therefore necessary 
to rethink the effects of nationalism on state behavior.  Given its focus on structures of shared knowledge, 
the constructivist approach in IR theory (see Chapter 2) provides an excellent tool for doing so.  Thus, the 
final step in bridging IR theory and nationalism is to employ constructivism to develop a third image 
theory of nationalism and nationalist conflict.  In essence, the key to understanding nationalist conflict is 
to understand precisely how nationalist ideas and practices are constituted by the international system, 
and what this means for the interests and actions of states. 
 In doing so, it is important to recall Alexander Wendt’s division of social structure into micro and 
macro dimensions.  The former is concerned with interactions between states, while the latter represents a 
deeper structure operating at the level of the population of states.  As discussed in Chaper 2, these 
different structural dimensions involve different levels of shared knowledge, and thus different forms of 
identity.  Nationalism’s impact on state behavior therefore depends on the specific form of identity that 
the nation represents.  It will be argued in this chapter that nationalism can be seen as both a macro- and 
micro-structural phenomenon, each having different implications for understanding nationalist conflict.  
Specifically, while seeing the nation as a type of state may provide important insights into the interests 
that might make nationalist states more prone to conflict in certain circumstances, it will be argued that 
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 the potentially aggressive influence of nationalism on foreign policy posited by many scholars is best seen 
as a manifestation of a role conflict that develops through state interaction.  As such, whether or not 
nationalism results in more aggressive foreign policy behavior depends primarily on the nature of the 
social interaction between the specific states involved, not on any inherent quality of nationalism itself. 
Nation as ‘Type’:  The Macro-Structural Impact of Nationalism on State Behavior 
 Since the macro-structural dimension of nationalism provides the necessary foundation for 
understanding its place in the international system, let us start with it.  It is not difficult to see that what 
James Mayall refers to as the ‘national idea’ – “that the world is (or should be) divided into nations and 
that the nation is the only proper basis for a sovereign state and the ultimate source of government 
authority”1 – has become an integral part of the world’s body of shared knowledge.  According to Mayall, 
this idea has successfully challenged “the assumptions, practices and institutions of the traditional 
world,”2 and as a result has made international society what it is today.  “The ultimate measure of that 
success,” he argues, “is the difficulty that people have everywhere…, in envisaging an alternative 
political form to that of the nation-state.  In the modern world the relations of governments, as much as 
those of peoples, are invariably described as international relations; to describe them in any other way 
would be pedantic.  Except to a handful of scholars, nationalism is not a problem; rather national 
sentiment is so pervasive and self-evident that it has become invisible.”3  Indeed, it is precisely this 
invisibility that has contributed to the ‘neglect-of-nationalism’ problem mentioned in Chapter 1. 
 At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that nationalism’s reordering of 
international society has not been without its limitations.  As Mayall puts it, “the nationalists… were 
more often forced to accommodate their own plans to the existing structure, than they were able to rebuild 
the international system in their own image.”4  The pursuit of national self-determination had to be 
grafted onto the existing system of sovereign states.  As such, the rise of nationalism does not so much 
                                                 
1 James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1990), 2. 
2 Ibid., 25. 
3 Ibid., 25. 
4 Ibid., 26. 
115 
 represent the wholesale replacement of the sovereign state as a transformation in its nature, with self-
determination taking its place alongside sovereignty as the dual (though not always equal) principles of 
international legitimacy.  Thus, we may see the development of nationalism as a macro-structural change 
in the international system, resulting in a change in the predominant type of state actor in the system.  In 
other words, nationalism marks a specific type identity that has important implications for the interests 
and actions of states. 
From Dynastic State to Nation-State:  The Macro-Structural Evolution of the International 
System 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, while one may be able to identify some essential form of state in any 
historical period, the nature of the state is subject to change as the meaning and scope of legitimate 
political authority changes.  In order to understand the transformation in state identity represented by 
nationalism, it is necessary to place it in historical context by examining the broader pattern of macro-
structural change associated with the evolution of the modern state.  The most common version of this 
story is a relatively simple one.  Although pretensions to a universal Christendom formally centered on 
the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire had continued to predominate for centuries after the fall of 
Rome, Europe during the feudal period was politically fragmented with cross-cutting allegiances between 
feudal lords producing a complex patchwork in which political authority was highly decentralized.5  The 
Peace of Westphalia (1648) that finally ended Europe’s religious wars, and which for most IR scholars 
marked the birth of the modern state, changed all this.  Not only did Westphalia formally discard the 
legitimacy of universal hegemony and thereby legitimize the political fragmentation of Europe, it did so 
by establishing the legitimacy of a more centralized form of particularistic political authority – the 
sovereign state.  “By sanctifying Europe’s centrifugal forces, by providing a legal basis for the developing 
territorial particularisms of Europe, and by terminating the vestiges of relations between superiors and 
inferiors, with authority emanating downward from the Emperor and the Pope, the [Peace of Westphalia] 
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 licensed an anarchical dynastic states system and the internal consolidation of its members.”6  It is this 
single transformation in the organization of political space – from feudalism to the sovereign state – that 
John Ruggie identifies as the birth of the modern era.7
 However, while it may capture the essence of an important change in international politics, this 
generally accepted story of the modern state’s development must be seen as abridged and somewhat 
simplistic.  At a minimum, it is important to recognize the implication of Kenneth Waltz’s assertion that 
anarchy produces like-units – at some point in the past the state as we know it may have coexisted with 
other types of political actors, and only came to dominate the international system over time and through 
competition.  This is essentially the argument made by Hendrik Spruyt – that “the decline of the feudal 
system…did not straightforwardly lead to a system of states but gave rise to multiple institutional 
arrangements, any one of which – at that time – appeared to be viable.”8  The modern state arose out of 
evolutionary competition with other forms of political organization, such as city-leagues and city-states, 
each vying to replace the mishmash of feudal allegiances.  In the end, it won out largely because it proved 
to be a more effective international actor.9  Thus, the transition from feudalism to the modern state was 
not as straightforward as it is often made out to be. 
More importantly for purposes of this discussion, one might consider the possibility that this 
transition took place not in one giant leap, but through a series of smaller steps.  This is the argument 
made by Rodney Hall.  Like Spruyt, Hall argues that changes in the predominant form of political unit 
(i.e., the type of actor) have important implications for the international system.  “Societies with different 
conceptions of the nature of legitimate authority choose to endow different elements of society with this 
authority.  What or whom is regarded as sovereign is strongly conditioned by the self-understandings of 
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 members of domestic society with respect to legitimate authority.”10  As a result, societies develop 
institutional forms that reflect the prevailing concepts of legitimate political authority.  Since different 
institutional forms may result in dramatically different sets of interests, “changes in the prevailing forms 
of societal self-identification generate changes in [the] ‘structure of identity and interests’ and result in 
epochal changes in the international system.”11  Hall identifies not one but three such epochal changes 
since the feudal era, resulting in three distinct international systems – the Augsburg system, the more 
commonly recognized Westphalian system, and the national-state system.  Each had at its core a different 
form of political organization – the dynastic-state, the territorial-state, and the nation-state, respectively – 
based on prevailing ideas of legitimate political authority, and each had its own patterns of state behavior. 
For the dynastic-state, political legitimacy was based on loyalty “toward the person of the prince, 
and particularly toward his confessional status within the Christian faith.”12  This might best be seen as an 
earlier incarnation of the sovereign state that grew out of the first failed attempt to end the religious 
conflicts arising from the Protestant Reformation of the 1520s.  By creating an irreparable split in 
Western Christianity, the Reformation shattered the religious foundation of universalism that had existed 
throughout the feudal period, resulting in devastating wars throughout much of central Europe by the mid-
1540s.13  These conflicts were brought to a temporary end by the Peace of Augsburg (1555), which 
established the legal principle of cuius regio eius religio – to each region its own religion.  This gave the 
sovereign of each principality the authority to determine the predominant religion of his subjects, and by 
doing so represented the first step in establishing state sovereignty as the defining principle of the 
international system.  As Hall argues, “the Reformation and its adaptation by many European princes had 
created the intersocietal norm of dynastic sovereignty in the principalities and free states that adopted 
Protestantism….The prince could take any action that pleased him with respect to other states and princes 
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11 Ibid., 6. 
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13 For a discussion of the effects of the Reformation on the breakdown of universalism, see Carlton J. H. Hayes, 
Three Centuries of Predominantly Agricultural Society 1500-1830, vol. 1 of A Political and Cultural History of 
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 without fear of excommunication, the interdict, or the ban.”14  He thus attained exclusive political 
authority over his subjects. 
However, as Hall goes on to say, “by the dawn of the seventeenth century, a fifty-year-old peace 
of convenience had proved to be an inadequate institutional prop to a highly underdeveloped principle of 
toleration between Protestant and Catholic German principalities”;15 large-scale conflict resumed with the 
Thirty Years War (1618-48).  It was only after tremendous blood-letting that the passions of religious 
conflict finally burned themselves out.  The Peace of Westphalia that ended the war took over where 
Augsburg left off, employing cuius regio eius religio to reinforce the principle of sovereignty and expand 
its scope.  The result was a change in the nature of the state from dynastic to territorial.  While loyalty to 
the monarch remained an important characteristic of the territorial-state for centuries, it was the 
monarch’s position as leader of a territorially sovereign state that became the foundation of this loyalty, 
not his religion.  As Hall puts it, “the prince’s legitimacy, and the state’s sovereignty, were now 
emancipated from the issue of confessional status.”16  Thus, the birth of the modern era, and the modern 
state, discussed by Ruggie actually represents the second phase in the post-feudal transformation of the 
international system, with territorial segmentation replacing the largely abortive attempt at religiously-
grounded sovereignty. 
This second phase might be seen as far more successful given both its relative longevity and the 
tendency for modern IR scholars to equate it with the existing international system.  Yet one should not 
confuse success with permanence.  While important elements of the Westphalian system remained, Hall 
argues that additional changes in the conception of political legitimacy, namely the belief in a sovereign 
people, fundamentally altered the nature of the state once again.  According to him, “the twin burden of 
high taxes, and conscription to support the inefficiency and militarism of the old regime state, resulted in 
a legitimation crisis for the social order upon which this particular institutional form of collective action 
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 was formed.”17  In order to deal with this crisis of legitimacy, “the state found that it had to expand 
participation…and progressively extended the franchise to ever broader circles of domestic society 
throughout the nineteenth century.”18  Thus, the political authority of the state became based not simply 
on its control of a particular territory but its representation of a people deserving of self-determination.19
This brief discussion of the evolution of the state illustrates the necessity of recognizing that the 
modern state has taken on more diverse forms than generally accepted, each one having significant effects 
on the international system as it has come to be the dominant form.  Before the impact of such systemic 
changes is addressed, however, let us first consider the mechanism by which they have occurred.  On the 
one hand, one could argue that system-wide changes in the predominant form of actor are the result of 
natural selection.  Spruyt’s argument that the sovereign state had distinct survival advantages over its 
competitors could be expanded to argue, for instance, that the nation-state had survival advantages over 
the territorial-state.  This is essentially the argument made by Barry Posen, as well as by Martha and 
Richard Cottam.  Since nation-states have populations with potentially strong emotional connections to 
them, they are better able to mobilize their populations for purposes of national defense.20  The ability to 
raise a national army would give the nation-state survival advantages over states still reliant on mercenary 
armies.  Over time, such advantages might lead to a change in the population of states in the system. 
As pointed out earlier, however, it is not necessary to rely on natural selection to weed out 
uncompetitive state forms; cultural selection (i.e., imitation and learning) may be even more important in 
shaping state identities, since it focuses on the intentional behavior of actors.  Liah Greenfeld provides a 
good example of how this might have occurred with respect to nations.21  She argues that the modern 
meaning of nation – as a unique, sovereign people – first began to develop in sixteenth-century England, 
largely as a response to crises in its own identity.  Once developed, however, the idea spread to other 
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 Western societies as they attempted to respond to similar identity crises through the importation of an idea 
that, they hoped, would solve the problem.  For instance, Greenfeld argues that the French nobility 
responded to the disintegration of their social status by adopting the idea of the nation to provide 
legitimacy to their claims against the crown. 
During the Fronde and the later years of Louis XIV’s reign, the ‘state’ was consistently 
redefined as the native population of France, or the French nation…In the early 
eighteenth century, spokesmen of the French elite joined to these elements of the 
indigenous tradition the value attached to the ‘nation’ in England, where it had already 
become the ultimate source of authority and the object of supreme devotion…Thus 
upgraded, the state, alias nation, alias people of France, was finally freed from 
dependence on the king and became the symbol around which opposition to the Crown 
could rally and in the name of which the righting of wrongs could be legitimately and 
righteously demanded.22
 
It was through this process of deliberate imitation, according to Greenfeld, that the idea of the nation 
came to be shared by states.   
Of course, since the idea had to be adapted to local conditions, the development of nationalism in 
any given state was heavily influenced by domestic politics.  Indeed, for the earliest nations such 
domestic conditions may have been the crucial factors that gave the nation-state its first foothold in the 
international system.  Hall argues that “national collective identity can develop from a very large number 
of domestic sources of that identity, and then provide a new legitimating principle for a domestic social 
order.  The new legitimating principles then require a new institutional form – leading to a new global 
social order and ‘system’ when aggregated with those of societies which have achieved a similar 
collective identity by their own path.”23  This is his first sequence of ‘transformational logic’ relating 
changes in collective identity to changes in the international system, which can be represented as follows: 
∆collective identity  →  ∆legitimating principles  →  ∆institutions  →  ∆domestic & 
international norms/rules/principles  →  ∆systems.24
 
In essence, changes in state identity eventually lead to changes in the international system once the new 
form of identity becomes accepted by enough states.  This is particularly true if the states in question, 
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 through their capabilities or position within the world order, are able to influence others and act as “agents 
of systemic transformation.”25  This first sequence provides a useful explanation for how the national idea 
was invented in the West and eventually came to be the dominant state form. 
However, there is another crucial element to this story – namely, how would such a system 
transformation affect those states that had not yet adopted the national idea on their own?  According to 
Hall, “national collective identity can develop in response to what might amount to a structural condition.  
This condition entails the privileging of a specific institutional form of collective action, and therefore, of 
specific legitimating principles of that institutional form.”26  Thus, the preceding sequence of 
transformational logic can be reversed: 
∆system  →  ∆domestic & international norms/rules/principles →  ∆institutions  →  
∆legitimating principles  →  ∆collective identity.27
 
This suggests that once the national idea became firmly established in the social structure of the 
international system, it began to exert its own influence on the states within it.  While the first states to 
develop ‘national’ identities (e.g., England, France) did so largely in response to domestic problems, their 
status as major powers allowed them to establish this new form of state identity as an international norm.  
This created “powerful incentives [for other states] to replicate the privileged institutional forms, their 
legitimating principles and associated collective identities.”28  Greenfeld makes a similar point, arguing 
that “as the sphere of influence of the core Western societies (which defined themselves as nations) 
expanded, societies belonging or seeking entry to the supra-societal system of which the West was the 
center had in fact no choice but to become nations.  The development of national identity thus was 
essentially an international process, whose sources in every case but the first lay outside the evolving 
nation.”29  In other words, non-nation states, particularly in the non-Western world, had to adopt their 
own identities as nations, not simply to compete and survive, but to be accepted as equals.  Thus, while 
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 nationalism has important systemic sources, they extend beyond a simple ‘survival of the fittest’ 
explanation.  The implications of this second transformational logic will be discussed later. 
The Evolution of Territorial Interests:  National Self-Determination & the Roots of 
Nationalist Conflict 
The perspective offered by Hall that the rise of nationalism and the nation-state represents a 
macro-structural change in the international system opens up some intriguing theoretical possibilities for 
understanding the potential connection between nationalism and international conflict.  Since different 
types of states may have different interests, a change in the predominant form of state is likely to result in 
the development of new interests, and thus changes in state behavior.  In looking at the transition from the 
territorial-state to the nation-state, Hall argues correctly that “it will not simply do to note that the 
territorial-sovereign states of modern Europe…have become nationalized, suddenly imagining themselves 
to have become nations, and then proceed to analyze their behavior as though the same norms of 
sovereignty are applicable to nation-states as had been the case for dynastic and territorial-sovereigns.  
Statesmen in the nationalist era have not spoken in voice of the same set of prenational interests.”30  It is 
therefore necessary to determine how the interests of the nation-state might differ from those of other 
types of state.  This should provide the first clues to how nationalism influences their conflict-propensity. 
Toward this end, let us first consider, for the sake of comparison, the kinds of interests associated 
with the territorial-state that preceded it.  As might be surmised from its label, the primary interest of the 
territorial-state was territory itself.  Territory has of course always been of key importance to states of all 
kinds.  Indeed, it has been argued that all conflicts are at heart conflicts over territory.31  However, the 
change in the nature of political legitimacy associated with the territorial-state gave the importance of 
territory a whole new meaning.  Evan Luard pointed out that “dynastic claimants had been eager for 
territory to add honour to the royal name, to add to the list of titles, properties, crowns and styles on 
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 which they could pride themselves.”32  In essence, such lands were “personal possessions of the royal 
line, akin to the extensive estates which might be put together by well-married families within states.  
They were claims to loyalty and allegiance, rather than to direct control.”33  In contrast, John Herz 
suggested that the sovereignty associated with the territorial-state was based on the idea that the sovereign 
“has the power to constrain his subjects, while not being so constrainable by superior power.  The 
decisive criterion thus is actual control of one’s ‘estates’ by one’s military power, which excludes any 
other power within and without.”34   
Yet while Westphalia had established sovereignty as a central principle of international law, it 
would take many decades of centralization – state-building – to give each sovereign full control over his 
respective territory.  Remnants of feudalism, such as the continued power of the nobility, remained 
obstacles to the aggregation of power in the hands of the sovereign.  Perhaps more importantly, the 
sovereign’s control of his own territory was often challenged from outside as well.  As Luard noted, “if 
every state in demanding sovereignty for itself was equally willing to concede sovereignty to every other 
state, all conflict should have been avoided.”35  Yet sovereignty was frequently disregarded by states 
eager to accrue more power for themselves.  During the feudal period, custom and convention associated 
with shared religious beliefs provided at least some normative constraints on international competition.  
However, the collapse of the old order meant that “dynastic claims to territory based upon custom or 
ancient privilege no longer held the sway they once had.”36  Raison d’état, which “asserted that the well-
being of the state justified whatever means were employed to further it,”37 became the new guiding 
principle for territorially-based sovereigns. 
This had a significant effect on the importance of territory to state interests.  According to Mayall, 
the rise of the territorial-state resulted in “the translation of territory from being just somewhere where 
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 people hunt, or farm or go to the factory into the ultimate object of political life.”38  As such, the value of 
territory to the state was dramatically increased.  Mayall goes on to argue that “the value which sovereign 
states can not sacrifice without, as it were, committing suicide, is their independence.  What this means in 
practice is that they cannot surrender their territorial integrity.”39  However, as Luard suggested, “it was 
no longer any territory to which they might be able to put forward a dynastic claim, or where their own 
religion was under threat…It was particular territories, believed to be of special value to the state 
concerned.”40  Specifically, states sought territories that could enhance their security.  The borders of 
dynastic-states often “had little geographical or strategic logic”41 since they simply represented the 
personal possessions of the sovereign.  So long as these dynastic claims remained legitimate, “the absence 
of logical frontiers had not been such a significant impetus to international violence.”42  However, once 
these claims became subordinated to raison d’état, sovereigns had a new incentive “to round frontiers to 
create more self-sufficient units.”43  As Hall puts it, “territorial sovereigns had thus developed a passion 
for contiguous, defensible territories, and many conflicts were fought in order to unite divided dynastic 
holdings.”44   
The exception to the desire for territorial contiguity was the drive to establish overseas colonies.  
Yet Hall attributes this to the new territoriality of the state as well.  He argues that the change in the 
predominant form of state fundamentally altered the existing system of alliances from an essentially 
bipolar one based on religion (the alignment of France being a significant exception) to a more multipolar 
one “increasingly characterized by a loose system of very short term alliances.”45  As a result of the 
“increasing uncertainty in alliance politics due to the delegitimation of religious-military affiliations,”46 
states were forced to create large standing armies, which in turn made the acquisition of additional 
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 revenues essential.  Much of this revenue came from the acquisition of overseas colonies.  Yet Hall is 
quick to point out that “the major incentive to establish colonies for eighteenth-century mercantilist 
regimes lay in the extension of the sovereignty of the state (and its monarch) to the remote colony, not for 
purposes of accruing status to either, but for the capability, unavailable on the continent, to leverage the 
terms of trade to the advantage of the mother country and to shield it from competition.”47  Thus, despite 
their distance and disconnectedness, such territories still possessed strategic value for the state.  The 
macro-structural change in state identity associated with the rise of the territorial-state thus produced 
significant changes in state interests and behavior. 
Of course, the creation of a territorial-state with reasonably defensible boundaries says little about 
the ethnic composition of the population within them.  Indeed, territorial-states often tended to be multi-
national entities with little concern for such matters.  This was not a serious issue so long as their 
populations felt no sense of common identity, or at least were uninterested in expressing it politically.  It 
mattered little to any given nationality whether they were ruled by co-nationals or by ‘foreigners.’  With 
the advent of nationalism, however, the ethnic composition of the state became an issue of great 
importance.  Multinational states (e.g., Austria-Hungary) found it increasingly difficult to maintain 
political legitimacy as it came to depend more on the state’s representation of a single people in whose 
name sovereignty was held.  As Hall puts it, “national-sovereign identity problematizes the issue of title 
to land as dynastic and territorial-sovereign legal claims are delegitimated.”48  As the territorial-state gave 
way to the nation-state, state interests also took on a distinctly national flavor. 
The most obvious ‘national’ interest is national self-determination – “the belief that each nation 
has a right to constitute an independent state and determine its own government.”49  Originating in 19th 
century Europe “as a natural corollary”50 of the growing nationalism of the time, it had by the end of 
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 World War I attained an important place in international affairs.  It was applied (selectively and 
imperfectly) in the Treaty of Versailles (1919), and though it was excluded from the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, it did appear in the United Nations Charter.51  Of course, given the fact that its 
application depended on the legal codification of the inherently ambiguous concept of ‘nation,’ it should 
not be surprising that such attempts were often plagued by disputes, not just over what groups were 
deserving of it, but over its very meaning.52  Yet despite such disputes, Hurst Hannum suggests that 
“perhaps no contemporary norm of international law has been so vigorously promoted or widely accepted 
as the right of all peoples to self-determination.”53
This new interest on the part of ethnically distinct peoples in self-determination could be 
expressed in a wide range of ways.  In cases where there were ethnic differences between ruler and ruled, 
self-determination might take the form of a movement to throw off foreign rule (national liberation 
movement).  Alternatively, ethnically distinct regions of a particular state might seek to secede (separatist 
movement), or failing this at least to gain some significant measure of political and cultural autonomy.  If 
the nation were divided among different states, self-determination might lead a state to claim authority 
over co-nationals outside its territory (irredentist movement), or alternatively those left out might seek to 
be absorbed into the broader nation-state (reintegrationist movement).54  Even if such movements failed to 
establish borders that fully encompassed the nation, there might be a strong national interest in protecting 
one’s co-nationals still living under foreign rule. 
These exclusively ‘national’ interests provide an important clue as to why nationalism may be 
associated with an increased propensity for conflict between states.  As new groups achieved national 
consciousness and began to demand the right of self-determination through the establishment of their own 
states, attempts to redraw the political map often resulted in war.  As Carlton Hayes argued, “modern 
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 nationalism began its association with international war through popular attempts to realise the ideal of 
national self-determination.”55  In fact, the long list of nationalist wars that he identifies are specifically 
referred to as wars of national self-determination.  Christopher Dandeker makes a similar point, arguing 
that “it is precisely because national identity is bound up with territory and political autonomy that 
national conflicts are fundamentally associated with the risk of violence:  control of the instruments of 
coercion and regulation over territory and thus the framework within which other activities are decided 
upon are at issue.”56
In addition, the inability to draw clear lines of demarcation between national groups brought 
about new sources of conflict – irredentism and the protection of conationals in other states – which “have 
gradually altered the character, if not the reputation, of nationalist warfare.”57  As Hall puts it, 
the emergence of national-sovereign collective identity [nationalism] created a number of 
new sources of potential conflict in the international system.  Extraterritorial expressions 
of allegiance to a people with shared language, culture, or history…became potential 
bases for the advancement of irridentist territorial claims, or conflictual secessionist 
movements.  National-sovereign identity problematized ethnic, linguistic and cultural 
minorities, territorial integrity and security, migration, titular claims to dynastic lands, 
and the integrity and identity of polyglot states.  Territorial-sovereign legal claims were 
delegitimated and peaceful resolution of disputes became more difficult in the absence of 
consensual knowledge regarding systemic legitimating principles.58
 
In essence, the advent of nationalism changed the way states defined themselves and their interests, 
resulting in new issues being brought onto the world stage for which there were no ready solutions.  From 
this point of view, nationalist conflict could be seen as the result of a lack of established norms regarding 
the relationship between state and nation.  This would imply that the relationship between nationalism and 
conflict is not constant, but instead changes as issues are resolved and knowledge becomes shared.  Such 
an interpretation fits with Hayes’ argument that as nationalism has passed through different stages, its 
impact on war has changed. 
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  Although this may on the surface provide support for the proposition that nationalism may result 
in increased conflict between states, closer consideration reveals that such a conclusion is premature.  
While the creation of a new state identity may produce new issues for states to fight over, it may at the 
same time eliminate other issues of contention.  For instance, the change from dynastic-states to 
territorial-states resulted in “the delegitimation of religious ideas and affiliations as sources of interstate 
conflict.”59  Thus, while changes in state interests may result in changes in the issues over which states 
will fight, it would be incorrect to conclude that these new issues are somehow inherently more prone to 
producing interstate conflict than their predecessors.  Since issues rise and decline over time,60 the linkage 
between nationalism and conflict may prove to be as historically contingent as the nation itself.  James 
Kellas suggests that the issues underlying nationalist conflict may be resolved as nation-states are 
consolidated and irredentist claims are satisfied.61  It is therefore conceivable that the incidence of 
nationalist conflict will eventually decrease.  Of course, since national identities are themselves subject to 
redefinition, such a prediction may seem premature.  However, this would demonstrate that it is not 
nationalism per se that is prone to conflict, but the lack of accepted norms regarding the drawing of 
national boundaries that arose from a macro-structural change in the international system.  From a macro-
structural perspective, therefore, the conflict proneness of nationalism is dependent on the degree of 
disagreement over such boundaries. 
Nation as ‘Role’:  The Micro-Structural Impact of Nationalism on State Behavior 
 While examining the macro-structural impact of nationalism yields some important insights into 
state behavior, it provides only a partial answer to the question of whether nationalism makes states more 
prone to engage in conflict.  For one thing, although a change in type identity may lead a state to pursue a 
new set of interests, how it does so remains an open question.  Whether a nation-state uses diplomacy or 
force may be highly dependent on the specific political, economic, and strategic circumstances it faces.  
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 As such, the macro-structural dimension of nationalism may only inform us of the basic parameters of a 
state’s behavior.  It may tell us for what a state is willing to use force to defend, and why, but it will be 
unlikely to allow us to predict under what specific circumstances it will do so.  This may require us to fall 
back on more traditional forms of analysis – e.g., domestic politics, balance of power. 
However, this leaves another issue.  For many scholars, the conflict propensity of nationalism 
goes well beyond the problem of disagreements over national boundaries brought about by changes in 
type identity.  As remarked in the last chapter, many subscribe to the view that even if a true nation-state 
were successfully established, there would be no guarantee that this would bring an end to nationalist 
conflict.  Recall Hayes’ assertion that nationalism might be heightened once claims of self-determination 
are successfully achieved.  After all, “how, without militarism,” Hayes asked, “could national rights be 
guarded, national interests promoted, and national honour vindicated?”62  Yet one has to wonder how this 
is different from any other kind of state, given the frequency with which states of every kind throughout 
history have resorted to force of arms to guarantee their security, wealth, and prestige.  Why would a 
nation-state be any more prone to militarism than any other type of state?  What would make an 
established nation-state with few (if any) remaining irredentist claims pursue an aggressive foreign 
policy?  A micro-structural analysis of nationalism and state behavior may provide some important 
insights into these questions.  A state’s behavior in pursuit of its ‘national’ interests may be partly 
dependent on considerations of politics and power, but it will also be dependent on something else – the 
role it enacts in its relations with others.  Thus, in order to understand a state’s propensity for nationalist 
conflict, it is necessary to analyze the dynamics of nationalist role formation and how these dynamics can 
set the stage for such conflict. 
The Ideational Security Dilemma:  The Dynamics of Role Formation & the Constitution of 
Threat 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the role that a state assumes in different circumstances represents its 
conception of the situation and how it should behave.  However, as already pointed out by Wendt, states 
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 do not necessarily have the ability to choose their roles freely, particularly in cases where the level of 
interaction with other states is high; roles are constituted through interaction with Others.  Recall the 
mirroring process described by Wendt that occurs during a hypothetical first encounter between two 
actors.  Each brings with it a set of a priori ideas and interests, and assumes a role (and projects a counter-
role) intended to achieve those interests.  Each acts toward the other on the basis of their assumed role and 
how they have defined the interaction, signaling to the other what its counter-role should be and how it is 
expected to respond.  Learning occurs if the two sides adjust their initial ideas about the other, which may 
eventually lead to the development of shared knowledge.   
However, the fact that states may develop shared knowledge says little about what form that 
knowledge will take.  One might expect the development of mutual understanding between states to lead 
to more cooperative behavior, and indeed constructivism is generally viewed as being more focused on 
the possibilities for international cooperation.  J. Samuel Barkin notes that “in practice in the United 
States [constructivism] tends to be liberal-idealist.”63  Members of both the realist and liberal camps have 
criticized constructivism based on this – the former arguing that such a position is too idealistic, the latter 
arguing that it negates much of the distinction between constructivism and neoliberalism.64  Yet Wendt 
argues that social learning is, or at least should be, “analytically neutral between cooperation and 
conflict,”65 suggesting that the same process of social learning can be used to explain the development of 
a Hobbesian culture of anarchy in which states pursue egoistic interests (i.e., realism).  He explains this as 
follows: 
If Ego casts Alter in the role of an object to be manipulated for the gratification of his 
own needs…, then he will engage in behavior that does not take Alter’s security needs 
into account in anything but a purely instrumental sense.  If Alter correctly reads Ego’s 
‘perspective’ he will ‘reflect’ Ego’s ‘appraisal’ back on himself, and conclude that he has 
no standing or rights in this relationship.  This will threaten Alter’s basic needs, and as 
such rather than simply accept this positioning Alter will adopt an egoistic identity 
himself…, and act accordingly toward Ego.  Eventually, by repeatedly engaging in 
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 practices that ignore each other’s needs, or practices of power politics, Alter and Ego will 
create and internalize the shared knowledge that they are enemies, locking in a Hobbesian 
structure.66
 
Thus, social learning may lead not to a shared sense of friendship, but to a shared sense of threat.  As Jutta 
Weldes, et al, point out, “insecurity is itself the product of processes of identity construction in which the 
self and other, or multiple others, are constituted.”67   
 The possibility that threats may be socially constructed inevitably leads to the question – threats 
to what?  Realists have long maintained an essentially material conception of threat – namely, threats to 
the physical security of the state.  In essence, “the nature of [states] is assumed to be both given and 
fixed…and security is thus understood to mean securing these fixed entities against objective and external 
threats.”68  Yet as we have already discussed, the state is not a fixed entity; it is socially constructed, as 
are its interests.  Thus, threats to the state cannot be purely objective, but can only be understood in terms 
of those socially constructed interests.  Of course, this is not to say that physical threats to the state do not 
exist, simply that such threats only have meaning within the context of the social interactions in question 
(recall the nuclear weapons example mentioned in Chapter 2).  However, while it is important to 
understand the social context in which physical threats exist, it is equally important to consider the 
possibility that the threats themselves may be ideational, not just physical, in nature.  In other words, a 
state may perceive a threat to its identity, not just its physical security.  To understand how identity can 
come under threat, it is necessary to briefly revisit the issue of what identity is. 
Identity depends on the maintenance of differences that serve to distinguish one actor from 
another.  As William Connolly argues, “these differences are essential to its being.  If they did not coexist 
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 as differences, [the identity] would not exist in its distinctness and solidity.”69  This can make identity “a 
slippery, insecure experience.”70  If one’s role identity were entirely self-defined, then the roles and 
actions of others would not endanger it.  However, since “one cannot enact role identities by oneself,”71 
their security will depend on the Other’s willingness to play along.  Since there is no guarantee that the 
role a state seeks to enact (and the corresponding counter-role that it seeks to project on the Other) will be 
compatible with the role that the Other seeks to enact (and the corresponding counter-role that it seeks to 
project back), the state’s identity is “vulnerable to the tendency of entities it would so define to counter, 
resist, overturn, or subvert definitions applied to them.”72  Thus, maintaining one’s own role identity may 
involve a struggle with Others who resist the implications it has for their own role identities, and vice 
versa – i.e., they may become involved in a role conflict (see Chapter 2).  For Connolly, the degree of 
conflict involved will depend on a number of factors, including 
variations in the degree to which differences from self-identity are treated as 
complementary identities, contending identities, negative identities, or nonidentities; 
variations in the extent to which the voice of difference is heard as that with which one 
should remain engaged or as a symptom of sickness, inferiority, or evil; variations in the 
degree to which self-choice or cultural determination is attributed to alter-identities; 
variations in the degree to which one’s own claim to identity is blocked by the power of 
opposing claimants…and so on.73
 
In some cases, “a powerful identity will strive to constitute a range of differences as intrinsically evil, 
irrational, abnormal, mad, sick, primitive, monstrous, dangerous, or anarchical – as other.  It does so in 
order to secure itself as intrinsically good, coherent, complete or rational and in order to protect itself 
from the other that would unravel its self-certainty and capacity for collective mobilization if it 
established its legitimacy.”74   
 Such role conflicts can be very serious.  Roles help bring order to an otherwise chaotic world by 
providing states with a conceptual framework with which to understand the world around them and how 
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 they should act within it.  If that role were challenged, it would be difficult for the state to find its footing 
on the world stage; it would be plagued by uncertainty and self-doubt.  Thus, when roles come into 
conflict, the actors involved will likely try to defend against the ideational threat by seeking to reinforce 
their own identities.  This is noted by both Wendt and Hall.  In discussing the prospects for systemic 
transformation through increased interdependence, Wendt argues that “states may respond to these 
systemic processes by redoubling their efforts to defend egoistic identities.”75  Hall makes a similar 
observation by linking individual and collective identities, arguing that 
individual identity is threatened by hazards to those collective identities that are 
constitutive of individual identity.  Therefore individuals perceive that their interest lies 
squarely in the defense and promotion of this collective identity.  The fundamental, even 
primordial, motive (or ‘interest’) of self-preservation will then ensure that individuals 
will come fully to the defense of the collective identity that they see as fundamentally 
constitutive of their selves when they feel that collective identity is threatened.76
 
The aggregation of this individual ‘will-to-manifest-identity’ produces a similar state interest in the 
defense of state identity. 
 The result of this might be termed an ‘ideational security dilemma.’77  In its more traditional 
form, the security dilemma refers to the fact that actions taken by a state to guarantee its own security 
(e.g., increasing military spending) may make its neighbors less secure, prompting them to reciprocate by 
increasing their own capabilities and thereby undermining the security that the first state had sought to 
maintain.  The result of this dilemma “may be a spiral of ever-increasing levels of belligerence as [states] 
try to respond to the prior actions of others.”78  As commonly noted in the literature on interstate conflict, 
such a ‘conflict spiral’ has the potential to escalate into violence.  The same concept can be applied to 
ideational security – actions taken by a state to guarantee its ideational security (i.e., the security of its 
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 identity) may make an Other’s identity less secure, prompting it to reciprocate by reinforcing its own 
identity and thereby potentially undermining the identity that the first state had sought to maintain.  As 
with the more traditional security dilemma in realist theory, such an ideational security dilemma could 
produce an escalation as each party seeks to safeguard its own identity at the other’s expense.  This could 
lead to increasing distrust, and potentially to violent conflict. 
Identity Threats & the Activation of Banal Nationalism:  A Reactive Model of Nationalist 
Conflict 
The concept of an ideational security dilemma provides important insights into the question of 
nationalist conflict.  Like states in general, nations represent a form of particularism in that their identities 
are defined in terms of their uniqueness relative to other nations.  As William Pfaff points out, 
“nationalism…has no universality.  It is impossible to be a nationalist as such, only a German or Croatian 
or American nationalist.”79  It should be noted that this directly contradicts Greenfeld’s assertion that 
“nationalism is not necessarily a form of particularism.  It is a political ideology…, and as such it does 
not have to be identified with any particular community.  A nation coextensive with humanity is in no 
way a contradiction in terms.”80  Given the common understanding and usage of nationalism, however, 
such an assertion cannot hold.  Most scholars of nationalism recognize that the belief in the uniqueness of 
nation is an essential part of nationalist doctrine.81  To expand its meaning to include the possibility of a 
‘universal nation’ would rob the term of its utility.  As such, the security of a state’s national identity is 
dependent on its ability to maintain that uniqueness – i.e., the separation of Self and Other.  This includes 
its ability to enact nationalist roles without interference or contradiction from outside actors.   
Of course, since a nation-state’s ability to independently define its roles is no less constrained 
than that of any other type of state, the potential for nationalist role conflict arises.  As with the mirroring 
process between egoistic actors discussed by Wendt, such a role conflict could lead to the mutual 
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 constitution of a relationship of enmity between the actors in which each seeks to defend itself against a 
perceived threat – not necessarily to its physical self, but to its national identity.  This may help to explain 
how nationalism could influence a nation-state to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy even when its 
main nationalist goals (i.e., self-determination) are fulfilled.  Stephen Van Evera has argued that “the 
effects of nationalism depend heavily on the beliefs of nationalist movements, especially their self-images 
and their images of their neighbors.”82  When these self-images come into conflict, for instance “if nations 
embrace self-justifying historical myths, or adopt distorted pictures of their own and others’ current 
conduct and character that exaggerate the legitimacy of their own cause,” then nationalism may become a 
strong motivating factor for the pursuit of aggressive foreign policies toward that other state.83  “If carried 
to extreme,” Van Evera argues, “such myths can also transform nationalism…from a purely self-
liberating enterprise into a hegemonistic enterprise.”84
From this perspective, nationalist conflict represents, not an instrumental tool of political elites, 
but the logical outcome of an ideational security dilemma between actors with radically different 
conceptions of both themselves and the other, in which each seeks to defend its identity against 
challenges (real or perceived) from the other.  This is an essentially reactive model of nationalist conflict.  
Such a model helps to relate the more extreme manifestations of nationalism that are so often the subject 
of study and the ‘banal nationalism’ of established states that often slips under the radar.  Michael Billig 
uses this term “to cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be 
reproduced.”85  In essence, he argues that “in the established nations [e.g., the United States, Britain, etc.], 
there is a continual ‘flagging’, or reminding, of nationhood….In so many little ways, the citizenry are 
daily reminded of their national place in a world of nations.  However, this reminding is so familiar, so 
continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding.  The metonymic image of banal nationalism 
is not a flag which is consciously being waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on 
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 the public building.”86  It is only in moments of crisis when the public is called forth to rally around the 
flag that nationalism manifests itself more openly.  In other words, while nationalism may always be 
present below the surface, it becomes ‘active’ as a reaction to outside threats. 
The application of such a reactive model of nationalism to the analysis of a particular state’s 
behavior would involve three basic steps.  First, it would be necessary to identify the primary role that the 
state in question seeks to enact.  Of course, since states may seek to enact different roles in different 
situations, it is necessary to place careful boundaries on the analysis.  One could do so either by 
identifying a particularly important role that is essential to the enactment of other roles, or by confining 
the analysis to behaviors associated with a lesser role.  Since it may be difficult to isolate behaviors 
associated with one role from those associated with another, the first strategy would probably be more 
useful.  It should be noted that even a state’s primary role may change significantly over time.  This 
would require either a careful delineation of temporal boundaries, or a careful examination of the effect 
that such a change might have on the model.  Since this dissertation will generally focus on only one 
primary role, the issue of how to deal with such variability will be left for others. 
Once a primary role is identified, it is necessary to determine whether or not a role conflict exists 
– i.e., if the role that the state seeks to enact is in conflict with a counter-role that an Other seeks to 
impose on it.  This actually involves two separate issues.  One is which Other or Others to include in the 
analysis.  This is not an unimportant question, since the choice of Other will likely have a major impact 
on whether or not one finds a role conflict; a state’s role may conflict with one state but not another.  
While the choice is one that can largely be left up to the analyst, it is important to keep in mind that 
conclusions drawn from the analysis of one set of relations may not be generalizable to others.  In other 
words, even if nationalism makes State A more prone to conflict with State B, that does not necessarily 
mean that it will make State A more prone to conflict with State C.  In a reactive model of nationalist 
conflict, nationalism’s conflict propensity is dependent on the relationship in question. 
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 Once the choice of Other is made, the second issue in determining whether or not a role conflict 
exists is identifying the Other’s role, and the counter-role it seeks to impose on the state being studied.  
Identifying such a role involves all of the considerations mentioned before regarding the establishment of 
proper analytical boundaries.  The ability to identify a key role that is central to the enactment of others 
will likely be helpful.  However, in determining its corresponding counter-role, such boundaries may by 
necessity need to be broader.  It is possible that, even if the Other’s role remains relatively unchanged, the 
counter-role it seeks to project on the state in question may change over time as circumstances in their 
relationship change.  Indeed, given the dynamic nature of role formation, this seems likely.  Thus, one 
must be prepared to address multiple counter-roles.  It might be noted here that it may not be necessary to 
examine the counter-role that the state seeks to project back on the Other, at least not in vigorous detail, if 
one is merely interested in ascertaining the nationalism’s impact on its behavior.  However, if one were to 
analyze the effect of nationalism on both state’s foreign policies then this would certainly be a necessity.  
While such an analysis of a bilateral relationship might be useful for understanding other issues – e.g., the 
development of rivalry – this will be left for future study. 
The final step in utilizing a reactive model of nationalist conflict is to analyze the result of the 
role conflict – i.e., its effect on the behavior of the state in question.  This also involves two separate 
issues.  One is the degree to which the role conflict produces a nationalist reaction.  While evidence of 
some level of banal nationalism might be observable, the key would be to see if those latent feelings are 
activated as a reaction against the counter-role that the Other seeks to project onto the state.  In other 
words, is there a nationalist backlash?  Of course, the mere existence of nationalist attitudes towards an 
Other would not be enough to support a reactive model; they might exist for other reasons.  In addition, 
while the author argues that there is more to nationalism than instrumental manipulation of popular 
sentiments, one cannot rule out the possibility that such attempts might exist.  The trick, therefore, would 
be to separate any such usages from the more ‘natural’ reactions being posited here. 
If one can establish that active nationalism is the result of a reaction against threats to the state’s 
national identity, then what remains is to determine whether or not that reaction makes the state more 
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 prone to conflict.  In other words, will the state resort to force in order to protect an identity that is under 
threat?  This brings up an interesting question.  While it is easy to conceive of a state using force to 
pursue tangible benefits like territory or wealth, or even intangible benefits like prestige, would a state go 
to war over something as abstract as its identity or its role in the world?  This seems rather unlikely.  It 
might make more sense to treat the conflict potential of nationalism as indirect.  Reactive nationalism 
may make a state more prone to conflict with an Other by creating or reinforcing a sense of distrust 
between the two parties, thereby making it more likely for the state to view the Other’s actions as 
provocative or threatening.  Under the right circumstances, this could lead to the outbreak of hostilities.  
From this perspective, nationalism may be a contributing factor to interstate conflict, but would not be a 
cause by itself.  In essence, it would at best be an intervening variable.  Thus, depending on the situation, 
even a highly nationalistic state reacting to the actions of an ideationally-threatening Other might not 
resort to force.  Other political and strategic conditions would certainly be required.  Nationalism may 
have a significant effect on a state’s foreign policy behavior, and may increase the potential for conflict, 
but it is far from the war-inducing ideology that it is often made out to be.  A reactive model of nationalist 
conflict thus offers a far more realistic appraisal of nationalism’s conflict potential. 
Such a model has another advantage as well.  Like instrumentalism, it is more analytical than 
primordialism and does not treat nationalism as some eternal constant.  It allows for the possibility that 
nationalism may fluctuate over time in response to various stimuli.  At the same time, however, a reactive 
model of nationalist conflict does not bleed the concept of nationalism of all emotional content by 
reducing it to the self-interest of rational political actors, as does instrumentalism.  Such actors may 
indeed be self-interested, but those interests are understood and defined in terms of the often emotional 
idea of nationalism.  This leaves room for the possibility that, while nationalism may often be caught up 
in domestic politics, the nationalist sentiments of both the public and elites (or at least some portion of 
them) are genuine.  A reactive model thus avoids many of the problems associated with primordialism 
and instrumentalism, and does so in a way that focuses attention on the importance of international 
politics. 
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 Applying the Reactive Model of Nationalist Conflict to Chinese Foreign Policy:  Previewing 
the Empirical Case 
The possibility that nationalism may be reactive in nature is not a unique proposition.  Indeed, 
Shuisheng Zhao has suggested as much in his own attempt “to explore whether there is a direct linkage 
between Chinese nationalism and international aggression by examining different orientations of the 
nationalism.”87  However, weaknesses in his argument only serve to obscure the importance of his 
conclusions regarding nationalism and China’s international behavior.  Indeed, the way in which he 
presents his argument lays bare the problems inherent in addressing the issue without developing a 
broader theoretical understanding of nationalism’s impact on state behavior, problems that may be 
addressed by utilizing the reactive model of nationalist conflict outlined above.  A brief examination of 
Zhao’s argument thus provides a useful segue to the empirical portion of this dissertation. 
Zhao outlines three perspectives of Chinese nationalism – nativism, antitraditionalism, and 
pragmatism – each “rooted in a different assessment of the sources of national weakness and advocates a 
best approach to revitalize China.”88  Nativism views such weakness as the result of “the subversion of 
indigenous Chinese virtues,” and is thus associated with “calls for a return to Confucian tradition.”89  In 
contrast, antitraditionalism views Confucian traditions themselves as the problem and advocates a 
wholesale modernization of Chinese culture.  Pragmatism might be seen as a middle ground between the 
first two perspectives – it “sees foreign economic exploitation and cultural infiltration as a source of 
China’s weakness, but believes that the lack of modernization is the reason why China became an easy 
target for Western imperialism.”90  Zhao then associates each of these perspectives with a particular 
international orientation – confrontation, adaptation, and assertion, respectively.   
Although Zhao suggests that the first two perspectives still “lurk in the background,” he argues 
that “pragmatic nationalism has become the dominant thinking of Chinese people and their leaders since 
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 the 1980s.”91  This pragmatic nationalism has three basic characteristics.  The first is instrumentality – 
i.e., nationalism serves as a political tool that allows the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to maintain its 
legitimacy.  Second, it is defined more in terms of loyalty to the state than loyalty to the Han as an ethnic 
group.  Finally, it is reactive – “it tends to become strong in response to perceived foreign pressures that 
are said to erode, corrode, or endanger the national interest of China.”92  As a result, Zhao argues that 
nationalism does not necessarily make China more prone to engage in conflict.  “Being instrumental and 
state-led, nationalism may be used to flex China’s muscles in international affairs if it is deemed desirable 
by Chinese leaders to enhance their political power.  But being reactive to international currents, 
nationalist sentiments may decrease if perceived external pressure diminishes and if China’s confidence 
in international affairs increases.”93  In essence, Chinese nationalism is primarily defensive in nature.94
While Zhao’s characterization of the international orientation of Chinese nationalism as 
essentially reactive and defensive is a useful one, and in the opinion of the author is largely correct, the 
way in which he reaches this conclusion is highly problematic.  First, the three perspectives of Chinese 
nationalism that he suggests are flawed because they do not take into account the historical changes 
involved in the evolution of Chinese national identity.  While nativism and antitraditionalism played 
important roles in the development of Chinese nationalism, and continued to influence China into the 
modern day, such sentiments do not represent distinct expressions of nationalism.  Indeed, as will be 
argued in the next chapter, equating support for Confucian tradition with true nationalist sentiment is a 
fundamental error; the former was an expression of a dramatically different form of identity than the 
latter.  For its part, antitraditionalism might better be described as a transitional stage between Confucian 
tradition and modern nationalism. 
Second, Zhao’s characterization of pragmatic nationalism is flawed by its overreliance on an 
instrumentalist view of nationalism.  He supports this approach by arguing that China’s “pragmatic 
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 nationalism does not have a fixed, objectified, and eternally defined content.  Instead, it has been 
continually remade to fit the needs of its creators and consumers.”95  While this may be true, the denial of 
a primordial Chinese nationalism does not necessarily lend credence to a wholly instrumentalist 
interpretation.  As has already been discussed, one of the major problems with instrumentalism is that it 
denies the ‘genuineness’ of nationalist feelings among the public and elites.  To suggest that Chinese 
nationalism is simply a cynical tool of political manipulation risks severely misinterpreting it and the 
impact it has on China’s behavior.  The fact that nationalism helps to prop up the crumbling foundations 
of communist rule is difficult to deny.  However, that does not mean that one can reduce Chinese 
nationalism to an epiphenomenon of Chinese domestic politics. 
Third, despite his use of instrumentalism, Zhao’s arguments seem ungrounded in broader theories 
of nationalism, much less a general theory of nationalist conflict.  As a result, he seems to fall victim to 
the common malady of China scholars – the treatment of China as a unique case.  By not examining 
Chinese nationalism within a broader context, it becomes impossible to come to any generalizable 
conclusions regarding the impact of nationalism on state behavior.  Of course, Zhao’s stated intention is 
not to address the issue of nationalist conflict in general, though he begins his analysis lamenting the lack 
of ‘convincing’ explanations of it; his goal is simply to address of question of whether nationalism makes 
China more prone to international conflict.  Yet by not going further to develop a theoretically-grounded 
explanation, he risks getting the right answer for the wrong reasons.  By employing a reactive model of 
nationalist conflict to the issue of Chinese foreign policy, the author hopes to avoid these problems and 
offer a more theoretically-informed view of the conflict potential of Chinese nationalism, one that may 
offer clues to the broader issue of nationalist conflict. 
 At this time, it is necessary to review the theoretical argument being made regarding the affect of 
nationalism on state behavior, and lay out the specific propositions to be examined in Part II.  Nationalism 
is constituted by the international system in two ways.  From a macro-structural perspective, nationalism 
represents an expression of a particular type of state whose interests are distinct from those of other types 
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 of states.  Such interests include the self-determination of a particular national group.  This sets the 
parameters on the behavior of the state.  From a micro-structural perspective, banal nationalism may 
become active if the nationalist-informed role that a state seeks to enact comes into conflict with the 
counter-role that an Other seeks to project onto it.  This may lead to escalating tensions, and potentially to 
violent conflict, as each state seeks to defend its identity against outside threats.  Taken together, these 
macro- and micro-dimensions of social structure help to explain nationalism’s effect on state behavior.  In 
order to evaluate this argument with respect to the China case, it is necessary to answer three main 
questions. 
 First, can Chinese nationalism be conceptualized as being constituted by the international system?  
If the answer is no, then the theoretical model outlined above will do little to explain the impact of 
nationalism on Chinese foreign policy.  However, it will be demonstrated in Chapter 5 that Chinese 
nationalism can indeed be conceptualized in this way.  Specifically, it will be shown that the development 
of Chinese nationalism was a direct result of international pressures brought about by Western 
imperialism.  As already mentioned in the introduction, such a claim is by no means new; China scholars 
have long recognized the role of the West in the development of Chinese nationalism.  Thus, it could be 
argued that this breaks little new ground.  However, the author will seek to do so by grounding the story 
of China’s incorporation into the modern international system, and the consequent development of 
Chinese nationalism, in IR theory – specifically, realist constructivism – and as such help to link China to 
broader patterns and processes of international politics.  By doing so, it will be possible to demonstrate 
the validity of a third image approach to understanding nationalism and nationalist conflict. 
 In essence, the argument that will be made is that prior to its contact with Western civilization, 
China could be conceived of as being the center of a regional subsystem, the social structure of which was 
fundamentally different from the Western interstate system, and as such constituted China’s identity in 
fundamentally different terms.  Thus, the patterns of behavior so familiar to China scholars can be 
integrated into a broader theoretical framework of international politics.  By doing so, we can gain a 
better understanding of the dynamics of systemic change in a non-Western context.  More importantly, it 
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 will give us a first-hand view of Hall’s second sequence of transformational logic – namely, the impact 
that a change in the system’s social structure had on China’s identity.  As will be demonstrated, it is this 
change in social structure, in conjunction with the military superiority of Western powers, that forced 
China to adopt a new identity as a nation-state. 
 The second question that must be addressed is – what interests and behavioral patterns are 
associated with this change in type identity?  In other words, what new ‘national’ interests did China 
develop as a result of macro-structural change?  Chapter 6 will seek to answer this question by examining 
the evolution of the Taiwan issue in Chinese foreign policy.  If China’s interest in Taiwan remains 
unchanged despite the dramatic changes in its identity, then nationalism might be seen as having little 
impact on Chinese foreign policy regarding this issue, except perhaps for the political instrumentality 
suggested by Zhao and others.  However, if these interests have changed, then this must be the result 
either of changes in China’s strategic environment (i.e., simple learning) or of changes in its identity (i.e., 
complex learning). 
 It will be argued that China’s interests with respect to Taiwan have indeed changed dramatically, 
from having little, if any, interest in the island to treating it as vital to China’s territorial and national 
integrity.  This can, in part, be attributed to changes in China’s security environment as external threats 
forced successive Chinese governments to seek greater integration of Taiwan with the mainland.  
However, in keeping with the perspective of realist constructivism discussed in Chapter 2, it will be 
argued that such threats simply influenced the direction of the learning process in which China was 
engaged, by forcing it to adopt Western conceptions of territorial and national sovereignty and not vice 
versa.  Yet the specific outcome could have been different – e.g., China could have defined its new 
territorial interests in such a way that Taiwan would remain excluded.  Indeed, the long, troubled path 
towards accepting Taiwan as an integral part of China demonstrates that strategic considerations alone do 
not explain China’s newfound interest in the island.  Such an explanation requires understanding how 
changes to China’s identity led to a redefinition of China’s interests. 
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  Finally, the last question that must be addressed is, given China’s new ‘national’ interests, to what 
extent is contemporary Chinese nationalism the product of an ideational security dilemma, and how likely 
is this to escalate into interstate conflict?  In other words, can contemporary Chinese nationalism be 
conceived of as a reaction to conflicts between the role it seeks to enact and the counter-role that 
significant Others seek to impose?  If it is indeed reactive, then there should be an identifiable Other (or 
Others) to which it is reacting, an associated role conflict that challenges Chinese identity, and evidence 
of an escalation in that conflict, at least to the point of significantly worsening relations.  Whether such an 
escalation would lead to actual conflict with the Other is an open question.  Chapter 7 will attempt to 
answer this question by examining the interaction between China and one of its most significant Others – 
the United States. 
 As the world’s sole superpower, the United States is arguably the most significant Other for most 
states.  In the case of China, that significance is enhanced by US support for Taiwan – which allows us to 
connect role with the previous discussion on the evolution of China’s territorial interests – and the 
leadership it took in imposing sanctions on China after Tiananmen Square.  While other states (e.g., 
Japan, Taiwan itself) are also important Others in China’s foreign relations, the author will focus on the 
case of Sino-US relations in order to map the main contours of any potential role conflicts.  The issue of 
how to deal with multiple role interactions will be left for future study.  It will be argued that the US 
treatment of China as a failed modernizer after Tiananmen directly conflicted with China’s evolving role 
as a great power.  This role conflict helps to explain the escalation in Sino-US tensions throughout the 
1990s that led to a confrontation over Taiwan in 1996.  However, it will also be pointed out that this role 
conflict, while it made relations between the two states difficult, did not escalate to the point of violent 
conflict.  While an ideational security dilemma may lead to a downward spiral in relations, whether it will 
lead to interstate conflict will depend on various other factors.  Thus, nationalism may help set the stage 
for conflict, but it does not automatically result in it. 
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Chapter 5. FROM MIDDLE KINGDOM TO NATION-STATE:  STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE & THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALISM 
 
 The theoretical framework discussed in Part I made three basic claims.  First, nationalism is 
constituted by the international system and is therefore part of its social structure.  Second, nationalism 
manifests itself macro-structurally as a particular type of state (a nation-state) with a specific ‘national’ 
identity and ‘national’ interests distinct from other state forms.  Finally, nationalism manifests itself 
micro-structurally as a role taken on by the nation-state in reaction to threats to its identity.  It is now 
necessary to examine the empirical evidence to determine whether or not it supports these claims.  As 
previously discussed, China provides an excellent case for examining the potential impact of nationalism 
on foreign policy since Chinese foreign policy has often been (and continues to be) associated with 
nationalist goals and the development of Chinese nationalism itself is strongly connected with 
international politics.  Therefore, Part II will examine Chinese nationalism and its impact on Chinese 
foreign policy in order to evaluate the theoretical claims made in Part I. 
 The first question that must be addressed is whether or not Chinese nationalism can be 
conceptualized as being constituted by the international system.  This will determine the basic validity of 
the theoretical arguments being made.  After all, if Chinese nationalism were derived solely from 
domestic sources, then the constructivist approach that has been outlined would be of little use.  
Therefore, this chapter will examine the historical roots of Chinese nationalism in order to demonstrate 
that its development was a direct response to structural changes brought about by Western imperialism 
and China’s forced absorption into the modern international system.  The fact that Western imperialism 
played an important role in the development of Chinese nationalism has long been recognized by scholars 
of modern Chinese history.  For instance, Jonathan Spence has stated that “for the Chinese [nationalism] 
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 comprised a new, urgent awareness of their relationship to foreign forces and to the Manchus.  It carried 
as well a corresponding sense of the Chinese people as a unit that must be mobilized for its own 
survival.”1  Similarly, Torbjörn Lodén has stated that “China’s confrontation with the Western Powers 
and Japan in the nineteenth century made it necessary to relinquish the universalistic pretensions of the 
empire and to seek entrance into the family of nations, or the international system of states, as one 
sovereign state among others.”2  The author’s position that Chinese nationalism was largely the product of 
international politics is therefore nothing new, particularly to China scholars.  However, given the fact 
that the relationship between nationalism and the international system has traditionally been under-
theorized, a reexamination of the Chinese case may help to flesh out the relationship and provide 
evidence for the initial proposition that the international system plays an integral role in the development 
of nationalism.  In addition, this chapter will provide readers, particularly those less familiar with modern 
Chinese history, with the historical context necessary for understanding contemporary Chinese 
nationalism. 
China as a Cultural-State:  Early Chinese Identity & the East Asian Tribute System 
 In order to understand the structural effects of nationalism on China’s identity and interests, it is 
important to remember that the international system itself is relatively young.  Prior to the era of Western 
exploration and colonization, and the technological innovations in transportation and communication that 
followed, the world was largely composed of relatively isolated regional systems – what George 
Modelski called “world regions”3 – separated by immense distances that severely limited contact between 
them.  For centuries, China lay at the center of one such system that was heavily influenced by Confucian 
values.  As such, while Rodney Hall’s conceptual framework for the evolution of the European interstate 
system (see Chapter 4) may yield important clues about the development of China’s modern identity as a 
                                                 
1 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China  (New York:  W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), 23. 
2 Torbjörn Lodén, “Nationalism Transcending the State:  Changing Conceptions of Chinese Identity,” in Asian 
Forms of the Nation, ed. Stein Tonnesson and Hans Antlöv  (Richmond:  Curzon Press Ltd., 1996), 277. 
3 George Modelski, “Long Cycles of World Leadership,” in Contending Approaches to World System Analysis, ed. 
William R. Thompson  (Beverly Hills:  Sage Publications, 1983), 116. 
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 nation-state, China’s developmental path more closely resembles his second sequence of transformational 
logic.  In other words, China was an object of systemic transformation, not an agent of it.  It is therefore 
necessary to examine the regional system of which China was a part, which I will refer to as the 
Confucian system (in contrast to the Augsburg or Westphalian systems), as well as the international 
norms, institutions, legitimating principles, and collective identity that produced it. 
 Although the Confucian system was highly dynamic, the basic ideas on which it was based 
endured for many centuries.  In fact, Adda Bozeman has suggested that the basic Chinese world-view 
existed well before it was formally laid out by Confucius and later Chinese scholars.  This world-view 
“assumed a natural harmony between heavenly and earthly forces, and invited men to think of the entire 
universe as a peaceful world-embracing community, which Heaven governs in such a way that all human 
destinies can express themselves in ordered relationships on all levels of association, be it in the family, in 
the state, or in greater spheres.”4  These ideas were developed more explicitly by numerous Chinese 
scholars, and particularly by Confucius (551-479 B.C.), whose ideas eventually became the core 
legitimating principles of the Chinese state during the Western Han dynasty (206 B.C. – 9 AD).  
Although summarizing the content of Confucian philosophy in just a few sentences risks gross 
oversimplification, it is necessary in order to understand the ideational foundations of the Confucian 
system.   
In essence, Confucianism was primarily concerned with the creation of social harmony.  This 
could only be achieved through human virtue, and thus Confucius “advocated a good government that 
rules by virtue and moral example rather than by punishment or force.”5  A ruler was therefore expected 
to demonstrate the highest possible virtue so that the people would follow his example.  Such virtue was 
demonstrated through li – “those ‘objective’ prescriptions of behavior, whether involving rite, ceremony, 
manners, or general deportment, that bind human beings and the spirits together in networks of interacting 
                                                 
4 Adda B. Bozeman, Politics & Culture in International History:  From the Ancient Near East to the Opening of the 
Modern Age, 2d ed.  (New Brunswick:  Transaction Publishers, 1994), 134. 
5 Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy  (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1963), 15. 
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 roles within the family, within human society, and with the numinous realm beyond.”6  In other words, 
social harmony could only exist if everyone in society understood their role and acted accordingly.  This 
is best represented by the ‘five relationships,’ each of which is associated with a particular virtue. 
Table 1 - The Five Relationships of Confucianism7
Five Key Relationships Appropriate Values
Father-Son Filial Piety 
Ruler-Subject Loyalty 
Brother-Brother Brotherliness 
Husband-Wife Love and Obedience 
Friend-Friend Faithfulness 
 
Although these relationships involved reciprocal obligations, the Confucian view of social harmony was 
essentially hierarchical.  For instance, while a ruler had an obligation to care for his subjects and provide a 
proper moral example, subjects had an obligation to obey the ruler. 
 Confucian beliefs in a moral and harmonious social order underpinned by proper behavior within 
a given social hierarchy provided the legitimating principles for China’s political institutions.  At the apex 
of the political system was the emperor, who as the Son of Heaven (tianzi [t’ien-tse])8 was considered to 
have the greatest virtue and thus the right to rule – the Mandate of Heaven (tianming [t’ien-ming]).  This 
mandate was exercised, not just through administration of the empire, but also through the proper conduct 
of various rites and ceremonies meant to ensure prosperity for the people.  Events such as droughts, 
floods, and other natural disasters, as well as widespread social unrest or invasion, were considered signs 
that the emperor had lost his mandate, bringing about the decline and eventual collapse of one dynasty 
and the rise of another.  In order to aid in the administration of the empire, an advanced system of 
bureaucracy was developed.  Its officials were required to pass a rigorous, highly standardized series of 
civil service exams based on the Confucian classics, for which study began in early childhood.  The exam 
                                                 
6 Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China  (Cambridge:  The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1985), 67. 
7 Charles O. Hucker, China’s Imperial Past:  An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture  (Stanford:  Stanford 
University Press, 1975). 
8 Over the years, the predominant method for transliterating Chinese characters into Western alphabets has changed.  
The author uses the more modern method – pinyin – whenever possible.  However, alternative transliterations using 
the older Wade-Giles system are also provided since this was once very common. 
150 
 system was designed to produce generalists, scholar-bureaucrats, who could apply the moral teachings of 
Confucius and later scholars to everyday matters. 
 Confucian ideas had a tremendous impact on China’s relations with its neighbors, and thus 
provided the normative structure of the Confucian system.  They were seen as the measure of civilization 
and as universal principles to which all people should subscribe.  Societies that failed to adhere to 
Confucian beliefs were considered barbarians and inherently inferior.  It should be emphasized that this 
“superiority over the barbarians had a cultural rather than a mere political basis; it rested less upon force 
than upon the Chinese way of life embodied in such things as the Confucian code of conduct and the use 
of the Chinese written language; the sign of the barbarian was not race or origin so much as non-
adherence to this way of life.”9  As such, barbarians could become civilized by accepting the superiority 
of Chinese ways, a concept referred to as laihua – ‘come and be transformed.’  This included acceptance 
of the authority of the Chinese emperor, who was not simply the ruler of the Chinese people, but the ruler 
of tianxia (t’ien-hsia) – ‘All under Heaven.’  Confucian beliefs thus “permitted the Chinese to 
conceptualize the international order in terms of value systems as well as systems of power.”10
 This conceptualization was institutionalized in a complex set of relations generally known as the 
tribute system.  Of course, as Mark Mancall points out, “it must be constantly borne in mind that the 
concept of the tribute system is a Western invention for descriptive purposes.  The Confucian scholar-
bureaucrat did not conceive of a tribute system…as an institutional complex complete within itself or 
distinct from the other institutions of Confucian society.”11  Instead, Mancall suggests that “in one sense 
the tribute system was simply the recognizable, stable recurrence of discrete social phenomena that shared 
certain characteristics.”12  At its core was the expectation that China’s barbarian neighbors should pay 
tribute to the Chinese emperor in recognition of his superior virtue and position as the Son of Heaven.  It 
was through this position that “the emperor connected human society to the rest of the cosmos.  Entry into 
                                                 
9 John K. Fairbank, and Ssu-yü Têng, Ch’ing Administration:  Three Studies  (Cambridge:  Harvard University 
Press, 1960), 137-38. 
10 Mark Mancall, China at the Center:  300 Years of Foreign Policy  (New York:  The Free Press, 1984), 7. 
11 Ibid., 13. 
12 Ibid., 15. 
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 the emperor’s presence or court required recognition of these principles through the correct performance 
of the rituals and through tribute presentation.”13  Thus, tribute represented more than an exchange of 
material goods brought about by an uneven distribution of power; it was part and parcel of the rituals and 
ceremonies that guaranteed universal harmony. 
 The idea that other states should pay tribute to the Chinese emperor was not mere wishful 
thinking on the part of Confucian intellectuals.  Between 1662 and 1911, for instance, over 500 tribute 
missions from sixty-two different countries arrived in the Chinese capital to perform the various rites and 
ceremonies associated with the recognition of the Son of Heaven’s authority over all mankind.14  While 
some states (e.g., Japan) were infrequent participants, others (e.g., Korea, Vietnam) sent tribute on a fairly 
regular basis.  In most cases, China did not actively seek out new tributaries; only occasionally were 
conscious efforts made to expand the system beyond China’s more immediate neighbors (e.g., the 
voyages of the Ming treasure fleet).15  Instead, Guoqi Xu suggests that “close-mindedness and self-
imposed isolation might be called the main characteristics of tianxia.”16  The tribute system existed to 
regulate China’s relations with other societies, not as a means of actively spreading Chinese hegemony. 
 However, while the tribute system provides a useful way of conceptualizing China’s early foreign 
relations, it is important not to accept it at face value.  Doing so risks severely oversimplifying what was 
an inherently complex system of international relations.  As such, it is necessary to offer a few 
qualifications.  First, the Confucian ideas that provided the foundation for the tribute system did not 
produce just one Chinese approach to foreign policy.  On the one hand, the Sinocentric world-view 
associated with the tribute system often produced an essentially introverted foreign policy, in which 
China was uninterested in anything foreign and sought to insulate itself from outside influences.  The 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 22. 
14 Ibid., 15.  For an extensive listing of tribute missions during the Ming and Qing dynasties, see Fairbank and Têng, 
Ch’ing Administration. 
15 For discussions of the Ming treasure fleet, see Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas:  The Treasure Fleet 
of the Dragon Throne, 1405-33  (New York:  Simon & Schuster, 1994); Philip Snow, The Star Raft:  China’s 
Encounter with Africa  (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1988); and Gavin Menzies, 1421:  The Year China 
Discovered America  (New York:  William Morrow, 2003). 
16 Guoqi Xu, “Nationalism, Internationalism, and National Identity:  China from 1895 to 1919,” in Chinese 
Nationalism in Perspective:  Historical and Recent Cases, ed. C. X. George Wei and Xiaoyuan Liu  (Westport:  
Greenwood Press, 2001), 102. 
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 abrupt ending of China’s own voyages of exploration is perhaps the perfect example.  On the other hand, 
Michael Hunt argues that during some historical periods Chinese foreign policy has been far more 
cosmopolitan in its outlook, actively trading with other societies and importing ideas (e.g., Buddhism).17  
Similarly, Joanna Waley-Cohen argues that China’s historical tendency towards isolationism is greatly 
exaggerated.18  It would therefore be a mistake to treat the tribute system as a simplistic expression of 
Confucian ideology. 
Second, while it will be argued that the incompatibility of the Confucian and Western systems of 
international relations would eventually bring about the demise of the former, the tribute system was not 
as static and inflexible as is often suggested.  The tribute system itself did not exist in a single form 
throughout China’s imperial history; it evolved over time.19  The system as it is most commonly described 
was developed during the Ming and Qing (Ch’ing) dynasties (1368-1644 and 1644-1911, respectively), 
with a number of significant innovations made during the Qing.20  It also allowed room for at least some 
limited compromise.  For instance, when the Qing came into contact with the expanding Russian empire, 
the two eventually signed two important agreements – the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) and the Treaty of 
Kyakhta (1728) – that “represented a compromise between the positions assumed by Moscow and 
Peking.”21  Many of their provisions, particularly the careful delineation of a frontier between them, were 
“something of a departure from traditional Chinese practice.”22  In part this was due to a pragmatic need 
to consolidate the Qing position vis-à-vis Central Asia.  However, Mancall suggests that such 
compromise was made possible by the fact that these treaties “established a culturally neutral system of 
institutions that allowed for interpretation of the acts of intercourse in accord with the political, 
                                                 
17 Michael H. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy  (New York:  Columbia University Press, 
1996), 5. 
18 Joanna Waley-Cohen, The Sextants of Beijing:  Global Currents in Chinese History  (New York:  W. W. Norton 
& Company, Inc., 1999). 
19 King C. Chen, “Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations:  Introduction,” in The Foreign Policy of China, ed. King 
C. Chen  (Roseland:  East-West Who? Inc., Publishers, 1972), 8-9. 
20 Mancall, China at the Center, 16-20. 
21 Ibid., 76. 
22 Ibid., 77. 
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 ideological, and ritual requirements and perceptions of each side.”23  In essence, both sides remained “free 
to perpetuate its own perceptions of the other and the international scene.”24  Thus, the Chinese were often 
quite flexible in their application of Confucian principles, so long as the principles themselves remained 
intact. 
Third, the operation of the tribute system was interspersed with periods in which China’s 
relations with its neighbors more closely resembled the European system of relatively equal states.25  This 
can be associated with the more or less cyclical rise and fall of Chinese dynasties that has given Chinese 
history its periodicity.  As Mancall puts it, “periods of unity, dominated by the imperial state, alternated 
with periods of disunity, characterized by the reemergence of a polycentric multistate system.”26  
Dynastic decline brought with it a significant reduction in the extent of Chinese power, often leading to 
invasions and internal collapse.  Although the basic institutions of the imperial system, and the power 
associated with it, were generally reconstituted in the form of a new dynasty, the periods between 
dynasties often necessitated important changes in the style and substance of China’s international affairs. 
For instance, during the relatively chaotic period known as the Five Dynasties and the Ten 
Kingdoms (907-960) that followed the collapse of the T’ang dynasty (618-907), “a political vacuum 
existed in East Asia that permitted the various domestic and foreign states to deal with each other more or 
less as diplomatic equals.”27  The traditional order provided by the tribute system broke down as Chinese 
and non-Chinese states competed with each other for authority, producing a system of constant 
competition and shifting alliances.  Even after the reestablishment of central authority under the Sung 
dynasty (960-1279), China was weak enough relative to many of its neighbors, particularly the Liao in the 
north, that its foreign relations had to be significantly altered.  In fact, Wang Gungwu has suggested that 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 79. 
24 Ibid., 79. 
25 China Among Equals:  The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries.  Edited by Morris Rossabi.  
(Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1983). 
26 Mancall, China at the Center, 4-5. 
27 Edmund H. Worthy, Jr., “Diplomacy for Survival:  Domestic and Foreign Relations of Wu Yüeh, 907-978,” in 
China among Equals:  The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th – 14th Centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi  (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1983), 19. 
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 “Liao’s relations with the Sung were the nearest thing to equality in Chinese history until modern 
times.”28  The rough parity between them prevented the Sung from treating the Liao as an inferior needing 
to present tribute.  Moreover, it resulted in other states, such as Vietnam and Korea, being less bound to 
their traditional vassal relationships with China.  “Thus,” concludes Wang, “the de facto situation around 
Sung China soon after 1005 was one of several states that did not ‘submit’ to Sung authority but allowed 
the rhetoric of tribute to be used until they were ready to reject it.”29
 Finally, it is important to consider the reasons for why (aside from ideology) the tribute system 
was established in the first place, and why other societies were often willing to play by its rules.  For 
China, it served an important function in self-defense.  Barbarian raids aimed at acquiring Chinese goods 
were relatively common, particularly when environmental conditions (e.g., drought) made nomadic life 
difficult.30  The tribute system provided a mechanism to control such raids by regulating China’s relations 
with these groups.  It could accomplish this because, as mentioned earlier, the relationship between ruler 
and ruled (or civilization and barbarism) in Confucian thought was not a one-way street; it involved 
reciprocal obligations.  While barbarians were required to present tribute in recognition of the emperor’s 
position at the apex of world order, the emperor bestowed gifts on his tribute-bearing subjects to 
demonstrate “his benevolence, compassion, and generosity [which] would serve as a model for foreign 
rulers and would draw them and their people closer to China.”31  Indeed, Mancall suggests that “the 
symbolic meaning of the tribute was further extended by the fact that the emperor’s gifts were usually 
more valuable than the tribute he received, indicating that the emperor, as the apex of the entire system, 
could not be outdone in generosity and reinforcing, through the obvious exhibition of abundance and 
                                                 
28 Wang Gungwu, “The Rhetoric of a Lesser Empire:  Early Sung Relations with Its Neighbors,” in China among 
Equals:  The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th – 14th Centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi  (Berkeley:  University of 
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29 Ibid., 62. 
30 Morris Rossabi, “Introduction,” in China among Equals:  The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th – 14th 
Centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi  (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1983), 1-3.  For an extensive discussion of 
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 wealth…, his apexical role.”32  The tribute system was thus intended to encourage barbarians to accept 
Chinese culture.   
On the other hand, since Confucianism denigrated trade and profit seeking, in many ways “tribute 
was a cloak for trade.”33  It was this prospect of trade that provided enormous material incentives for other 
states to participate in the system.  This was particularly true of the more nomadic groups of central Asia.  
As Thomas Barfield points out, these groups “not only rejected Chinese culture and ideology, worse, they 
obstinately refused to see any value in it except in terms of the material goods the Chinese could offer.”34  
Their participation in the tribute system was thus purely based on a calculation of interests, a 
consideration that, despite Confucian ideology, did not escape the Chinese either.  Sechin Jagchid and 
Van Jay Symons argue that “nomads carefully and continually gauged whether existing frontier markets, 
tributary exchange, or intermarriage arrangements were more advantageous to them than raiding China.  
In turn, Chinese dynasts constantly weighed the costs of maintaining these exchange mechanisms against 
the expense of warring with nomads.”35  From this perspective, the tribute system could be interpreted as 
an ideological front for material interests, one which Barfield suggests was readily manipulated by 
nomadic tribes for their own ends.36
Yet these qualifications should not detract from the overall importance of the tribute system as a 
normative structure of international relations in East Asia, just as the frequent failure to abide by the 
principles of state sovereignty do not negate its importance as a defining characteristic of the European 
interstate system.  While China itself was sometimes too weak or fragmented to exercise influence 
through the tribute system, the ideas to which it gave rise provided a fundamental norm of international 
conduct that served as the foundation of the East Asian system’s social structure.  The concept of tribute 
was utilized by various states in the region in their relations with each other, not just with China.  “Korea, 
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33 Fairbank and Têng, Ch’ing Administration, 111. 
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Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 2. 
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 for instance, often conducted its relations with Japan on a tribute pattern.  Ladakh presented tribute to 
Tibet, and Cambodia might present tribute to a stronger Thailand.  The Nguyen rulers of Vietnam might 
call themselves ‘emperors’ at home, but, in communications with China, they called themselves ‘kings,’ a 
clear example of the extension of hierarchy.”37  In essence, Mancall suggests that, “viewed vertically, the 
Peking-centered tribute system was itself only the uppermost and most solemn part of a vast system of 
hierarchical relationships that seemed to embrace the entire intergroup and even interpersonal life of East 
Asia.”38  The tribute system was not simply China’s way of ordering its relations with other, sometimes 
threatening, societies.  It was the crux of an East Asian system of international relations that differed 
significantly in its normative structure from the European world of sovereign states. 
Of course, returning to the perspective of realist constructivism discussed in Chapter 2, such an 
ideational structure would probably have been unsustainable if the relative power of China and its 
neighbors had not been so lopsided for so long.  While international systems may be socially constructed 
based on shared knowledge, social structures that deviate significantly from material bases of power are 
likely to eventually be overwhelmed.  In the end, whose norms prevail will depend to a large extent on the 
balance of material capabilities.  This helps to explain why China’s pretensions to universal authority 
were largely more successful than, say, the Holy Roman Empire’s.  As Henry Kissinger has speculated, 
“had the Holy Roman Emperor ever succeeded in establishing central control over the territories 
technically under his jurisdiction, the relations of Western European states to it might have been similar to 
those of China’s neighbors to the Middle Kingdom, with France comparable to Vietnam or Korea, and 
Great Britain to Japan.”39  Similarly, if the periodic breakdown in centralized Chinese authority had been 
longer lasting, then the traditional idea of tribute and hierarchy might have been replaced by something 
resembling the Western notion of state sovereignty as competing powers sought to assert their own, 
independent authority. 
                                                 
37 Mark Mancall, “The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in The Foreign Policy of China, ed. 
King C. Chen  (Roseland:  East-West Who? Inc., Publishers, 1972), 32. 
38 Mancall, China at the Center, 33-4. 
39 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy  (New York:  Simon & Schuster, 1994), 56-7. 
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 Power relations aside, however, one should not underestimate the ability of Confucian norms to 
shape state relations even during periods of dynastic decline.  Although Edmund Worthy suggests that 
“the Sinocentric structure of foreign relations lost much of its compelling logic”40 during such periods, the 
ideational basis of it remained.  As a result, dynastic decline and disunity in China did not cause the 
breakdown of the Confucian system so much as spark a competition for who would lay claim to a new 
Mandate of Heaven.  For instance, during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period, Rossabi points 
out that “there were…numerous rulers who claimed to be the Son of Heaven….Each pursued his own 
interest with little concern for loyalty to anyone else’s Mandate of Heaven.”41  While he and others point 
to this as an example of the breakdown of the system, it is important to recognize that lack of loyalty to 
someone else’s Mandate of Heaven is very different from disavowal of the idea of a mandate itself, let 
alone the recognition of state sovereignty.  Rossabi may be correct that “such continual shifts in loyalty 
diminished the prestige of the imperial institution.”42  However, the normative foundation of the 
institution remained.  Even groups that did not fully accept Confucian ideas often utilized its institutions, 
particularly when they were powerful enough to take the reigns of central power themselves and establish 
a ‘foreign’ dynasty (e.g., the Qing).  The fact that such dynasties had a direct interest in maintaining 
Confucian norms upon assuming the Mandate of Heaven does not detract from their importance.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, social structures are only maintained through social practice. 
What is essential to recognize is that this hierarchical system was not simply a system of unequal 
states with China as regional hegemon.  It was a system in which the inequality of states was 
ideologically sanctioned in such a way that the state as an actor was barely recognized.  The tianxia over 
which the emperor ruled “entailed a single, stratified, total order based on principles of differentiation 
(involving ritual and decorum) at the basis of the transcendent authority of heaven….There was no world 
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41 Rossabi, “Introduction,” 5. 
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 outside of the tianxia, for it was itself a single, complete ‘world’ system.”43    As such, it is commonly 
suggested that in the Confucian worldview “international society was the extension of internal society.”44  
Thus, it could not recognize the existence of particularistic states, nor even recognize ‘China’ as a 
political entity per se.  Indeed, “there was not even a serviceable Chinese word for the historical and 
ethical community of ‘China’ before the nineteenth century.”45  As Xu points out, “the tianxia system not 
only refused to acknowledge the world of formally equal states, but more importantly, it disregarded 
Chinese national sovereignty.”46  Similarly, Mancall suggests that “the Chinese state was not a state in the 
conventional Western mold; rather, it was the administration of civilized society in toto, and the emperor, 
far from being the ruler of one state among many, was the mediator between heaven and earth, a cardinal 
point in the universal continuum, the apex of civilization, unique in the universe.”47  In essence, without 
even the most basic recognition of separate polities, there could be no concept of state and no 
‘international’ relations as such, only relations between the emperor and his subjects, between civilization 
and barbarism. 
 Such a position is perhaps somewhat of an exaggeration.  In its dealings with other societies, 
China certainly understood that other governments existed with the power to rule over their respective 
subjects and over which China had no direct control.  These polities were termed guo (kuo), which is 
generally translated as ‘state.’  However, Mancall and others are correct to point out that since such 
entities had no legitimate standing in Confucian thought, guo should not be equated with the Western 
concept of the sovereign state.  As Joseph Levenson noted, Confucianism was careful to distinguish 
between tianxia and guo – “the latter connotes not only land and people but protection by military force.  
But t’ien-hsia is a conception of civilized society; it means far more than just a political unit held by de 
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 facto power.”48  Barbarian societies might be able to attain guo, but they could never hope to attain 
tianxia without achieving the highest level of civilization (i.e., accepting Chinese culture).  In this way, 
Confucianism did recognize the existence of corporate actors, outside of direct Chinese control, that 
might be termed states.  In this sense, China too was a guo – zhongguo, the Middle Kingdom, the center 
of tianxia.  Yet it was tianxia, not guo, that was the defining principle of the Confucian system, and of 
China’s identity. 
 How then should one define China’s collective identity as a political actor?  Given the central role 
of the emperor as an object of political loyalty, and the fact that the term would fit well with the 
periodization of Chinese imperial history, one might be tempted to employ the term ‘dynastic-state’ to it.  
However, this would risk confusing it with the European dynastic-state discussed in the last chapter 
whose source of legitimacy was very different from that of the Confucian Middle Kingdom.  Instead, 
China might best be described as a ‘cultural-state’ in which the object of supreme loyalty was not the guo 
per se, but tianxia as an expression of Chinese culture.  While this certainly involved the political 
institutions of the Chinese guo, it was tianxia that defined China’s collective identity, and that came into 
conflict with the interstate system of the West. 
A Clash of Civilizations:  System Change & the Breakdown of the Confucian World Order 
 As with any set of international norms, the Confucian system’s continuation depended on active 
practice on the part of both sides.  As Mancall suggests, “when discontinuities threatened the system it 
was often because China’s partner in the relationship could not accept, ideologically or institutionally, 
necessary elements of the system itself.”49  While such discontinuities were not unknown in other periods 
of history, they became overwhelming when the Western powers, whose norms of international conduct 
differed significantly from those of the Chinese, began to interact more with China and its vassals.  
During the early years of Sino-Western interaction, these differences produced numerous instances of 
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 misunderstanding and distrust.  For instance, Mancall notes that in East Asian diplomatic practice, “an 
ambassador’s credentials and the letters he carried from his master were valued more highly, and treated 
with greater reverence, than the person of the ambassador.”50  This often produced Western complaints 
over the treatment of diplomatic representatives and was sometimes seen as a deliberate insult to the ruler 
being represented.  In addition, unwillingness on the part of some Western powers, particularly Britain, to 
perform important rituals (e.g., kowtowing before the emperor) created bad feelings and often resulted in 
breakdowns in diplomatic exchange.  It was this fundamental incompatibility between Western and 
Chinese norms of international behavior – i.e., a lack of shared knowledge – that, when combined with 
Western technological superiority and the West’s willingness to exert influence through military force, 
resulted in the collapse of the Confucian order of international relations and provided the seeds for 
Chinese nationalism as China was forced to redefine itself in Western terms. 
The Confucian System in Crisis:  Western Imperialism & the Collapse of the Tribute System 
 As already discussed, one of the main functions of the tribute system was to provide a framework 
for trade within the confines of Confucian ideology.  While overland trade with various nomadic groups 
in central Asia had long been the primary impetus for this, the tribute system also served to control 
maritime trade with Southeast Asian and Arab traders.  “By the thirteenth century the main features of 
this system were well established:  the supervision and taxation of trade by officials responsible directly 
to the capital, the confinement of trade to certain ports…, the confinement of foreigners at these ports…to 
their own quarters, where they were under the authority of one of their own number.”51  This system was 
further adapted to deal with increased contact with Western traders in the 16th and 17th centuries.  What 
became known as the Canton system was instituted in 1685, restricting foreign trade to four ports – 
Guangzhou (Canton), Zhangzhou (Chang-chou), Ningbo (Ningpo), and Yuntai shan (Yün-t’ai-shan).  
Although the latter three were under the authority of provincial officials, Guangzhou, where the bulk of 
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 foreign trade was conducted, remained under central control through the Superintendent of Maritime 
Customs (often referred to as the Hoppo).52
Trade in the Canton system was conducted monopolistically, after 1720 by a Chinese merchant 
guild called the Cohong.  The hong merchants served as intermediaries between the Chinese officials and 
the Western traders, who were not permitted to have direct contact with the government.  The high costs 
and rampant corruption associated with trade in Guangzhou briefly forced the British East India 
Company, the predominant foreign trading concern in China, to relocate its operations north to Ningbo 
(near Shanghai).  However, complaints from officials in Guangzhou over their loss of trade, as well as 
government concerns over the spread of Western influence, resulted in a sharp increase in customs duties 
in Ningbo aimed at discouraging further Western attention and the eventual restriction of foreign trade to 
Guangzhou in 1759.53
While local officials and the imperial court benefited enormously from the trade, Fairbank points 
out that its “fiscal importance…seems never to have been acknowledged in the official ideology of the 
Manchu dynasty.”54  Indeed far from actively encouraging foreign trade, the Chinese government placed 
numerous restrictions on it and the conduct of the traders in order to limit their contact with Chinese 
society as much as possible.55  These restrictions, as well as disputes over legal jurisdictions for criminal 
cases involving foreigners, produced a great deal of discontent on the part of the trading companies.  As a 
result, the British government decided to pursue the establishment of more direct diplomatic links with 
the imperial court, as well as a more favorable trading arrangement.  The position of ‘Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China’ was given to 
Lord Macartney on May 3, 1792, and his mission set sail on September 26.  Macartney was tasked with 
the following objectives: 
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 1. To acquire one or two places near the tea- and silk-producing and the woolen-
consuming areas, where British traders might reside and English jurisdiction be 
exercised. 
2. To negotiate a commercial treaty with a view to extending trade throughout China if 
possible. 
3. To relieve existing abuses at Canton. 
4. To create a desire in China for British products. 
5. To arrange diplomatic representation at Peking [Beijing]. 
6. To open Japan, Cochin China, and the Eastern Islands to British commerce.56 
 
The British mission arrived in Guangzhou on June 19, 1793 and proceeded to sail north to the port of 
Dagu (Taku), near Tianjin, where it disembarked for its trip to the capital and on to the emperor 
Qianlong’s (Ch’ien-lung) summer residence in Jehol (in Manchuria). 
The Chinese treated the British mission as they would any other tribute mission sent by a 
barbarian king to recognize the superior virtue of the emperor, although the mission was generally 
afforded greater hospitality given that this was their first official presentation of tribute.  For the most 
part, Macartney played the role, bringing with him 600 cases of presents for the emperor and allowing a 
flag reading “Tributary Envoy from England” to be flown from the boat he traveled on from Tianjin to 
Beijing.  However, during his audience with the emperor on September 14, Macartney refused to perform 
the kowtow and instead knelt on one knee as he would before the English king, a fact that annoyed the 
court but did not produce an immediate breakdown in the mission.  Despite the elaborate ceremonies, 
banquets, and exchanges of gifts that took place, Macartney failed to gain any agreement from the 
Chinese court regarding his requests.  Indeed, he was unable to discuss the matter with the emperor 
directly and had to be satisfied with presenting a written request through a third party.  He left Beijing on 
October 7 and returned to Guangzhou, and then from Macao set sail for home on March 8, 1794 without 
having achieved any of the British goals.57
The failure of the Macartney mission, as has so often been stated, was the direct result of the 
incompatibility of the Western and Confucian systems of international relations.  The extension of trade 
and the establishment of a permanent diplomatic mission in the capital were completely contrary to 
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 Confucian diplomatic practice.  This is perhaps best illustrated by the oft-cited message Qianlong sent to 
King George III: 
It may be, O King, that the above proposals have been wantonly made by your 
ambassador on his own responsibility; or peradventure you yourself are ignorant of our 
dynastic regulations and had no intention of transgressing them when you expressed these 
wild ideas and hopes…Above all, upon you, who live in a remote and inaccessible 
region, far across the spaces of ocean, but who have shown your submissive loyalty by 
sending this tribute mission, I have heaped benefits far in excess of those I have accorded 
to other nations.  But the demands presented by your embassy are not only a 
contravention of dynastic tradition, but would be unproductive of good results to 
yourself, besides being quite impracticable…It is your bounden duty reverently to 
appreciate my feelings and to obey these instructions henceforth for all times, so that you 
may enjoy the blessings of perpetual peace.58
 
A second British mission sent in 1816 and headed by Lord Amherst was even less successful, being 
unable to even obtain an imperial audience for refusal to perform the kowtow.  This led to consideration 
of military action on the part of the British, and of ending the Canton trade altogether on the part of the 
Chinese. 
The breakdown in relations between Britain and China was exacerbated by the changing nature of 
the Canton trade.  By 1820, private traders had surpassed company traders as the predominant players, 
with opium becoming the main commodity being (illegally) traded.  Opium had been introduced to China 
centuries before, but only came into 
recreational use in the 17th century.  It had 
become a large enough problem by 1729 
that the Emperor Yongzheng (Yung-
cheng) banned its sale; its importation 
and cultivation were banned by the 
Emperor Jiaqing (Chia-ch’ing) in 1796.  
As Figure 5.1 shows,59 the opium trade 
remained steady throughout the first two decades of the 19th century despite the ban, and began to 
Figure 5.1 – Opium Shipments to China (1801-39) 
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
1801 1806 1811 1816 1821 1826 1831 1836
Year
O
pi
um
 (c
he
st
s)
                                                 
58 Cited in Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 213. 
59 Hosea Ballou Morse, The Period of Conflict 1834-1860, vol. 1 of The International Relations of the Chinese 
Empire  (London:  Longman, Green, and Company, 1910), 209-10. 
164 
 increase dramatically in the 1820s.  In addition to the obvious social problems (e.g., drug addiction) that 
this produced, the opium trade also caused severe economic distress.  Given its illicit nature, payment for 
the drug was in hard currency (silver).  The increase in the opium trade therefore caused a large outflow 
of silver from China, upsetting the local economy.60  Between 1828 and 1833, China saw a net loss of 
$13.8 million.  By the late-1830s, the annual outflow of silver had almost doubled.61  For Western traders, 
particularly the British, who had been unable to establish a positive balance of trade for lack of Chinese 
demand for Western goods, the opium trade proved to be an “economic panacea.”62   
Although some Chinese officials advocated legalization as a way of bringing the opium trade 
under control, the government instead responded by targeting it more aggressively.  On December 31, 
1838, Lin Zexu (Lin Tse-hsü) was appointed imperial commissioner and charged with the task of 
suppressing the opium trade.  Upon his arrival in Guangzhou in the spring of 1839, Lin initiated a 
crackdown that included the stoppage of trade and a siege of the British factory in Guangzhou aimed at 
forcing the traders to hand over their supplies of opium and sign an agreement to end their involvement in 
the opium trade.  The British superintendent of trade, Charles Elliot, who was present in the factory 
during the siege, responded by ordering all opium under British control to be turned over to him; he in 
turn handed it over to Lin for destruction.  Elliot’s compliance was not out of sympathy for the Chinese 
position, but to make China responsible to the British government for the economic loss of the opium.  He 
refused to accept Lin’s demand for a signed agreement to halt the opium trade and requested military 
support to protect British trade interests against further Chinese actions.  On November 3, 1839, a naval 
skirmish resulted in the destruction of four Chinese ships with several others sustaining heavy damage.  
On January 31, 1840, a formal declaration of war was issued on behalf of the British government, 
marking the official start of the first Opium War (1840-42).63
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 In addition to the more immediate issues of compensation for the lost opium and the illegal 
detention (from Britain’s perspective) of British officials, the Opium War provided an opportunity for 
Britain to achieve what had eluded it since the failure of the Macartney mission almost 50 years earlier – 
the further opening of China to British trade and the establishment of more normal diplomatic relations, 
on accepted Western terms, with the Middle Kingdom.  In fact, Suisheng Zhao argues that “to a great 
extent, the Opium War was a conflict between the expansive modern West and a traditional China.  From 
this perspective, the problem of opium was secondary to the struggle between the Chinese empire and 
Western nation-states.”64  Britain’s military victory over China helped to accomplish what years of 
diplomacy could not.  The Treaty of Nanjing, signed on August 29, 1842, included the following 
provisions: 
1. An indemnity of $21 million:  $12 million for military expenses, $6 million for the destroyed 
opium, and $3 million for the repayment of the hong merchants’ debts to British traders. 
2. Abolition of the Co-hong monopolistic system of trade. 
3. Opening of five ports to trade and residence of British consuls and merchants and their 
families:  Canton, Amoy [Xiamen], Foochow [Fuzhou], Ningpo, and Shanghai. 
4. Cession of Hong Kong…. 
5. Equality in official correspondence. 
6. A fixed tariff, to be established shortly afterwards.65 
 
The treaty thus included much of what the British had wanted from the Chinese in terms of both trade and 
diplomatic protocol.  The Treaty of the Bogue, signed on October 18, 1843 to supplement the original 
treaty, accomplished even more by not only giving the British the right to anchor warships in the treaty 
ports, but also establishing the principles of extraterritoriality and most-favored-nation status. 
The irony of the treaties ending the Opium War was thus that while the war had been conducted 
in part to force the Chinese to deal with Britain as a diplomatic equal, as dictated by the Western principle 
of state sovereignty, the principles they included simply reversed the situation by locking China into a 
position of diplomatic inferiority through what became known as the unequal treaty system.  
Extraterritoriality gave the Western powers legal jurisdiction over their own citizens operating on Chinese 
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 soil, while the most-favored nation clause stated:  “Should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause 
whatever, be pleased to grant additional privileges or immunities to any of the subjects or citizens of such 
foreign countries, the same privileges or immunities will be extended to and enjoyed by British 
subjects.”66  The United States and France both rushed to capitalize on Britain’s ‘diplomatic’ success by 
concluding the Treaty of Wangxia (1844) and the Treaty of Whampoa (1844), respectively.  “These 
British, American, and French treaties reinforced each other and formed the beginning of a treaty system, 
which was further enriched and enlarged by later agreements.”67  While this system of ‘unequal treaties’ 
would eventually provide fuel for nationalist attacks on Western imperialism, it is important to note that 
at the time they were viewed as perfectly acceptable solutions to the barbarian problem, ones that fit well 
within the bounds of Confucian ideology.  As Murata Yūjirō points out, Qing officials “considered the 
equality of benefits gained through most-favored-nation status as the dynasty’s blessing of ‘universal 
benevolence’ and hence it was an extension of the past policy of ‘barbarian affairs.’”68
However, the first unequal treaties did not solve the problem of Sino-Western relations so much 
as put it off until later.  Indeed, Mancall suggests that the Sino-British conflict over opium actually 
marked the beginning of a Twenty-one Years’ War between China and the West (primarily Britain) 
dating from the first shots of the Opium War in 1839 to the end of the second opium war, generally 
referred to as the Arrow War, in 1860.  “The immediate causes for the resumption of hostilities,” he 
points out – namely, the diplomatic row that arose over the removal of a British flag being flown by a 
Chinese ship, as well as the torture and execution of a French missionary – “could not mask the fact that 
the war was continuing because the West had not yet achieved its objectives.”69  Despite initial attempts 
at accommodation on the part of the Chinese ‘foreign minister’ Qiying (Ch’i-ying),70 China took an 
increasingly hard line against foreign demands, particularly over British access to Guangzhou, and 
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 refused to pursue treaty revisions as stipulated in the American and French treaties of Wangxia and 
Whampoa (and demanded by Britain based on most-favored-nation status).  Thus, the Anglo-French 
Arrow War (1856-60) with China can be seen as a continuation of Western attempts to gain greater access 
to the Chinese economy and establish Western ground rules for China’s relations with the West.71
The outcome of the Arrow conflict proved to be an even greater, and more humiliating, defeat for 
China than the Opium War because it was not just a defeat on the periphery of Chinese territory that 
could be safely ignored; the war struck at China’s political heart with an Anglo-French expeditionary 
force entering Beijing itself, forcing the emperor, Xianfeng (Hsien-feng), to flee to Jehol, and destroying 
his summer palace (Yuan Ming Yuan).  The Treaty of Tianjin (1858) and the Conventions of Beijing 
(1860) that ended the conflict established eleven more treaty ports, including Tianjin itself, and required 
China to pay reparations, allow foreign travel (including missionaries) in the interior of the country, cede 
the Kowloon peninsula to the British, and allow the establishment of a permanent diplomatic mission in 
the capital.  This effectively ended the Chinese attempt to apply Confucian norms to its relations with the 
Western powers.  In an imperial edict sanctioning the treaty, the Emperor Xianfeng declared:  “England is 
an independent soverign state, let it have equal status [with China].”72  By the end of the 19th century, 
China’s tributary relations with its vassal states would also be dismantled after losing two more 
imperialist wars, the Sino-French War (1884-85) and the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95).  Thus, 
Western imperialism resulted in the collapse of the Confucian system and China’s forced absorption into 
the Western system of sovereign states. 
Sowing the Seeds of Identity Change:  Simple Learning & the Failure of the Self-
Strengthening Movement 
 As the military superiority of the Western powers, as well as Japan, allowed them to establish 
ever-larger spheres of influence over Chinese territory throughout the latter half of the 19th century, the 
culturalist world-view of Chinese intellectuals became increasingly untenable.  Yet as Levenson points 
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 out, despite the fact that China’s world, and its place within it, was rapidly changing, “there was an 
intellectual lag behind political change.”73  While they recognized that the West presented a serious 
material challenge that China had to meet, most Chinese intellectuals could not accept the possibility that 
it represented a fundamentally different kind of challenge than the barbarian invasions China had faced in 
the past.  The new barbarians might be materially stronger at the moment, but China still represented a 
superior civilization – the only civilization – and thus would eventually impress upon the new arrivals the 
necessity of submitting to its superior virtue.  As Jerome Grieder points out, “not until late in the 
century…did the Chinese perceive an intellectual dimension to the Western threat.”74  This made it 
difficult to develop adequate policy responses.  Because China did not realize that its relations with the 
West represented “a contact with an other qualitatively different from any other till that point,”75 its 
responses were limited to those that could fit Confucian standards.  In essence, it tried to avoid the 
difficult task of social learning – i.e., rethinking its identity and interests – by concentrating instead on the 
easier task of simple learning – i.e., finding better ways to pursue its old interests.  Yet because of the 
magnitude of the incompatibility between the two systems, and the continued military superiority of the 
West, China’s initial response to the Western challenge proved inadequate. 
The requirement that China’s response remain within the parameters dictated by Confucianism of 
course did not mean that there was no debate over which specific policies to pursue.  Indeed, Chinese 
decision-making in the latter part of the 19th century was marked by often intense competition between 
two groups of intellectuals – those that wanted to preserve all aspects of Chinese civilization and those 
that sought to adapt to the West while still preserving the core of Confucian values.  This latter group, 
which Levenson called “the cautious eclectics,” believed that “the only alternative to outright destruction 
of Chinese civilization by foreign conquerors was selective innovation by dedicated Chinese 
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 traditionalists.”76  Selective innovation meant the adoption of those material capabilities of the West (e.g., 
guns, ships, and industrial technology) that could have practical use in the service of traditional Chinese 
values.  This strategy would come to be expressed in the phrase, zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong – 
“Chinese learning for substance, Western learning for use,” coined by the scholar-official Zhang Zhidong 
(Chang Chih-tung) in the 1890s.  The tiyong concept, which can be used to describe China’s strategy for 
dealing with the West throughout the latter half of the 19th century, is still used by some scholars to 
express China’s essential dilemma of modernization (particularly military modernization) – “the tension 
which comes from seeking to balance that which is in essence Chinese against that which is needed from 
foreign sources.”77  In other words, how can China become more like the West without losing its own 
identity?  It was this basic question that Chinese reformers struggled with. 
 The first attempts to adapt Western technology came almost immediately after the first Opium 
War.  Lin Zexu, whose efforts to halt the opium trade had helped to set the stage for the conflict, became 
an early advocate of military reform.  He put forward a proposal in 1844 in which he stated:  “Let us now, 
in this time of peace, adopt the superior skill of the barbarians in order to control them with greater 
effect.”78  He created a staff for translating foreign documents on military technology and lobbied the 
government in Beijing for the financial resources necessary to purchase Western arms.79  After its defeat 
in the Arrow War, China’s modernization efforts became more comprehensive in the form of the Self-
strengthening Movement (1861-95).  In addition to purchasing foreign arms, China sought “self-
sufficiency in arms production – an across-the-board capability which required modernization not only in 
producing the weapons themselves but throughout the entire production cycle, from prospecting and 
mining raw materials, to transportation and communications infrastructures, to efficient manufacture, and 
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 to maintenance, logistics and support of weapons in the field.”80  Various arsenals, shipyards, and 
factories were established to improve China’s military capabilities.81
 Suisheng Zhao suggests that China’s tiyong strategy to deal with the West “was a pragmatic 
nationalist program.”82  However, to associate the concept of tiyong with nationalism would be a serious 
mistake.  The reform efforts of this period were extremely limited in scope because they merely sought to 
graft Western technology onto existing Chinese institutions without critically examining whether those 
institutions might themselves be to blame for China’s inability to compete.  This becomes readily 
apparent when one considers that the first period of the Self-strengthening Movement coincided with the 
Tongzhi (T’ung-Chih) Restoration (1862-74), which attempted to solve China’s numerous social and 
political problems by “restoring the traditional order through reaffirmation of the old morality and 
application of knowledge to practical affairs.”83  The possibility of a temporary restoration of dynastic 
authority, grounded in the traditional Chinese belief that history represents a continuous cycle of rise and 
decline, fell well within the bounds of Confucian ideology.  As Mary Wright points out, a restoration in 
Confucian political theory “is not a coup d’état or a revolution or a new age, but an Indian summer in 
which the historically inevitable process of decline is arrested for a time by the ability and effort of the 
whole gentry-bureaucracy.  The harmony of the natural and social order is temporarily re-established, not 
through basic changes but through emergency injections of the crucial element in that harmony:  the 
devotion to duty of the indoctrinated Confucian official.”84  As such, the Tongzhi Restoration was more 
of an attempt to prolong the existing Chinese system than to significantly reform it, making early 
modernization efforts inconsistent with modern nationalism. 
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 These ideological constraints left relatively little room for innovation.  While attempts to improve 
China’s military capabilities brought with them the beginnings of modern industry, as well as some 
important innovations in diplomacy (e.g., China’s first proto-foreign office, the Zongli Yamen [tsungli 
yamen]), Hsü correctly points out that such reforms “really represent very superficial attempts at 
modernization….No attempts were made to assimilate Western institutions, philosophy, arts, and culture.  
The Self-strengthening efforts barely scratched the surface of modernization, without achieving a 
breakthrough in industrialization.”85  Among the various reasons he cites for its failure are a lack of 
central coordination, a shortage of capital, continued pressures from foreign powers, persistent 
technological backwardness, a lack of vision on the part of Chinese leaders, and social and psychological 
inertia that resulted in a strident resistance to change among much of the Confucian intellectual elite.86  
Even relatively minor reform efforts, such as using Western experts to teach astronomy and mathematics 
at the newly established Tongwen Guan (T’ung-wen kuan – College of Foreign Languages), prompted 
strong reactions from conservative officials.  Woren (Wo-jen), a leading neo-confucian scholar and Grand 
Secretary, argued that the best way to save China “is to lay emphasis on propriety and righteousness, not 
on power and plotting.  The fundamental effort lies in the minds of people, not in techniques.”87  
Although conservative resistance did not prevent these most basic reforms, it did put a great deal of 
political pressure on early reformers.  As a result, “the Self-strengtheners had to fight every inch of the 
way to launch the movement.”88
Such resistance to change persisted despite China’s continued inability to defend against foreign 
aggression.  Conflicts such as the Sino-French War and, in particular, the Sino-Japanese War laid bare the 
inadequacies of China’s reform efforts during the Tongzhi Restoration.  Yet the imperial court was slow 
to respond with more extensive efforts at modernization.  Although moderate scholar-officials close to the 
emperor, like Zhang Zhidong and Weng Tonghe (Weng T’ung-ho), recognized the need for further 
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 reform, their approach was essentially more of the same – “limited administrative reorganization along 
with adoption of some Western ‘implements’ in the Self-strengthening tradition.”89  As such, they 
strongly resisted the efforts of more radical reformers, like Kang Youwei (K’ang Yu-wei) and Liang 
Qichao (Liang Ch’i-ch’ao), who were far more willing to sacrifice traditional Chinese institutions in order 
to save China itself.  Kang’s persistent efforts to gain the ear of the emperor Guangxu (Kuang-Hsü) 
eventually paid off in 1898 with the implementation of the Hundred Days Reforms.90  Over forty imperial 
decrees were issued between June 11 and September 20 aimed at reforming the educational system, 
public administration, and the economy.  These decrees included dramatic changes to the civil service 
exams, abolition of numerous offices, and the appointment of reformers into positions of influence in the 
government.   
Yet far from taking this as an opportunity to save the country, most officials fiercely resisted the 
reforms and did their best to avoid implementing them.  Even moderate reformers saw them as too radical 
and an intolerable deviation from Confucian norms.  The Empress Dowager, Cixi (Tz’u-hsi), who had 
ruled China from behind the scenes for decades during the minority of both the Tongzhi emperor (her 
son) and the current Guangxu emperor (her nephew), admonished the emperor for turning his back on 
Confucian tradition.  The reform efforts were brought to an abrupt end when the emperor was overthrown 
and placed under house arrest in a palace coup led by Cixi, who once again assumed the reins of power.  
Most of the reforms initiated during the Hundred Days were reversed, while a number of prominent 
reformers were executed; Kang and Liang fled to Japan. 
Although Hsü suggests that the reformers cannot entirely escape blame for their rather naïve 
attempts to force radical changes through the system without obtaining broader support, the real roots of 
failure for the Hundred Days in particular, and the Self-strengthening Movement in general, lay with the 
conservatism of most officials.  Such resistance should not be surprising given the fact that reform 
inevitably threatened their interests, as well as those of many members of the imperial court.  Yet official 
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 conservatism must be seen in a broader light than just the desire by various political elites to maintain 
their own positions.  The limited vision of so many of China’s leaders that Hsü refers to was the result of 
the constraints placed on the efforts of reformers by the necessity of maintaining Confucianism.  As he 
points out, even advocates of reform “never dreamed of remaking China into a modern state.”91  Instead, 
their goal, as expressed in the tiyong principle, was to preserve the essence of Chinese civilization (i.e., 
Confucianism) through the adoption of Western techniques and technology.  The catch-22 in which China 
was caught was that the modernization needed to save it as a state could only succeed by destroying it as a 
civilization. 
Conservative critics of reform throughout the latter half of the 19th century were well aware of the 
dilemma presented by the tiyong principle.  Many argued that such a strategy was impracticable, since ti 
and yong could not be separated; every set of practices came with its own essence.  The fear among 
conservative Confucian intellectuals such as Woren was thus that “the more western learning came to be 
accepted as the practical instrument of life and power, the more Confucianism ceased to be t’i, essence, 
the naturally believed-in value of a civilization without a rival, and became instead an historical 
inheritance, preserved, if at all, as a romantic token of no-surrender to a foreign rival which had changed 
the essence of Chinese life.”92  Essentially, even moderate reformers were wrong to think that they could 
have it both ways – selectively modernize China without infecting it with Western ways.  If a choice had 
to be made between saving China as a state (guo) and saving China as a cultural system (tianxia), many 
conservatives preferred the latter. 
While such sentiments might seem strange in a world where loyalty to the nation-state is an 
accepted fact of political life, they fit perfectly with traditional Confucian thought.  After all, the choice 
was not a new one for China; it had faced conquest before.  Yet even when the Chinese state had fallen to 
barbarian invaders in the past, it had always been reconstituted in more or less the same form.  The 
Confucian view of history as a continuous cycle of dynastic rise and decline, as well as China’s historical 
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 experience with foreign threats, gave credence to the belief that no dynasty was as important as the 
continuation of the Confucian order itself.  The guo could be sacrificed, but not tianxia.  Had the new 
barbarians been willing to accept the Confucian system as those in the past had done, even if only for the 
sake of expediency, then this formula might have worked; history may have repeated itself and the 
dynastic cycle might have continued with tianxia once again in the hands of a foreign (now Western) 
dynasty.  However, the Western powers had no intention of adopting Confucianism for their own use.  
They had their own ideas and institutions, their own system that they sought to export around the globe 
through trade, conquest, or both.  Thus, the choice between guo and tianxia was a false one – the 
Confucian system was incompatible with the new challenger and could not be saved.  As Levenson put it, 
“unless [China] chose to come down from its pedestal, its view of itself as t’ien-hsia, and to stand as a 
kuo among kuo, it would be smashed.”93
From Culturalism to Nationalism:  Social Learning & the Transformation of Chinese 
Identity 
 The collapse of the Confucian system of international relations, and China’s inability to develop 
an effective strategy to deal with the Western threat that did not sacrifice Confucian values, forced China 
to redefine itself and its place in the world.  This finally began to occur at the end of the 19th century, 
decades after China’s first defeat at the hands of a Western power, as more and more Chinese intellectuals 
began to realize and accept that the Confucian order could not be maintained.  Such acceptance did not 
come easily.  Even for those intellectuals more open to the necessity of reform “it was a slow and 
agonizing process of self-discovery, testing at every step the subjective sense of Chinese identity against 
the objective circumstances of China’s uncertain place in the world.”94  Yet loyalty to China as guo 
finally began to supersede loyalty to China as tianxia.  Chinese culture remained important, but only as a 
means to an end – saving the Chinese state.95  As such, even Confucianism could be sacrificed if it was 
necessary to protect China.  The consequences of this for China’s identity were significant.  As James 
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 Harrison suggests, “in the process of learning to distinguish political and cultural values and in trying to 
save the Chinese people and state, even at the cost of the culture, modern Chinese nationalism was 
born.”96  The result was a wholesale transformation of Chinese identity – from cultural-state to nation-
state. 
What made this transformation possible was the new understanding of the world brought about 
through long-term interaction with the West.  Perhaps the most critical component of this was what 
Charlotte Furth has referred to as “the Chinese ‘discovery of the West’ – not merely as a source of 
imperialist aggression or technological wizardry, but as a world civilization in its own right.”97  Before 
the end of the 19th century, the Western powers were still perceived through the Confucian lens much as 
they had been a hundred years before – as barbarians outside of (Chinese) civilization, not as 
representatives of a rival civilization.  It is this “sense of rivalry” that Levenson suggested “is the essence 
of nationalism; no man trumpets ‘my country’ unless he realizes that other countries exist, with loyal 
populations of their own and a dangerous capacity to threaten.”98  Such a realization was beyond the 
capacity of older scholar-officials still committed to the Confucian world order.  Yet for younger 
generations of scholars, whose life experiences had been shaped by China’s humiliation at the hands of 
Western powers and whose knowledge of the world beyond China was often more extensive than their 
predecessors (or older contemporaries), the discovery of the West as a rival civilization allowed new 
perspectives to take root.  Most importantly, it allowed them to borrow ideas from the West, which now 
served as a model for China’s reform. 
In essence then, it was China’s experience with Western imperialism that resulted in the 
development of Chinese nationalism, providing support for the author’s proposition that nationalism is 
constituted by the international system.  What is important to note here, however, is that it was not 
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 imperialism per se that produced Chinese nationalism, but the international system (namely, its social 
structure) that came with it.  In other words, it was not just that foreign threats resulted in the Chinese 
public rallying to protect the nation, but that the social structure brought by the West forced China to 
redefine itself as a nation.  This can be seen in the distinction both Levenson and Harrison make between 
nationalism and anti-foreignism.99  As Harrison points out, anti-foreignism had often arisen in periods of 
conflict with barbarians and had even been institutionalized to some extent in the form of anti-Manchu 
secret societies that had for centuries desired the overthrow of the (foreign) Qing dynasty.  Such societies, 
as well as much of the general public, responded strongly to the incursions of Western powers, 
particularly in areas like Guangzhou where contact was highest.  Violent incidents were relatively 
common, and increased along with the rise in missionary work that occurred after the settlements of 1860.  
The Boxer Rebellion (1900) was perhaps the largest, and best-known, example of anti-foreignism. 
However, Harrison argues, in contrast to Zhao (see Chapter 4), that while “xenophobia and 
varying degrees of concerns for the country as a whole were evident [in these incidents],…such rebels 
were not modern nationalists.”100  Instead, they “represented an intensification of traditional 
patriotism.”101  In other words, they retained a commitment to Confucian ideas and institutions.  
Similarly, one Chinese scholar has argued that “traditional Chinese culture with its core of Confucianism 
was a system beyond nationalism…Within this system, nationalism and patriotism could not emerge.  
The so-called ancient Chinese patriotism that has been repeatedly discussed by many people was only 
sinocentrism.”102  Harrison suggests that true Chinese nationalism could only develop with the merger of 
“xenophobic mass patriotism with intellectual feelings of positive commitment to the nation-state.”103  
Yet such a commitment was contrary to Confucian values; indeed, it was wholly impossible since the 
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 nation-state did not yet exist as such in Chinese intellectual discourse.  It was only when Chinese 
intellectuals began to import the idea of the nation-state from the West that true nationalism arose. 
The redefinition of China’s identity during the late-19th century represents a clear case of social 
learning.  This learning process had been an on-going one.  However, its character changed dramatically, 
along with Chinese perceptions of what the West represented, as the availability of information about the 
West – through the translation of Western books and travel to Western countries (or at least to Western 
concessions in China) – increased.  During the first half of the century, the task of translating Western 
books into Chinese had fallen primarily on missionaries.  As a result, 86% of the almost 800 titles 
translated between 1800 and 1867 were religious in nature and attracted little attention from most Chinese 
intellectuals.  The Self-strengthening Movement brought with it active Chinese involvement in translating 
foreign books, as well as a shift in the types of books being translated.  In line with the goals of the 
movement, about 70% of the works translated between 1850 and 1899 dealt with science and 
technology.104  Such books, along with the far less numerous (though no less important) translations of 
history and geography, introduced Chinese intellectuals to new perspectives that helped to undermine 
many Confucian assumptions.  “On the one hand there was the discovery of a world history 
encompassing a plurality of high civilizations in dynamic interaction with one another as well as with a 
‘barbarian’ perimeter; on the other, there was the exploration of the implications of Western scientific law 
– particularly the laws of evolution…, but also those of Newtonian physics.”105  The result was “a world-
view which took away from Chinese their self-image as the sole source of world civilization, and exposed 
them as members of one culture and one nation among many.”106
It was China’s loss in the first Sino-Japanese War to a state that had once been a tributary that 
helped this new view to truly crystallize.  Indeed, many scholars have suggested that this marked the birth 
of modern Chinese nationalism.107  The defeat drove home to many intellectuals the inadequacies of 
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 previous attempts at reform through self-strengthening, and brought about important changes in Chinese 
thinking.  Scholars like Yen Fu argued that “the key to Western development…was the ‘different vision 
of reality’ which involved ideas and values; it was thought, not military power, which made a country 
strong and wealthy.”108  Though such a sentiment fit the traditional Confucian belief in the non-material 
sources of strength, it was the ideas of the West that became increasingly paramount.  Translation efforts 
began to focus more on politics, economics, and philosophy in search of the roots of Western material 
superiority.  While some like Kang Youwei still hoped that Confucianism could be retained as an 
expression of China’s distinctive history and culture,109 the goal of completely remodeling China’s 
institutions on the West left little room for traditional ideas.  By the early 20th century, scholars such as 
Liang Qichao had come to the conclusion that “China’s disasters do not stem from betrayal of the genius 
of Chinese culture, from willful resistance to the authority of the classics; they come rather from 
insistence on that authority.  Liberation is needed – from ‘false’ classics, from ‘true’ classics, from 
domination by any dead hand of the past.  Evolution is the law of life,…even for China.”110
These shifting intellectual currents were further enhanced by the dramatic growth after 1895 of 
political study associations (xue hui).  Kang was particularly instrumental in this.  In trying to arouse 
support for his reform ideas prior to the Hundred Days, “he conducted a sort of educational and 
propaganda campaign among [the lettered elite], familiarizing them with world affairs and China’s 
problems, and urging them to make concerted efforts ‘to save the country’ through reform.”111  He helped 
form a number of study associations, including the Qiangxue hui (Ch’iang-hsüeh hui – Society for the 
Study of National Strengthening) in 1895 and the Baoguo hui (Pao-kuo hui – Protect the Nation Society) 
in 1898.  Their activities included  
collecting books translated from Western languages, translating selected Western-
language books, circulating these books among the members; translating newspapers 
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 published in foreign lands and distributing them in the provinces; promoting scientific 
studies by providing laboratory facilities and establishing museums; encouraging ‘useful 
knowledge’ by requiring each member to pursue a specific field of study; and sending 
‘accomplished members’ to travel in China and abroad, with a view to giving them 
opportunities to acquire further knowledge and to contribute to it.  Contacts were to be 
made with prominent officials, with sympathetic overseas Chinese, with Western scholars 
residing in China, and with learned societies in other countries.112
 
While these organizations proved to be short-lived due to conservative opposition, they helped set the 
stage for an explosion of new groups in the early 20th century that played an important role in changing 
the mindset of Chinese intellectuals.   
Connected with the rise of study associations was the introduction of political newspapers and 
journals, many of which were published by the associations themselves.  “The new press reported on 
foreign and domestic affairs, bringing new ideas, new terminology, and new information to its readers.”113  
As information about China and the rest of the world became more widely disseminated to a younger 
generation of Chinese intellectuals less committed to the superiority of Confucian principles, many 
Chinese came to see themselves as part of a national community.  As Xu suggests, “to a great extent, the 
new press served as glue, knitting the otherwise loosely organized Chinese society into a political 
body.”114  Its impact was unmistakable even to more conservative officials like Zhang Zhidong, who 
pointed out that “after 1895, literary men of patriotic spirit began to publish journals….As a result, gentry 
from the most obscure pockets in the realm, and isolated peasants, learned for the first time that there was 
a China.”115
These changes continued despite the failure of the Hundred Days and the subsequent exile of 
leading reformers like Kang and Liang.  Indeed, it could be argued that intellectual changes accelerated 
after 1898.  This was in part due to the failure of the last gasp of Chinese conservatism – the Boxer 
Rebellion.  By 1900, anti-foreign violence perpetrated by a secret society called the Yihetuan (I-ho 
ch’üan) – Militia of Righteous Harmony (a.k.a. the Boxers) – had dramatically increased, resulting in 
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 attacks on Western diplomats and a siege of their legations in Beijing.  At first, the Boxers were supported 
by Cixi and other conservatives in the imperial court in the hopes that they would accomplish what the 
court itself had never been able to do – expel the foreigners from China.  However, the Western powers 
reacted by sending an allied force of 18,000 men to storm the capital and defeat the Boxers, forcing the 
court to flee and eventually resulting in further Chinese concessions.  After its failure, the Qing 
government finally began to initiate basic reforms, including extensive changes to the educational system, 
encouragement of foreign travel and study, and tentative moves toward establishing a constitutional 
monarchy.116
While these reforms would prove too little too late to save the Qing dynasty, the education 
reforms helped to reinforce the intellectual changes already underway.  After 1900, the number of 
Chinese students studying abroad, particularly in Japan, increased dramatically.  By 1906, the number of 
students studying in Japan had risen from less than 100 to at least 8,000.117  There they joined exiled 
reformers like Kang and Liang who were still actively trying to organize support for reform, as well as 
committed revolutionaries, like Sun Yat-sen, who sought the overthrow of the Qing.118  While Kang 
remained committed to some hybrid form of modernized Confucianism, Liang began to pursue new ideas 
during his time in Japan and published a number of newspapers that developed popular followings back 
in China (despite the fact that they were often banned), making Liang “a star of the public press.”119  It 
was in these papers that Liang began to expound on the idea of modern nationalism. 
By 1902, Liang had come to the conclusion that “the sickly state of Chinese patriotism…was the 
root cause of [China’s] accumulated weaknesses.”120  In Xinminshuo (Hsin-min shuo – The New Citizen), 
he argued that the strength of the imperialist powers came from their development of nationalism, which 
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 gave them the cohesiveness necessary to not only flourish, but to expand.121  Such an idea did not yet 
exist in China, a fact that Liang lamented, because of China’s traditional adherence to the idea of tianxia.  
Therefore, he argued that “if we wish to oppose the national imperialism of all the powers today and save 
China from great calamity and rescue our people the only thing for us to do is to adopt the policy of 
promoting our own nationalism.”122  This could only be accomplished by inculcating the Chinese people 
with a sense of citizenship in the Chinese nation.  “If it is the people of a state who govern, legislate, and 
plan for the interest of the whole state and stave off the troubles which might afflict the state, the people 
then cannot be bullied and the state cannot be overthrown.  This means citizenry.”123  Liang’s ideas, by 
making the final break with traditional Confucian thought, thus represent the first truly modern expression 
of Chinese nationalism. 
 Of course, this culturalism-to-nationalism argument is not without its critics.  For instance, James 
Townsend argues that its “main weakness is that it exaggerates the totality and clarity of the change in 
question.  It overstates both the dominance of culturalism and the weakness of pre-modern nationalism in 
imperial times, as well as overstating the eclipse of culturalism and triumph of nationalism in modern 
times.”124  Instead, he suggests, both have coexisted, albeit in varying proportions, throughout much of 
China’s history.  He further suggests that the errors in the argument “occur because [it] focuses on 
intellectual history, elite behaviour and official rhetoric, without taking full account of popular sentiments 
or the realities of statecraft, and because it does not consider carefully the conceptual problems involved 
in the study of nationalism and ethnicity.  In particular, it does not analyse closely the Chinese nation and 
its changing relationship to other Chinese and non-Chinese communities.”125  In essence, Townsend 
argues that because the Chinese had possessed a common identity as a distinct cultural and political group 
long before the arrival of the West, many of the necessary elements of nationalism were already in place 
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 to be drawn on by modern nationalists.  Thus, to suggest that a fundamental transition had occurred 
between two distinct identities is flawed. 
 The fact that imperial China possessed many of the elements of modern nationalism is difficult to 
dispute.  As Harrison points out, “for at least two millennia, there had been feelings of common 
characteristics and culture, of loyalty to a tradition and to a dynasty and its bureaucracy.  There was 
patriotism in the sense of commitment to a home-land, to common ideals, and to a group of people.”126  
Thus, China certainly represented, in Anthony Smith’s terms, an ethnie or ethnic core.  However, as 
Harrison goes on to say, it did not yet possess “the modern concept of owing one’s supreme loyalty to the 
nation-state, and all that it governed.”127  While Townsend is correct to point out the dangers of 
oversimplifying the change from culturalism to nationalism, he is too quick to recognize the existence of 
a pre-modern Chinese nation.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the modern nation is intimately linked with the 
modern state, which did not exist in traditional Chinese thought.  While there was certainly a recognition 
that a Chinese cultural and political community existed, Townsend himself admits that it “was not a 
continuous or even prominent focus for organization or loyalty.”128  To say that a Chinese nation existed 
despite the lack of any such belief, as Townsend does, flies in the face of what is generally understood 
about nationalism.  He seems to be falling back on a primordialist notion of Chinese nationhood – a 
Chinese nation without nationalism.  It was only when the Western idea of the nation spread to China that 
anything resembling modern nationalism could develop. 
A second criticism that could be made of the culturalism-to-nationalism argument is its view of 
Chinese intellectual development at the turn of the century as a response to the West.  As Furth points out, 
“one danger in the concept…is its tendency to suggest that the process was one of linear substitution of 
‘Western’ ideas for native ones; and that Chinese played an intellectually passive role.  Another is to 
foster the assumption that once the process of Westernization had occurred, it was impossible for Chinese 
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 thereafter to maintain any authentic commitment to traditional values.”129  Instead, it must be recognized 
that Chinese intellectuals drew from various domestic traditions, even as they sought to adopt Western 
ideas, and that Confucianism was never totally expunged from China’s political culture.130  Rebecca Karl 
makes a similar point when she argues that the knowledge China gained about the non-Western world, as 
fellow victims of Western imperialism, was as important to the reconfiguration of Chinese identity as the 
models it sought to borrow from the West.131
However, the caveats offered by Furth and Karl do little to undermine the central tenet of the 
culturalism-to-nationalism thesis – that the development of Chinese nationalism represents a fundamental 
change in China’s identity brought about through China’s interaction with the West.  While it is certainly 
true that the intellectual transition in question involved a complex interplay between native Chinese ideas 
and knowledge gained about the rest of the world (both Western and non-Western), it seems unlikely that 
Chinese nationalism would have developed without these outside influences.  Indeed, looking at the issue 
through the lens of international politics lends critical support to the culturalism-to-nationalism thesis by 
providing it with a stronger theoretical foundation.  While even its critics have agreed that it provides a 
useful heuristic for understanding the development of Chinese nationalism, its lack of grounding in a 
broader theoretical framework has called it into question.132  By introducing into the argument the role 
that the international system plays in identity construction, we gain a far better understanding of what 
made this transition possible – namely, China’s recognition of a system of sovereign states, of which it 
was a part.133
 The preceding discussion of China’s response to the West is by necessity somewhat general and 
incomplete.  However, it does provide a basic picture of the historical development of Chinese 
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 nationalism.  This picture fits well with Hall’s second sequence of transformational logic connecting 
changes in state identity to changes in the international system.  Recall from Chapter 4 that in the case of 
Europe, it was the development of a new state identity – the nation-state – that produced changes in the 
international system.  The new identity carried with it new interests and thereby fundamentally altered the 
dynamics of international politics.  It is this first sequence – the nationalization of international relations – 
that Hall focused on.  Yet as he suggests, the sequencing of this transformational logic can be reversed, 
with changes in the system producing changes in state identities and interests.  It is this second sequence 
that best describes the development of Chinese nationalism. 
 China’s encounter with the West introduced dramatic changes to the regional system in which it 
had been the dominant actor for centuries.  Not only did it cease to be a strictly regional system, but the 
new, increasingly global system was characterized by a very different distribution of material capabilities 
that favored a completely different type of state.  This resulted in the breakdown of the international 
norms (i.e., the tribute system) that had defined the Confucian system.  With the breakdown of these 
norms, and the continued challenge posed by Western power, China was forced to reform its own 
institutions and rethink the legitimizing principles that had given expression to its collective identity as a 
cultural-state.  As such, this identity could no longer be sustained, and had to be replaced by a new 
identity based on ideas adopted from the West – namely, China as a nation-state.  Thus, it becomes clear 
that nationalism can be seen as constituted by the international system. 
 Of course, as realists would point out, the disparity in material capabilities between China and the 
West played an important part in this process.  This certainly cannot be disputed.  As already suggested, if 
the disparity in power had been reversed, then not only would there have been no necessity for China to 
redefine itself and its relations with the world, but it is quite conceivable that the Confucian system might 
have won out and forced the West to conform to it.  The point to be made here is not that power relations 
are unimportant, but that they do not provide a full account of Sino-Western relations during the 19th 
century.  To treat these relations as simply a conflict between competing powers is to miss the real 
substance of that conflict – the incompatibility of two different systems based on dramatically different 
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 conceptions of self.  While the power factor requires us to consider the relationship between (material) 
power and the constitution of state identity, it does not invalidate focusing on the process of social 
construction itself.  As suggested by the realist-constructivist perspective introduced in Chapter 2, one 
cannot fully separate power and ideas.  What remains to be considered, however, are the macro- and 
micro-structural dimensions of Chinese nationalism and their impact on Chinese foreign policy.  These 
will be examined in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 6. ‘A CHICKEN CAN’T STAND ON ONE FOOT’:  THE TAIWAN ISSUE & 
THE MACRO-STRUCTURAL DIMENSION OF CHINESE NATIONALISM 
 
In the last chapter, it was argued that the development of Chinese nationalism during the 19th 
century was the result of changes in the social (and material) structure of the regional system of which 
China was a part – namely, its breakdown and incorporation into the broader international system based 
on Western ideas and norms (e.g., sovereignty and the nation-state).  What remains to be considered is the 
impact that this change in identity had on the definition of Chinese interests, and consequently on Chinese 
foreign policy behavior.  As discussed in Chapter 4, different types of states have different interests, and 
may therefore behave differently.  In the case of Europe, the modern state developed through a number of 
stages, each of which had important implications for the interests these states sought to pursue.  While 
they are arguably less clear cut, these stages were mirrored in China’s own transition from cultural-state 
to nation-state – i.e., it required China to redefine itself in both territorial and national terms.  In order to 
understand the impact that nationalism had on Chinese interests, it is thus necessary to consider each of 
these processes. 
While a number of specific cases might be used to examine these issues, perhaps the best case to 
consider is that of Taiwan.  Few issues evoke so strong a nationalist reaction, from party hard-liners to 
more liberal-minded intellectuals, than the issue of Taiwan.  As one professor at Peking University 
suggested, noting that the outline of China’s territory resembles a chicken – with the islands of Hainan 
and Taiwan as the feet, “a chicken can’t stand on one foot.”1  Yet this has not always been the case.  
Sophia Yen has argued that until the late-19th century, Taiwan was both geographically and politically 
                                                 
1 During lecture given as part of Pitt in China study abroad program. 
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 peripheral to the Chinese empire.2  Similarly, Denny Roy points out that “through most of antiquity, the 
Chinese government considered Taiwan beyond the pale of Chinese civilization.”3  How then did Taiwan 
achieve the status of a vital Chinese ‘national’ interest, one that continues to hold the prospect for serious 
international conflict?  To answer this question it is necessary to examine how China’s adaptation to the 
(Western) international system, and its subsequent changes in identity, forced it to redefine its relationship 
to territory and its own people, and hence its conception of its interests.  In doing so, it will become clear 
that the Taiwan issue in Chinese foreign policy is one that has been socially constructed in conjunction 
with the development of Chinese nationalism. 
From Pirates’ Lair to Chinese Province:  Taiwan’s Changing Territorial Status 
Analysts of Chinese foreign policy have often identified certain basic continuities in the vital 
interests pursued by imperial, republican, and communist regimes.  Foremost of these interests is 
territorial integrity and the reclamation of lost Chinese territory.4  A document written for the British 
Foreign Office in 1943 summarized Republican China’s foreign policy goals as follows: 
China will seek the restoration of the Chinese Empire of the hey-day of the Manchu 
Dynasty, meaning the recovery of Tibet, Sinkiang [Xinjiang], Mongolia, Manchuria, 
Formosa [Taiwan], and Hong Kong and the islands off the China coast.  For what the 
present declarations of her leaders may be worth, she will not lay claim to any of the 
former semi-tributary states on her periphery, such as Korea, Upper Burma, Siam 
[Thailand], Annam [central Vietnam], and Tonquin [northern Vietnam].  But here again 
the Chinese would no doubt prefer to see these regions under nominally independent 
Governments, which could be taken gradually under their protection, rather than see them 
re-incorporated in the dominions of Britain and other European Powers.5
 
                                                 
2 Sophia Su-fei Yen, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations 1836-1874  (Hamden:  The Shoe String Press, 1965), 
297. 
3 Denny Roy, Taiwan:  A Political History  (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 2003), 11. 
4 Andrew J. Nathan, and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress:  China’s Search for Security  
(New York:  W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), 16; Michael H. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign 
Policy  (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1996), 10-7. 
5 Hans van de Ven, “Some Historical Perspectives on the Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism,” Issues & Studies  36, 
no. 6 (November/December 2000): 55. 
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 Harold Hinton notes similar statements from the PRC under Mao Zedong.6  Such goals are indicative of 
what Michael Hunt refers to as “the commitment to an inherited definition of security” based on “a core 
cultural area” and “those peripheral areas important to the security of the core.”7
Given the fact that territorial integrity has long been treated as a fundamental interest of sovereign 
states, such an observation about Chinese interests might be considered as stating the obvious.  Yet as 
discussed in Chapter 4, the significance of territory to state interests largely depends on the type of state 
(e.g., dynastic, territorial, or national) in question.  Thus, we might expect territory to take on different 
meanings for China depending on its type identity.  If so, then we cannot treat China’s territorial interests 
– its concerns for core and periphery – unproblematically.  Not only might its behavior toward the 
periphery change, but more importantly the determination of what constitutes core and what constitutes 
periphery may be subject to change.  In other words, the importance of any given territory would be 
determined, in part, by the identity of the state as it is constituted by the international system.  This 
becomes quite clear when we examine the changing territorial status of Taiwan. 
Discovery & Disinterest:  Taiwan & the Maritime Interests of the Chinese Cultural-State 
Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China has long been shrouded in controversy and ambiguity.  
Despite its close proximity to the mainland, Chinese settlement of the island began relatively late.  Its 
original inhabitants, who now make up less than one percent of Taiwan’s population, were aboriginal 
tribes that migrated there primarily from Southeast Asia.  Chinese began to settle in the Penghu (P’eng-
hu) islands (a.k.a., Pescadores), off the western coast of Taiwan, around the 7th century, and in Taiwan 
itself by the 12th century.8  However, these early Chinese settlements represented little more than a 
“migratory trickle.”9  Indeed, Penghu initially saw far more settlement activity than did the far larger 
Taiwan.  The first major wave of Chinese settlement on Taiwan did not begin until the 16th century.  By 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that Hinton emphasizes the propaganda value of such statements.  Harold C. Hinton, Communist 
China in World Politics  (London:  Macmillan, 1966), 113-14. 
7 Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 10; see also Michael D. Swaine, and Ashley J. Tellis, 
Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy:  Past, Present, and Future  (Santa Monica:  RAND, 2000). 
8 John F. Copper, Taiwan:  Nation-State or Province?  4th ed.  (Boulder:  Westview Press, 2003), 31. 
9 Simon Long, Taiwan:  China’s Last Frontier  (London:  Macmillan, 1991), 5. 
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 1624, the Chinese population on Taiwan had reached 25,000-50,000, and continued to grow rapidly 
throughout the 17th century, perhaps reaching 100,000 by the 1680s.  The growth in Taiwan’s Chinese 
population resulted in the displacement of many of its aboriginal inhabitants to more forested and 
mountainous regions in the central and eastern parts of the island.10
Despite increased Chinese settlement on Taiwan, however, its political incorporation into the 
larger Chinese empire was far from assured.  Aside from a few brief attempts at exploration in the 3rd and 
early-7th centuries, Taiwan was largely ignored by China until the Ming dynasty.  It was generally 
considered part of the kingdom of Liuchiu (Liu-ch’iu – the Ryukyu islands), and appears in the records of 
the Sui dynasty as Tai Liuchiu (Great Ryukyu).11  In 1430, during China’s brief period of naval 
exploration under the Ming, the explorer, Zheng He (Cheng Ho), landed there by accident and brought 
word of it (as well as some medicinal herbs) back to the imperial court.  His descriptions of the island, 
along with reports of its extensive maritime trade, helped to spark some temporary interest in Taiwan as 
officials began to search court records for references to it.  Yet despite this initial interest, “no plans for 
colonization of the island were drawn up and no attempt was made to take over possession.”12  When 
Zheng died in 1435, interest in Taiwan quickly died with him.  For the next two centuries, “Taiwan 
became mainly known as a hotbed of piracy.”13  As a result, Simon Long points out that “by the middle of 
the seventeenth century, the Chinese claim to Taiwan was unformulated.  Taiwan was an outpost, a haunt 
of savages and pirates and in no way incorporated into the Chinese polity.”14
Given the Western history of exploration and expansion, China’s failure to incorporate Taiwan 
into its empire seems difficult to fathom.  It would have been inconceivable for such an island, 
strategically situated to aid in coastal defense (or offense) and provide greater access to maritime trade, as 
                                                 
10 Shinkichi Eto, “An Outline of Formosan History,” in Formosa Today, ed. Mark Mancall  (New York:  Frederick 
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), 43; Roy, Taiwan, 12, 18; Yu-ming Shaw, “Modern History of Taiwan:  An 
Interpretative Account,” in China and the Taiwan Issue, ed. Hungdah Chiu  (New York:  Praeger Publishers, 1979), 
9; and Edwin A. Winckler, “Mass Political Incorporation, 1500-2000,” in Contending Approaches to the Political 
Economy of Taiwan, ed. Edwin A. Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh  (Armonk:  M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988), 49. 
11 Long, Taiwan, 4-5; Copper, Taiwan, 31; Winckler, “Mass Political Incorporation,” 49. 
12 W. G. Goddard, Formosa:  A Study in Chinese History  (Ann Arbor:  University of Michigan Press, 1966), 39. 
13 Long, Taiwan, 6. 
14 Ibid., 11. 
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 well as having great potential for economic development, to remain unclaimed for so long had it existed 
off the coast of Europe.  What then explains China’s complete disinterest in Taiwan?  One explanation 
could be China’s traditional preoccupation with security threats from Inner Asia.15  While China’s 
northern frontier had often been vulnerable to attacks from nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, the 
geography of its southern and maritime frontiers presented far less of a problem.  Jane Leonard argues 
that its relations with maritime Asia “were much more relaxed and passive…[since it was] regarded as 
essentially peaceful, distant, and fragmented in a geopolitical sense.”16  Given the balance of threats with 
which they were forced to contend, the Chinese might be excused for failing to recognize the potential 
value of an island whose possession would eventually come to be so contested.  This is even truer of the 
Manchu-ruled Qing dynasty, which had even less experience with or interest in maritime affairs than the 
Ming, and hence had an even more continental strategic orientation.17
However, while the relative lack of security concerns along China’s maritime frontier certainly 
influenced its disinterest in Taiwan, a more complete answer lies in the interests it derived from its 
identity as a cultural-state.  While China had security concerns like every other state, its primary interest 
as the Middle Kingdom – “its axiomatic policy,” in the words of Mark Mancall – was the defense of the 
institutional and normative order conceived by Confucian doctrine and made manifest through the tribute 
system.18  It has often been suggested that such interests favored, to paraphrase W. G. Goddard, conquest 
by civilization rather than by the sword – i.e., soft power strategies of cultural influence were preferable 
to the hard power of military force.19  As John Fairbank and Ssu-yü Têng once suggested, “tribute was a 
substitute for more forceful domination.”20  If that is the case, then China’s disinterest in the active 
                                                 
15 Goddard, Formosa, 37; Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China’s Rediscovery of the Maritime World  
(Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1984), 36; Nathan and Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, 193. 
16 Leonard, Wei Yuan and China’s Rediscovery of the Maritime World, 40. 
17 See Leonard, Wei Yuan and China’s Rediscovery of the Maritime World, 63-5. 
18 Mark Mancall, “The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in The Foreign Policy of China, ed. 
King C. Chen  (Roseland:  East-West Who? Inc., Publishers, 1972), 34. 
19 Goddard, Formosa, 38. 
20 John K. Fairbank, and Ssu-yü Têng, Ch’ing Administration:  Three Studies  (Cambridge:  Harvard University 
Press, 1960), 130, n. 34.  For an extensive discussion of Chinese attitudes towards military force in classical China, 
see Herrlee G. Creel, The Western Chou Empire, vol. 1 of The Origins of Statecraft in China  (Chicago:  The 
University of Chicago Press, 1970), 242-316. 
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 colonization of Taiwan might make some sense.  However, while such norms certainly had operational 
consequences, they should not be overblown.  As Mancall points out, “there were…no moral inhibitions 
to prevent the development of calculated policies…[n]or was there any conflict concerning the means to 
be used to obtain the primary policy objective.”21  China was often willing to use force to protect its 
interests.  Indeed, recent scholarship has shown that, Confucian ideology aside, China has often taken a 
very realist view toward relations with its neighbors.22
While the impact of Confucian norms on the means China has used to pursue its interests may be 
up for debate, what is more important for our purposes is their impact on the ends themselves – i.e., 
China’s conception of its own territorial interests.  Some scholars, such as Owen Lattimore, have argued 
that, at least in the north, China had a strong preference for rigid frontiers to separate Chinese civilization 
from barbarians that could not be effectively controlled.  Indeed, because of the dramatic differences in 
geography, agriculture, language, and lifestyle, Lattimore asserted that the dividing line between China 
and the northern steppes was “one of the most absolute frontiers in the world,” one which the Chinese 
sought to delineate with the construction of the Great Wall.23  Ng Chin-keong argues that China had an 
equally strong sense of its maritime boundaries, citing efforts to accurately delineate administrative 
boundaries as Chinese territorial control expanded southward along the coast.24  However, Arthur 
Waldron and others offer the contrary opinion “that the idea of clear boundaries is not, in the earliest 
period of history, a particularly strong one in the Chinese tradition.”25  Confucian belief held that the 
emperor ruled over tianxia – all under Heaven.  Thus, “legal boundaries could not exist between societies 
since all societies were part of a socially and culturally hierarchical, not a legal and egalitarian, 
                                                 
21 Mancall, “The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy,” 34. 
22 For instance, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism:  Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese 
History  (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1995). 
23 Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China  (Boston:  Beacon Press, 1962), 21.  See also Owen Lattimore, 
Studies in Frontier History:  Collected Papers 1928-1958  (London:  Oxford University Press, 1962), 98-9. 
24 Ng Chin-keong, “Maritime Frontiers, Territorial Expansion and Hai-fang during the Late Ming and High Ch’ing,” 
in China and Her Neighbors:  Borders, Visions of the Other, Foreign Policy 10th to 19th Century, ed. Sabine 
Dabringhaus and Roderich Ptak  (Weisbaden:  Harrassawitz Verlag, 1997). 
25 Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China:  From History to Myth  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
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 universe.”26  In other words, Chinese ‘sovereignty’ technically extended to all territories and all societies 
even if they were ‘allowed’ to be self-governing. 
If Confucian norms did not recognize the existence of boundaries between states, what explains 
the Chinese desire in some cases to create them?  The answer lies in the meaning they were given.  As 
Lloyd Eastman points out, “the concept of fixed and precise boundaries was not alien to the Chinese 
mind.  These boundaries, however, were not considered a mark of territorial sovereignty, but rather were 
thought to demark divisions of administrative jurisdiction.”27  In essence, the Chinese recognized that 
distance, geographical barriers, and cultural incompatibility put limits on the effective range of direct 
Chinese control.28  Thus, practical concerns for administration and defense sometimes required the careful 
delineation of borders, along natural geographic ones when possible,29 by constructing their own physical 
barriers when necessary.  As Waldron put it, “wall-building was thought of as a way of providing 
boundaries when Heaven had neglected to make them clear.”30  Yet as Lien-sheng Yang points out, “the 
boundary need not always be a line.  It might be a belt of land in which both sides refrained from 
occupancy and cultivation, or a zone in which the people belonged to both countries, or a buffer state.”31  
Even during historical periods where the collapse of central authority produced a system of independent 
polities resembling the European interstate system, the attitude toward specific territorial boundaries 
remained somewhat ambivalent.32  As such, one should be careful not to equate this with the concept of 
sovereign territory associated with the modern state.  Even physical barriers like the Great Wall merely 
                                                 
26 Mark Mancall, China at the Center:  300 Years of Foreign Policy  (New York:  The Free Press, 1984), 30. 
27 Lloyd E. Eastman, Throne and Mandarins:  China’s Search for a Policy During the Sino-French Controversy 
1880-1885  (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1967), 43. 
28 Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History, 98; Mancall, China at the Center, 31. 
29 See Johannes L. Kurz, “The Yangzi in the Negotiations between the Southern Tang and Its Northern Neighbors 
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30 Waldron, The Great Wall of China, 43. 
31 Lien-sheng Yang, “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order,” in The Chinese World Order:  Traditional 
China’s Foreign Relations, ed. John King Fairbank  (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1968), 22. 
32 See Christian Lamouroux, “Geography and Politics:  The Song-Liao Border Dispute of 1074/75,” in China and 
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 represented cultural boundaries.  “It was never a political or even a jurisdictional boundary.”33  Indeed, 
China’s administrative reach often extended beyond the Great Wall to include large parts of Mongolia 
and Manchuria.  The same was true of the Chinese coast. 
The fact that the concept of tianxia was more myth than reality does not detract from its potential 
to influence Chinese behavior.  As part of China’s socially constructed identity as a cultural-state, it 
served to provide China with an idea about its interests – specifically, it was unnecessary to be overly 
concerned with demarking specific territorial boundaries except to deal with practical issues of 
administration.  Eastman cites an interesting case that helps to illustrate this point.  In the midst of a 
border dispute with Vietnam in 1725, the Vietnamese protested against the Chinese proposal to use a river 
to mark the border.  The exchange between the Chinese and Vietnamese emperors is informative: 
[Chinese decree:]  ‘We exercise universal authority over the whole world…In all the 
present subject states, there is no territory that is not Ours.  Why must you quibble over 
this mere forty li [thirteen miles] of land?’  The decree continued by giving the 
Vietnamese emperor a sound scolding for his insubordinate behavior, adding that ‘the 
delineation of the frontiers and the determination of the borders ought to be the first task 
of government.’  After this tongue-lashing, the Vietnamese ruler reportedly expressed his 
abject repentance – whereupon [Chinese emperor Yongzheng] Yung-cheng graciously 
bestowed the full forty li of contested territory on Vietnam in perpetuity.34
 
Whether the Vietnamese were really so repentant is immaterial.  This case illustrates that “despite the 
rather clear demarcation that might mark off the lands of a tributary from the empire, the Chinese did not 
consider that state boundaries circumscribed Chinese sovereignty.”35   
Of course, one might suggest that such statements merely represented Confucian rhetoric.  
However, this does not explain the decision to give in on the issue.  Indeed, Chih-yu Shih argues that 
China has always demonstrated “a relatively flexible approach to the acquisition and relinquishing of 
territory…What worried the Chinese leaders the most involves symbolic issues relating to the emperors’ 
place vis-à-vis barbarians.”36  While Shih argues that this emphasis on symbolism has shaped Chinese 
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34 Eastman, Throne and Mandarins, 43. 
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 strategic culture to the present,37 its implications for imperial China’s territorial interests become clear – 
territory itself had less importance to the Chinese than the maintenance of its identity as the Middle 
Kingdom.  Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross suggest that this helps to explain the relative lack of Chinese 
concern regarding Western pressures on its neighbors.  “In Qing eyes fights among barbarians of different 
degrees of closeness to China did not mean the transfer of territory from their empire to another, just 
adjustments of relations among their diverse cultural inferiors.”38
It is this ambivalent attitude towards territory that helps to explain China’s maritime interests and 
its disinterest in Taiwan.  According to Leonard, “the early Ming emperors were responsible for 
redefining China’s interests in the Nan-yang [Southern Ocean] to emphasize peace, security, and China’s 
active exercise of overlordship.”39  It essentially pushed a more stringent application of the tribute system 
– trying to reduce (in the end, unsuccessfully) the private junk trade and seeking to enforce peace among 
its tributaries.  “Open communications and tributary relations were considered necessary so that the 
stabilizing effect of te [virtue] could be channeled to the Nan-yang and expressed in good government and 
peaceful relations among the sea kingdoms.”40  When this failed, China claimed the right to intervene.  
However, China’s policies were geared toward the strengthening of its position within the order laid out 
by Confucian norms, not trade or territorial aggrandizement.  Since its aboriginal inhabitants did not 
participate in the tribute system, Taiwan was of little concern.  Even during a period when China was 
actively engaged with its maritime neighbors, and was willing to intervene in disputes between distant 
tributaries in Southeast Asia,41 the conquest of Taiwan was inconsequential to the pursuit of its culturally-
defined interests.  Thus, despite its proximity to the Chinese coast, it might be argued that Taiwan did not 
even warrant being part of China’s periphery.  Growing threats along its northern frontier only served to 
reinforce this orientation. 
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 Simple Learning & Shifting Interests:  China’s Response to Taiwan as an Internal Security 
Threat 
Given its complete lack of interest in Taiwan, China was readily willing to give up administrative 
control of the island (though certainly not its inherent right to rule) to Western powers.  Although the 
Portuguese were the first Europeans to spot the island in 1517, giving it the name Ilha Formosa – 
‘beautiful island,’ it was the Dutch who would first colonize Taiwan over a century later.  Their first 
target was not Taiwan, however, but Penghu, on which they built a fort in 1622 in order to put pressure on 
the Portuguese trade in Macao.  While China did not lay administrative claim to Taiwan, Penghu had 
been incorporated into the empire at least by 1368 as part of Fujian province.42  As a result, China became 
involved in a dispute with the Dutch over control of the islands.  The dispute was settled when the 
Chinese agreed to allow the Dutch to establish a trading post on Taiwan in exchange for their evacuation 
from Penghu.  This, as both Goddard and Long suggest, was a clever ruse to keep the Dutch at arms’ 
length, since China had little interest in the island.43  While the Chinese found this to be a convenient 
solution to dealing with the Dutch problem, the Dutch themselves were quite satisfied, believing that 
“they were being handed a bigger and better Macao.”44  They built a fort in 1624 near the present-day city 
of Tainan.  Although the Spanish and Japanese briefly tried to compete with the Dutch for influence over 
the island (1626-42 and 1628-36, respectively), both attempts failed.  As the Dutch began to expand their 
control over the island and its aboriginal inhabitants (though never the whole island), they encouraged 
Chinese farmers to settle the land, sparking a new wave of Chinese emigration to the island. 
Ironically, the events that first brought Taiwan to the full attention of the imperial court 
foreshadowed the current conflict between the PRC and Republic of China (ROC).45  In 1644, the Ming 
dynasty collapsed through a combination of internal disorder and Manchu invasion.  The Qing dynasty 
that succeeded it would continue to encounter resistance from Ming loyalists intent on removing 
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 ‘barbarians’ from the imperial throne.  One such loyalist was Zheng Chenggong (Cheng Ch’eng-kung, 
a.k.a., Koxinga), the son of a Chinese pirate who had built an extensive maritime trading network in the 
1620s and eventually attained the rank of admiral in the Ming navy.  While his father switched his 
support to the Qing, Zheng used the power base he inherited to support the Ming cause, establishing 
control over much of the southern coast and launching a failed attempt to conquer Nanjing in 1658.  He 
was eventually forced to flee to Taiwan where he succeeded in forcing out the Dutch in 1662, establishing 
a new regime modeled on the Ming.  Although he died shortly thereafter, the short-lived Zheng dynasty 
would continue to be a thorn in the side of China’s new Manchu rulers.  After two failed attempts to 
attack Taiwan in 1664 and 1665, the Qing attempted to isolate Zheng by forcibly evacuating residents 
living within ten miles of the coasts of Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong provinces.  The success of such 
policies was limited at best.  The Zheng regime continued to maintain trading outposts along the coast, 
and took advantage of a major rebellion against Qing rule (the Revolt of the Three Feudatories) to 
establish a military presence in Amoy in 1673.  However, by 1680, the Qing succeeded in driving the 
Zheng from the mainland; in 1683, China finally mounted an invasion of Taiwan that succeeded in 
conquering the island.46
The defeat of the Zheng regime presented a serious policy dilemma to the Qing court – what to do 
with Taiwan?  On the one hand, “Taiwan had not previously been part of the Chinese empire and evoked 
no patriotic stirrings in the hearts or minds of mainland Chinese elites.”47  Despite a growing Chinese 
population, it remained ‘beyond the pale of Chinese civilization’ – “a peripheral little mud ball, 
insufficient to significantly expand Chinese territory, a desolate and essentially uninhabited place, 
untouched by the wonder of the celestial deities,” as one Qing official described it.48  In addition, it was at 
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 the edge of China’s range of effective control.49  Since the island was deemed economically insignificant 
and, given the Qing dynasty’s decidedly continental strategic orientation, militarily inconsequential, 
continued occupation seemed undesirable.  “Virtually all prominent officials of the Qing court advised the 
emperor to abandon Taiwan to the aborigines.”50  Shi Lang (Shih Lang), the Qing admiral responsible for 
the final defeat of the Zheng regime, even discussed with Dutch representatives the possibility of 
returning Taiwan to their control.51
On the other hand, its occupation by Zheng’s forces had demonstrated that Taiwan could present 
a serious threat to internal security if occupied by dissident Chinese opposed to Qing rule.  Consideration 
was therefore given to the forcible evacuation of all Chinese from the island to prevent it from again 
becoming a base of resistance to Qing rule.  Toward that end, about 40,000 of Zheng’s troops were either 
sent back to their communities on the mainland or integrated into the Qing’s own forces.  In addition, 
coastal regulations adopted in 1683 put pressure on Taiwan’s civilian population to leave by forcing those 
without wives or property to return to the mainland.  As a result, it was estimated that by September 1684 
the island’s Chinese population had been cut in half.  However, Shi successfully argued against this 
policy, pointing out that the complete evacuation of Taiwan was impractical given the length of time it 
would take and the potential social problems it would create on the mainland, not to mention the 
possibility that elements of the Zheng regime might remain to cause trouble as pirates and brigands.52  
More importantly, Taiwan represented “a defense shield for several southeastern provinces.  If 
abandoned,” he argued, “it will be occupied by either the natives or bandits.”53  He also suggested that the 
island possessed some products that would make it economically worthwhile to retain.54  In the end, Shi 
managed to convince the court to extend its administrative control to Taiwan.  Thus, in April 1684, 
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 Taiwan was formally incorporated into the Chinese empire as a prefecture of Fujian province.  Some 
10,000 troops were garrisoned on the island to guard against pirates and Zheng loyalists.55   
The decision to make Taiwan a Chinese prefecture represents an important first step toward its 
becoming the vital Chinese interest that it is today.  However, this must also be considered a very 
tentative step.  First, it is important to note that this decision does not yet represent a change in China’s 
identity as a cultural-state – i.e., China did not have to redefine itself in order to expand its administrative 
control to another territory.  This was a case of simple learning; China was seeking to achieve its 
culturally-defined interests better by dealing with a concrete threat to its internal security.  After all, one 
cannot be the Middle Kingdom if the emperor’s legitimacy is being directly challenged by a hostile 
regime.  In addition, the lack of Dutch interest in reestablishing themselves on Taiwan, much less forcing 
China to play by Western rules with respect to the island, meant that there was not yet a broader 
confrontation between the Western and Confucian systems over the Taiwan issue. 
Perhaps more importantly, despite expanding administrative control to Taiwan, Chinese attitudes 
toward the island remained ambivalent and its administration of it haphazard at best.  For Qing officials 
posted to Taiwan “it was a career graveyard,”56 an assignment often given to the least qualified and from 
which advancement was exceedingly difficult.  Corruption and civil unrest were endemic, as evidenced 
by frequent rebellions; some 159 rebellions took place under Qing rule, leading to the saying “every three 
years an uprising, every five years a rebellion.”57  In addition, the poor administrative control that did 
exist did not extend to the whole island.  It was concentrated around the prefectural capital, Tainan, in the 
southwestern part of the island, with military outposts extending only up to the Ta-chia River in the north 
and the mountains in the center.  As such, less than half of Taiwan was under direct Chinese control, a 
fact which little disturbed the court.  Indeed, while the ‘civilized’ aborigines of the western coastal plains 
were at least partially incorporated into the Qing tax system,58 the government actively sought to maintain 
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 a barrier between areas of Chinese control and the territories of the island’s ‘raw’ aborigines – “the 
mountains running through the heart of Taiwan, as well as the territory along the rugged east coast, was 
considered beyond the boundaries of Han Chinese settlement or economic exploitation.”59  The aborigines 
living there remained independent of Chinese administrative authority. 
In addition to the dynasty’s limited administrative control, Roy suggests that “the Qing’s 
vacillating emigration policy was emblematic of the lack of vision in Beijing’s Taiwan policy.”60  While 
some officials argued in favor of explicit colonization in order to ensure that Taiwan not become a threat 
to internal security, the view that predominated for a century (excluding a brief period in the 1730s) was 
that the emigration to the island should be kept to a minimum.61  To that end, “the court imposed a partial 
quarantine on the island”62 by laying out strict regulations for Chinese emigration to Taiwan.  The Three 
Prohibitions with Regard to Refugees read as follows: 
1. Those wishing to migrate to Taiwan must apply from their home villages of 
registration and submit documents for examination by the branch military circuit 
intendancy for Taiwan and Xiamen; further investigations will be conducted by the 
Coastal Defense Magistrate’s Office.  Severe penalties will be invoked in cases of 
illegal emigration. 
2. Those obtaining permission to migrate may not bring family or friends.  Those 
already on Taiwan should not offer encouragement to friends or relatives to apply for 
emigration from the mainland. 
3. Hakka [an ethnic group] from Chaozhou and Huizhou should not henceforth migrate 
to Taiwan.63 
 
These restrictions were meant to create “a population of male laborers dependent on the government for 
access to their families on the mainland,” as well as to minimize potential conflicts between Han settlers 
and aborigines by discouraging more permanent settlements.64   
Such restrictions proved incapable of stemming the flow of emigration to the island; Taiwan’s 
Chinese population increased six-fold to almost 840,000.65  By the late-18th century, the increasingly 
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 hollow emigration restrictions had to be loosened, though the government did not adopt a policy of 
unrestricted emigration until 1875.66  While the growth of the island’s Chinese population, and its 
subsequent spread to more unsettled areas, forced the geographical scope of government administration to 
grow with it, the process was slow and grudging.  “Clinging to the restrictive immigration policy and 
endeavoring to appease the aborigines, officials would redraw the quarantine boundaries and expend 
some effort to minimize further expansion into areas claimed by Taiwan’s original inhabitants.”67  Always 
the attempt to minimize administrative control was a failure.  As a result, the area under Qing authority 
(ineffective though it was) slowly grew, though much of the eastern part of the island remained outside 
direct Chinese control.  Given China’s inability to properly administer even a relatively limited portion of 
the island, one is forced to agree with Roy’s assertion that “the challenge of effectively governing Taiwan 
was beyond the Qing’s ability and commitment.”68
Chinese Territory or No-Man’s Land?:  Disputes over Administrative Responsibility 
Taiwan’s minimal incorporation into the Chinese empire had been a solution of last resort to a 
practical problem of internal security – a case of simple learning.  Its eventual establishment as a Chinese 
province would come in response to problems relating to China’s external security – namely, Taiwan as a 
growing source of contention between it and the Western powers, including Japan.  This contention was 
characterized as much by conflicting norms of sovereignty as by imperialist efforts at territorial 
aggrandizement.  In essence, China’s policy towards the aboriginal territories in eastern Taiwan 
conflicted with Western norms of sovereignty that required actual administrative control of a territory in 
order for a state’s claim to it to be recognized.  It was through protracted disputes over China’s lack of 
administrative control of Taiwan that China began to redefine itself as a territorial-state, one accepting the 
norm, and the consequent responsibility, of state sovereignty – a case of complex learning. 
The root of the dispute over Taiwan was China’s policy toward the aborigines.  The island’s 
natives were categorized by the Chinese as either sheng fan (‘raw foreigners’) or shu fan (‘ripe 
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 foreigners’).  The former were semi-nomadic, living in more remote mountainous areas of the island, and 
often engaged in practices seen by the Chinese as uncivilized (e.g., head-hunting).  The latter, while still 
considered barbarians, were more settled, had greater interaction with Chinese settlers, and had thus 
become more assimilated.  It was this latter group that was at least partially administered by the 
prefectural government on Taiwan, while the raw aborigines remained outside of China’s direct control.69  
This was fully in line with Confucian norms of statecraft.  Although practical needs of administration and 
defense might require the incorporation of some non-Chinese into the boundaries of the empire, it was 
unnecessary to seek out barbarians to actively civilize.  “The Chinese policy toward [them] was one of 
‘laissez-faire,’ expecting them to gradually and voluntarily seek assimilation” due to China’s inherent 
cultural superiority.70  Until they came to realize this fact, Taiwan’s raw aborigines could be “left 
undisturbed to continue with their ‘uncivilized’ habits.”71
It was this policy of leaving the inhabitants of the unsettled portions of the island to their own 
devices that would become a source of tension between China and the West.  What made this a political 
issue was a series of incidents involving the killing by aborigines of crews from foreign ships that sank 
off the Taiwanese coast.  As trade with China increased after the Opium War, and particularly after the 
Treaty of Tianjin (1858) opened treaty ports on the island, so did the problem of shipwrecks.  The first 
case to receive international attention72 was that of the British ship Larpent, which wrecked off the 
southeast coast of Taiwan in 1850.  In May 1851, three survivors from the Larpent were rescued and told 
of their capture by aborigines and enslavement by Chinese settlers.  A second major incident occurred in 
March 1867, when the US ship Rover sank after it struck rocks near the southern tip of Taiwan.  All but 
one of the survivors that made it to shore were killed by local aborigines.  The third such incident 
occurred in December 1871, when a group of fishermen from the Ryukyu islands met a similar fate.  In 
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 each of these cases, the essential problem was the same – a lack of Chinese control over the eastern 
portion of Taiwan, as well as ambiguous Chinese claims to the territory in question, that led to debate 
regarding its territorial status as part of China. 
The uncertainty over the status of the eastern half of Taiwan began shortly after the Larpent 
incident.  Anxious to ascertain the fate of other lost vessels, the British sent a ship to investigate the 
situation on Taiwan.  Its conclusion was  
that the Chinese could not be depended upon to assist in the release of captive foreigners, 
or to transmit any information regarding them, for the southern and eastern parts of 
Taiwan were not formally incorporated into the administrative units of the prefecture.  
The areas near which the ships often met trouble were inhabited by the aborigines of 
Taiwan.  The lack of communication, because of the high mountain range that divided the 
island in two as well as the lack of roads between the two areas, and the absence of 
contact between officials and the inhabitants of the aboriginal territory made it impossible 
to obtain from the Chinese government any news of occurrences in southern and eastern 
Taiwan.73
 
American and Prussian observers made similar assessments over the next several years.  To Western eyes, 
the absence of administrative control of these portions of Taiwan brought into question the extent of 
China’s sovereignty over the island. 
The apparent lack of Chinese sovereignty over the eastern half of Taiwan resulted in a great deal 
of interest on the part of some Westerners in obtaining control of it for their own governments.  
American, British, and Prussian interests all sought to establish a foothold on the island, justifying their 
plans on the premise that it was a no-man’s land available to anyone for exploitation.  Moreover, they 
often believed that China would not mind foreign incursions into barbarian territory, and might even 
welcome them.  For instance, American Commodore Mathew Perry (who successfully forced Japan to 
open to Western trade in 1854) felt that if the United States established an outpost on Taiwan, “the 
Chinese could be benefitted from the protection of the settlers against pirates and rebels who infested the 
island.”74  In most cases, foreign designs on Taiwan came largely from private individuals, not their 
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 governments, and thus were rarely acted upon.75  For instance, despite the interest of Perry and others in 
including Taiwan as part of America’s manifest destiny, the US government gave the idea of acquiring 
any part of the island little attention.76  However, foreign powers, discouraged by China’s seeming 
unwillingness to act to protect foreigners wrecked on Taiwan’s shores, did occasionally send punitive 
expeditions against local aborigines, usually without much success. 
Far from helping to clarify the situation, China gave conflicting signals about its dominion over 
the areas in question.  On the one hand, it laid claim to the entire island.  When it became known that 
foreign traders had set up an operation to harvest camphor trees on aboriginal territory, the Zongli Yamen 
(China’s proto-Foreign Ministry) made it clear to representatives of the governments whose citizens were 
involved that “the territories inhabited by the aboriginal tribes [are] within Chinese territory.  Ta-nan-
ao…, where the foreigners settled, is not a treaty port; foreigners are not permitted to enter that territory to 
rent land from the aborigines or cultivate land there; the land is not for the aborigines to rent at their 
will.”77  The venture was ended at China’s insistence.78  Perhaps recognizing the inherent contradictions 
between Chinese policy and the Western norms of sovereignty that would later result in a major crisis, the 
Zongli Yamen gave the following warning to local officials during the Rover case: 
Although the uncivilized aborigines are not bound by our law, their land is still part of 
Chinese territory.  To prevent foreign ambition, it is advised that during the debate with 
the U.S. Consul (LeGendre), our officials can not refer to the view that the aboriginal 
territory is beyond the Chinese imperial domain.79
 
The Chinese government also protested against unilateral attempts by foreign powers to punish aborigines 
for attacks on their sailors, such as a failed US attempt in June 1867 to seek retribution for the Rover.80
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 On the other hand, the Chinese disavowed any control over the island’s aboriginal inhabitants.  
When the local authorities reported to the imperial court about the Rover incident, they pointed out that 
“the area of K’uei-lei [where the incident took place] is not yet cultivated and is an inaccessible jungle 
where people seldom visit and is not yet incorporated in our territorial map; (the area) is also sealed off by 
the imperial practice so that unnecessary loss of precious life (at the hands of the savages) could be 
prevented.”81  Despite warnings from the Zongli Yamen, similar statements were made in a letter to the 
American consul at Amoy, Charles LeGendre, stating that “the Americans were not murdered on Chinese 
territory, or on Chinese Seas, but in a region occupied by the Savages.”82  When the Japanese sent a 
punitive expedition to aboriginal territory in 1874 (to be discussed shortly), the Taiwan Circuit Intendant, 
Xia Xianlun, responded that “if the Japanese approach our central region, we will defend it with our 
troops and local militia.  If they only seek revenge on the aborigines, we should keep alert and reason 
with them according to the Sino-Japanese treaty.”83  The Minzhe Governor-General, Li Henian, made a 
similar point.84  As far as local officials were concerned, the Qing policy on Taiwan precluded them from 
taking action in the aboriginal territories since it was not under their direct administration.85
Lung-chih Chang suggests that the central government in Beijing had a very different perspective, 
noting a reprimand of local inaction to Japanese incursions into aboriginal territory: 
The aboriginal territory has long been part of the Chinese domain.  Its interdependence 
with the Taiwan prefecture is like the relation between the lips and the teeth.  The foreign 
nations coveted the territory since the opening of commerce.  Japan is especially close to 
the territory and might intend to occupy it….The Taiwan Circuit is oblivious of the 
priorities and irresponsible to consider the conflict in the aboriginal territory as 
unstoppable.86
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 The court also stated that “it is forbidden to use the pretext of differences between the aboriginal territory 
and the central region to allow the Japanese [to] act at will.”87  This would seem to indicate that the 
discrepancy over Taiwan’s status was merely a misunderstanding between local officials and the court, or 
of local officials trying to shirk their responsibilities.  However, as demonstrated by the following 
exchange that took place between officials of the Zongli Yamen and the Japanese Foreign Ministry on 
June 21, 1873, less than a year before the Japanese expedition, and which is repeated here at length, the 
central government was itself less than clear about Taiwan’s status as Chinese territory: 
Japanese:  Formosa had formerly been occupied by the Japanese and the Dutch, and 
afterwards Teiseiko [Koxinga] established his independence there.  Under his 
descendents, however, the island became Chinese territory, but China subdued only a 
portion of the island, leaving the eastern portion to the aboriginal savage tribes, which 
your Government never attempted to reduce to obedience.  Now, in the winter of 1871 
these barbarians attacked and murdered the Japanese subjects shipwrecked on the coast, 
and the Japanese government intends to send an expeditionary force to chastise them.  
But as the region lies adjacent to the territory under the local government of China, the 
Ambassador [Soyeshima Taneomi] thought it better to inform you of the fact, in order to 
avoid a collision endangering amity between the two empires. 
 
Chinese:  We have only heard of the Formosan savages plundering and killing the people 
of Liukiu [Ryukyu islands], but never heard of their attacking Japanese.  Liukiu is a 
Chinese territory, and Chinese officers rescued and sent home to Liukiu such of them as 
could escape the savages. 
 
Japanese:  Liukiu has always belonged to Japan.  During the feudal ages it was a 
dependency of the Prince of Satsuma, and is now under the direct rule of the Imperial 
Government.  Hence, there is not a person of Liukiu who is not a Japanese subject, 
entitled to the protection of the Japanese Government.  You say you have rescued the 
Liukiu people, but what have you done towards chastising the Formosan savages that 
have plundered and killed the rest? 
 
Chinese:  There are two sorts of aborigines in Formosa – those that have come under the 
Chinese rule, and are governed by the Chinese local officers, called the ‘ripe barbarians,’ 
and those that remain beyond the influence of China, called ‘the raw aborigines.’ 
 
Japanese:  The Formosan savages have molested foreign subjects more than once, and 
your government never chastised them.  This might lead to a very serious consequence – 
namely the occupation of Formosa by other Powers, as in the case of Cambodia, 
Tonquin, and Amur districts, which is inconvenient, and a source of danger both of Japan 
and China.  Hence the Japanese Government has decided to undertake the work of 
chastisement itself.  But in order to avoid complications our Ambassador, in his capacity 
of Minister of Foreign Affairs, caused the expedition to be postponed until he had 
opportunity to assure the Chinese Government that what Japan is going to do in Formosa 
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 concerns only the barbarians outside the limit of Chinese administration, and that it is no 
intention of hers to interfere with the internal affairs of China.  It is also to be taken into 
consideration that, if the Japanese Government does not act now, the Japanese public, 
much angered as they are at the murder of the Liukiu people, might invade the island of 
their own accord, and thereby give rise to a state of things incompatible with the existing 
treaty.  The Japanese Government was originally against the idea of informing the 
Chinese Government of their intention, and it is therefore on his own responsibility that 
the Ambassador makes the present communications, etc. 
 
Chinese:  ‘The raw aborigines’ have not been chastised, because they are beyond the 
reach of our government and culture; but as we have in our hands the reports of the 
Governor-General of Fukien [Fujian], who rescued the Liukiu people, we will consult 
those papers, and then answer your questions. 
 
Japanese:  You have already stated that the raw aborigines are beyond the reach of your 
government and culture; and they are traditionally an independent tribe; and we shall 
treat them as an independent nation.  There is not a Japanese ignorant of the murder of 
the Liukiu People in Formosa, as the incident has appeared in the Chinese journals; and 
as the Ambassador is preparing with all haste for his departure, he will certainly not wait 
for any later response.88
 
Beyond the dispute over the Ryukyus,89 what is clear from this exchange is that the Chinese government 
did not see the eastern part of Taiwan as within the administrative jurisdiction of the Chinese empire.  
While there may have been some recognition that such policies could result in foreign claims, China did 
not seem ready to stake an unambiguous claim to the entire island.  Indeed, their use of the same language 
in referring to the Ryukyus, a tributary, as Chinese territory further complicates the question of how 
China defined the limits of its territory. 
Believing that the Chinese government had formally acknowledged that the territory of the raw 
aborigines did not belong to it, the Japanese proceeded to organize their own punitive expedition in the 
spring of 1874.90  Japan’s primary interest in punishing the aborigines for the death of the Ryukyu 
fishermen was to obtain Chinese recognition of its claim over those islands.91  However, the creation in 
April 1874 of a Bureau of Aboriginal Affairs of Taiwan testifies to the Japanese interest in establishing a 
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 more permanent presence on Taiwan as well.  As Yen suggests, “the planners of the Japanese expedition 
to Taiwan carefully calculated the steps which would be taken to seek redress for the Ryukyu victims but 
which would in effect gain a foothold in Taiwan as a preliminary step toward eventual incorporation of 
Taiwan within the Japanese Empire.”92  The Japanese force included three ships and about 3,600 men,93 
and landed on the southern tip of Taiwan in May where it proceeded to set up camps and engage in some 
military actions against local aborigines.94
Word of the planned expedition reached the Chinese court on April 18, about two weeks before a 
Japanese warship bound for Taiwan entered the harbor of Amoy requesting the use of its facilities.  It 
responded by appointing a Special Commissioner for Taiwan Affairs, Shen Baozhen (Shen Pao-chen), 
and sending him along with troops to the island to ensure its defense.  The Zongli Yamen also sent a 
communiqué to the Japanese Foreign Ministry which read: 
The intention of Japan in regard to the Taiwan aborigines in sending off a mission [as 
understood by China from the June 1873 meeting] was only to desire from them good 
treatment of her people in future, if they ever go to their territories, and not in any way to 
wage war upon them….Taiwan is an island lying far off in the sea and we did not yet 
restrain the aborigines inhabiting it by any legislation nor establish any government over 
them, following in this a maxim mentioned in Li-chi [The Book of Rites]:  Don’t change 
the usage of a people but keep their proper ones.  But the territories inhabited by the 
aborigines are truly within the jurisdiction of China; and this is also the case with several 
aboriginal groups in other remote provinces within the Chinese Empire….China permits 
them to preserve their customs….We hear now with astonishment, that Japan intends to 
send an expeditionary force to Taiwan, but still we do not firmly believe that this is truly 
the case.  If it is true, why did you not consult us first?  For what purpose is the ship 
destined which is now anchored in the harbor of Amoy?  Kindly inform us.95
 
While Yen suggests that this first message was relatively weak because it was not “a straightforward note 
of protest,”96 it was the first shot fired in a diplomatic struggle between China and Japan over the status of 
eastern Taiwan.  Though it ended peacefully with a settlement signed on October 31, 1874, the dispute 
brought the two states to the brink of war. 
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 The details of the negotiations are beyond the scope of this dissertation.  What is important is the 
nature of the dispute.  China’s position that it had possession of the whole island of Taiwan, but that this 
possession did not extend to direct administrative control over all of its inhabitants, made sense according 
to Confucian norms of statecraft.  However, it conflicted with the Western concept of state sovereignty.  
Yen argues that the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin, which opened some Taiwanese ports to Western 
trade, represented “the de facto recognition of China’s sovereignty over western Taiwan.”97  Yet with this 
recognition came “an obligation to offer protection to foreigners traveling and residing within her 
Empire.”98  If China’s claim to sovereignty over the whole island of Taiwan was to be accepted by the 
Western powers, it had to demonstrate its ability (and willingness) to effectively deal with Western 
concerns over the safety of their ships’ crews wrecked on the coast.  “Management of such cases 
necessarily meant that the local mandarins should dispatch punitive expeditions to punish the head-
hunting aborigines or that they enforce law and order by extending jurisdictional control over to the 
aboriginal territory, by erecting forts and building lighthouses, to provide some measure of protection for 
shipwrecked foreigners.”99  The inability and/or unwillingness of Chinese officials to meet these 
obligations of sovereignty called China’s claim to the eastern part of Taiwan into question. 
It was the failure of China to meet its obligations as a sovereign state that formed the basis of the 
Japanese argument.  In a written statement presented to the Zongli Yamen in September, Japan’s chief 
negotiator, Okubo Toshimichi, focused on the following questions: 
1. If your country claims that the aboriginal territory is within your domain then why 
have you not to this day taken measures to enlighten [civilize] the aborigines?  If you 
do claim it to be your territory, an administrative and educational system must be 
established there.  How much have you done to administer and civilize the 
aborigines? 
2. With the opening of relations among nations throughout the world, people travel 
widely.  Every country has taken steps toward insuring the safety of mariners on its 
shores.  Your country is known throughout the world for high morality and the 
principle of love and righteousness.  One expects from you a generous treatment of 
shipwrecked foreigners.  But, the murder of the foreigner by aborigines has never 
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 received your attention.  It is evident that you do not sympathize with foreigners, but 
you encourage the aborigines in their cruel undertakings.  Is this reasonable?100 
 
The Chinese response explaining its policy of gradually assimilating the aborigines was deemed 
unsatisfactory.101  For the Japanese, the standard of administrative responsibility in denoting sovereignty 
was a matter of established international law.102  If China exercised no such authority over the aboriginal 
territories, then its claim to them was legally invalid. 
In the end, the settlement that ended the dispute essentially forced China to accept full 
administrative responsibility for the aboriginal territories, stating in Article III that “it will be the duty of 
the Chinese Government to take such steps for the due control of the savage tribes in the region referred 
to as will for ever secure the navigation (along their coasts) against any farther atrocities on their part.”103  
Yen argues that in the dispute over Taiwan, “the Western concept of the state as defined in international 
law had to give way to the more traditional Chinese system of the universal state with its claim to 
sovereignty over even unabsorbed regions.”104  Yet such an interpretation seems unfounded; indeed, the 
reverse is true.  While China’s claim over the eastern portions of Taiwan was recognized despite its 
failure to administer it in line with international law, this recognition was prefaced on China’s future 
acceptance of the legal standards of sovereignty.  As Yen herself points out, “after the recognition of her 
sovereignty [over Taiwan] was obtained, China proceeded to fulfill those legal obligations as prescribed 
in international law.”105
Toward that end, and as part of its more general effort at Self-Strengthening, the Chinese 
government pursued an extensive program of modernization on Taiwan, which included “bring[ing] 
Taiwan’s underdeveloped central mountain belts under Han Chinese settlement and control[ling] those 
aborigines who stood in the way by suasion if possible, or coercion if necessary.”106  Forests were cleared 
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 for cultivation, new roads and settlements were built in aboriginal territory, and, most importantly, 
administrative authority was extended over the whole island.  Public schools were established for the 
aborigines in order to assimilate them into Chinese culture.107  While the long-term success of such efforts 
may be questionable, their meaning is clear – China now accepted the basic principles of state sovereignty 
(at least as they related to Taiwan).  After Taiwan became a battleground in the Sino-French War (1884-
85), the court went further by deciding to make it a Chinese province, which formally occurred in 1887.  
Taiwan was now fully accepted as sovereign Chinese territory, and China had demonstrated that it was 
willing to fight to protect that sovereignty. 
What the preceding discussion of the evolution of Taiwan’s territorial status shows is the complex 
interplay of security concerns and social learning that went into the constitution of Taiwan as a Chinese 
interest.  The transformation in Chinese identity, from cultural-state to territorial-state, required a 
fundamental redefinition in its relationship to territory and boundaries, as well as a change in the 
diplomatic practices through which that relationship was expressed.  Allen Carlson argues that a state’s 
territorial boundaries are socially constructed through “three main types of diplomatic and 
representational practices” – official claims, boundary analysis by elites, and international agreements.108  
While his focus on modern boundary disputes assumes a territorially-defined Chinese state, the same 
concepts may be applied to understand its development.  The ambiguous nature of China’s official claims, 
the conflicting analyses among various observers regarding the region’s status, and China’s own failure to 
live up to previous international agreements (as understood by the West) demonstrate diplomatic and 
representational practices that were in flux as a result of China’s on-going transition from cultural-state to 
territorial-state.  This transition could only be completed as these practices converged on a common 
understanding of China’s sovereign boundaries, both what they were and what they meant. 
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 The main burden of social learning necessary for such a convergence to occur was placed 
squarely on the shoulders of China.  While the West came to accept that eastern Taiwan was not a no-
man’s land open for colonization, China had to learn the practices associated with a fundamentally 
different conception of state in order to earn that acceptance.  It had to learn that it could no longer claim 
sovereignty over ‘All under Heaven,’ nor could it expect to continue its dealings with other societies over 
the ill-defined boundaries that the tribute system implied.  The new rules of international politics by 
which China was being forced to play required it to accept the modern concept of sovereignty and the 
definition of territorial boundaries that came with it.  This meant that the boundaries of the newly 
territorial Chinese state had to be established, almost by trial and error, as China learned what territories 
were necessary for its security, which could and could not be defended, and, perhaps most importantly, 
which would be accepted by other actors in the system.  While the relative material power of the actors 
involved played a key role in determining the outcome of this learning process, power alone does not 
explain the redefinition of Taiwan as Chinese territory that had to be defended, both diplomatically and 
militarily. 
From Chinese Province to Japanese Colony, and Back Again (Almost):  Taiwan & the 
Nationalization of China’s Territorial Interests 
By all accounts, China has taken its new identity as a modern state to heart.  Nathan and Ross 
suggest that one of the great puzzles of Chinese foreign policy is the fact that “for centuries it placed itself 
at the core of its own world order, oblivious to the power politics of Europe and the interstate law that it 
spawned.  Today it defends a purist, originally European conception of national sovereignty.”109  China’s 
wholehearted defense of Western notions of sovereignty is certainly ironic given the traditional Confucian 
world view, but it is less puzzling when one considers the harsh lesson that foreign imperialism taught it – 
state survival depends on the vigorous defense of one’s territorial integrity, defined in Western terms.  By 
the end of the 19th century, China was experiencing “a territorial crisis.”110  Its losses of territory and 
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 control over treaty ports had accelerated into an unprecedented scramble for concessions among the Great 
Powers as they sought to carve out their own spheres of influence.  Although American pressures to 
maintain an Open Door policy in China helped to prevent it from being formally colonized, many Chinese 
intellectuals feared that ‘the Chinese melon’ would soon be sliced up.  China thus learned the hard way 
that territorial integrity mattered. 
Given this territorial crisis, and the new identity as a territorial-state it brought about, it should not 
be surprising that the Western principle of raison d’état – i.e., power politics – became a guiding principle 
of Chinese foreign policy.  Indeed, as Thomas Christensen has argued, “China may well be the high 
church of realpolitik in the post-Cold War world.  Its analysts certainly think more like traditional 
balance-of-power theorists than do most contemporary Western leaders and policy analysts.”111  Yet 
realpolitik can only go so far in explaining the importance of territorial integrity to China’s interests.  As 
Christensen acknowledges, its concern for power politics is mixed with “less antiseptic emotions rooted 
in China’s bitter history.”112  This is due to the fact that, just as China began to accept its new identity as a 
territorial-state, it began another phase in its transformation – from territorial-state to nation-state.113  For 
a state committed to controlling strategically and economically valuable land that could enhance its 
security, China’s territorial losses were bad enough.  However, the nationalization of China – the 
association of a territorially-defined Chinese state with the Chinese people – meant that its evolving 
territorial interests began to take on greater meaning than just land, resources, or more defensible borders; 
it became the Motherland of the Chinese nation, imbuing it with a new sense of importance.  As a result, 
territorial integrity achieved an emotional significance far beyond the strategic or economic value of the 
land in question.  Losses of territory implied a collective impotence in the face of foreign aggression felt 
by the whole nation, a sense of national humiliation. 
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 Taiwan as a Symbol of National Humiliation:  KMT & CCP Responses to China’s Territorial 
Crisis 
The real legacy of China’s territorial crisis is not just the physical loss of territory, but “the myth 
of China’s humiliation at the hands of the West and Japan, a myth that gripped the imagination of three 
generations of Chinese and stung them into even more critical analysis of the international order and 
Chinese society.  The result was an obsession, long sanctioned by official orthodoxy, with expunging the 
residue of a feudal-imperialist past.”114  Of course, as John Garver points out, to call this historical legacy 
a myth is not to suggest that China did not suffer greatly at the hands of foreign powers.  “It is mythic, 
rather, in the sense that the fact of belief is more important than what actually occurred.  The story of 
National Humiliation is constantly told and retold in Chinese schools, in the mass media, and in countless 
mandatory study sessions attended by Chinese citizens….The myth of National Humiliation stands at the 
center of the political culture of the People’s Republic of China.”115  As Peter Gries puts it, “the ‘Century 
of Humiliation’ [from 1840 to 1949] is neither an objective past that works insidiously in the present nor 
a mere ‘invention’ of present-day nationalist entrepreneurs.  Instead, the ‘Century’ is a continuously 
reworked narrative about the past central to the contested and evolving meaning of being ‘Chinese’ 
today.”116
The importance of this myth becomes readily apparent when we examine the nature of China’s 
territorial claims.  China has made numerous territorial claims against its neighbors and former 
colonizers.  Between 1950 and 1990, China had territorial disputes with fourteen of its seventeen 
neighbors.117  A number of these disputes are ongoing – e.g., Diaoyu (a.k.a., Senkaku), the Paracel 
Islands, the Spratly Islands, and the Sino-Indian border.  China also sought the repatriation of two 
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 colonies – Hong Kong from the British, and Macao from Portugal – which were returned to China in 
1997 and 1999, respectively.  As Chi-kin Lo notes, such claims have driven many observers to argue that 
“China’s policies towards territorial disputes [are] dictated by insatiable irredentist ambitions.”118  For 
some China-watchers, that view still holds.  Maria Chang has asserted that “Chinese patriotic nationalism 
is…profoundly irredentist.”119  More alarmist observers have even suggested that China could seek to 
reclaim its hegemonic status over former tributaries.  The Chinese publication in the early-1950s of a 
history book containing a map of China that included Mongolia and other border regions has lent 
legitimacy to such claims.120
Of course, it should be pointed out that the actual scope of China’s irredentist ambitions is not so 
clear-cut.  As Arthur Huck once pointed out, “it does not follow that any modern Chinese state will want 
to regain all these ‘lost’ territories in the sense of incorporating them in a new Chinese Empire (whether 
Communist or not).”121  Lo argues that despite the scope of its claims, China’s behavior in pursuing them 
has been fairly moderate.122  Similarly, Carlson has argued that China has pursued an increasingly 
pragmatic policy towards its territorial disputes.123  Indeed, while territorial disputes continue to exist 
between China and its neighbors, many have been resolved.  Others involve relatively small portions of 
land, often in remote areas where establishing borders is difficult, and as such have received relatively 
little attention from Chinese policy-makers.  Thus, while the pursuit of territorial claims has been an 
important element of Chinese foreign policy, one should not jump to the conclusion that all such claims 
are equally likely to produce aggressively irredentist policies. 
Indeed, what is particularly interesting about China’s territorial claims is the relatively limited 
nature of the losses themselves.  To be sure, China’s concessions to foreign powers were significant, but 
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 many proved short-lived.  Indeed, when one compares the boundaries of the PRC with those of the Qing 
empire, one is struck by the lack of significant long-term losses of territory.  As William Kirby rightly 
points out, “perhaps the greatest accomplishment of Republican diplomacy” was its success in defending 
the boundaries of the Qing “to such a degree that the borders of the PRC today are essentially those of the 
Qing, minus only Outer Mongolia.”124  Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria all presented 
enormous challenges to China’s territorial integrity, but in the end China managed to retain or regain 
control over all of them.  Some of China’s remaining claims (e.g., Diaoyu) would seem to be of 
comparatively little strategic or economic value, a fact that would seem to contradict its unwillingness to 
compromise its claims of sovereignty.  Even in cases where claims might yield material benefits (e.g., the 
Spratly’s), the costs of pursuing them are likely to outweigh any benefits for the foreseeable future.  
While pragmatism may help to explain its reluctance to settle most of them militarily, there appears to be 
a disconnect between the limited nature of China’s claims and its unwillingness to settle many of them. 
This begins to make more sense when one considers the impact that the myth of national 
humiliation has had on China’s definition of its territorial interests.  Shih argues that China’s national 
identity is defined in terms of “the Chinese nation in its confrontation with an invading imperialist 
Other.”125  As such, its often uncompromising attitude towards territorial concessions “does not imply 
anything essential about Chinese territoriality being ready to be protected; rather it is some territorially 
based anti-foreignism that produces and reproduces nationalist narratives for the citizens of the new 
Republic.”126  In essence, it is the not the size, strategic or economic value of missing territories that is 
necessarily important, but the weight of China’s past weakness on the collective memory of the Chinese 
nation that such territories represent.  As a result, China’s territorial demands, and its actions supporting 
them, can appear to have a somewhat schizophrenic quality.  As Shih puts it, “when the Chinese need to 
signal their willingness to sacrifice for the cause of nationalism, the national defense of a seemingly 
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 worthless land may become absolute; the occasional casualness, on the other hand, implies China’s 
transcendence over the secular issue of state sovereignty.  Sacrifice as well as transcendence stress 
humanity and morality over territorial integrity.”127  Thus, it is not territorial integrity for its own sake that 
China pursues, but territorial integrity as a way to purge all signs of its historical weakness.  As Shih 
argues, “a deeper reading [of China’s concept of national defense] may indicate that the state is never as 
important as the nation and territorial sovereignty rarely is more important than the unity of the Chinese 
people.”128   
From this perspective, it is not Taiwan’s value as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ or an economic 
asset that fuels China’s desire to reclaim the island; it is the fact that Taiwan represents the last major 
symbol of national humiliation at the hands of imperialist powers.  Indeed, the loss of Taiwan to Japan 
after the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) would come to represent a particularly cruel twist of fate – 
less than a decade after its incorporation as a Chinese province, it was stripped away by a state that the 
Chinese had always looked down upon and that would brutalize China a few decades later.129  As such, 
Christensen has suggested that “Taiwan combines all the worst lessons of the century of humiliation for 
China.”130  It thus provides an excellent case for examining how the nationalization of China’s interests 
has affected its foreign policy behavior.   
Before doing so, however, it is necessary to address a certain level of ambiguity that existed in 
Chinese attitudes toward the loss of Taiwan during the Republican period (1911-49).131  It has been 
argued that neither the Guomindang [Kuomintang (KMT), a.k.a, the Chinese Nationalists] nor the CCP 
had shown much interest in the recovery of Taiwan until the early-1940s.  In his second lecture on 
nationalism on February 3, 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen lamented the tremendous loss of territory, including 
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 Taiwan, to the foreign powers.132  Yet as Frank Hsiao and Lawrence Sullivan point out, Taiwan is listed 
along with Korea, Vietnam, and Burma, implying that it was not seen as specifically Chinese territory.133  
Similarly, they interpret statements by Chiang Kai-shek in his 1938 speech on the ‘Anti-Japanese 
Resistance War and the Future of Our Party’ as meaning that the KMT leader “was more concerned with 
‘restoring’…the independence and freedom of Taiwan and Korea so as to create buffer states against 
Japan, while China would assume traditional protection, but not necessarily sovereignty, over Taiwan and 
Korea.”134  In essence, they suggest that Taiwan was no longer considered Chinese territory due to the 
cultural differences that developed during decades of Japanese colonial rule.135  It was not until shortly 
before the Cairo Conference in 1943, during which the Allies promised to return Taiwan to China, that 
Chiang publicly called for its return. 
Early communist documents indicate a similar attitude within the CCP.  The “Resolution on the 
Nationality Problem” accepted at the CCPs Sixth National Congress in Moscow in 1928 regarded the 
Taiwanese living in Fujian as a national minority, like Mongols, Tibetans, and Uighurs.  Statements made 
at the time calling for the return of Shandong and Manchuria from Japanese control did not include 
Taiwan.136  Indeed, the CCP acknowledged that the goal of liberating Taiwan from Japanese imperialism 
would be the task of a separate struggle led by the Taiwanese Communist Party (TCP), established in 
1928 as a branch of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP).137  Furthermore, Hsiao and Sullivan point out 
that “the CCP never referred to the Taiwanese as ‘brethren’ (dixiong), or ‘the offspring of the Yellow 
Emperor,’ or ‘compatriots’ (tongbao), who would de facto belong to the Han after they return to 
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 China.”138  Statements made by Mao in an interview with Edgar Snow on July 16, 1936 seem to support 
the view that the CCP did not see Taiwan as Chinese territory that had to be reclaimed: 
Question [Snow]:  ‘Is it the immediate task of the Chinese people to regain all the 
territories lost to Japanese imperialism, or only to drive Japan from North China, and all 
Chinese territory beyond the Great Wall?’ 
Answer [Mao]:  ‘It is the immediate task of China to regain all of our lost 
territories, not merely to defend our sovereignty south of the Great Wall.  This means that 
Manchuria must be regained.  We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese 
colony, but when we have re-established the independence of the lost territories of China, 
and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will 
extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence.  The same thing 
applies for Taiwan.139
 
Communist policy regarding Taiwan did not change until the 1943 Cairo Declaration made it politically 
expedient to treat the island as Chinese territory.140
The evidence outlined above would seem to be enough to conclude that Nationalists and 
Communists alike did not consider the recovery of Taiwan to be an issue of vital importance to the 
Chinese nation.  If that were indeed the case, then the construction of Taiwan as a vital ‘national’ interest 
to China would represent a later application of its new nationalist identity.  However, such conclusions 
would be premature.141  First, regardless of whether either side felt that Taiwan represented lost Chinese 
territory that must be repatriated in order to remove the stain of foreign imperialism, China had far bigger 
issues of national sovereignty with which to contend.  Prior to the Republican revolution of 1911, Chinese 
nationalists were primarily concerned with the overthrow of the Qing dynasty.  After that task was 
successfully completed, China was faced with the enormous task of creating a new political system, the 
difficulty of which was compounded by a severe lack of central authority that eventually led to 
warlordism.  The consolidation of power in the hands of the KMT did not fully solve this problem; it still 
had to contend with challenges to its authority, particularly from the communists, and had yet to regain 
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 direct control of various frontier territories.  Throughout the Republican period, the government had to 
fight hard to counter challenges to its territorial integrity in places like Tibet, Xinjiang, and Manchuria.142  
These challenges culminated in a second devastating war with Japan in 1937.  In essence, one might 
argue that China simply had ‘bigger fish to fry’ than to make the recovery of Taiwan much of a priority.  
Indeed, Hsiao and Sullivan tacitly acknowledge that “confronted with domestic chaos and an ever 
stronger and more aggressive Japan, [KMT leaders] realized that China could not hope to ‘recover’ 
Taiwan and Korea as sovereign territory.”143
Second, Nationalist statements regarding Taiwan are less clear-cut than Hsiao and Sullivan make 
out.  Although Sun does seem to list the loss of Taiwan along with that of Korea, his list of China’s 
territorial losses is organized chronologically, not according to any order of importance.  While one might 
expect greater emphasis on Chinese territories than former tributaries, the lack of stronger statements 
regarding Taiwan should not be taken as definitive proof of the KMTs disinterest in it.  A stronger case 
for viewing Taiwan as an early Chinese national interest can be made by examining Chiang’s statements 
more closely.  Hsiao and Sullivan focus on the following passage in his 1938 speech to support their 
assertion that what the KMT sought was independence for Taiwan:  “we must restore the independence 
and freedom of the brethren in Korea and Taiwan so as to solidify the defense of the Republic of 
China.”144  However, earlier in the speech Chiang states “as Korea was originally our vassal country, so 
was Taiwan our Chinese territory; geographically they are on the life line of China.”145  Thus, while 
Korea and Taiwan may be equated in the sense that they both had close relationships with China and both 
suffered from Japanese imperialism, he clearly distinguishes Taiwan as belonging to China.  In addition, 
Chiang saw little ethnic distinction between Chinese and Taiwanese, pointing out that Taiwan had been 
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 settled by the Han, and even asserting that differences between the various national minorities in China 
were “due not to diversity in race or blood but to dissimilarity in creed and geographical environment.”146
What then explains the relative scarcity of statements calling for the return of Taiwan?  One 
possible explanation is that both the Nationalists and the Communists were forced to operate under 
certain international constraints.  As already mentioned, KMT diplomacy was faced with the challenging 
task of “defending the Republic’s far-flung and militarily indefensible borders.”147  It did so by seeking to 
prevent international recognition for the independence of various border areas, a policy that Kirby has 
referred to as the ‘non-recognition doctrine.’148  In most cases, this strategy was quite successful.  
However, it could not be applied to the case of Taiwan because China had formally recognized its transfer 
to Japanese sovereignty through the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895).  As such, Xiaoyuan Liu suggests that 
the Nationalists were unable to treat Taiwan in the same terms as Manchuria because of the difference in 
legal status.  Indeed, Republican efforts to gain diplomatic support might have been undermined if it had 
attempted to abrogate the treaty.  Once the Sino-Japanese War started in 1937, such concerns began to 
lose their importance and Chiang began to openly advocate the return of Taiwan; all Sino-Japanese 
treaties were nullified by the Chinese government’s formal declaration of war on December 9, 1941.  In 
addition, the KMT began to develop organizational components for Taiwan affairs even before the Cairo 
Declaration, including the Preparatory Office of the KMT for a Regional Branch of Taiwan.149
Since it had never recognized the legitimacy of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the CCP did not have 
the same legal constraints as the KMT.  However, it was constrained by the international communist 
movement led by the Soviet Union.  Hunt argues that while it often tried to hedge its support, the CCP 
generally followed the Soviet line regarding self-determination for China’s nationalities.  As he points 
out, “a weak and dependent party could not…always evade Comintern expectations, especially where the 
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 interests of the USSR were involved.”150  Like its earlier decision to recognize the independence of Outer 
Mongolia, the CCPs decision to treat the liberation of Taiwan as a separate revolutionary struggle was 
essentially forced on it by its Soviet patrons.151  Hsiao and Sullivan acknowledge as much when they 
point out that the divisions within the TCP over whether they should be organized under the auspices of 
the CCP or the JCP were settled by orders from the Comintern.152  A more accurate statement of early 
communist interest in Taiwan may be from one of the founders of the CCP, Li Dazhao (Li Ta-chao), who 
stated in a lecture at Peking University on May 13, 1924 that “all citizens who participate in a common 
history and culture, whether they be united or not from a political and juridical point of view, can be 
considered as belonging to a same nation.  For example, even though the people of Taiwan are today 
subjected to the Japanese government, their history and culture are similar to ours, and therefore they 
cannot be separated from the Chinese nation.”153  Even Mao’s ‘support’ for the self-determination of 
China’s nationalities was predicated on the belief that they would choose to remain part of China.154  
Thus, for Nationalists and Communists alike, Taiwan was part of the legacy of China’s humiliation at the 
hands of foreign powers, a territory lost to the Chinese nation that had to be restored. 
Type Identity & the Parameters of Foreign Policy Behavior:  Power, Politics, & ‘National’ 
Interest in Chinese Actions Toward Taiwan 
On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong announced to the world the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China by declaring that “the Chinese people have stood up.”  Yet while China had finally 
stood up, it did so on only one foot; Taiwan remained beyond the grasp of Communist authority as it 
became the last redoubt of the defeated KMT.  While the CCP would manage to consolidate its power 
over China by ‘liberating’ Tibet, Hainan, and other territories, US actions in 1950 to neutralize the 
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 Taiwan Strait in response to the Korean War prevented a similar result for Taiwan.155  Since then, 
“Taiwan’s aloofness [has represented] a double political challenge to the CCP:  the island [is] not only a 
formerly Chinese-administered territory that had been lost to foreign imperialism, but it also sheltered the 
KMT government, thereby denying the Communists their complete victory in the Chinese Civil War.”156  
As a result, Taiwan has remained the single most important territorial claim of China.  Zhu De (Chu Teh), 
the founder of the PLA, once said that “as long as Taiwan is not liberated, the Chinese people’s historical 
humiliation is not washed away; as long as the motherland is not reunited, our people’s armed forces’ 
responsibility is not fulfilled.”157  Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) stated in his report to the First 
National People’s Congress on September 23, 1954: 
The Government of the People’s Republic of China has repeatedly stated that 
Taiwan is China’s sacred and inviolable territory and that no United States infringement 
or occupation will be tolerated.  Our compatriots on Taiwan…have always been members 
of the great Chinese family of nationalities and their enslavement by the United States 
will never be tolerated.  The liberation of Taiwan is China’s sovereign right and internal 
affair and no interference by any foreign country will be tolerated.  Both the Cairo 
Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration, to which the United States is a signatory, 
affirm that Taiwan is Chinese territory; no perfidious violation of these solemn 
international agreements by the United States is permitted….all proposals to place 
Taiwan under United Nations trusteeship or under neutral mandate, or to ‘neutralize’ 
Taiwan or to create a so-called ‘independent Taiwan state,’ are attempts to carve up 
China’s territory, enslave the Chinese people on Taiwan and legalize United States 
occupation of Taiwan.  None of this will be tolerated by the Chinese people.158
 
While the specific rhetoric has changed over time as ideology has given way to reform, the essential 
Chinese position has not – Taiwan and its people are an integral part of the Chinese nation from the 
standpoint of both history and international law, outside interference cannot be tolerated in China’s 
handling of its domestic affairs, and the United States, in particular, should refrain from attempting to 
prevent Taiwan’s rightful reunification with the motherland.   
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 Yet while Taiwan has remained a vital national interest to China, the actions it has taken in 
pursuit of this interest have varied greatly depending on China’s strategic environment and domestic 
political conditions.  As various observers have pointed out, the basic pattern of Chinese policy toward 
Taiwan has been one of oscillation between bellicosity and conciliation.159  Thus, while China’s type 
identity as a nation-state, defined in terms of its humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, has 
constituted the recovery of Taiwan as a vital national interest, this does not mean that nationalism (at least 
in the macro-structural sense) will produce any specific policy response – e.g., conflict.  As Suisheng 
Zhao suggests, “although nationalism has set the rhetoric and perhaps the bottom line of Beijing’s 
sovereignty claim over Taiwan, Beijing’s policy has been constructed based on prudence.”160  In other 
words, nationalism sets the basic parameters of Chinese foreign policy behavior by determining Chinese 
interests – i.e., what China wants.  However, it is necessary to consider the intersection of identity, power, 
and politics in order to understand how China behaves within those parameters.  By doing so, we may be 
able to determine how broad those parameters are, and thus what the limits are of a macro-structural 
approach to nationalism and conflict.  As such, this section will provide a basic overview of the PRCs 
efforts to reclaim Taiwan, with particular emphasis on the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. 
During the 1950s, it was bellicosity that predominated in Chinese policy toward Taiwan, leading 
to two major crises in the Taiwan Strait.  The first took place between September 1954 and March 1955.  
With the Korean War (1950-53) over, China turned its attention to Taiwan, with Zhou Enlai declaring on 
August 11, 1954 China’s intention to “struggle to the end to fulfill the glorious task of liberating 
Taiwan.”161  This was, at least in part, an attempt to discourage the United States from signing a defense 
treaty with Taiwan.162  China proceeded to amass military forces in Fujian and on September 3 began to 
shell the offshore island of Jinmen (Quemoy), which was still under Nationalist control, with artillery.  
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 This escalated into a number of coastal battles between Communist and Nationalist forces that spread to 
involve other offshore islands held by the Nationalists – Mazu (Matsu), Dachen (Tachen), and Nanchi.  
China’s efforts at discouraging a formal alliance between the United States and Taiwan backfired, with 
the signing of a Mutual Defense Treaty (December 2, 1954) that came into force on March 3, 1955.  
Although the United States pressured Taiwan to evacuate Dachen and Nanchi, providing a minor victory 
for the PRC, its suggestion of the possibility of assisting Taiwan in the defense of Jinmen and Mazu 
resulted in the suspension of hostilities by the end of March.  Throughout the crisis, China rebuffed 
diplomatic efforts to allow outside mediation. 
Despite its position that Taiwan represented ‘sacred’ Chinese territory, China responded to 
growing US commitments to the defense of Taiwan by stating its willingness to pursue the ‘peaceful 
liberation’ of the island.  It opened up diplomatic discussions with the United States and appealed to the 
KMTs sense of nationalism to return to the motherland.  These efforts led nowhere, however, and military 
actions resumed on August 23, 1958 as the PRC once again began shelling Jinmen.  The United States 
reiterated its intention to aid in the defense of Taiwan, including its offshore islands.  Although Sino-US 
talks continued during most of this second crisis, China’s shelling of Jinmen continued until it declared a 
unilateral ceasefire on October 5, resuming again on October 20.  A few days later, on October 25, 
Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (P’eng Teh-huai) announced a ‘ceasefire’ in which China would only shell 
Nationalist installations on Jinmen on even days of the calendar.163  While this policy of alternate-day 
shelling would continue until 1979, “the PRC quietly dropped its attempt to ‘liberate’ [the offshore 
islands] by force and turned to political and long-term strategy.”164  However, it has consistently refused 
to renounce the right to use force to achieve reunification. 
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 While China’s actions towards Taiwan became less overtly aggressive after the second Taiwan 
Strait crisis, its rhetoric continued to shift “between carrot and stick.”165  During the late-1960s, as China 
was in the ideological throes of the Cultural Revolution, “it was the hard line that dominated China’s 
pronouncements, with official commentaries expressing skepticism about the prospects for a peaceful 
resolution.”166  Intense domestic upheaval, however, made any attempt to put those pronouncements into 
action nearly impossible.  China’s policy towards Taiwan during this period was essentially one of ‘all 
bark and no bite.’  By the 1970s, as the more radical phases of the Cultural Revolution were coming to an 
end, China began to pursue a softer line once again by attempting to allay fears that Taiwan’s standard of 
living would be damaged by reunification.  Zhou Enlai even implied an early version of the ‘one China, 
two systems’ approach developed in the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping to deal with the return of Hong Kong 
by suggesting the possibility of a long transition period.  China also tried to encourage more direct 
contacts between the two sides.  While the succession struggle of the mid-1970s once again brought about 
an escalation in China’s rhetoric, this quickly subsided after Deng Xiaoping managed to solidify his 
position as its new ‘paramount leader’ in 1978.167
The normalization of relations between the United States and China on January 1, 1979, and the 
withdrawal of US recognition for Taiwan that came with it, brought about major changes in China’s 
approach to the problem of Taiwan.  It shifted from a coercive strategy to one of “peaceful offense,”168 
discarding the rhetoric of ‘liberation’ in favor of ‘reunification’ and announcing a halt to its intermittent 
shelling of Jinmen.  It also proposed renewing trade, transport, and mail linkages with Taiwan, as well as 
promoting academic, cultural, sports, and technological exchanges between the two – proposals known 
collectively as the ‘three linkages’ (santong) and the ‘four exchanges’ (siliu).  In addition to these 
proposals, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress, Ye Jianying, 
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 set out a more detailed formula to pursue peaceful reunification in September 1981.169  What came to be 
known as the ‘Ye Nine Points’ (see Appendix A) included suggestions to improve cross-strait 
communications and promises of continued political autonomy.  Although the specifics regarding some of 
Ye’s proposals were somewhat vague, they “remain the most concrete description of terms for a Taiwan 
model of ‘one country, two systems,’” the model that would be used a few years later in Sino-British 
negotiations over Hong Kong.170  Indeed, “Hong Kong was both a dry run for the reintegration of Taiwan, 
and China’s best chance of demonstrating to the sceptical Taiwan public that it was feasible.”171  
Similarly, the more pragmatic approach that China took towards its other territorial disputes in the 1980s 
was also intended to emphasize its willingness to compromise. 
It is at least conceivable that China’s new strategy could have yielded some improvements in 
PRC-ROC relations, if not necessarily the reunification that China wanted.  Indeed, in the late-1980s, 
Taiwan began to soften its own approach to China and allow commercial and other links (indirectly).  
However, political events in both polities soon drove them further apart.  China faced growing domestic 
discontent that eventually resulted in the use of force against political opponents.  Violent demonstrations 
in Tibet in 1987 resulted in a major crackdown in the ostensibly ‘autonomous’ region, raising serious 
questions about whether Taiwan could trust the PRC in the event that it did agree to reunification.  As 
Long suggests, “the [Beijing] government’s uncompromising and brutal handling of the unrest in 
Tibet…helped destroy the image so painstakingly built up of a reformed, reasonable regime.”172  The 
military response to student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989 further eroded any impression 
that the government in Beijing might be willing to accept political opposition of any kind. 
At the same time, political reforms in Taiwan were eroding the ability of the KMT to impose a 
political solution even if it wanted to.  The KMT had ruled Taiwan as a dictatorship for four decades, with 
martial law being lifted only on July 15, 1987.  Under the leadership of President Lee Teng-hui, who took 
                                                 
169 Long, Taiwan, 159-61. 
170 Byron S. J. Weng, “‘One Country, Two Systems’ From a Taiwan Perspective,” Orbis  46 (Fall 2002): 715. 
171 Long, Taiwan, 162. 
172 Ibid., 174. 
227 
 power in 1988, Taiwan began a steady process of democratization.  The implications of that process for 
relations with the mainland were dramatic.  Taiwanese society remains deeply split between those 
Chinese that had settled on the island during the Chinese civil war (mainlanders) and those whose 
ancestors had settled there during the previous centuries (Taiwanese), with the former representing a 
relatively small minority (about 14%).  Although it had made some progress in co-opting elements of the 
native Taiwanese (Lee himself is Taiwanese), the KMT largely represented the interests of the 
mainlanders who felt a stronger connection to their old homeland.  Fifty years of Japanese colonialism, 
not to mention the KMTs own harsh policies, had helped to produce a growing ‘Taiwanese’ identity.  As 
such, “democratization inevitably meant Taiwanization as well.”173  As the island became more 
democratic, thereby giving more political power to its Taiwanese citizens, this split in its identity made 
serious talks with the PRC increasingly unlikely.   
By the early-1990s, Taiwan began a set of new diplomatic initiatives that would put it on a 
collision course with China and produce the biggest crisis in the Taiwan Strait since 1958.  This new 
‘pragmatic diplomacy’ began in the spring of 1991 with the adoption of new Guidelines for National 
Unification that “formally abandoned the ROC’s claim to sovereign jurisdiction over the mainland and 
recognized the jurisdiction of the PRC there.”174  Further elaborations “defined ‘one China’ as ‘one 
country and two areas separately ruled by two political entities.’”175  While Taiwan’s renunciation of its 
claim to rule all of China could be interpreted as significant progress in reducing tensions between the 
two sides, China remained concerned about the level of equality and the possibility for a multi-state 
solution that the new policy implied.  Indeed, Alan Wachman suggests that “from [China’s] point of view, 
the routinization of Taiwan’s autonomy may be even more threatening than the erstwhile jingoism of the 
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 old KMT-dominated ROC.  The KMT was, at least nominally, supportive of the concept of ‘one 
China.’”176   
China’s concerns were soon borne out as Taiwan began to seek greater diplomatic recognition.  In 
September 1993, Taiwan announced its desire to join the UN General Assembly under the divided-states 
formula previously applied to Germany and Korea; further requests were made for Taiwan’s admission in 
1994 and 1995.  Despite its promise in 1995 to donate $1 billion to the UN if admitted, the proposals 
received little support.  Taiwan also pursued ‘vacation diplomacy’ as President Lee made private trips to 
visit with leaders in Southeast Asia in January and February 1994.177  These efforts to gain greater 
international recognition coincided with the July 1994 release by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council of a 
White Paper that rejected the ‘one country, two systems’ formula and stated that “it was an 
‘incontrovertible historical fact’…that the ROC ‘has always been an independent sovereign state.’”178  
While it did not rule out the possibility of eventual reunification, it stated that any such talks would have 
to be conducted on the basis of parity between the two parties with China renouncing the right to use 
force in the matter. 
Not surprisingly, China rejected this approach as a prelude to establishing Taiwan as an 
independent state.  China’s President Jiang Zemin responded on January 30, 1995 with his own ‘Eight 
Points’ on ‘Continuing to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland’ (see Appendix B) which opposed 
Lee’s vacation diplomacy, set Taiwan’s acceptance of the principle of ‘one China’ as the prerequisite for 
negotiations, and refused to rule out the possible use of force to achieve reunification.  Lee Teng-hui, in 
turn, responded on April 8 with his own ‘Six Points’ (see Appendix C) that emphasized the fact of 
political separation between Taiwan and the mainland, and the need for Taiwan to be treated as an equal 
in any negotiations.  While Jiang’s Eight Points and Lee’s Six Points contained significant overlap, they 
remained deeply divided in three key areas.  “Jiang demanded that Taiwan accept a status subordinate to 
Beijing, while Lee insisted the two sides be coequals.  Jiang demanded that Taiwan suspend its 
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 ‘pragmatic diplomacy,’ while Lee insisted that Beijing stop opposing Taiwan’s efforts to expand its 
international relations.  Finally, Jiang insisted on Beijing’s right to use force against Taiwan, while Lee 
demanded that Beijing renounce that right.”179  These differences would set the tone for a major 
diplomatic and military confrontation, involving not just China and Taiwan, but the United States as well, 
one that had the potential to escalate into a major Sino-US conflict. 
The spark for this confrontation was Lee’s continued attempts to use ostensibly unofficial visits to 
extend Taiwan’s diplomatic profile, specifically his trip to Cornell University (his alma mater) in June 
1995, which was allowed by the Clinton administration due to intense Congressional pressure.  China 
responded by initiating three major rounds of military exercises.  The first round consisted of air and 
naval exercises code-named Blue Whale 5 (late-June)180 and two sets of missile and live-fire exercises 
(July 21-28 and August 15-25) less than 100 miles north of Taiwan.  After intensive diplomatic 
negotiations with the United States in the summer and fall of 1995 aimed at probing its potential 
response, China initiated a second round that included amphibious landing exercises (mid-October and 
November 15-25) just before Taiwan’s December legislative elections.  The third and largest round of 
exercises took place in March 1996 just before Taiwan’s March 23 presidential election and included 
three waves.  The first (March 8-15) involved firing short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) into target 
areas just thirty-two miles southwest of the Taiwanese port of Kaohsiung and just twenty-two miles 
northeast of the Taiwanese port of Keelung.  The second wave (March 12-20) involved air, land, and 
naval live-fire exercises off the coast of Fujian province.  The final wave (March 18-25), also off the 
Fujian coast, reportedly included complex joint-forces exercises.181
The US response to Chinese provocations was initially mixed.  Since the 1979 normalization of 
Sino-US relations, US policy regarding the Taiwan issue had been couched in strategic ambiguity.  While 
the United States maintained good relations with Taiwan, including periodic sales of military hardware, it 
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 generally downplayed any commitment to defend Taiwan in order to avoid angering China, as well as to 
prevent pro-independence forces from viewing any such commitment as a blank check.  At the same time, 
however, it sought to make clear to China that any attempt to settle the issue by force would be 
considered a threat to US interests.  Thus, the Clinton administration sought to walk a fine line by 
signaling displeasure with China’s aggressive actions toward Taiwan, while at the same time working to 
smooth relations and reassure the Chinese that the United States was not out to contain China.  It was not 
until December 19, weeks after the end of China’s second round of exercises, that the USS Nimitz battle 
group passed through the Taiwan Strait on its way to the Persian Gulf from Japan.  While this was 
intended to signal US interests in the region, it might be suggested that such a signal was ambiguous.  The 
passage was not announced publicly for six weeks, after tensions between the United States and China 
had already begun to escalate, and was supposedly authorized by the Commander in Chief, Pacific 
Command (CINCPAC), not the White House itself.  However, since the ‘liberation’ of Taiwan had been 
prevented before by the presence of US naval power in the Taiwan Strait, it is likely that the Chinese 
leadership “understood the threat implicit in this movement.”182
China could have responded to this implicit threat by seeking to reduce tensions; it could easily 
have counted its two exercises as successes and moved on.  But instead, “China upped the ante.”183  It 
announced the third, and largest, round of exercises, and even seemed to imply that it was willing to use 
nuclear weapons to defend its claims on Taiwan against US involvement, with one official suggesting that 
US policymakers “care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan.”184  Although it has been 
suggested that this was merely meant to denote China’s ability to deter US nuclear power,185 such 
comments were at the very least provocative.  When the United States announced on March 8, the first 
day of China’s SRBM tests, that it was deploying the USS Independence battle group to the region, China 
responded the following day by announcing the second wave of exercises.  When the United States 
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 announced on March 11 that the Nimitz was being ordered back to the region as well, China responded by 
not only following through with its second wave of exercises, but also announcing on March 15 a third 
wave. 
On the surface, China’s unwillingness to renounce the use of force in pursuing the inherently 
nationalist goal of reunification, as well as the extent of its attempts at coercive diplomacy during the 
1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, might be considered clear evidence of the conflict propensity of Chinese 
nationalism.  China explicitly framed its actions in terms of nationalism, as evidenced by remarks made 
by Defense Minister Chi Haotian just prior to the start of the March 1996 exercises, in which he quoted 
Zhu De’s statement that the liberation of Taiwan was necessary to wash away the stain of national 
humiliation.186  China’s willingness to risk a confrontation with the world’s last superpower would seem 
to indicate that such comments were not merely rhetoric intended for domestic consumption.  However, 
the evidence is less clear when we consider the fact that the crisis did not escalate into an actual conflict.  
Thus, before rendering a judgment about the conflict propensity of Chinese nationalism (from a macro-
structural perspective), it is necessary to consider the reasons for why the crisis ended without violence, 
and what this may imply about the possibility for conflict in the future. 
One explanation is that the threat of US intervention successfully deterred further Chinese action.  
At first glance, this seems feasible.  Chinese actions have always been strongly conditioned by the 
potential for US intervention; the island would have been ‘liberated’ decades ago without it.  As such, it 
would seem logical to surmise that the US decision to send two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region 
erased any initial misconceptions that Chinese leaders may have had regarding US interests and 
convinced them that continued belligerence could carry significant military, political, and economic costs, 
none of which they were willing to pay.  Reunification might be an important nationalist goal, but China 
was unwilling to engage in conflict to pursue it.  If this interpretation is correct, then nationalism may be 
less a cause of conflict than simply an underlying reason for why one state’s interests conflict with 
another’s.  This would imply that while nationalism may push states to pursue goals of national self-
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 determination that may put them in conflict with other states, their willingness to actually use force is 
highly subject to more traditional concerns – e.g., balance of power, domestic politics.  Thus, nationalism 
might be seen as playing only a supporting role in explaining international conflict. 
However, Roy warns that it would be a mistake to treat China as a “paper dragon” that backed 
down in the face of US threats.187  While US actions clearly influenced Chinese decision-making, he 
suggests another possibility – that China had limited goals in its use of coercion and had no intention of 
using force against Taiwan in the first place.  There are a number of reasons why this would seem to be 
the case.  First, Taiwan’s transgressions had been relatively limited.  While it might be seen by China as 
coming dangerously close, Taiwan had not yet crossed the lines China had drawn in the proverbial sand 
that would require a violent reaction.  Taiwan had not declared independence, become politically 
unstable, come under the control of a foreign power, developed nuclear weapons, or even denied the 
possibility of eventually engaging in reunification talks – all of which China has suggested at various 
times could result in the use of force.188  China’s actions might thus be seen as proportional to the 
provocation.  In addition, despite the concerns of some observers who believed that the Chinese military 
buildup was a prelude to an actual attack,189 Chinese military deployments did not indicate any intention 
to use force during the crisis.  Roy argues that this “is clear from the fact that the PLA mobilised forces 
only a fraction of the size that would have been necessary for an actual attack.”190  Garver makes the same 
point, noting that “an invasion would require far more troops, aircraft, and, especially, civilian vessels to 
ferry troops than were mobilized for the March 1996 exercises.”191
Finally, Allen Whiting argued that China engaged in a significant degree of risk management in 
order to ensure that its preparations were not misunderstood.   
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 Risk management began in mid-1995 with the explicit designation of scheduled missile 
firings and the advance announcement of exercises in the fall.  In addition, none of the 
missiles fired in Taiwan’s vicinity in either year were armed.  PLAAF planes flew across 
the midstrait line in 1996, contrary to practice by both sides, but they did not come close 
to Taiwan.  Finally, in contrast with all previous cases [of Taiwan Strait crises], Beijing 
took several steps to inform Washington that no attack on Taiwan was planned.192
 
Similarly, Garver points out that “the PLA did not fill the Strait with air superiority fighters.  It did not 
simulate massed strikes by large numbers of precision attack aircraft.  Overall, air participation in the 
March exercises was moderate….Its ships and planes did not cover the approaches to Taiwan or approach 
U.S. ships in the area.  Nor did PLA radar lock on to U.S. warships and planes in a fashion suggesting 
possible target acquisition.”193  The evidence would thus indicate that China had no intention of actually 
using force against Taiwan, much less against US forces.  To borrow a statement made by Alastair 
Johnston regarding the importance of economic linkages as a barrier to conflict, “would there have been 
such a careful delineation of the boundaries of the PLA military exercises, such careful signalling to 
American and Taiwanese officials, such continuing normalcy in all other aspects of Sino-U.S. and China-
Taiwan economic, cultural and political relationships in the midst of a very heavy concentration of 
modern firepower”194 if China had actually intended to use force? 
Roy argues that “Beijing’s goal…was to signal disapproval [of Taiwanese actions], not to start a 
war.”195  In essence, China’s demonstrations of force were primarily symbolic.  Such an argument has 
merit.  Since China’s threat to use force can be seen as an effective deterrent against any attempt on the 
part of Taiwan to declare independence, he suggests that “the PRC has sufficient incentive to maintain 
this posture even if there is no actual intention to attack Taiwan.  China’s warning to Taiwan, in other 
words, might be a bluff rather than a threat.”196  Yet while Roy acknowledges that “such a tactic would be 
consistent with the heritage of Chinese politico-military thought, which emphasises the importance of 
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 strategem and psychological warfare,”197 he maintains that China’s position regarding Taiwan is not a 
bluff.  He supports his position by noting the place of Taiwan in China’s myth of national humiliation, a 
point that has already been made here in detail.  However, one can also surmise this from China’s actions 
during the crisis itself.   
The seriousness of the US decision to deploy not one, but two aircraft carrier groups to the region 
should not be underestimated.  As Garver points out, “deployment of a second battle group was in some 
ways more important than deployment of the first.  One aircraft carrier could be seen as a symbol, a 
demonstration, or political theater.  Two represented a more real capability.”198  Yet far from being 
deterred by US involvement, China escalated its coercive actions toward Taiwan.  While plans for the 
exercises had probably been made before the United States announced its intention to intervene, Garver 
suggests that the decision to follow through with them “in the face of deployment of two U.S. battle 
groups demonstrated that China would not be intimidated by Washington.”199  Moreover, while some of 
the third-wave exercises were actually cancelled, this was largely due to weather considerations which 
were likened by Chinese sources to “exercises being conducted during a typhoon.”200  Thus, while China 
may not have been willing to use force in the face of the still somewhat limited Taiwanese provocation, 
this does not mean that China would never use force if backed into a corner – e.g., by a formal declaration 
of Taiwanese independence – even if that meant a conflict with a militarily superior United States.  In 
analyzing past Chinese uses of force, Whiting argues that “the PLA has been constrained not by a power 
imbalance favoring the opponent, but by risk management through closely supervised rules of 
engagement in an attempt to control escalation.”201  While China may be careful to keep escalation within 
boundaries with which it is comfortable, this does not mean that it will shy away from the use of force if 
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 it believes it to be necessary.  Roy argues that “American influence probably would not be decisive in 
preventing Beijing’s military reaction to Taiwan’s full declaration of independence.”202   
The fact that China appears willing to take on the United States, if necessary, in order to pursue 
its irredentist ambitions with respect to Taiwan, despite the obvious negative consequences that such a 
conflict would bring about and despite the Chinese recognition that they are not militarily ready for such a 
conflict, supports the proposition that nationalism is an important factor in Chinese foreign policy and 
could lead China to engage in international conflict.  However, willingness to engage in conflict to 
safeguard ‘national’ interests does not mean that such conflicts are inevitable, nor even likely.  The 
oscillation between bellicosity and conciliation that is evident in China’s behavior toward Taiwan since 
1949 indicates that the parameters set by China’s type identity as a nation-state are fairly broad.  The 
interest in reclaiming national territory supports a wide range of policy options for pursuing that interest, 
including force.  Thus, there are limits to what the macro-structural dimension of Chinese nationalism can 
tell us about China’s propensity to engage in nationalist conflicts.  It can explain why Taiwan is a vital 
interest for which China is willing to go to war, but it cannot necessarily tell us whether or not such a war 
would actually occur.  This would depend on a variety of other factors. 
Indeed, the difficulties in making predictions regarding the likelihood of conflict over Taiwan are 
evident in Roy’s predictions prior to the 2000 Taiwanese presidential election.  Roy argued Chinese 
responses to continued Taiwanese intransigence were liable to be stronger in the future.  He supported 
this assessment with the following reasons: 
First, the principle of proportionality would suggest that the closer Taiwan moves toward 
statehood, the more intense will be China’s demonstration of disapproval.  Second, 
Chinese leaders are likely to interpret any new diplomatic probes by Taipei as evidence 
that previous PRC signals were not strong enough to ‘teach Taiwan a lesson’, and that the 
next signal must therefore be even stronger.  Finally, to avoid the credibility of its threats 
being undermined by the ‘crying “wolf”’ effect, the PLA’s future actions will have to be 
more threatening than those in 1995-96 if they are to achieve comparable results.203
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 Yet so far this has not occurred.  Indeed, China has largely moderated its approach to Taiwan despite its 
election in 2000 of Chen Shui-bien, a member of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP), and Chen’s attempts to push constitutional reforms that China sees as a prelude to independence.  
Since 2000, “the PRC has played the good boy, refraining from taking any provocative action against 
Taipei and exercising restraint in its response to what it sees as unwarranted actions or threatening 
statements from Taiwan.”204  Thus, while the macro-structural dimension of nationalism is important for 
understanding the nationalist parameters of Chinese foreign policy, it is necessarily incomplete.  Strategic, 
economic, and political circumstances, as well as other social structural aspects of Chinese nationalism, 
must also be considered.  These other social factors – namely, the micro-structural dimension of Chinese 
nationalism – will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7. THE CRACKED LOOKING GLASS:  SINO-US ROLE CONFLICTS & 
THE MICRO-STRUCTURAL DIMENSION OF CHINESE NATIONALISM1 
 
 The last chapter made clear that the issue of Taiwan is not a long-standing, objective Chinese 
interest, but one that has been comparatively recently constructed as a result of a macro-structural change 
in China’s identity – i.e., its transformation from cultural-state to nation-state.  However, as already 
suggested, while this macro-structural change may help to explain why Taiwan is seen as a vital Chinese 
interest, it says relatively little about how China is likely to pursue that interest.  Nationalism as an 
expression of type identity may make China willing to use force to prevent formal Taiwanese 
independence, even in the face of US intervention, but it certainly does not foreclose other possible 
courses of action.  The shifts in China’s Taiwan policy since 1949 testify to the fact that while type 
identity may set parameters on a state’s behavior by informing it what it wants (e.g., reunification), the 
means by which an end is achieved will largely depend on circumstances, including the dual constraints 
of material power and domestic politics.  This demonstrates the limits of using macro-structurally-defined 
interests alone to explain (let alone predict) state behavior.  Yet while power and politics certainly cannot 
be ignored, another social factor remains to be considered – the micro-structural dimension of state 
identity.  As discussed in Chapter 4, how a state’s macro-structural interests manifest themselves will 
partly depend on the role that the state assumes in its relations with others.  Since such roles are not 
chosen freely, but are constituted by interaction with an Other (or Others), it is necessary to examine the 
dynamics of nationalist role formation in order to understand how they might set the stage for nationalist 
conflict. 
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 The widely-observed deterioration of Sino-US relations since 1989 provides an excellent case for 
exploring these dynamics.  This shift has generally been attributed to two factors – (1) America’s reaction 
to China’s violent suppression of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square and (2) the collapse 
of communism in Eastern Europe, as well as the disintegration of the Soviet Union, that brought an end to 
the Cold War.2  In other words, the character of Sino-US relations was altered by the dynamics of 
domestic politics, a fundamental change in the distribution of power in the international system (i.e., the 
breakdown of bipolarity), or some combination of the two.  Yet as David Lampton notes, such 
explanations have “become a cliché of post-cold war analysis.”3  While either explanation is accurate as 
far as it goes, neither provides a complete picture of how this fundamental change in Sino-US relations 
came about.  One needs a unifying theme that helps to connect these factors and provides a broader 
understanding of the changes that have occurred in Sino-US relations over the last fifteen years.  Looking 
at the deterioration of Sino-US relations since 1989 in terms of the dynamics of nationalist role formation 
provides just such a theme.  Furthermore, the pivotal position that the United States has in the relationship 
between China and Taiwan makes such an analysis critical to the story of Chinese nationalism and foreign 
policy.  Thus, in order to fully understand the impact of nationalism on Chinese behavior, particularly 
with respect to Taiwan, it is necessary to examine the micro-structural dimension of Chinese nationalism 
– i.e., nationalism as a role constituted by its interaction with the United States – by applying the reactive 
model of nationalist conflict outlined in Chapter 4. 
Given its importance to the analysis that follows, it is worth summarizing this model.  As 
previously discussed, roles are socially constructed through a mirroring process in which each state seeks 
to assume a role for itself and impose a corresponding counter-role on the Other with which it is 
interacting.  While these roles and counter-roles may initially be derived from some set of a priori ideas 
                                                 
2 For instance, see Steven I. Levine, “Sino-American Relations:  Testing the Limits,” in China and the World:  
Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, 3d ed., ed. Samuel S. Kim  (Boulder:  Westview Press, 1994), 
77; and David Shambaugh, “Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations,” in Chinese Foreign Policy:  
Theory and Practice, ed. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh  (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1995), 205. 
3 David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams:  Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000  (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 2001), 3. 
239 
 and interests (i.e., each actor brings some ideational baggage with it to the interaction), they are subject to 
change as continued interaction allows each party to learn and adjust its ideas about the Other, and its 
own relationship to it.  As such, the images that states develop of each other are likely to become tightly 
intertwined, or as David Edelstein puts it, “are often in ‘infinite regress,’ meaning that one state’s images 
of another state are influenced by that state’s image of the other state and so on.”4  This is certainly true of 
China and the United States.  As Peter Gries points out, “Chinese and American identities are dynamic, 
evolving in part through their mutual interactions.”5   
Yet as already mentioned, this mirroring process will not necessarily lead to more cooperative 
behavior or greater understanding.  On the contrary, the role a state seeks to enact (and the corresponding 
counter-role it seeks to project on the Other) may be incompatible with the role that the Other seeks to 
enact (and the corresponding counter-role it seeks to project back).  Such a role conflict may lead to an 
ideational security dilemma as the actions taken by each state to defend its identity against the other 
causes a reaction that further erodes its ideational security.  This could in turn provide the basis for 
antagonistic relations between the parties that could develop into a long-term rivalry, and possibly even 
into interstate conflict.  In essence, the extreme behavior so often associated with nationalism can be 
understood as the potential outcome of a reaction to an ideational threat.  In order to apply this model to 
Sino-US relations, it is necessary to do three things – 1). identify the primary role that China seeks to 
enact, 2). establish whether or not a role conflict exists between China and the United States, and 3). 
analyze the effect of this role conflict on China’s foreign policy in order to determine the extent to which 
Chinese nationalism is a reaction to it.  Each of these issues will be addressed in this chapter.  The 
question of whether or not reactive nationalism makes China more prone to conflict will be addressed in 
the conclusions.   
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 The Victimized Great Power:  China’s Role in World Affairs 
As with most states, one can identify many conceptions of China’s role in world affairs.6  Indeed, 
Samuel Kim has suggested that “the People’s Republic…has succumbed to wild swings of national 
identity projection over the years, mutating through a series of varying global roles.”7  However, it is 
possible to identify one key role in Chinese foreign relations that is central to the enactment of all others – 
the role of ‘victimized great power.’  As discussed in Chapter 6, China has long seen itself as a victim of 
foreign imperialism.  It is this sense of victimization that has spurred Chinese attempts at reform and 
revolution since the 19th century.  Yet victimhood has done little to dampen China’s fundamental belief in 
itself as a great nation.  Chinese leaders throughout the 20th century “have all shared a strong sense of 
entitlement that China deserves great power status as they believe China’s decline is a mistake of history, 
which they should correct.”8  As Gilbert Rozman points out, “the Chinese take for granted that their 
venerable civilization and vast population ensure that they have something positive to contribute to the 
world.”9  In the days of Mao, this confidence manifested itself as a fervent belief in China’s ability to be a 
leader in the international communist movement, a bulwark against imperialism and superpower 
hegemony, and a model for the developing world.  As economic reform has brought unprecedented 
prosperity to the Chinese people, China has increasingly come to see its role in more common terms – as 
that of a great power.  Rozman argues that “of all of the contenders in the [Chinese] quest for national 
identity in the 1990s, the notion of China as a great power (daguo) has gained a clear-cut victory.”10
The reasons for China’s self-image as a victim of imperialism have already been addressed.  
However, it is necessary to examine the great power component of its role conception in more detail.  For 
realists, great power status is largely an objective outcome of having superior material capabilities relative 
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 to other states.  Yet this is not necessarily the case.  Since a state’s material capabilities only acquire 
meaning through shared knowledge, capabilities alone do not make it a great power.  Like so many other 
phenomena in international relations (e.g., sovereignty), great power status is largely the product of social 
construction – i.e., a state is a great power if it is recognized by others as such.  This is not to say that 
capabilities are not important in determining who can and cannot be a great power; they clearly are.  It 
would be difficult to mistake a state with few capabilities (e.g., Costa Rica) for a great power, just as it 
would be difficult to mistake a state with enormous capabilities (e.g., the United States) for not being one.  
Returning to the issue of rump materialism and the author’s own realist-constructivist position (see 
Chapter 2), material factors provide an important foundation on which social constructs are built.  
However, this leaves open the possibility that a state whose level of capabilities are ambiguous (i.e., 
significant, but not overwhelming) could be denied great power status by other great powers because its 
capabilities are not yet recognized as being sufficient, or could be granted that status prematurely based 
on an assumption or expectation of the state’s current or future capabilities. 
The latter is the case for China.  Given the sorry state of China’s position vis-à-vis the Western 
powers at the beginning of the 20th century, its “transition from pupil to power”11 is nothing short of 
remarkable.  Yet while the Nationalists deserve some credit for helping to modernize the country, a closer 
examination of China’s rise to great power status reveals that it was less a matter of acquiring the 
requisite capabilities than of getting recognition of its status by other, established great powers.  Early 
attempts by Republican China to be treated as an equal were largely unsuccessful.  Its entry into WWI in 
the hopes of reclaiming German concessions brought only bitter disappointment.  It was not until WWII 
that China managed to attain recognition as a great power by leveraging US fear of a separate peace with 
Japan to overcome its reluctance to making China one of the Big Four (the United States, Britain, the 
Soviet Union, and China).  China was included in the Washington and Quebec Conferences (May and 
August 1943, respectively) as a major Allied power, and was then able to use the United States to put 
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 pressure on Britain and the Soviet Union to formally acknowledge its new status in the declaration of the 
Moscow Conference (October 1943).12  Although Hans van de Ven argues that unfavorable provisions in 
the Yalta agreements (February 1945) and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (August 1945) indicate 
that China was still not fully accepted as an equal,13 its inclusion as one of the five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council indicates that China was now taken seriously as a major player on the world 
stage.   
What makes this turn of events significant is not just that it represents a dramatic reversal in 
China’s fortunes, but that it occurred despite China’s continued relative weakness.  While China’s efforts 
in the war were important in keeping Japanese attention divided in its own two-front war, its material 
capabilities were certainly not on par with the other three major Allied powers.14  Indeed, throughout the 
Cold War, China’s capabilities remained well behind those of the two dominant superpowers.  Its weight 
could be felt close to its borders (as it was during the Korean War), but its ability to project power much 
beyond them remained severely limited.  Indeed, despite two decades of modernization efforts, China’s 
military capabilities still remain well behind those of other major powers, not to mention the United 
States, with little ability to project air or naval power beyond its borders for any extended period of time.  
In many ways, China has remained at best a regional power, always fearful of its security with respect to 
the superpowers.  Its interests have largely been regional in character (e.g., territorial claims, regional 
balance of power),15 and its foreign relations correspondingly centered on the Asia-Pacific.16  Until fairly 
recently the PRC remained largely ambivalent toward international organizations, treating its membership 
in them (including the UN Security Council) more as a symbol of its international status than an arena for 
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 pursuing global interests.17  Yet despite the fact that its capabilities were more characteristic of a regional 
power, China was increasingly recognized as a great power, if only due to expectations about its future.  
As Steven Levine once put it, “China’s role in contemporary politics is determined more by what China 
may become than by what it already is.”18
Whether or not such expectations were warranted, China has been more than willing to play the 
role of great power and for decades has been a vocal advocate of the idea that it is an important actor in 
world affairs.  As Kim observes, “China is continually issuing calls for all the nations, especially the 
superpowers and international organizations to get on the good side of China as a rapidly rising global 
power.  China is constantly cultivating the expectation that everything is possible with China and nothing 
is possible without China.”19  Such sentiments are clear in a statement by then-Foreign Minister, Qian 
Qichen, that “more and more countries are paying attention to the rise of China…People are talking about 
the potential role that China can play in world politics…World peace and development need China…To 
isolate China will not go anywhere, but hurt oneself.”20  In essence, “without first having acquired the 
reach of a global power, China acts as if it has already become a global power.”21  As such, it has sought 
to define its largely regional interests in global terms.  As Levine observed in the 1980s: 
China has regarded its conflict with Vietnam as a microcosm of a global struggle against 
Soviet expansionism.  It sees its support of Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s claims to the 
Straits of Malacca as part of a broader pattern of Third World opposition to the maritime 
hegemony of the superpowers.  It portrays its policies toward Taiwan and South Korea as 
examples of a worldwide resistance against American imperialism.  It depicts its trade 
with ASEAN as an instance of South-South economic cooperation.22
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 This led him to describe China as “a regional power without a regional policy.”23  Although Kim suggests 
that China’s approach to regional relations is no longer “merely an extension of its superpower policy,” 
he argues that China “still does not have a proper regional policy.”24  This is because “during the Cold 
War years, none of China’s multiple identity enactments and role playing had much to do with Asian 
regionalism.”25  Instead of defining itself in regional terms, China has always sought to define itself and 
its role in the world in global terms – i.e., with respect to its position vis-à-vis the superpowers. 
Key to this definition of itself was the emergence in the early-1970s of the strategic triangle.26  
After years of international isolation, the United States began actively courting China as a potential 
counterweight to the Soviet Union, “playing up China’s standing as one of the world’s five great 
powers.”27  Its position within the strategic triangle thus became an important element of China’s identity 
as a great power.  Indeed, Rozman suggests that “even more than Moscow or Washington, Beijing 
became enamored of the strategic triangle…Increasingly, it measured its importance as one of three 
global powers capable of shifting the balance of world power.”28  While the international system might 
technically remain bipolar, China’s position between the two camps introduced a degree of tripolarity that 
proved extremely useful to it, “enabling Beijing to exploit superpower rivalry to gain its own strategic 
leverage, economic and trade benefits, and global weight.”29  Kim suggests that “the structural reality of 
[this system] is an answer to the puzzle of how a regional power managed to be treated as a global power 
without first having acquired the reach or the requisite normative and material resources of a global 
power.”30
The fact that China’s role as a great power depended more on its position in the strategic triangle 
than on its own capabilities had important implications for its adjustment to the post-Cold War world.  On 
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 the one hand, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union should have been, and to 
some extent was, welcomed by China as a dramatic improvement in its security environment.  Kim 
suggests that “the progressive removal of the Soviet threat from China’s expansive regional security 
perimeters…brought perhaps the deepest international peace that China has enjoyed since the Opium 
War.  Indeed, there is no shortage of upbeat assessments of the external security environment by Chinese 
officials and policy specialists as the most satisfactory since the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949.”31  Yet at the same time, he notes that China’s security policies – e.g., accelerated military 
modernization, increased defense spending, continued nuclear testing – indicate a certain level of 
insecurity that seems paradoxical to its professed satisfaction with the end of Cold War tensions.  While 
he suggests that such insecurities may simply be a result of uncertainty due to dramatic changes in the 
international system, he also notes that “part of the problem also has to do with the wrenching national 
identity difficulties that practically all major powers encounter in trying to adjust to a world in which 
conflict no longer takes place along an East-West divide.”32
For China, such difficulties were particularly serious.  While the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe helped to validate America’s role in the world as a champion of democracy (as will be 
discussed), the end of superpower competition risked undermining China’s role as a great power.  As 
Jing-dong Yuan argues, “the end of the Cold War has to some degree created an identity crisis for China.  
The decline and demise of the Soviet Union, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the US-led 
victory in the Gulf War, and the appearance if not the reality of a ‘unipolar moment’ have spelled an end 
to the relevance of China in the superpower balancing game.”33  This helps to explain the initial 
ambivalence of Chinese analysts to a world that appeared at the time to be moving toward multipolarity, 
presumably with China as one of the poles.  As Kim points out, “a multipolarizing world was seen…as 
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 bereft of the much-coveted balancing force – the vaunted China card – in global triangular geopolitics.”34  
Thus, even if China were one of many major powers, its overall importance in global affairs seemed to be 
diminished.  Of course, the need to find a new way of validating its position as a great power to replace 
the strategic triangle soon led Chinese policy-makers to adopt ‘multipolarization’ (duojihua) as the CCPs 
official characterization of the international system at the 14th Party Congress in late-1992.35  Indeed, 
multipolarity has since been actively advocated by China, not just as a description of the system as it is, 
but as a goal to be pursued by the international community.  However, this last point provides a clue to 
China’s shift in attitude towards multipolarity, from reluctance to whole-hearted embrace.  While it may 
not be as useful to China as the strategic triangle, it is far better than the potential alternative – a unipolar 
world led by the United States. 
As early as 1990, it was already being suggested that the international system was shifting not to 
multipolarity but to unipolarity, with the United States as the world’s preeminent power.36  By the late-
1990s, this interpretation was becoming widely accepted.  As Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth 
point out, American capabilities are so far beyond those of any potential competitor, according to every 
measure, that “if today’s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will.”37  
Such a development is of great concern to Chinese leaders.  As many neorealists would argue, the rise of 
a single, dominant power should be seen by others as a potential threat to their interests, and this is 
certainly true of China.  Yet beyond the possibility that an unrestrained United States could threaten 
Chinese interests (e.g., by preventing reunification with Taiwan), unipolarity threatens China’s identity as 
a great power.  If a shift from de facto tripolarity to multipolarity represented a certain loss of status and 
relevance, then a shift to unipolarity represents a far greater loss.   
This helps to explain why China has fought hard to maintain the fiction of multipolarity against 
the reality of a unipolar world.  While China has come to recognize the position of the United States as 
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 the world’s preeminent power,38 Chinese analysts continue to describe the international system in 
multipolar terms, frequently using the term yi chao duo qiang – “one superpower and four big powers”39 
– to imply a rough equivalence within the context of an asymmetric distribution of power.40  China has 
been a vocal proponent of multipolarity.  Deng Xiaoping himself, in describing the international system at 
the end of the Cold War, argued that “the international structure will be divided into three poles, four 
poles, perhaps five poles in the future.  In this so-called multipolar world, China must be one of the poles.  
China should not underestimate herself.  Whatever the structure is, China is a pole.”41  Toward that end, 
China has worked to promote partnerships with other important states, including the EU, Japan, and 
Russia, in order “to redefine its position” in the international system.42  In essence, China has sought to 
replace the strategic triangle with a multipolar alternative that allows it to maintain its identity as a great 
power in the face of vastly superior US capabilities. 
Of course, given the growing US concerns throughout the 1990s about ‘the rise of China,’ 
Chinese worries about their own irrelevance in a unipolar world dominated by the United States might 
seem paradoxical.  After all, if China’s role as a great power is partly constructed through its relations 
with the United States, and the United States sees China’s growing material capabilities (economic and 
military) as a potential threat, then China can remain secure in the knowledge that it is as important as it 
thinks.  Yet great power status involves more than just having an ability to threaten; it involves a certain 
measure of respect from other great powers, even if it is only the grudging respect of one adversary for 
another.  After its troubled entrance into the family of nations, it is precisely this kind of respect that 
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 China wants most, and feels is owed it.  While China may initially have been given its seat at the table of 
great powers based on expectations of its future importance, most Chinese believe that such expectations 
have now been fulfilled.  Its successes in modernizing over the last quarter century have given the 
Chinese “a strong sense of national pride” that Yongnian Zheng suggests is “probably as strong as, if not 
stronger, than what they felt when Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the People’s Republic in 
1949.”43  As such, “the new leadership has identified pursuing international respect for China as a major 
theme of China’s foreign relations.”44  Whatever the significance of China’s material capabilities, without 
this respect its role identity as a great power would be threatened. 
Getting on the Wrong Side of History:  The Development of the Sino-US Role Conflict in 
the 1990s 
Having outlined China’s key role identity, it is now necessary to establish whether or not a role 
conflict exists between it and the United States.  To do so, it is necessary to identify the key US role, and 
the corresponding counter-role the United States seeks to impose on China.  The first task is relatively 
straightforward.  America’s self-image has long been shaped by a fundamental belief in the universal 
efficacy of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism, and of its own central role as the ultimate 
repository for and transmitter of these values to the rest of the world.  While policy-makers often debate 
the proper means by which to fulfill that role, the idea of ‘American exceptionalism’ – “that the United 
States is a special, chosen nation created to play a unique role in history as the redeemer of an inferior, 
corrupt, and oppressed world”45 – remains an important defining element of US foreign policy. 
As with any state, this sense of its role in the world leads the United States to cast others in 
corresponding counter-roles that help to give that role meaning.  However, in addressing the question of 
what counter-role the United States seeks to cast on China, it is necessary to recall the issue brought up in 
Chapter 4 – namely, that even given a relatively constant role, the counter-role a state seeks to cast may 
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 be subject to change depending on circumstances.  This is certainly true of the United States and China.  
As Lampton points out, an “enduring component of the American view of China has been that Americans 
hold, seemingly simultaneously, two images of China – one benign and constructive, the other malevolent 
and threatening.”46  These images were eloquently described by Harold Isaacs in the 1950s: 
The name of Marco Polo is scratched onto the mind of almost every American 
school child.  Attached to it are powerful images of China’s ancient greatness, 
civilization, art, hoary wisdom.  With it in time comes a heavy cluster of admirable 
qualities widely attributed to the Chinese as people:  high intelligence, persistent industry, 
filial piety, peaceableness, stoicism.  These were attributes identified in our own 
generation with the people of Pearl Buck’s novels, solid, simple, courageous folk 
staunchly coping with the blows of fate and adverse circumstances. 
Genghiz Khan and his Mongol hordes are the non-Chinese ancestors of quite 
another set of images also strongly associated with the Chinese:  cruelty, barbarism, 
inhumanity; a faceless, impenetrable, overwhelming mass, irresistible if once loosed.  
Along this way we discover the devious and difficult heathen, the killers of girl infants, 
the binders of women’s feet, the torturers of a thousand cuts, the headsmen, the Boxer 
Rebellion and the Yellow Peril, the nerveless indifference to pain, death, or to human 
disaster, the whole set of lurid, strange, and fearful images clustered around the notion of 
the awakening giant and brought vividly to life again by Mao Tse-tung’s ‘human sea’ 
seen flooding down across the Yalu, massed barbarians now armed not with broadswords 
but with artillery, tanks, and jet planes.47
 
The prevalence of either of these images at any given time has largely depended on circumstances.  As 
Isaacs put it, “these two sets of images rise and fall, move in and out of the center of people’s minds over 
time, never wholly displacing each other, always coexisting, each ready to emerge at the fresh call of 
circumstance, always new, yet instantly garbed in all the words and pictures of a much-written literature, 
made substantial and unique in each historic instance by the reality of recurring experience.”48  As a 
result, as numerous authors have pointed out, “American attitudes toward China have undergone regular 
cycles of romanticism and cynicism, of idealization and disdain.”49   
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 This cyclical change can be at least partly attributed to a lack of knowledge about China that 
often leads to gross simplifications.  As Nancy Tucker correctly points out, the American public’s 
“ignorance about foreign affairs generally and about Asia in particular” is an important factor influencing 
US images of China.50  Even when existing images are shattered by changing circumstances and/or new 
information, they are often simply replaced by new simplifications.   For instance, early American images 
of China “as a great, ancient, and exotic culture devoted to the arts and sciences” were quickly replaced 
by images of China as a ‘backward’ country as contact between the two cultures increased during the 19th 
century.51  After China began to open up in the 1970s, Stanley Karnow lamented the poor quality of 
Western reporting about it, observing that “having frequently magnified the Communist regime’s 
shortcomings in the past as they assessed China from afar, on-the-spot American observers now appear to 
be leaping to the other extreme of portraying the country in nothing but euphoric prose.”52  Yet as Harry 
Harding points out, China’s new openness eventually helped to dispel such “naïve euphoria,” bringing 
about new criticisms of its reforms.53  These wide shifts in American images have produced changes in 
the counter-role the United States has sought to cast on China.  For the purposes of this dissertation, it is 
necessary to examine the most recent such change, and its effects on US policy toward China. 
Shattering the Liberal China Myth:  Tiananmen Square & America’s Changing Counter-Role 
In order to understand the dramatic nature of the change in the counter-role the United States 
sought to impose on China in the 1990s, it is first necessary to consider the counter-role that had prevailed 
until then.  Richard Madsen has argued that, at least since the 1970s, America’s conception of its own role 
in the world as a champion of democracy and the free market gave rise to a ‘liberal China myth’ that 
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 “portrayed China as a troubled modernizer.”54  According to this myth, the threat of communism 
represented only a temporary challenge to the eventual victory of Western/American ideals, since these 
ideals represented “the inevitable expression of modernity itself.  As Communist China modernized, its 
leaders and citizens would learn to follow this [American] dream.”55  Chinese attempts at modernization 
and economic reform that began in the late-1970s were seen as evidence of China’s progress toward the 
acceptance of Western economic and political norms.  As Thomas Dorogi puts it, “many Americans 
deeply believed that once China opened its doors to the United States and liberal thinking, the system of 
Maoism and central economic planning would slowly wither away.”56  In some sense, this has played out 
– China’s shift to ‘market socialism’ represents a significant degree of economic liberalization and decay 
in communist ideology.  Yet within the context of the liberal China myth, this represents but a small step 
in China’s path toward becoming the “land of liberty, pluralism, private ownership, and free markets”57 
envisioned by hopeful American observers. 
This myth represented an effort by the United States to impose a counter-role on China that fit 
with its own role in the world.  As such, it provided a way to interpret the dramatic changes going on in 
China, as well as a set of expectations about how China would and should develop – namely, it would 
become more Westernized.  Perhaps more importantly, it provided a prescription for US China policy – 
“Americans should help the process of modernization along by becoming actively engaged with China 
economically, politically, and culturally.”58  Although different variants of such an engagement strategy 
have been suggested,59 each has been based on the same, inherently liberal, rationale – “that China’s 
integration into global trading and financial systems will gradually but inexorably moderate the behavior 
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 of the People’s Republic of China.”60  As Gerald Segal put it, “China can be neutered as a challenge to the 
status quo, by giving it incentives to join regional and global society.”61  By tying China into the 
international system, interdependence would make it increasingly unlikely that it would disrupt regional 
security.  China would eventually become a responsible actor on the world stage.  An underlying 
assumption of this belief was that ‘responsible’ included the eventual transition from communism to 
democracy.  This is not to say that the active promotion of political reform in China was a high priority in 
US policy.  Indeed, Dorogi argues that trade remained America’s predominant interest in dealing with 
China.  Yet “for the most part, the ideological rhetoric and the images of China reinforced this notion of 
positive trade relations and the idea that economic liberalization in China would eventually lead to 
political reform.”62  As Lampton puts it, engagement with China could “bring both economic benefit [for 
the United States] and moral purification [for China].”63
However, as Madsen points out, “like all the stories we use to understand our national identity 
and purpose, the central American story about China did more than simply reflect empirically verifiable 
facts – it also imposed a socially constructed vision upon the ambiguities of historical experience.  It is as 
much about America as about China; it construed American relations with China in terms of common 
understandings of the core values of American society.”64  As such, the liberal China myth was more a 
reflection of America’s faith in its own place in the world than an accurate portrayal of Chinese reality.  
Even if modernization and reform could bring about democratization in the long-term (a position 
supported by the author), the simplistic way in which this process was often characterized provided 
enormous opportunity for disappointment in the event that China took a significant step backward.  All 
that was needed to get the pendulum to swing back toward a more malevolent and threatening image was, 
as Isaacs put it, a ‘fresh call of circumstances’ that could shatter the myth that it was somehow steadily 
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 progressing toward a more democratic future.  This came in the spring of 1989 with the crackdown on 
pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.65  As Lampton points out, “the violence of 
Tiananmen served as a catalyst for change.”66   
The Tiananmen Incident began with the death on April 15, 1989 of Hu Yaobang, the former CCP 
General Secretary who had been ousted in 1987 for his support of student demonstrations.  His death 
prompted a new, and far larger, wave of demonstrations that quickly turned into a student-led mass 
movement with widespread public support.  Although the students’ main grievances centered on issues of 
job insecurity, lack of free speech, and complaints about official corruption, the demonstrations were 
saturated with the rhetoric of democracy, with calls for political reform and dialogue with party leaders.  
The CCP leadership’s attempt to get the students to back down by issuing a stern warning in the party’s 
official mouth-piece, the People’s Daily, on April 26, backfired by prompting a still-larger demonstration 
and march to Tiananmen Square the next day.  Divisions within the CCP leadership over how to deal with 
the situation, as well as poor organization on the part of the students in putting forward a clear set of 
demands, produced a stalemate.  By mid-May, the situation had worsened significantly, with large 
numbers of more radical students going on a hunger strike and the government frustrated with its inability 
to get the students out of the square in time for a summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.  The 
May 19 decision to impose martial law did nothing to end the crisis, with thousands of Beijing residents 
taking to the streets to block the movement of troops to the square.  Though the PLA initially stood down, 
it returned on the night of June 3-4 and forced the students to leave Tiananmen Square.  Clashes between 
protesters and the military resulted in the deaths of several hundred Beijing residents and students, as well 
as a few soldiers. 
The events in Tiananmen Square had a powerful impact on the US image of China.  This was 
largely due to what has been called ‘the CNN effect’ – “a complex reality in which powerful, real-time 
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 images of unfolding human events and tragedy are potentially directed into every electrified home in the 
world, setting off demands for a policy response by governments, markets, and multinational 
organizations globally.”67  Media coverage of the student demonstrations and the government crackdown 
was extensive, with images of the students’ passionate calls for democracy being broadcast live around 
the world.  It is difficult to overestimate the influence such images had on American public opinion.  Prior 
to Tiananmen Square, almost 75% of the American public had favorable views of China.  By July that 
number had dropped to 33%, with 58% having unfavorable views of it.  Similarly, the proportion of the 
public that considered China a close friend or ally of the United States dropped from 25% in May 1988 to 
16% in July 1989.  More importantly, the proportion viewing China as an enemy more than doubled, 
from 19% to 39%.68  Such an effect would not be short-term either.  As Lampton points out, the images 
“did more than create a sense of human identification between those in Tiananmen Square and viewers 
around the world – they provided images so memorable that they are still used repeatedly as lead-in 
footage to news and documentary broadcasts more than a decade after the events themselves.”69  Scenes 
of students erecting the ‘Goddess of Democracy’ (based on the Statue of Liberty) in Tiananmen Square or 
of a lone man standing in the way of a column of tanks in the days after the crackdown became indelible 
reminders of China’s failed attempt to throw off the chains of communism. 
Of course, this represents a rather romanticized interpretation of events.  The reality surrounding 
the Tiananmen Incident was far more complex than generally portrayed by the Western media.  The 
students were far more divided in their goals and less committed to the Western concept of democracy 
than it appeared to the casual observer.  At the same time, the actions of the government, though difficult 
to excuse, were less cold-blooded than initial reports indicated.70  Yet “policy makers and the media 
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 refused to look past the blood that had been spilled in Beijing to ascertain the true nature of the 
incident.”71  They saw what they wanted to see – a Chinese public struggling to attain Western-style 
democracy against an oppressive communist state.  As Representative Mickey Edwards (R-Oklahoma) 
stated after the crackdown:  “Diplomatic messages of disapproval are a pretty puny reaction to the 
murdering of innocent civilians whose only crime is to want the same basic freedoms we in the West take 
for granted.”72  As a result of this misunderstanding about the nature of the incident, “a skewed 
impression of these two tumultuous months was presented to the public, with only minimal information 
about the deeper political, social, and cultural elements of the Tiananmen fiasco.”73  Without the 
necessary “contextual knowledge,” the negative media coverage of these events had “an inherently 
distorting effect” on the public’s image of China.74  It helped to feed the latent image of China (or at least 
of its government) as a malevolent political force.   
Yet it was not just that information about what occurred was distorted or inaccurate (which it 
certainly was) that affected the public image of China; it was that the information completely contradicted 
American expectations.75  After all, 1989 was the beginning of ‘the end of history.’76  Communism was 
giving way to democracy in states around the world.  The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe just a few months after the military crackdown in Tiananmen provided a 
stark contrast to China’s actions against peaceful student demonstrators.  Thus, what made the events of 
Tiananmen Square so shocking to the American public and policy-makers was that they so strongly 
contradicted what the United States knew (or thought it knew) about China and how it would inevitably 
develop.  As Madsen puts it, “the crackdown in China was for Americans a drama with an unexpected, 
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 incorrect ending.”77  China was supposed to be moving forward toward democracy, not backward toward 
repression.  It was this disconnect between expectations and events, not simply the events themselves, 
that, according to Madsen, explains the strong reaction of the United States.  Tiananmen Square shattered 
the American image of China as a modernizing, and therefore liberalizing, state.  It was now a reactionary 
state that sought to hold off the pace of political reform and prevent the final triumph of democracy, while 
at the same time profiting from its increasing contact with the world.  As a result, “the sanguine vision of 
a democratic utopia for future China came tumbling down and was replaced by a more critical assessment 
of the PRC as an emerging economic power operating under an authoritarian political system.”78   
The rapid change in American perceptions represented an attempt to reconcile its role in the 
world with the now flawed counter-role that it had projected onto China for over a decade.  The United 
States’ role as a champion of democracy and human rights remained unchanged.  Indeed, the end of the 
Cold War and Soviet communism only served to validate it.  At the same time, however, its counter-role 
of China as a modernizer was shattered by the events in Tiananmen Square; the liberal China myth 
proved to be just that.  The United States thus had to rethink its understanding of China – i.e., it had to 
develop a new counter-role that could make sense of Chinese actions.  This new counter-role was China 
as a failed modernizer and potential rogue.  Rey Chow refers to this replacement for the liberal China 
myth as the ‘King Kong syndrome’ – a “structure of cross-cultural, cross-racial representation aimed at 
producing ‘China’ as a spectacular monster whose despotism necessitates the salvation of its people by 
outsiders.”79  Along with the geopolitical changes brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, this 
change in counter-role would have a profound impact on Sino-US relations. 
Dealing with a Failed Modernizer:  America’s Changing Counter-Role & the Reorientation of 
US China Policy 
As one might expect, the new counter-role of failed modernizer the United States sought to cast 
on China came into conflict with China’s own role as a great power.  As Lampton notes, the combination 
                                                 
77 Madsen, China and the American Dream, 4. 
78 Dorogi, Tainted Perceptions, 3. 
79 Chow, “King Kong in Hong Kong,” 94. 
257 
 of victimhood and national pride inherent in this role “creates a sense of entitlement,”80 one that was 
unlikely to be accommodated in light of its actions in Tiananmen Square.  The result was a role conflict 
that would have serious repercussions for Sino-US relations.  In order to appreciate the degree of that role 
conflict, it is necessary to address the reorientation of America’s post-Tiananmen China policy that came 
about as a result of its newly developed counter-role.  In doing so, however, it is first necessary to note 
that US China policy since Tiananmen has by no means been consistent.  It has been characterized by 
conflicting impulses for engagement and containment, enticement and punishment.  This inconsistency 
can be largely attributed to the breakdown of the pre-Tiananmen consensus among American policy-
makers regarding US China policy.  As a result of the military crackdown, “formerly held assumptions, of 
which the trajectory of Chinese political and economic reform were the most pertinent, were cast aside 
while policy makers scrambled to digest the unexpected steps the CCP had taken to quell a possible social 
revolution.”81  That scramble inevitably sparked a political struggle over US relations with China. 
The counter-role being discussed could therefore be seen as contested – the product of often 
intense political competition.  This is to be expected.  As products of social construction, roles and 
counter-roles require the actions of agents to produce, reproduce, and when necessary, change them.  This 
includes domestic agents.  As suggested in Chapter 2, if one is to apply constructivism to the problem of 
foreign policy analysis, it is necessary to recognize that while the international system and the states that 
compose it may mutually constitute each other, the same mutually constitutive relationship exists between 
the states themselves and the domestic political actors that compose them.  This means that in analyzing 
any potential role conflict, one must be careful not to assume that a state’s role and counter-role are 
givens; they are just as dependent on social practice as any other construct.  What this means in practical 
terms for analysis of the role conflict between the United States and China is that it is necessary to 
examine the internal debates over China policy in order to more fully understand the nature of the 
counter-role in question and the actions it produced. 
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 The initial struggle over US China policy centered on differences between the White House and 
Congress.  The White House’s initial reaction to the events of Tiananmen Square was decidedly cautious.  
In a statement released from his residence in Kennebunkport, Maine, President George H. W. Bush 
stated:  “I deeply deplore the decision to use force against peaceful demonstrators and the consequent loss 
of life.  We have been urging and continue to urge non-violence, restraint and dialogue.  Tragically, 
another course has been chosen.  Again, I urge a return to non-violent means for dealing with the current 
situation.”82  To back up his somewhat mild words of condemnation, the administration quickly decided 
to suspend military-to-military contacts, as well as sales of military equipment, including avionics for the 
Chinese F-8 fighter plane, torpedoes, and counterartillery radar.83  In addition, the United States sought to 
cut off international financial support to China, particularly from the World Bank, which had been 
scheduled to lend it some $2.3 billion in the coming year, and encouraged others to do the same.84  The 
administration also announced that it would consider requests from Chinese students studying in the 
United States to extend their stays, and allowed a leading Chinese dissident, astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, to 
take refuge in the US embassy in Beijing. 
Despite these initial actions, however, the Bush administration remained concerned about their 
potential impact on Sino-US relations.  While it understood that a failure to condemn the crackdown 
would inevitably lead to public and Congressional criticism, it still viewed China as an important strategic 
partner.85  Moreover, the White House was unclear what was happening in China or who was in charge.  
Some hope remained that Chinese reformers would assert themselves and condemn the crackdown.86  Yet 
even when it became clear that China’s policy regarding the demonstrations was not about to change, the 
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 administration remained equivocal in its condemnation.  Publicly, the administration hardened its 
position.  On June 20, Secretary of State James Baker told Congress that he was recommending a 
suspension of high-level meetings between the two countries.  Yet at the same time, the administration 
had already decided to secretly send National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of 
State Lawrence Eagleburger to Beijing to meet with Deng Xiaoping personally, a meeting that took place 
at the end of June;87 a second, more public visit by the two occurred in December.  The administration 
also tried to soften many of the sanctions it had imposed.  In early July, it allowed China to purchase four 
Boeing 757s, the sale of which had originally been banned due to their advanced navigation systems.  It 
also allowed collaboration to continue between American engineers and Chinese military officers 
involving the design of an avionics package for the F-8.  It was hoped that such actions would signal to 
the Chinese that the United States still valued their relationship.88
The administration’s attempt to placate potential critics and prevent a complete breakdown in 
Sino-US relations failed on both counts.  Even before the military crackdown, the White House had been 
severely criticized for what some saw as “a lack of vision and a poverty of rhetoric” concerning China.89  
The Congress had demonstrated its support for the students by passing a concurrent resolution supporting 
democracy in China (H. Con. Res. 136); it passed in the Senate on May 31 by a vote of 89-0.90  After the 
violence of June 3-4, the Congress put increasing pressure on the Bush administration to take stronger 
actions against China, with some even pushing the White House to break diplomatic relations with 
Beijing and recall the US ambassador.91  Representative Stephen Solarz (R-New York) warned:  “If the 
president doesn’t take the initiative in changing American policy in this regard, the Congress will do it for 
him.”92  As the White House continued to pursue a more moderate approach to the situation, the Congress 
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 did just that.  The House and Senate passed an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act 
(418-0 at the end of June and 81-10 in mid-July, respectively) codifying the administration’s initial 
sanctions and requiring the White House to show that the situation had improved, or that US national 
interests were at stake, before they could be removed.  A later bill (H.R. 2712), sponsored by 
Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-California), which was more generous toward Chinese students studying 
in the United States, was vetoed by the administration, though most of its provisions were later included 
in a November 30 executive order.  These Congressional calls for stronger action against China were 
largely supported by the American public, and helped to lay the groundwork for future tensions over a 
wide range of issues, particularly human rights, trade, and security. 
To Link or Not to Link:  Human Rights & Trade in Sino-US Relations 
Although criticism had been made about China’s human rights record before 1989, Tiananmen 
Square brought the issue to the forefront of the new debate over US China policy.  Areas of contention 
included not only China’s treatment of student demonstrators and other political dissidents, but also the 
effects of its ‘one child policy’ (e.g., forced abortions, female infanticide), its use of prison labor, and its 
treatment of ethnic and religious minorities (e.g., Tibetans, Christians).  A detailed discussion of these 
issues is beyond the scope of this study.  What is important, however, are the actions taken by the United 
States to pressure China into improving its human rights record, particularly the attempt to link this issue 
with trade.  Almost immediately after the military crackdown in China, the US Congress began to discuss 
the possibility of using its burgeoning trade with the United States as a way of exerting pressure on the 
Chinese leadership to change its behavior.  The legislation it passed in the summer of 1989 included 
recommendations for the White House to use further economic sanctions, such as opposing Chinese 
membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and revoking its most-favored 
nation (MFN) status, if the political situation in China continued to deteriorate.93  The debate over 
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 whether to link human rights and MFN status would become a defining element of Sino-US relations in 
the 1990s. 
Until it was given permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) just prior to its accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001, US law required that the extension of MFN 
status to China (and other non-market economies) had to be renewed annually.94  Throughout the 1980s, 
this had been done almost automatically.  The events in Tiananmen Square, however, changed that.  Some 
discussion had been given to revoking China’s MFN status immediately after the incident, but such 
proposals received little real consideration.  However, with MFN due to expire on June 3, 1990, the first 
anniversary of the crackdown, it was perhaps inevitable that it would become a serious political issue.  
Congressional discussion of MFN began early in 1990 and continued despite the release of several 
hundred Chinese political prisoners, including Fang Lizhi (who had spent almost a year in the US 
embassy in Beijing).  Although Congressional action did not come in time to prevent the Bush 
administration’s June 3 decision to renew China’s MFN status, three proposals did come up for a vote in 
the House on October 18, 1990 – one (H.J. Res. 647) called for immediate revocation of China’s MFN 
status, while a second (H.R. 4939) called for strict conditions on renewal for the following year.95  
Although both passed by wide margins (247-174 and 384-30, respectively), neither bill went to the Senate 
for a vote before the end of the Congressional session.  Efforts to attach conditionality to MFN renewal 
continued in 1991.  The United States-China Act (H.R. 2212), sponsored by Nancy Pelosi, passed both 
houses of Congress (313-112 in the House, 55-44 in the Senate) but was vetoed by President Bush in 
February 1992.  The Congress responded by quickly passing the China Most Favored Nation Trade Status 
Bill (H.R. 5318), sponsored by Representative Donald Pease (D-Ohio), which was again vetoed just two 
months before the 1992 presidential election.96
When a new version of the United States-China Act (H.R. 1835) was introduced in April 1993, it 
got a warmer reception from a newly Democratic White House.  While the Bush administration had 
                                                 
94 This was a provision of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. 
95 The third, and most moderate one, was rejected. 
96 Harding, A Fragile Relationship, 265-69; Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, 108-10, 122, 134. 
262 
 fought hard to renormalize relations with China after Tiananmen Square, and in particular opposed the 
linkage of human rights and MFN, the Clinton administration initially took a much tougher line toward 
China.  Bill Clinton had criticized President Bush during the 1992 presidential campaign for ‘coddling 
dictators’ in Beijing and was more open to the possibility of using trade as leverage to force Chinese 
concessions on human rights.  On May 28, 1993, President Clinton announced the signing of Executive 
Order 12850 – Conditions for Renewal of Most-Favored-Nation Status for the People’s Republic of 
China in 1994.97  Although the executive order did not include many of the extraneous conditions (e.g., 
pure trade disputes, proliferation) that had been added to the Congressional bills, it marked a clear change 
in US policy regarding the linkage between human rights and trade.  China’s MFN status would be 
renewed in 1993, but renewal again the following year would require that China provide greater 
emigration freedoms, halt the export of goods produced by prison labor, and make “overall, significant 
progress” in several areas, including adherence to the UN Declaration of Human Rights, release of 
political prisoners, permitting outside inspections of Chinese prisons by NGOs, protecting Tibetan 
culture, and permitting Voice of America broadcasts into China.98
Despite the Clinton administration’s efforts to craft a policy of engagement for China, its decision 
to link human rights and trade remained a soar point in Sino-US relations.  When President Clinton met 
with Jiang Zemin on November 19, 1993 during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
conference in Seattle, he was admonished by the Chinese president for attempting to interfere in China’s 
domestic affairs.99  China’s disgust over the situation did not end with words.  A meeting in February 
1994 between Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs John Shattuck and 
Chinese dissident Wei Jingsheng prompted a series of arrests of prominent dissidents on the eve of 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s March trip to Asia.  Although the Chinese offered some minor 
concessions at the end of Christopher’s trip, the overall encounter was marked by diplomatic rancor and 
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 was viewed by many as an abject failure.100  Thus, by the spring of 1994, it had become increasingly clear 
that Sino-US relations were being seriously undermined by the administration’s decision to link the 
renewal of China’s MFN status with improvements in its human rights record. 
Whether or not the US attempt to use trade as leverage over China’s domestic behavior was (or 
could have been) effective is a question that is open to debate.101  However, during the Clinton 
administration’s second year, US China policy abruptly changed direction.  In addition to the diplomatic 
costs of pursuing human rights/MFN linkage, the administration faced increasingly vocal and organized 
opposition from business and economic interests that saw trade with China as vital.  It also began to 
develop a new foreign policy strategy centered on the promotion of free trade that seriously undermined 
the rationale for linking human rights and MFN.102  On May 26, 1994, noting that China had made limited 
progress in improving its record on human rights, President Clinton announced his decision to officially 
‘delink’ human rights and MFN, stating: 
That linkage has been constructive during the past year.  But I believe, based on our 
aggressive contacts with the Chinese in the past several months, that we have reached the 
end of the usefulness of that policy, and it is time to take a new path toward the 
achievement of our constant objectives.  We need to place our relationship into a larger 
and more productive framework.103
 
China’s MFN status was renewed without conditions.  However, the administration’s decision to delink 
human rights and MFN did not make the issue go away.  Annual attempts by some in Congress to 
withhold MFN status from China continued until it was finally extended PNTR in 2001.  While none of 
these attempts succeeded, they did serve to keep the human rights issue alive by exerting political 
pressure on the Clinton administration in its dealings with China, and thereby on China as well. 
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 The Congress’s failure to use MFN status to force a change in Chinese behavior did not prevent it 
from expressing its concern for human rights in China in other ways.  It publicly denounced China’s 
effort to host the 2000 Summer Olympics, with the House passing a resolution against it (H.Res. 88) on 
July 26, 1993 (287-99) and the Senate sending a letter signed by 60 senators to the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC).104  In addition, it took a strong stand on the issue of Tibet.  In February 1995, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed legislation declaring Tibet “an occupied, and sovereign 
country.”105  Similar efforts were made by the House in May.106  Though neither of these efforts had much 
real impact on formal US China policy,107 they indicated a significant degree of hostility toward China on 
the part of a large number of US policy-makers that, along with the fight over MFN, helped to poison 
Sino-US relations throughout much of the 1990s. 
The Rise of a New ‘Peer Competitor’:  Security Issues in Sino-US Relations 
While Tiananmen Square helped to bring human rights issues to the forefront of America’s China 
policy, the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as China’s efforts at military modernization, introduced a 
new security dimension to the increasingly fragile relationship – the rise of China and the potential ‘China 
Threat.’  During the last decades of the Cold War, China had been an important (if informal) ally against 
the Soviet Union; it received significant military assistance from the United States throughout the 
1980s.108  With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a rethinking of that 
relationship was perhaps inevitable.  Thomas Barnett suggests that, deprived of its old rival, the United 
States set out in search of a new ‘peer competitor’ that could justify its military budget and defense 
posture; China seemed to fit the bill.109  Yet the effect that a changing image of China had on American 
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 calculations of its strategic interests should not be underestimated.  The mere absence of another potential 
competitor was not enough to transform China into a security threat.  It was a new interpretation of 
China’s capabilities, seen through the lens of China as a reactionary state, that helped create the idea of 
the China Threat. 
Early US security concerns about China, which began prior to Tiananmen, centered on its 
activities in proliferation.  China had long been critical of arms control efforts, including the nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), seeing them as attempts to maintain the military superiority of the 
superpowers.  However, by the early 1990s, China had begun to accept international norms and 
agreements on preventing the proliferation of weapons.  It signed the NPT and agreed to abide by the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1992, and signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 
January 1993.  Despite such outward moves in the right direction, reports of continued missile sales to 
Pakistan in 1992 resulted in significant Congressional pressure on the White House to take action.  On 
August 5, 1993, the State Department imposed sanctions on China and threatened to expand them if it 
turned out that entire missiles (and not just parts and technology) had been shipped.  At the same time, the 
United States and China were engaged in a dispute over a Chinese container ship, Yin He, which the 
United States believed was carrying chemicals to Iran that could be used for weapons.  The United States 
eventually forced China to allow inspections of the ship and its cargo (carried out by Saudi Arabia, with 
advice from US experts), which turned up no evidence of the suspected chemicals.  Chinese demands for 
a formal apology were turned down.110
Yet while the United States continued to have concerns about China’s behavior in the area of 
proliferation, its attention soon shifted to China more generally.  The first inclination that a strategic 
reorientation was occurring in US China policy came in a speech by National Security Adviser Anthony 
Lake on September 21, 1993.111  Citing democracy and capitalism as the core values of the United States, 
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 Lake argued that “the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement – 
enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.”112  While this might initially appear 
to be a relatively benign statement suggesting a desire to develop more cooperative relations to replace 
the confrontations of the Cold War, the context in which it was presented hinted at a harder edge to the 
proposed policy of enlargement.  Lake went on to suggest that “we should expect the advance of 
democracy and markets to trigger forceful reactions from those whose power is not popularly derived.”113  
In particular, he warned of ‘backlash states’ that could threaten the security of the United States and other 
democratic states, and which therefore had to be isolated “diplomatically, militarily, economically, and 
technologically.”114  Although he recognized China’s move towards economic liberalization, and 
emphasized the importance of maintaining good relations with it, Lake seemed to lump China together 
with rogue states like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.  As such, he seemed to be signaling a significant 
downgrading of China’s status relative to the United States – from strategic ally to potentially disruptive 
rogue.   
At the same time, many policy-makers and China-watchers began to take notice of China’s 
increasing capabilities.  In 1992, the World Bank reported that the Chinese economy was already the 
second largest economy in the world next to the United States if measured in terms of purchasing power 
parity (PPP), and could surpass the United States by 2020.  Soon after, publications began to appear 
speculating that such economic growth could lay the foundation necessary for China to become a 
superpower.115  In conjunction with continued efforts at military modernization, many believed that this 
could make China a significant threat to regional security.116  The resulting debate over “how best to deal 
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 with the awakened dragon…spawned a lucrative cottage industry among analysts and pundits in 
academia, corporations, banks, governments, and the media worldwide.”117
While such concerns could certainly find support from various theories of international politics,118 
the debate over the China Threat was heavily influenced by US domestic politics.  With a Republican-
controlled Congress facing off against a Democratic president, China policy became a wedge issue, 
particularly after the Republicans failed to win back the White House in 1996.119  Accusations of 
impropriety on the part of the Clinton administration involving campaign contributions from questionable 
sources with links to China only served to intensify these partisan divisions and increase anti-China 
sentiment among American conservatives.120  Revelations of Chinese espionage activities aimed at 
acquiring US military, and particularly nuclear, technology added to the feeling that China was now a 
major adversary that had to be contained.121  Such sentiments were expressed throughout the 1990s in a 
whole series of highly alarmist books extolling the threat posed by China to the United States.122  While 
many of these concerns about the China Threat were based on suppositions about the future, the 1995-96 
Taiwan Strait crisis seemed to give them real substance. 
The Makings of a Crisis:  Policy Reorientation & Taiwan 
The reorientation of American China policy had a significant impact on how the United States 
dealt with the issue of Taiwan.  The strategic necessities of maintaining good relations with the PRC 
during the latter part of the Cold War had forced the United States to distance itself from its long-time 
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 ally.  Yet the breakdown in Sino-US relations, as well as the democratization of Taiwan, helped to reverse 
this trend.  Of course, it must be noted that the question of how to deal with Taiwan after the 
normalization of relations with China in 1979 had long been an open one.  Many in Congress had been 
dissatisfied with the terms of normalization, resulting in the overwhelming passage of the Taiwan 
Relations Act (1979), which allowed for the continued sales of arms to Taiwan and stated that “any effort 
to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, 
[would be considered] a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and a grave concern 
to the United States.”123  The Reagan administration flirted with the idea of resuming relations with 
Taiwan, and even the relatively pro-China Bush administration decided to sell 150 F-16s to Taiwan in 
1992 in spite of earlier US assurances that it would reduce, and eventually halt weapons sales to the 
island.124  Such issues had long been obstacles to smooth relations between the United States and China.  
However, it was not until the Clinton administration took office in 1993 that the Taiwan issue would 
become a major problem. 
As already mentioned, Clinton had been highly critical during the 1992 presidential campaign of 
the Bush administration’s efforts to maintain reasonably good relations with China.  One of his first 
foreign policy actions was to initiate a policy review to revise the highly restrictive procedures under 
which the United States conducted its unofficial relations with Taiwan.  The Taiwan Policy Review was 
released in September 1994, just months after the administration’s decision to delink human rights and 
MFN.125  The name of Taiwan’s unofficial representative office in Washington was changed from the 
non-descript Coordinating Council on North American Affairs (CCNAA) to the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Representative Office (TECRO).  Restrictions on contacts between officials were relaxed, 
allowing Taiwanese officials to meet with their American counterparts in their offices (excluding the 
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 State Department and the Executive Office of the President) and allowing American officials in Taiwan to 
meet with the president and other high-level officials in their offices.  A regular dialogue was established 
between subcabinet officials regarding economic relations.  Cabinet-level meetings would also be allowed 
on economic and technical issues.  The United States agreed to support Taiwanese membership in the 
GATT, as well as other international organizations that would not require statehood for membership.  
Finally, top Taiwanese officials would be allowed to make ‘transit stops’ in the United States, but would 
still not be allowed to make personal or official visits.126
While the new policy was intended to be a pragmatic adjustment in US policy, both Beijing and 
Taipei criticized it, the former for going too far and the latter for not going far enough.  Not surprisingly, 
the Chinese were particularly critical of the policy changes, with Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu 
calling it “‘gross interference’ in China’s internal affairs and a ‘serious infringement’ of China’s 
sovereignty.”127  Perhaps more importantly, it still did not meet Congressional expectations.  For one 
thing, high-level Taiwanese leaders were still prohibited from visiting the United States, even 
unofficially.  By the time the Taiwan Policy Review was released, this had become a major political issue.  
In keeping with his attempts at ‘vacation diplomacy’ (see Chapter 6), Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui 
had sought to use unofficial visits to the United States to increase Taiwan’s diplomatic profile.  During a 
refueling stopover in Hawaii on his way to Central America in May 1994, Lee had not been allowed to 
stay overnight (and play a round of golf), nor even leave the airport.  While he was permitted to deplane 
at a transit lounge at Hickham Air Force Base, Lee instead decided to make a political statement by 
refusing to get off the plane, prompting a widely-held myth on Capitol Hill that the State Department had 
not allowed him to deplane at all.128  The failure of the Taiwan Policy Review to adequately address this 
issue was strongly criticized by Congress. 
The increasing Congressional dissatisfaction with the administration’s policy toward Taiwan 
presented Lee with an opportunity.  While it was prevented from dealing directly with the White House, 
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 the Taiwanese government was able to actively lobby the Congress to promote its interests, which it 
began to do with renewed vigor in the summer of 1994.  In particular, Lee sought to gain permission from 
the US government to visit Cornell University, his alma mater.  Besides the large sums of money it spent 
on its lobbying efforts (including a three-year, $4.5 million contract with Washington firm, Cassidy & 
Associates),129 the Taiwanese government’s task was made easier by “widespread admiration for 
Taiwan’s economic prowess and for the democratic development that had taken place under Lee,”130 
which put Taiwan in marked contrast to China’s continued repression.  In addition, the new Republican-
controlled Congress that took office in January 1995 saw the issue of Taiwan as an opportunity to put 
political pressure on the Clinton administration.131  House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia) not only 
openly supported allowing Lee to visit the United States, a move also supported by House International 
Relations Committee Chairman Benjamin Gilman (R-New York) and former Secretary of State James 
Baker, but even stated that Taiwan deserved to be readmitted to the UN.  In May 1995, the House and 
Senate voted overwhelmingly (390-0 and 97-1, respectively) in favor of a nonbinding resolution 
supporting giving Lee a visa to visit the United States.  While the Clinton administration had initially 
promised China that it would deny a visa to Lee, it bowed to Congressional pressure and announced its 
reversal on May 22. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the Chinese reacted to this reversal by initiating a series of military 
exercises intended to intimidate Taiwan and make its displeasure clear to the United States.  In keeping 
with the US policy of strategic ambiguity, the Clinton administration tried to walk a fine line between 
expressing its concerns over China’s aggressive stance toward Taiwan and smoothing relations with it.  
The White House did not take a strong stance, in part, because “U.S. foreign policy makers concluded 
that Chinese leaders understood the U.S. position well enough, that further reiteration would have been 
unnecessary and provocative, and that it was best left implicit and unsaid in the tense atmosphere of mid-
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 1995.”132  However, its measured response to China’s intimidation of democratic Taiwan evoked severe 
criticism from Congress.  On January 31, a Sense of Congress resolution was introduced “calling on the 
president to condemn China’s military intimidation of Taiwan and to report to Congress on how the 
United States could defend Taiwan against a Chinese ballistic missile attack.”133  It was at least partly this 
political pressure that led the Clinton administration to ratchet up its statements of concern regarding 
Chinese actions, and to deploy the Independence and Nimitz battle groups to the region. 
The fact that the Taiwan Strait crisis ended peacefully did little to reassure those that saw China 
as the United States’ next peer competitor.  Indeed, while discussion about the possibility that China 
might become a threat to US interests had begun a few years before, Dorogi argues that “the Taiwan crisis 
cemented fears in the minds of Americans that China might become the successor to the Soviet Union as 
the next major international adversary of the United States.”134  Much as Tiananmen Square had shattered 
the image of China as a liberal modernizer, the Taiwan Strait crisis helped to solidify the growing image 
that China was a dangerous, potentially expansionist state that needed to be contained.  The fact that 
China did not actually attack Taiwan, and indeed had not even mobilized the forces necessary for such an 
attempt to be made, made little difference to many US policy-makers as “an image of China as a rising 
communist giant captured the American psyche.”135
Before going on to discuss China’s reaction to the reorientation in China policy, it should be 
noted that despite it, the growing anti-China sentiment in public opinion, and the belief by many in a 
China Threat, the counter-role that the United States seeks to cast on China remains contested.  The 
argument for engagement that had been a cornerstone of the liberal China myth still remains part of “the 
establishment position.”136  Many (including the author) still hold to the notion that China will become 
less threatening, and more reformist, as it becomes more intertwined in an increasingly globalized world.  
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 However, it cannot be denied that, in the decade and a half since Tiananmen Square, this position has 
come under increasing attack from those who see engagement as appeasement of an immoral and 
potentially dangerous adversary.  The US counter-role is thus not one dimensional; it did not change 
completely from one mode to another.  It has been constructed through a long process of political debate 
that is ongoing.  Yet while this counter-role may be a work in progress, it is equally clear that it conflicts 
with China’s own role as a victimized great power. 
As already discussed, great power status is about more than just material capabilities or an ability 
to threaten; it involves a certain measure of respect and acceptance from other great powers.  The pursuit 
of international respect has thus become a major theme of Chinese foreign policy.  Yet respect is precisely 
what the Chinese feel is most lacking in their relationship with the United States.  For China, it was a 
cruel irony that just as its reform efforts were fulfilling the promise of great power status by putting it on 
track to become one of the world’s largest, most dynamic economies (not to mention the potential this 
might provide for enhancing China’s efforts at military modernization), the United States began a 
wholesale reorientation of its policy toward it.  Instead of accepting China’s growing importance in 
international politics and treating it as an equal, the United States after 1989 began to treat it as a near-
pariah, little better than the rogue states it sought to contain through diplomatic isolation, economic 
sanctions, and occasional military chastisement.  The fact that this counter-role was politically contested 
did little to soften its impact on the Chinese.  For them, it was an objective social fact.  The United States 
thus wound up, as Yuan Peng puts it, “on the wrong side of Chinese history.”137  It was this disconnect 
between China’s rise to prominence and the US reaction to it – i.e., this role conflict – that helped to spark 
a nationalist backlash in China, and set the stage for Sino-US confrontation. 
‘China Can Say No’:  Sino-US Role Conflict & the Rise of China’s ‘New Nationalism’ 
The final step in applying the reactive model of nationalism to Sino-US relations is to analyze the 
effect of the Sino-US role conflict on Chinese foreign policy.  In doing so, it should be noted once again 
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 that the post-Tiananmen deterioration in Sino-US relations could be attributed to the shift from bipolarity 
to unipolarity or to some changes in domestic politics.  Just as the post-Cold War change in the 
distribution of power made China less important to the United States, so it could be expected to make 
China more wary of a superpower that could threaten its interests.  Indeed, China’s discomfort with the 
idea of a unipolar world has already been discussed.  In addition, just as the events of Tiananmen Square 
produced political debate in the United States over China policy, the domestic aftermath of Tiananmen 
Square for China might be expected to produce political discord that could influence the China’s US 
policy.  Yet to view the deterioration of Sino-US relations in the 1990s as merely an inevitable and logical 
outcome of new strategic conditions brought about by changes in the global balance of power is to miss 
the real substance of the change in question – namely, the rising nationalism and anti-Americanism that 
appeared in China in the 1990s.  Similarly, as will be demonstrated, this rise of nationalism cannot be 
attributed solely to domestic politics.  To treat it as purely instrumental risks overlooking its emotional 
and often spontaneous nature.  The solution to this problem, as has been suggested throughout, is to treat 
this rise in nationalism as a reaction to an ideational threat posed by the role conflict already discussed. 
As with the change in the US counter-role discussed earlier, the rise of anti-American nationalism 
has simply been the most recent of a long series of pendulum swings in Chinese attitudes toward the 
United States.  Indeed, Chinese attitudes toward the United States have gone through the same ‘cycles of 
romanticism and cynicism, idealization and disdain’ as have US attitudes toward China, with positive and 
negative views of the United States never fully replacing the other.  For China, the United States is ‘the 
beautiful imperialist,’ a term David Shambaugh coined that “nicely captures the ambivalence – 
admiration and denigration – that distinguishes Chinese perceptions of the United States.”138  While the 
United States participated in the forced opening of China in the 19th century, Yuan Peng suggests that 
“Chinese perceptions of the United States are relatively good, especially compared with Chinese images 
of Russia and the European powers.  Chinese generally view the United States as engaging in ‘good 
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 imperialism’ rather than the ‘bad imperialism’ that was practiced by the Europeans.”139  The United States 
has often been admired for its prosperity and political openness, as well as the assistance it rendered 
during China’s war with Japan.  In fact, after the thaw in Sino-US relations in the 1970s, many students 
and intellectuals saw the United States as a model to be emulated.140  Today, Yuan suggests that the 
younger generation in China “can generally be classified as ‘pro-American.’  Deeply influenced by 
McDonald’s, the NBA, Microsoft, Hollywood, and American advanced education, Chinese youth admire 
the United States.”141
At the same time, however, the Chinese have not been blind to the fact that US actions toward 
China have often been less than principled.  What the United States may see as benevolence is often 
interpreted by China as intended to extract benefits in a time of weakness.  As Lampton summarizes about 
differences between US and Chinese views of their pre-1949 relations: 
The predominant view in the United States has been that American missionary 
involvement in China from the early 1800s until the communist takeover in 1949 was 
largely a philanthropic and humanitarian undertaking that left behind many enduring 
legacies, particularly in the educational and medical fields; Chinese point to the 
patronizing aspect of such missionary work.  Americans assert they never had ‘treaty 
ports’ in China; the Chinese remember that Washington did not relinquish 
extraterritoriality until 1943.  Americans see their Open Door Policy dating from 1899-
1900 as an attempt to prevent China from being carved up into commercially 
impenetrable foreign colonies; Chinese believe that the Americans were more concerned 
about maintaining their own commercial access and having the privileges that 
extraterritoriality conferred.  While Americans view their ‘nonrecognition’ of Japanese 
aggression in China during the 1930s as standing up for China’s territorial integrity, 
Chinese see inaction until 1941.142
 
Yuan notes that while today’s Chinese youth may be fascinated by the United States, “these young 
students can also be labeled as ‘anti-American’ and ‘Chinese nationalists.’  Whenever Sino-U.S. relations 
become tense, such as after the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade or the plane collision 
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 in 2001, it is young college students who rush to the American embassy to stage protests.”143  It is the 
development of this reactive Chinese nationalism that will be addressed in the rest of this chapter. 
Numerous scholars and observers of China have noted “the remarkable resurgence of Chinese 
nationalism” in the years after Tiananmen Square,144 what has been referred to as China’s ‘new 
nationalism.’  This had two main sources – one official and intentional, one public and spontaneous.145  
With respect to the former, for much of the Chinese leadership, the Tiananmen demonstrations were the 
direct result of ideological drift characterized by three ‘crises of faith’ (sanxin weiji) – a crisis of faith in 
socialism (xinxin weiji), a crisis of faith in Marxism (xinyang weiji), and a crisis of faith in the CCP 
(xinren weiji).  In essence, “the ‘Tiananmen Incident’ could be seen as a result of the bankruptcy of the 
official ideology”146 and the party’s inability to deal with the socioeconomic problems associated with 
reform.  While conservatives in the party preferred to address these crises by resurrecting Maoist 
ideology, reformers like Deng Xiaoping, who believed such methods to be impracticable, sought to 
develop a replacement ideology that could fulfill the vital role of political indoctrination necessary to 
maintain control – namely, nationalism.  As Suisheng Zhao points out, “Chinese Communist leaders 
began to place emphasis on the party’s role as the paramount patriotic force and guardian of national 
pride in order to find a new basis of legitimacy to bolster faith in a system in trouble and hold the country 
together during the period of rapid and turbulent transformation.”147
As a result, the CCP initiated the patriotic education campaign (aiguozhuyi jiaoyu yundong) in the 
early-1990s to regain legitimacy among the country’s youth.  Instead of trying to increase education on 
Marxist ideology (something that Chinese students increasingly resented anyway), the party focused on 
“the ‘great achievements’ of the Chinese people and especially the Communist Party….By appealing to 
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 the students’ sense of patriotism rather than trying to convert them to Marxism, the Communist regime 
hoped to reassert the moral authority of the party.”148  It should be noted that the government preferred the 
term ‘patriotism’ to ‘nationalism’; their desire was to promote loyalty to a CCP-led state, not ethnic 
division between the majority Han Chinese and China’s fifty-five minority nationalities.  Yet for the 
purpose of this study, such a distinction is relatively unimportant.149  What is important is the fact that for 
the first time, national patriotism, stated in distinctly unMarxist terms, became the primary subject of 
official propaganda.  A new emphasis was put on Chinese history and traditional culture, including the 
Confucian values (though not Confucianism per se) that early Chinese nationalists had tried so hard to 
eliminate. 
The active efforts of the CCP to promote Chinese patriotism as the new source of its political 
legitimacy would seem to give strong support for an instrumentalist interpretation of the ‘new Chinese 
nationalism.’  Indeed, Zhao argues that the patriotic education campaign was the real source “behind the 
seemingly spontaneous rise of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s.”150  For him, the instrumental nature of 
Chinese nationalism becomes readily apparent when one considers that “it lacks rich content that can give 
a real sense of commonality.  The ideals of nationalism with all of its myths and symbols should have 
their own domain, well above the arena of contemporary policy programs of a political party.”151  Instead, 
he argues, Chinese nationalism lacks real substance beyond support for the CCP and the state.  “There is 
little to compare with the substance of American nationalism with its mystique about [sic] George 
Washington, Abraham Lincoln, [the] Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, 
the Pledge of Allegiance.  Similarly, there seems to be no counterpart to the Japanese feelings about the 
monarchy and the British pride in the parliament.”152
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 Yet to suggest that contemporary Chinese nationalism lacks substance is not entirely accurate.  
While Zhao is correct to point out “the void [in] cultural ideals” due to decades of attacks on Chinese 
tradition,153 at least one substantive component of Chinese nationalism has remained largely intact – the 
sense of victimization that came out of China’s interaction with the West.  The same ‘mystique’ that he 
associates with American respect for the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution may be seen 
in Chinese pride in ‘standing up’ against Western imperialism and China’s struggle to reclaim some small 
measure of its past glory.  The Chinese national discourse centered on China’s ‘century of humiliation’ is 
every bit as meaningful and substantive as the American national discourse centered on a revolution to 
protect individual liberty against tyranny.  Without such a discourse, it is difficult to see how the CCPs 
patriotic propaganda would have any effect on China’s youth.  While the party may have found it 
politically expedient to tap into latent nationalist feelings, such a strategy could only work if such feelings 
already existed to be exploited.  As Liu Xiaobo asserts, “no government-sponsored patriotic 
campaign…can compare with the latest surge in patriotism in the suddenness with which it occurred and 
in its intensity and its longevity.”154  In addition, one has to consider the fact that nationalist discourse in 
China is not the sole property of the CCP.  Zhao himself has more recently acknowledged that “although 
the emerging intellectual discourse on nationalism overlapped, to a certain extent, the patriotic education 
rhetoric of the Chinese government, its emergence was largely independent of official propaganda.”155
The independent emergence of a new sense of Chinese nationalism was a public reaction, 
particularly among intellectuals, to the reorientation of US China policy after Tiananmen Square.  Given 
the fact that this reorientation was sparked by an American desire to stand up for the freedoms of the 
Chinese people in general, and Chinese students and intellectuals in particular, Zi rightly points out that 
this may seem paradoxical.156  Yet US actions toward China were perceived quite differently on the other 
side of the Pacific.  “Americans thought they were striking a blow for the Chinese people against a 
                                                 
153 Ibid., 301. 
154 Cited in Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction:  Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism  (Standford:  
Stanford University Press, 2004), 9. 
155 Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism and Pragmatic Foreign Policy Behavior,” 68; emphasis added. 
156 Zi, “The Clash of Ideas,” 240. 
278 
 repressive elite,”157 and expected them to recognize, and perhaps even embrace, the benevolent intentions 
of US economic sanctions.  Most Chinese, however, saw US actions in a far more cynical light.  Lampton 
points out that “as Washington pushed for sanctions to punish the human rights infractions of the 
Communist leadership in 1989 and thereafter, it simultaneously pushed for market opening and protection 
of intellectual property rights, the same combination of commercial pressure and high-minded rhetoric 
that the Chinese had experienced prior to 1949….For the Chinese, this was but a recurrent pattern – 
Americans articulate high principles but simultaneously seek to turn Chinese weakness to their 
commercial advantage.”158
Many Chinese reacted strongly to what they perceived as unwarranted interference in their 
domestic affairs.  In his study of Sino-American images, Wang points out that “some Chinese 
respondents, while they might not generally oppose American intervention in international affairs, 
became very emotional when touching upon the American ‘interference’ in Chinese internal affairs.  Even 
for some Western-educated respondents who generally had good feelings about the United States, this 
nationalistic mentality was inescapable.”159  The US attempt to use MFN status as leverage over human 
rights was an issue of particular concern.  Wang cites one diplomat as saying: 
To tell you the truth, a large number of Chinese intellectuals I know feel sickened about 
the way the United States brandishes MFN trade status as a weapon to push China down.  
China’s $10 billion trade surplus is nothing in the whole of American trade.  If you 
Americans are sincere in helping China, why do you keep picking on it?  The behaviour 
of the American Congress hurts Chinese feelings badly.  To put it bluntly, you Americans 
are rich and strong, we Chinese are poor and weak.  Therefore you feel free to bully us.  I 
have very favourable feelings about some aspects of the United States, but on this issue I 
am disgusted.  You take China as a piece on the chessboard of domestic politics, kicking 
it here and kicking it there.  How do we Chinese feel?  Some Americans assert that Sino-
US relations are not important any more because of the relaxation of US-Soviet relations.  
You simply play the China card in politics at home and abroad.  We Chinese cannot stand 
this.  Are you Americans advocating fair play?  Where is the fair play?  The only reason 
is that China is still poor so that you can kick me around.  They are mistaken.  We 
Chinese will not stomach this insult (yanbuxia zhekouqi).  We are prepared for the worst.  
China will not disappear.  In the future, Chinese people will remember what you 
Americans did to us when we were in difficulties.160
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Of even greater concern to the general public was the Congressional attempt to prevent China from 
hosting the 2000 Summer Olympics.  Hosting the Olympics was seen by many as a symbol of China’s 
increased international status, much as Japan’s hosting of the 1964 Olympics and South Korea’s hosting 
of the 1988 Olympics represented their rise in world standing.161  By successfully preventing China from 
doing so (from the Chinese perspective), the United States entered the crosshairs of the Chinese public.  
Suettinger argues that, “not inclined to accept American criticism of China’s human rights situation in the 
first place, Chinese citizens tended to share the government’s view that the Olympic defeat had been 
carefully orchestrated to humiliate China.”162  Although he suggests that this incident was played up by 
the government, Joseph Fewsmith asserts that “this exercise of ‘leverage,’ more than any single event, 
convinced students, intellectuals, and ordinary Chinese alike that the United States opposed China, not 
[just] the Chinese government.”163
The belief that the United States was opposed to China, not just to the Chinese government, 
began to crystallize even more due to its intervention during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis.  That 
intervention helped reinforce the growing sense that the United States sought to contain China and 
prevent it from attaining its rightful place in the international system as a whole nation-state.  The Chinese 
felt deeply betrayed by the Clinton administration’s decision to allow Lee to visit the United States, 
particularly since the administration had previously promised that no such visit would be allowed.  
“Ordinary Chinese were quick to believe that the United States was aiding Taiwan’s independence 
aims….Posters such as ‘Down with U.S. Imperialism’ were found on many university campuses in 
Beijing and young students made an application to the public security bureau for permission to stage a 
demonstration at the U.S. embassy in Beijing.”164  When the United States sent two aircraft carriers to the 
region, China was even more incensed.  As Garver describes: 
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 In Beijing some people believed there was no reason for the United States to be uncertain 
of what China intended to do.  Through its limited force deployments to the Strait region, 
China had signaled that it did not intend to actually attack Taiwan.  While fire-breathing 
propaganda might issue from the CCP’s Hong Kong media, China had not deployed the 
material means to effect an actual invasion….Chinese analysts believed that U.S. leaders 
should know from intelligence gathered by U.S. satellite reconnaissance that Chinese 
intentions were limited to influencing Taiwan’s leaders psychologically.  Distinction 
between China’s propaganda and real capabilities should show that the PLA did not 
intend to actually attack Taiwan.  When, in spite of this knowledge, the United States 
intervened, a second layer was added to the Chinese feeling of betrayal.165
 
While US policymakers saw American actions as a prudent response to prevent the possibility of Chinese 
aggression against Taiwan, the Chinese saw it as yet another attempt by the United States to thwart its 
efforts to forestall Taiwan’s move towards independence, and thus keep the Chinese nation weak and 
divided. 
Thus, by the mid-1990s, a significant degree of anti-American nationalism became evident in 
China.  One 1995 survey reported that the United States was the most disliked country of 57% of 
respondents, with 87% believing that the United States was the most unfriendly country to China.166  The 
growing public contempt for US interference in China’s domestic affairs became particularly evident with 
the popularity of a number of harshly nationalistic books that were published beginning in 1996.167  The 
first, China Can Say No (Zhongguo keyi shuo bu), was a compilation of essays written by five, formerly 
pro-American, intellectuals who stated in the book’s preface that “they were angered by American 
interference in Chinese domestic politics and by harsh U.S. economic sanctions.”168  Its main theme, as 
summarized by Fei-ling Wang, was that 
a morally corrupted and over-stretched imperialistic US has been plotting against the 
rising China in a new cold war, with the help of the non-repenting Japanese and some 
‘disgusting Chinese’ including those living in Taiwan who take slavery by the West as 
something ‘noble and happy’.  As a result, it is necessary and almost mandatory for 
China to stand up and say no to the US clearly and loudly.  China should adopt a counter-
containment strategy and prepare for a long-term resistance against the American 
‘hegemony’ politically, economically, and culturally….By saying no to the US and 
having a counter-containment strategy, the future will be brighter for a ‘socialist China’ 
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 after ‘holding out for only ten to fifteen years’ because then ‘the world situation will have 
major changes in favor of us, and the world socialist movement definitely will have a 
new high tide’.169
 
This theme appeared to strike a nerve in the Chinese public, particularly among the country’s youth, who 
Wang suggests were drawn to its promise of a future where “the power of Chinese thoughts, and Chinese 
managerial ability will deeply affect the world, and become the only force leading the future human 
ideological trend.”170  The book quickly sold over 2 million copies.171  The commercial success of the 
book led to the publication of a sequel in October, entitled China Still Can Say No (Zhongguo haishi neng 
shuo bu). 
The level of official support for these books has remained a matter of dispute.  Wang points out 
that “significant political and administrative approval and even support from Beijing has been widely 
rumored.”172  According to Suettinger, “one member of the government’s Human Rights Commission 
provided an epilogue for the book, and Xinhua [the official government news agency] publicized 
favorable reviews [of the book].”173  On the other hand, Zheng notes that the book also received official 
criticism “because it had a negative impact on China’s foreign image.”174  In his review of China Can Say 
No and other similar books, Hongshan Li suggests that “although the basic views of the books were very 
close to the official policy toward the US,…[American observers] jumped to the conclusion that the 
books were anti-American and suspected that the authors were manipulated by the Chinese 
government.”175  The point he makes about not assuming that such criticisms must be government-
sanctioned is a good one.  “Being used to hearing a single voice from the Chinese government in the last 
half century, some Americans could not accept the fact that many Chinese intellectuals would join the 
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 Communist government in attacking the US policy toward China.”176  Yet just as the Congress and the 
media in the United States may articulate attitudes toward China independent of official White House 
policy, Li argues that “the criticism from the Chinese public would add the second voice, which had long 
been absent, in China’s dealing with the US.”177  Thus, despite its general support for the government,178 
such expressions of Chinese nationalism should be seen as authentic, not government-manufactured.179
However, in many ways, China Can Say No and similar books that followed were a response not 
just to anger at US interference in China’s domestic affairs, but to the perception that the United States 
now saw China as an actual threat that needed to be contained.  The publication in the United States of 
Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, Samuel Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?,”180 
and Bernstein and Munro’s The Coming Conflict with China sparked enormous concern that China would 
enter the crosshairs of the United States as its next major competitor.  “While some Chinese, liberal 
intellectuals, welcomed Fukuyama’s argument in terms of the victory of liberalism, they were concerned 
that Western, liberal democracies would confront China’s rising based on geopolitical considerations.  
Their concern was confirmed by Huntington’s argument that geopolitical struggles in the post-Cold War 
world were not ideologically motivated but defined by different civilizations,”181 and reconfirmed by the 
growing discussion of a ‘China Threat’ in books like Bernstein and Munro’s.  Huntington’s essay, in 
particular, had an enormous impact on the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals.182
To many Chinese, such arguments were not mere academic theories.  They seemed to provide the 
intellectual background for changes in American policy during the first years of the Clinton 
administration.  In particular, Anthony Lake’s comments in 1993 on ‘backlash states,’ which came on the 
heels of the publication of Huntington’s provocative essay, helped to solidify the perception that US 
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 policy-makers took such ideas seriously.  As Suettinger points out, “Lake’s address seemed to put the 
otherwise unconnected U.S. actions over the summer [continued fights over MFN, proliferation, and the 
Yin He incident] into an understandable context and probably began tipping the balance of the debate in 
China about what U.S. strategic intentions toward China really were….China’s think tanks and strategic 
writers began talking more openly and frequently about America pursuing a policy of ‘containment’ 
toward China.”183  American publications and policy statements seemed to represent the opening salvos of 
a second Cold War aimed at China, one justified by the belief that the rise of China presented a concrete 
threat to American interests and regional security.  The China Threat argument was seen by most Chinese 
as inherently unjust.  In May 1997, then Vice Premier Zhu Rongji criticized it by stating: 
I’ve seen the book ‘The Coming Conflict with China’ and Samuel Huntington’s ‘The 
Clash of Civilizations.’  It’s ridiculous.  For more than 150 years, China has been 
subjected to foreign aggression and we have suffered egregiously.  China’s still got a 
long way to go to become a developed country.  Even when China becomes strong and 
developed, China will never get involved in aggression against other countries or 
interfere in other countries’ internal affairs.184
 
Zi summarizes Chinese sentiments well, suggesting that “while the Chinese feel that they have barely 
stretched their back after a hundred years of bending, the Americans are already talking about 
constraining China to prevent it from growing too tall.”185
Such fears of a US policy of containment provided the lens through which the accidental 
bombing on May 7, 1999 of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia was perceived.  To most 
Chinese, the bombing, which resulted in the death of three Chinese journalists, was no accident.186  John 
Wong and Zheng Yongnian note the irony that almost a decade after Tiananmen Square, Chinese students 
were once again taking to the streets in protest, not for democracy, but against the United States.187  Much 
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 like Tiananmen Square did for the United States, “the May 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy 
in Belgrade created powerful visual images that were constantly replayed and reprinted in the PRC media; 
this information was made available to the Chinese people through the expanding infrastructure of global 
communication…Those images included pictures of the smoking hulk of the bombed-out embassy, 
grieving relatives of the dead, the return of the victims’ bodies to their homeland, and their bodies lying 
on autopsy tables.”188  The embassy bombing was Tiananmen in reverse – a set of powerful visual images 
that shattered once and for all the idea of the United States as a benevolent world power, and reinforced 
the new image of the United States as a threat to China’s place in the world.  As Lampton puts it, “if 
powerful visual images of Tiananmen ended Americans’ honeymoon with China in 1989, powerful visual 
images of Belgrade ended what was left of that honeymoon for the Chinese people a decade later.”189  If 
US intervention in the Taiwan Strait had not convinced them of US intentions, then its bombing of the 
Chinese embassy certainly did. 
A clear picture begins to develop out of this discussion.  In the wake of Tiananmen Square, the 
United States sought to secure its identity as a champion of democracy and human rights by recasting 
China as a failed modernizer, a role that conflicted with China’s own role as a victimized great power.  
This role conflict represented a threat, not just to China’s material security, but to its ideational security.  
China, in turn, sought to defend its identity by recasting the United States as a hegemonic power out to 
contain China and prevent it from attaining its rightful position on the world stage.  The result was the 
rise of a ‘new’ Chinese nationalism in the 1990s that was largely anti-American in character.  Just as 
Gries suggests that “American ideologues have long deployed the foil of Chinese tyranny to argue the 
virtues of American liberty,”190 the United States became the main foil against which Chinese nationalism 
was reinvigorated.  Indeed, it could be argued that contemporary Chinese nationalism is almost 
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190 Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 33. 
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 synonymous with anti-Americanism.191  Thus, this nationalism can be understood as a reaction to the 
ideational threat posed by the United States.  The deterioration of Sino-US relations during the 1990s can 
thus be seen as the result of an ideational security dilemma, in which the actions taken by each party to 
guarantee its own security left the other insecure.   
Of course, it should be noted that the argument that contemporary Chinese nationalism is a 
reaction to the United States is not meant to suggest that developments in Chinese domestic politics did 
not contribute to its construction, nor even that it was uncontested.  Indeed, a counterargument to China 
Can Say No was published two years later, entitled China Should Not be ‘Mr. No’ (Zhongguo bu dang ‘bu 
xiansheng’), and received positive reviews from the CCP-run People’s Daily.  James Miles notes that 
“this book was symptomatic of divided opinion among officials and the public about the hot-headed anti-
US sentiment expressed in The China Can Say No.”192  As suggested earlier in this chapter, domestic 
political actors play an important role in processes of social construction and should not be completely 
left out of the analysis.  However, as with the US counter-role of China as a failed modernizer, just 
because Chinese nationalism is politically contested does not mean that it is any less real, or that it can be 
understood simply by examining the dynamics of Chinese domestic politics.  The reactive model utilized 
here is meant to provide a more complete picture of nationalism and its effects, one that focuses on the 
international dynamics that produce it without ignoring domestic political realities.  The question that 
remains to be answered is whether or not such reactive nationalism makes China more prone to conflict 
with the United States, and what this reveals about nationalist conflict more generally.  In other words, 
what can the reactive model of nationalism illustrated here tell us about the propensity of states to use 
force in pursuit of nationalist goals?  This final question will be addressed in the conclusions. 
                                                 
191 Of course, it should be noted that Japan has often gotten equal scorn from Chinese nationalists.  However, given 
the relative importance of Sino-US relations, the part that Japan plays in the construction of Chinese nationalism can 
be left for another time. 
192 James Miles, “Chinese Nationalism, US Policy and Asian Security,” Survival  42, no. 4 (Winter 2000-01): 54. 
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Chapter 8. CONCLUSIONS:  ASSESSING THE PROSPECTS FOR NATIONALIST 
CONFLICT 
 
This dissertation has sought to address an important question in international politics – how does 
nationalism influence the behavior of states, and more specifically, does nationalism make states more 
likely to become involved in interstate conflict?  This is an important question to answer, since 
nationalism has often been assumed to be a source of such conflict.  Yet scholars of international politics 
have largely failed to explore this issue, leaving it under-theorized and making it difficult to assess 
whether or not such assumptions have any basis in reality.  This is compounded by the fact that traditional 
debates regarding the nature of nationalism between primordialists, who see nations as real communities 
bound by long-standing social ties, and instrumentalists, who see them as manufactured comparatively 
recently by elites in pursuit of their own political interests within the confines of the modern state, have 
largely ignored the role of international politics.  Even the entry of ‘constructivists’ into the debate has 
failed to lead to a comprehensive search for answers to the riddle of nationalism beyond the boundaries of 
the state.  This represents a serious omission, since – recalling the comments of James Mayall cited in the 
introduction – without a third image approach to nationalism, it will never be clear to what extent 
nationalism is produced or constrained by the international system, let alone the effects it may have on 
state behavior. 
The author has attempted to address this problem by developing a reactive model of nationalism 
and nationalist conflict that is explicitly grounded in IR theory, thereby bridging the conceptual gap 
between two areas of scholarly inquiry – IR and nationalism – that have remained isolated from each 
other for far too long.  Specifically, the author has sought to use the constructivist approach in IR theory – 
or, more accurately, a realist-constructivist approach – to understand how nationalism is constituted by 
the social structure of the international system at both a macro- and micro-level, how it is expressed 
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 macro-structurally as a type of state (the nation-state) with specifically ‘national’ interests that set the 
parameters of state action, and how it is expressed micro-structurally as a reaction to ideational threats.  
By utilizing this model to analyze the origins of Chinese nationalism and its influence on two important 
(and closely related) issues in Chinese foreign policy – reunification with Taiwan and Sino-US relations – 
it was hoped that some conclusions could be drawn regarding the conflict propensity of Chinese 
nationalism (assumed by many to be very high), and of nationalist states in general.  Although the 
conclusions made here are not meant to offer a final, definitive answer to the question of nationalist 
conflict, they do help to bring some clarity to an important issue and, perhaps more importantly, lay the 
groundwork for further study. 
As noted in Chapter 4, the application of the theoretical model developed here requires answering 
three essential questions.  First, is nationalism constituted by the international system?  This is vital to 
determining the validity of the approach; if nationalism is not constituted by the international system, then 
the reactive model outlined by the author will yield few answers to the central question of nationalism and 
state behavior.  Second, if nationalism is constituted by the international system, how does ‘national’ 
identity differ from other types of state identity in terms of the interests associated with it, and what 
impact do these ‘national’ interests have on state behavior?  Analysis of the macro-structural dimension 
of nationalism (i.e., nationalism as type identity) will make it possible to establish the basic parameters of 
a state’s foreign policy – what it wants and why.  Finally, to what extent does nationalism manifest itself 
as a reaction to ideational threats, and how might this set the stage for interstate conflict?  Analysis of the 
micro-structural dimension of nationalism (i.e., nationalism as role identity) will provide a glimpse of 
how prone such an ideational security dilemma may be to escalation.  The analysis of Chinese 
nationalism has provided some important answers to these questions. 
First, the examination of the origins and development of Chinese nationalism conducted in 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that, at least in the China case, nationalism is indeed constituted by the 
international system.  Prior to its contact with the West, China was at the center of a Confucian system of 
international relations that was based on fundamentally different norms from those of the European states 
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 system on which the modern international system is based.  Such norms did not involve the recognition of 
sovereign states (much less the idea of nation-states) and established political legitimacy on the 
acceptance of Confucian practices.  For China’s neighbors, this acceptance meant the sending of tribute 
missions intended to demonstrate recognition of the superiority of Chinese civilization.  China might thus 
be best characterized as a cultural-state that saw itself as coterminous with civilization, not a nation-state 
limited by legal boundaries or ethnic differences.  Despite the rise and fall of Chinese dynasties, and the 
occasional conquest of China by stronger neighbors, the basic character of this system remained 
essentially the same for centuries. 
It was the arrival of the Western powers that eventually forced a fundamental change in China’s 
identity, and consequently in its relations with the rest of the world.  The Confucian system that China 
had developed was incompatible with the Western system of sovereign states, and the West’s 
technological and military superiority gave them a distinct edge that forced China to adapt.  This 
adaptation was slow and painful.  It took decades of failed reform efforts, and the eventual importation of 
Western ideas, for China to learn how to operate in a much changed world.  Critically, this involved more 
than just changes in China’s policies, but changes in its identity and the interests associated with it.  China 
had to discard its conception of itself as a universal empire and learn how to be a modern state, and a 
nation.  Although domestic political debates certainly had an important impact on the specific dynamics 
of China’s adaptation to the West, it was system-level forces that led to Chinese acceptance of the 
national idea, making China a perfect example of Rodney Hall’s second sequence of transformational 
logic linking system change and identity change.  While this is not a surprising conclusion for China 
scholars who have long recognized the role that the West played in the development of Chinese 
nationalism, it does lend critical validity to the author’s decision to use constructivism to analyze 
nationalism’s impact on state behavior and offers an important lesson for scholars of nationalism that 
international politics cannot be ignored when discussing its nature and origins.  It also helps to connect 
this oft-told story to broader currents in international politics. 
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 Since Chinese nationalism was indeed constituted by the international system, this leads us to the 
second question – how have changes in China’s type identity, from cultural-state to nation-state, affected 
the definition of its interests regarding Taiwan, and what does this change in interests tell us about the 
conflict propensity of Chinese nationalism?  This actually involves three sub-questions.  First, have 
Chinese interests regarding Taiwan changed over time?  If its transition from cultural-state to nation-state 
has not influenced China’s interests, then further analysis would be unnecessary.  Yet as the discussion in 
Chapter 6 clearly demonstrates, China’s interest in Taiwan has indeed changed dramatically, from being 
‘beyond the pale’ of Chinese civilization to being integral to China’s territorial and national integrity.  
Despite its proximity to the Chinese mainland, there was little official interest in the island for centuries, 
either in terms of trade, territorial aggrandizement, or incorporation into the tribute system.  Its relatively 
low level of political development made Taiwan inconsequential in the eyes of Confucian scholar-
bureaucrats, regardless of any potential value it may have had for trade and security.  It was not until the 
17th century that China grudgingly began to pay attention to the island.  Even then, the determination that 
Taiwan was important to China was the result of a slow learning process as it responded to increasing 
threats from the Western powers.  Taiwan did not receive its current status as a vital interest until well 
into the 20th century. 
Given the fact that Chinese interests regarding Taiwan have indeed changed over time, the next 
question is – why did this change occur?  Two explanations present themselves.  One is that China simply 
adapted to changes in its strategic environment by reevaluating the importance of Taiwan to its security.  
The other is that changes in the social structure of the system in which China was embedded forced it to 
redefine its identity, and therefore its interests.  The former involves simple learning that only affects the 
way in which China pursues its exogenously-defined interests – i.e., how does China achieve its interests 
better given changing circumstances?  The latter involves complex learning that affects the way in which 
China defines its identity and its interests – i.e., how does a change in identity alter what China wants in 
the first place?  On the surface, China’s changing concern for Taiwan could certainly be seen as simply a 
response to changes in its strategic environment.  The initial incorporation of Taiwan into the Chinese 
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 empire in 1684 was prompted by practical security considerations, as was the final acceptance of full 
administrative responsibility for the eastern half of the island in 1887.  New challenges thus forced China 
to reconsider how to effectively guarantee its own security.  Without them, Taiwan might have remained 
on the periphery.   
However, while this explanation is not incorrect, it fails to tell the whole story.  What it does not 
fully account for is the slowness of the Chinese response, the degree of political resistance involved, or 
the lack of communication and understanding between the various parties.  While serious debate over a 
proper course of action might be expected for any state struggling with new challenges to its security, 
China’s attempt to fit its response within the traditional pattern of Confucian norms, even after it should 
have become clear that those norms were failing in the face of Western pressure, makes any argument that 
China was simply seeking better ways to pursue its established interests highly suspect.  Even if one takes 
into account the fact that conservative elites had little desire to weaken their own political positions, the 
pattern of China’s response and the difficulty it had communicating its position to other actors would 
seem to make more sense if we treat its identity and interests as in flux.  Furthermore, the fact that these 
changes in China’s interests regarding Taiwan occurred at the same time that China was attempting to 
recast itself as a modern nation-state cannot be just a coincidence.  Thus, while security concerns may 
have provided the impetus for change, those changes should not be narrowly construed as China’s search 
for better ways to pursue the same interests. 
Finally, what does this suggest about the conflict propensity of Chinese nationalism?  
Nationalism, expressed macro-structurally as a type identity, sets the basic parameters of state behavior 
by helping to define its interests.  In the case of China, its transition from cultural-state to nation-state led 
it to redefine its relationship to territory so as to make the issue of territorial integrity a vital interest.  At 
the same time, the development of Chinese nationalism led it to interpret its territorial losses as a legacy 
of national humiliation, making territorial integrity not just a matter of state security, but of national pride.  
This macro-structural change in China’s identity helps to explain the importance of Taiwan to Chinese 
national interests and its willingness to use force in pursuit of that interest – it is the last major piece of 
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 territory that remains to be reclaimed, one that is particularly symbolic of China’s suffering at the hands 
of foreign powers.  Although economic and security interests must certainly be factored in, it is the 
historical legacy it represents that gives the Taiwan issue its substance. 
However, while the macro-structural change in China’s identity helps to explain why Taiwan is a 
vital Chinese interest, it tells us relatively little about how China is likely to pursue that interest.  It is 
clear that China’s past actions toward Taiwan have been quite varied, oscillating between bellicosity and 
conciliation.  Indeed, at the same time that nationalism has seemed to be on the rise in China, China 
appears to have taken a decidedly more moderate approach to the problem of Taiwan.  As such, one can 
conclude that the parameters established by a state’s type identity are relatively broad, allowing for a 
great deal of variation depending on specific circumstances.  This makes sense, given the fact that there 
may be numerous ways for a state to achieve any particular goal.  Thus, while Chinese nationalism and 
the ‘national’ interests associated with it may create the potential for conflict over Taiwan, it does not 
necessarily make such a conflict more likely.  The macro-structural dimension of nationalism determines 
what a state is willing to fight for, not under what circumstances it will do so. 
This brings us to the third and final question that this dissertation has sought to address – namely, 
given the parameters set by China’s identity as a nation-state, how do the dynamics of nationalist role 
formation influence Chinese foreign policy?  Again, this actually involves a number of sub-questions.  
First, does a role conflict exist between the United States and China?  The discussion of post-Tiananmen 
Sino-US relations in Chapter 7 makes clear that such a role conflict does in fact exist.  The Chinese 
crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in 1989 caused the United States to redefine the counter-role 
it sought to project onto China – from the ‘liberal China myth’ to the image of China as a failed 
modernizer.  US policy toward China followed suit, with attempts to put various economic and political 
sanctions on China, as well as a growing concern that China would become a threat to US interests in the 
Asia-Pacific.  This counter-role conflicted with the great power role that China sought to enact, and 
arguably did so at a particularly sensitive time.  Just as China seemed to be reaping the rewards of reform, 
its status was called into question by the United States which saw China less as a great power to be 
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 respected than as a potentially dangerous rogue to be contained.  In essence, it was this incompatibility in 
the roles that each sought to pursue in their relations with each other that helps to explain the deterioration 
of Sino-US relations in the 1990s. 
Of course, one could argue that a role conflict is not necessary to explain such a deterioration.  
Even if one discards the suggestion that it was all but inevitable due to the systemic changes that came 
with the end of the Cold War, one could legitimately question whether the issue of conflicting roles would 
offer any greater explanatory power than simply considering the concrete actions taken by the United 
States that may have conflicted with Chinese interests.  After all, one would not have to analyze roles and 
counter-roles to recognize the potential for US economic and political sanctions to produce a negative 
reaction from China.  While this is no doubt true, it does not tell the whole story.  Looking at US actions, 
even in the aggregate, without considering their broader context risks obscuring the underlying substance 
of those actions, and the true nature of the Chinese response.  China was reacting to more than just threats 
to its material interests; it was reacting to threats to its place in the world – the role it sought to play as a 
newly prosperous nation-state – and defined the nature of US threats in those terms. 
Given that a Sino-US role conflict did exist, was the rise of China’s ‘new nationalism’ a result of 
it or something else?  The discussion of China’s ‘new nationalism’ makes it clear that the deterioration of 
Sino-US relations was a major factor in the renewal of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s.  Although the 
CCPs decision to rebuild the party’s legitimacy in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square by launching the 
patriotic education campaign cannot be discounted as an important factor in the rise of nationalism, it is 
difficult to see how such a campaign could have been successful if it had not been able to tap into latent 
feelings of nationalism in the public and had not been corroborated by US actions.  Party officials may 
have taken advantage of the situation, but it was US policy – economic sanctions to force American 
standards of human rights, attempts to prevent China from hosting the Olympics, treating China as a 
dangerous threat to regional security, continued support for Taiwan – that turned much of the Chinese 
public against the United States.  Thus, while one cannot ignore the dynamics of domestic politics, 
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 Chinese nationalism must be properly seen as a reaction to US threats, not so much to China’s physical 
security, but to its identity. 
Finally, if Chinese nationalism is a reaction to US threats to China’s identity, could it lead to an 
escalation in Sino-US tensions, and possibly even to a Sino-US conflict?  On the surface, this certainly 
seems possible.  At a minimum, the development of Chinese nationalism as a reaction to US pressures 
might indicate a higher likelihood of a Sino-US conflict in the sense that it highlights an incompatibility 
of interests.1  The existence of a role conflict may increase the likelihood of misunderstanding the other’s 
intentions, thereby making it more difficult for either to see past their differences.  This could be 
reinforced as nationalist sentiments make China more sensitive to perceived slights.  It is even possible 
that this could grow into a long-term rivalry, possibly even into a new Cold War.  Indeed, it might be 
suggested that the deterioration of Sino-US relations in the 1990s provides evidence of this.  William 
Overholt has argued that 
the emergence of the Second Cold War is increasingly difficult to reverse because it is 
emerging not just in national policies but also in the hearts of the American and Chinese 
peoples.  Citizens of the United States increasingly see China as dangerous, aggressive, 
and militaristic.  Citizens of China see the United States as determined to use any means 
necessary to suppress China’s revival.  In both cases, these perceptions are close to the 
opposite of the truth.  But the perceptions go very deep.2
 
The deterioration of Sino-US relations might thus be characterized as an ideational security dilemma – the 
result of each side seeking to safeguard its own identity, and causing a reaction that further threatens it – 
that has produced a downward spiral of increasingly sour, if not necessarily hostile, relations. 
The rise of a new Cold War between the United States and China would certainly make China 
more prone to conflict with the United States than if their relationship was characterized by mutual 
respect and trust.  Yet conflicts of interest, misunderstanding, mistrust, and even long-term rivalry do not 
mean that China will necessarily become more aggressive or likely to initiate a military conflict.  Indeed, 
                                                 
1 Charles Gochman has defined interstate conflict as “when decision makers of states perceive and pronounce that 
their interests or the interests of their states are incompatible with those of other states.”  See Charles S. Gochman, 
“The Evolution of Disputes,” in The Process of War:  Advancing the Scientific Study of War, eds. Stuart A. Bremer 
and Thomas R. Cusack  (Amsterdam:  Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1995), 64. 
2 Cited in Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China:  Modernization, Identity, and International 
Relations  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999), 4. 
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 as the Taiwan Strait crisis demonstrates, even within the context of heightened nationalist feelings and a 
potential challenge to China’s national interests, China’s behavior has remained relatively restrained.  Of 
course, one could argue that this is largely due to the willingness of the United States to confront Chinese 
provocations and force China to blink in the face of superior capabilities.  Yet even if this were true, it 
would tend to discredit the view that nationalism drives states to mindless aggression in pursuit of their 
‘national’ interests.  The fact that China can subordinate nationalist feelings to broader interests, such as 
maintaining a stable security environment by avoiding conflict with the United States in order to focus on 
modernization, indicates that Chinese nationalism is not as destabilizing as many have feared.  A Sino-US 
conflict cannot be entirely ruled out in the future, particularly in the event of a significant shift in the 
balance of power, or if China were backed into a corner by a formal declaration of Taiwanese 
independence.  However, while Chinese nationalism might be seen as setting the stage for such a conflict 
by contributing to the breakdown of Sino-US relations, it would not necessarily be a direct cause of such 
a conflict. 
Furthermore, the fact that Chinese nationalism is largely a reaction to the United States means 
that it is likely to be highly variable depending on US policy.  Another shift in American attitudes towards 
China could result in a reduction in outward expressions of Chinese nationalism (at least directed at the 
United States).  This might arguably have already begun.  Kurt Campbell has suggested that “the horror 
of September 11 and the establishment of a new enemy…that posed a greater ‘clear and present’ danger 
to the American homeland cast China in a new light for many Americans.  Instead of being the biggest 
threat of the United States, China overnight became an indispensable partner in the U.S.-led war on 
terrorism.”3  Although he recognizes that this is likely to be only a temporary change in US priorities, 
Campbell also correctly notes that it “presents an important window of opportunity”4 for both sides to 
alleviate the tensions that built up in their relationship after Tiananmen Square.  Even prior to 9/11, 
Jianwei Wang noted that the complex nature of their mutual images offered a limited window for Sino-
                                                 
3 Kurt Campbell, “Images and U.S. Strategic Thinking on China,” in China in the American Political Imagination, 
ed. Carola McGiffert  (Washington:  The CSIS Press, 2003), 3-4. 
4 Ibid., 4. 
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 American cooperation, suggesting that “American moral objections to the Chinese regime probably will 
not eliminate China as a possible partner in international affairs, and Chinese nationalist resentment of 
American ‘hegemonism’ may still allow the Chinese to absorb American political and cultural values on 
their own terms.”5  Thus, the reactive nature of Chinese nationalism indicates that China’s propensity for 
nationalist conflict is highly dependent on the state of its relationship with the United States.  As Yuan 
Peng suggests, “if the United States treats China as a partner, China will reciprocate and Chinese people 
will embrace America.  If the United States treats China as a threat, Chinese perceptions of the United 
States will turn sharply negative.”6
What then does the China case suggest about the impact of nationalism on state behavior in 
general?  First, in those cases where international politics plays a significant role in the constitution of 
national identity, it is likely that nationalism’s influence on a state’s behavior will be heavily dependent 
on the social relationship that exists between the state in question and any significant Other(s) with which 
it interacts.  Whether this would apply to all, or even most, states must remain an open question.  The 
importance of domestic politics in the social construction of national identity cannot be discounted in any 
case, and in some cases might be far more important than international politics.  However, given the fact 
that the national idea has become an integral part of the international system’s social structure, it seems 
equally unlikely that international politics could be completely ignored, even in those cases where 
nationalism seems to be largely the product of domestic politics.  Further study will be necessary to begin 
mapping out the relative importance of international and domestic factors in the construction of 
nationalism more fully.  However, the China case highlights the importance of taking international 
politics seriously in any analysis of nationalism.   
This has important implications for our understanding of nationalism and nationalist conflict.  If 
all nationalism is constituted to one degree or another by international forces, then we can consider 
                                                 
5 Jianwei Wang, Limited Adversaries:  Post-Cold War Sino-American Mutual Images  (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 203. 
6 Yuan Peng, “Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Attitudes,” in China in the American Political Imagination, ed. Carola 
McGiffert  (Washington:  The CSIS Press, 2003), 111. 
296 
 nationalism to be inherently reactionary.  It may exist below the surface in any state that has adopted that 
form of state identity (i.e., banal nationalism), but the visible manifestations of nationalism will likely be 
the result of outside pressures.7  This helps to explain why nationalism is so often associated with conflict; 
it can be easily ignored, or even believed to not exist, until it is brought to the surface by increasing 
tensions.  However, it would also indicate that, as a cause of interstate conflict, the factor of nationalism is 
largely indirect.  Nationalism may help to define the interests that a state is willing to use force to defend, 
and thus may set the stage for conflict by outlining the potential for a serious conflict of interests.  But it 
does not determine what actions will be used to defend those interests; this is likely to be highly 
dependent on circumstances.  Nationalism may also help to reinforce poor relations between states by 
fueling a conflict spiral as each state seeks to defend its own identity at the expense of the other.  But it is 
not the cause of poor relations; it is rather the effect of a role conflict.  Thus, it might be suggested that 
nationalism is not so much a cause of conflict as a product of it.  It could certainly add fuel to the fire by 
pushing a state to take actions that would cause another state to respond in kind, but nationalism does not 
necessarily cause interstate conflict as is so often assumed. 
The conclusion that nationalism does not necessarily cause interstate conflict, and indeed that 
nationalism is largely a reaction to ideational threats, is a critical one.  Not only does it require us to 
rethink our understanding of nationalist conflict from a scholarly point of view, it also forces us to 
consider the possible repercussions that the failure to properly understand the international dimension of 
nationalism may have on international politics itself.  Yongnian Zheng argues that “mis-perceptions about 
China’s nationalism and its impact on international politics have only resulted in strong nationalist 
reaction in China….Indeed, the mis-perception of Chinese nationalism in the West is likely to become a 
major force that pushes China’s nationalism towards more aggression.”8  In other words, the failure of 
scholars and policy-makers alike to understand the reactionary nature of nationalism may have 
                                                 
7 One could broaden this to include ethnic conflict within states by relaxing the criterion for ‘outside.’ 
8 Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China, 9 
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 contributed to the very nationalism that so many China watchers have warned about.  If nothing else, this 
highlights the critical importance of making nationalism a major subject of study in IR theory. 
In addition to these conclusions about nationalism and nationalist conflict, another important 
conclusion can be made from this study.  The question of whether material power or social norms and 
identity are more important in explaining state behavior has driven the debate between realists and 
constructivists for well over a decade. Yet this study has demonstrated what a number of scholars have 
begun to realize – neither power nor identity alone can adequately address many of the important issues in 
international relations.  Realism does not fully explain the dramatic changes that China experienced 
during the latter half of the 19th century as it sought to come to terms with the West.  The constructivist 
focus on social norms and identity provides a better explanation of events, and thus allows the Chinese 
experience to be more fully integrated into the study of IR.  At the same time, however, the constructivist 
perspective fails to address a key point – the changes in China’s identity were forced on it by the superior 
material capabilities of the West.  Understanding China’s absorption into the international system requires 
us to set aside the tendency to treat realism and constructivism as entirely incompatible approaches, and 
instead develop a more synthetic approach that combines realist concerns for power and constructivist 
concerns for identity.  Thus, while the main point of this dissertation was to address the problem of 
nationalist conflict, an important secondary conclusion is the need to treat realist-constructivism as a 
valuable addition to IR theory. 
Finally, it should be noted once again that while this study represents an important step toward a 
better understanding of nationalism and nationalist conflict, it is not intended to offer definitive answers 
to the question of whether nationalism makes states more prone to engage in interstate conflict.  Further 
study will be necessary to flesh out the propositions made by the author.  The case of China examined 
here is but one case; other cases may provide critical support to the concept of reactive nationalism, or 
could identify critical flaws.  While such cases will be left for future study, it would be useful to identify 
some of the possible directions that such studies could take.  Of course, one direction would be to apply 
the same reactive model of nationalism to other states in order to determine the extent to which 
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 nationalism in those states is a reaction to outside forces, and how it influences their behaviors.  However, 
another important contribution could be made by developing the China case in greater detail, particularly 
by examining multiple international sources of Chinese nationalism.  While the United States has 
certainly been a primary object of China’s reactionary nationalism, Japan has also prompted nationalist 
reactions.  Indeed, one could look at cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan as a separate role 
conflict.  Each of these relationships would be important to examine individually, but it would also be 
important to examine how multiple interactions affect nationalism and state behavior.  Regardless of what 
direction future research on this topic takes, the reactive model of nationalism developed here represents 
an important first step in bridging the gap between nationalism and international relations. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
Ye Jianying’s “Nine Principles” 
 
1. In  order to bring an end to the unfortunate separation of the Chinese nation as early as possible, 
we propose that talks be held between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang of 
China on  a reciprocal basis so that the two parties will co-operate for the third time to accomplish 
the great cause of national reunification.  The two sides may first send people to meet for an 
exhaustive exchange of views. 
 
2. It is the urgent desire of the people of all nationalities on both sides of the straits to communicate 
with each other, reunite with their families and relatives, develop trade and increase mutual 
understanding.  We propose that the two sides make arrangements to facilitate the exchange of 
mails, trade, air and shipping services, family reunions and visits by relatives and tourists as well 
as academic, cultural and sports exchanges, and reach an agreement thereupon. 
 
3. After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special 
administrative region and it can retain its armed forces.  The Central Government will not 
interfere with local affairs on Taiwan. 
 
4. Taiwan’s current socio-economic system will remain unchanged, so will its way of life and its 
economic and cultural relations with foreign countries.  There will be no encroachment on the 
proprietary rights and lawful right of inheritance over private property, houses, land and 
enterprises, or on foreign investments. 
 
5. People in authority and representative personages of various circles in Taiwan may take up posts 
of leadership in national political bodies and participate in running the state. 
 
6. When Taiwan’s local finance is in difficulty, the Central Government may subsidize it for the 
circumstances. 
 
7. For people of all nationalities and public figures of various circles in Taiwan who wish to come 
and settle on the mainland, it is guaranteed that proper arrangements will be made for them, that 
there will be no discrimination against them, and that they will have the freedom of entry and 
exit. 
 
8. Industrialists and businessmen in Taiwan are welcome to invest and engage in various economic 
undertakings on the mainland, and their legal rights, interests and profits are guaranteed. 
 
9. The reunification of the motherland is the responsibility of all Chinese.  We sincerely welcome 
people of all nationalities, public figures of all circles and all mass organizations in Taiwan to 
300 
 make proposals and suggestions regarding affairs of state through various channels and in various 
ways.9 
 
                                                 
9 Ye Jianying, “Chairman Ye Jianying’s Elaborations on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to Motherland and 
Peaceful Reunification,” Beijing Review, 5 October 1981, 10-11. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
Jiang Zemin’s “Eight Points” 
 
1. Adhering to the principle of one China is the basis and prerequisite for peaceful reunification.  
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must never be allowed to suffer division.  We must 
resolutely oppose any statement and action for creating ‘the independence of Taiwan’; and we 
must also resolutely oppose the propositions to ‘split the country and rule under separate 
regimes,’ ‘two Chinas over a certain period of time,’ etc., which are contrary to the principle of 
one China. 
 
2. We do not have objections to the development of nongovernmental economic and cultural ties 
between Taiwan and other countries.  According to the principle of one China and the characters 
of international organizations concerned, Taiwan has joined the Asian Development Bank, the 
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum and other international economical organizations in 
the name of ‘Chinese Taibei.’  However, we oppose Taiwan’s activities in ‘expanding its living 
space internationally,’ aimed at creating ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan.’  All patriotic 
compatriots in Taiwan and other people of insight understand that instead of solving problems, 
such activities can only help the forces working for the ‘independence of Taiwan,’ and undermine 
the progress of peaceful reunification.  Only after peaceful reunification is accomplished can our 
Taiwan compatriots and other Chinese truly and fully share the international dignity and honor 
attained by our great motherland. 
 
3. It has been our consistent stand to hold negotiations with Taiwan authorities on the peaceful 
unification of the motherland.  Representatives of all political parties and groups from both sides 
of the Taiwan Straits can be invited to participate in the negotiations for peaceful 
reunification….I suggest that, as a first step, negotiations should be held and an agreement 
reached on officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides under the principle that 
there is only one China.  On this basis, the two sides may bear responsibilities together, maintain 
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as plan the future development of the 
relations between the two sides separated by the strait.  As regards the name, place and form of 
these political talks, a solution acceptable to both sides can certainly be found so long as 
consultations on an equal footing can be held at an early date. 
 
4. We shall try our best to achieve the peaceful reunification of China since Chinese should not fight 
Chinese.  We do not promise not to use force.  If used, force will not be directed against our 
compatriots in Taiwan, but against the foreign forces who intervene in China’s reunification and 
go in for ‘the independence of Taiwan.’  We are fully confident that our compatriots in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Macao and those residing overseas would understand our principled position. 
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 5. Challenged with world economic development in the 21st century, we shall spare no effect to 
develop economic exchange and cooperation between the two sides separated by the Taiwan 
Straits so that both sides enjoy a flourishing economy and the whole Chinese nation benefits.  We 
maintain that political disagreements should not impede economic cooperation between the two 
sides of the Taiwan Straits.  We shall continue, for an extended period, to implement a policy of 
encouraging Taiwanese investment on the mainland and carry out the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Protecting Investments by Taiwan Compatriots.  In any circumstances, we 
shall protect all legitimate rights and interests of Taiwanese investors in a down-to-earth way and 
continually encourage exchange and contacts across the Taiwan Straits which promote mutual 
understanding.  Since the direct links for postal, air and shipping services and trade between the 
two sides are the objective requirements for their economic development and contacts in various 
fields, and since they are in the interests of the people on both sides, it is absolutely necessary to 
adopt practical measures to speed up the establishment of such direct links.  Efforts should be 
made to promote negotiations on certain specific issues between the two sides.  We are in favor of 
conducting this kind of negotiations on the basis of reciprocity and mutual benefit and signing 
nongovernmental agreements on the protection of the rights and interests of industrialists and 
business people from Taiwan. 
 
6. The splendid culture of 5,000 years created by the sons and daughters of all ethnic groups of 
China has become ties keeping the entire Chinese people close at heart and constitutes an 
important basis for the peaceful reunification of the motherland.  People on both sides should 
jointly inherit and carry forward the fine traditions of the culture. 
 
7. The 21 million Taiwan people, whether born there or in other provinces, are Chinese and our own 
flesh and blood.  The lifestyles of our Taiwan compatriots and their desire to be masters of their 
own country should be fully respected.  All their legitimate rights and interests must be protected.  
All relevant departments in our Party and government, including agencies stationed abroad, must 
improve their relations with our Taiwan compatriots, listen to their views and requrests, show 
concern and take care of their interests and do everything they can to help solve their problems.  
We hope that Taiwan Island enjoys social stability, economic growth and affluence.  We also 
hope that all political parties in Taiwan will adopt a sensible, forward-looking and constructive 
attitude and promote the expansion of relations between the two sides.  We welcome all political 
parties and personages from different walks of life in Taiwan [to] exchange opinions with us on 
the relations between the two sides and on peaceful reunification.  Their visits to the mainland are 
also welcome.  All personages from various circles who have contributed to the reunification of 
China will go down in history for their deeds. 
 
8. We welcome leaders of Taiwan to visit the mainland in their proper status.  We also are ready to 
accept invitations to visit Taiwan.  We may discuss state affairs or exchange opinions on certain 
issues first.  Even a simple visit to the side will be useful.  The affairs of Chinese people should 
be handled by us, something that does not take an international occasion to accomplish.  People 
of both sides of the Taiwan Straits eagerly look forward to meeting each other and being able to 
freely exchange visits.10 
 
                                                 
10 Jiang Zemin, “Jiang Zemin’s Eight-Point Proposal,” Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council Website. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
Lee Teng-hui’s “Six Points” 
 
1. The fact that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan have been ruled by two political entities in no 
way subordinate to each other had led to a state of division between the two sides and separate 
governmental jurisdictions, hence, the issue of national unification….Only by facing up to this 
reality can both sides build greater consensus on the ‘one China’ issue and at the earliest possible 
date. 
 
2. In Taiwan, we have long taken upon ourselves the responsibility for safeguarding and furthering 
traditional Chinese culture, and advocate that culture by the basis for exchanges between both 
sides to help promote the nationalistic sentiment for living together in prosperity and to foster a 
strong sense of brotherliness… 
 
3. We will continue to assist the mainland in developing its economy and upgrading the living 
standards of its people based upon our existing investments and trade relations.  As for trade and 
transportation links with the mainland, the agencies concerned have to make in-depth evaluations 
as well as careful plans since these are very complicated issues… 
 
4. I have indicated on several occasions that if leaders on both sides could meet with each other on 
international occasions in a natural manner, this could alleviate the political confrontation 
between both sides and foster a harmonious atmosphere for developing future relations…It is our 
firm belief that the more international organizations both sides join on an equal footing, the more 
favorable the environment will become for the growth of bilateral relations and for the process of 
peaceful unification… 
 
5. We believe the mainland authorities should demonstrate their goodwill by publicly renouncing 
the use of force and refrain from making any military move that might arouse anxiety or 
suspicion on this side of the Taiwan Strait, thus paving the way for formal negotiations between 
both sides to put an end to the state of hostility. 
 
6. Hong Kong and Macau are integral parts of the Chinese nation…Post-1997 Hong Kong and post-
1999 Macau are naturally a matter of great concern to us.  In this regard, the ROC government 
has reiterated its determination to maintain normal contact with Hong Kong and Macau, further 
participate in affairs related to Hong Kong and Macau, and provide better services to our 
compatriots there…11
                                                 
11 Cited in Shirley A. Kan, “China/Taiwan:  Evolution of the ‘One China’ Policy – Key Statements from 
Washington, Beijing, and Taipei,” in Taiwan-China:  A Most Ticklish Standoff, ed. Adam W. Clarke  (Huntington:  
Novinka Books, 2001), 96-7. 
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